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BY

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**VOLUME XVI**

OF

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# BOOK I.

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## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.



# THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

## CHAPTER I.

### INTRODUCTION.

EVER since Luther broke the authority of the church of the Middle Ages, which had been so long dominant in every sphere of human thought and action, a movement, intellectual and spiritual, has been in progress, which permits itself neither to be permanently checked by restrictions imposed from without nor limited by arbitrarily drawn bounds. Once set free from implicit faith in traditional authority, the human mind began to put to the test all that came within its ken, and to look no longer to revelation for an answer to the questions constantly arising, but to the verdicts of its own judgment. Philosophy burst asunder the fetters of dogma, and took possession of the throne from which it had driven theology. As men's attention was directed more and more to the natural, instead of to the supernatural, new fields, before undreamed of, disclosed themselves for investigation. With unparalleled boldness and certitude science traced out for itself the immutable principles that were to guide it for all time. No sooner had Newton demonstrated that one rule of law pervaded the universe, than the various sciences began to emerge from their isolation and to unite in one all-comprehensive system. English thinkers were the first to apply, with unsparing rigor, the newly discovered criticism to religion as well as to the state, and, in substituting easily understood conceptions for the unfathomable mystery of faith, became the founders of a natural religion; while, in setting up the inherent and inalienable rights of man in opposition to the divine right of kings, they inaugurated a new era in the political development of mankind.

This mighty and universal movement seemed, in the eighteenth century, to strive to recover by redoubled ardor the ground which it had lost in the seventeenth. What had hitherto been only theory began to be converted into practice. A consciousness of strength, never felt before, permeated the spirits of men. Now that they had passed the years of

childhood, religion seemed to many a guide to be dismissed, that they might follow only the light of reason. To the people of Germany, amid the fields covered by the ruins of their political life, a literature began to unfold itself, unwarmed, indeed, by the beams of princely favor, but having its roots deep down in the native vitality of the race, and worthy to take its place by the side of the literatures of the most advanced nationalities. The noble conception of religious toleration came to antagonize the desire for supremacy of the Roman, as well as of every other, church; the night of fanaticism and superstition began to recede before the dawn of science and morality, and the claims of privilege to melt away before the mild breath of humanity. Among the monarchies of Europe it was the youngest and the smallest that first ventured to realize in practice the modern ideas. In sharpest contrast to the self-idolatry of Louis XIV., the Hohenzollerns transmuted princely power into duty toward state and people. Frederick the Great was the founder of "enlightened absolutism," and soon the example of the great Prussian so wrought on princes and statesmen—in Roman as well as in German lands, in Catholic as in Protestant—that the dawn of a new era announced itself throughout all Europe.

Step by step, and, though by no means uniformly, yet without pause, this process of discarding the outworn and replacing it by the new seemed to progress. But, ere the century reached its close, the political world of Europe was driven from its path of peaceful development. The shock that produced this catastrophe came from France. In this land the claims of the new era were so irreconcilably antagonistic to the constitution of the state, of the church, and of society, that the attempt at reform was here scarcely begun before it ruined or annihilated all existing conditions.

The original causes leading to this issue reach back to the time when the French monarchy, while establishing national unity, absorbed all other political powers into a pure absolutism. After the pride of the feudal nobility had been humbled by Richelieu and compelled to submit implicitly to the authority of the monarch, Louis XIV. was able to make his personal will the supreme and sole law of the land. A court of unexampled splendor, in which the sacred person of the king was separated from every other mortal, gave to this monarchy almost the semblance of a theocracy. One thing, however, this despot did not understand: namely, how to imitate other distinguished princes in being not only the ruler, but also the father of his people, and in blending his own interests with theirs and justifying his assumption of the conduct of every matter of supreme importance by the results he attained for them. Absolutism, in



his case, by surrounding itself with the halo of a deity, carried in itself its own punishment, not only because it was subject to arrogance, arbitrary caprice, and selfishness, but also because, resting, as it did, on no legal foundation, it appeared in the light of a perpetual usurpation to all who found themselves robbed of their share of power.

Yet this apparently unlimited autoeracy was hemmed in and hampered on all sides by the claims and privileges of other powers. The independence of the church remained almost untouched. While the States-General had not been summoned to meet since 1614, and while not even ten of the nobles could assemble to consult regarding their interests without express permission of the king, the clergy continued to hold regular convocations, and drew from their landed property and tithes more than 200,000,000 livres a year. Yet the nobility still maintained an eminent position, and this not so much because, in some provinces, they, in the form of provincial estates, still retained the power of ratifying and allotting new taxes and of voting gifts to the king, as well as a certain measure of self-government, but rather because they had become changed in their nature. Ever since they had been converted by Louis XIV. into a court nobility, living in close contact with the sovereign, they drew without ceasing from this source of grace and favors, of gifts and pensions, and were never weary in improving their advantages for the acquisition of ever greater and more lucrative privileges. The nobles had secured for themselves exemption from taxation wholly or partially. From the most oppressive taxes, especially the *taille*, they were entirely free; of the capitation-tax they paid but little, and the more eminent the man, the greater was the indulgence in its exaction. From all employment by the state, save only in the army and diplomacy, the noble held himself far aloof; work implying subordination and obedience was inconsistent with the seigniorial traditions of feudal independence. The provincial governorships, positions of the highest dignity and most lucrative, came to be regarded as prerogatives of the nobles, but the real administration of the offices lay in the hands of *intendants*, commonly plebeian *parvenus*. The *intendant* was in every province the sole and direct executor of the ordinances issuing from the highest department of the government—the royal council—and this made him an object of detestation alike to the nobility, who were thus deprived of their power, and to the common people, who groaned under his tyranny. Through these *intendants* and the officials subordinate to them the central government exercised a tutelary authority over every matter, even the most trivial.

That which the kings of France had won in this way, they cast

away in a great measure in another way. With the view of emancipating themselves from dependence on grants from the estates, they had, since the end of the fifteenth century, created a large number of useless offices for the sole purpose of selling them as hereditary possessions. The higher their needs, the greater became the abuse. Not only was a cumbrous and complicated state machine thus called into existence, but, in order to increase their price, these venal offices were declared to exempt their holders from taxation, so that, alongside of the nobility by birth, there arose an official nobility of the *bourgeoisie*, privileged like the other. Offices and office-holders alike thus came to be regarded as nuisances. In the same way the crown had lost all influence on the composition of the fifteen Parlements, all of whose judicial positions were put up for sale and declared hereditary. In addition to this, from the time when the kings sought the support of the Parlements in their conflict with the feudal nobility and with their aid set aside the States-General, the highest of these courts—the Parlement of Paris—had possessed the privilege that no ordinance should have legal force till it was enrolled in its register. As a consequence the judicial rights of the Parlements were exposed to attacks from the crown. Not only could the king by appearing in person (the so-called “bed of justice”) compel the registration of an obnoxious ordinance, and, by a *lettre de cachet*, imprison any refractory man of quality or troublesome writer for any length of time, but it required only a royal order to withdraw a case from the regular judges and submit it to the *intendant* or to the royal council. To the cities, also, Louis XIV. had sold the right of choosing their magistracies, and, as these bodies developed into irresponsible oligarchies, a door was opened here also to the arbitrary encroachments of the supreme power.

But the nobles were shut out not only from the government, but even from any exercise of authority over the dependents on their estates. This loss of influence naturally rendered residence on their estates distasteful to them and strengthened the magnet that drew them to the court, there to revel in pleasures and honors, and to be fed by the king at the expense of the public. While the English peer dwelt at stated intervals among his tenants and took a personal interest in their welfare, for the French noble there was no harder punishment than to be relegated by the sovereign to his estates. With this estrangement between the nobles and the peasantry was closely associated another main evil that afflicted France—namely, the perversity of its whole system of rural economy. The seigniors were known to their tenants only by the burdens they heaped on them—the *corvée*, the game laws with their rigorous enactments, the right of pasturage, the privilege of keeping myriads of doves, multifarious

imposts in money and natural products, the right to a share of their wine, grain, fruit, etc. Either the lands were tilled by *métayers* who, as a rule, paid the half of their gross produce, and who, owing to the exceeding smallness of their holdings, earned only the scantiest living, or the seigniors' dues were farmed out to bailiffs who treated the peasants with merciless severity. To the nobles the maintenance of every one of their privileges became ever more important in proportion as they became poorer. Nothing contributed more to this economical decadence than the law of primogeniture, by which the eldest son took two-thirds of the estate, and the remaining members only one-third. In time the estates came to be very much subdivided, and, as class prejudice forbade every industrial occupation, no resource was left the aristocrat but new alienations and more rigorous enforcement of his privileges.

The French peasant was all the more sensitive to this system of oppression, in that he enjoyed more freedom than his compeers in other lands, especially in Germany. Serfdom was all but extinct, but the peasant proprietors, owing to the burdens passing with the land, were condemned to lives of penury and misery. To this we have to add the fact that the state imposed the heaviest burdens not on those most able to bear, but on those least able to resist. It relieved the rich and crushed down the poor. The frightful *taille*, the capitation-tax, the tax of a twentieth, the impost in place of the *corvée*, and the indirect taxes swallowed more than half of the peasant's meagre earnings. The *gabelle* compelled, by severe penalties, everyone above seven years of age to purchase annually seven pounds of salt. It was strictly forbidden to manufacture salt from sea-water. These burdens were made all the heavier by the unreasonably merciless mode of exaction. Where the taxes were not farmed out to financial corporations, the quota falling to a province was assessed on the separate communes, every individual of which as his turn came was bound to act as collector, and as such to be answerable for the full amount of the quota, not only with his whole property, but with his personal freedom. The dread that he who was this year the assessor might the next year be himself the assessed made the collectors indulgent to the influential and proportionally severe on the defenceless. With the farmers of the taxes wealthy individuals, and even whole communes, were able to come to terms, so that they no longer had to pay taxes. As if all this were not enough, the state, in the latter part of the reign of Louis XIV., began to burden the village communes with forced labor in the construction of royal highways, and this expedient was found so convenient that it was extended to all possible public works. The government, moreover, in its anxiety to secure

cheap bread for the turbulent masses of the cities, so hampered the husbandman by internal tolls and prohibition of exports, that it became impossible for him to find a fair market for his grain. Ever wider stretches of arable land were left uncultivated; in the most fertile wine districts thousands of acres lay untilled, for the produce did not pay for the labor. In 1750 it was estimated that one-fourth of the arable soil was lying desolate.

In the cities the burdens were so allotted that they fell almost exclusively on the lower classes. The reckless multiplication of guilds, from which the state had made dishonorable profit by selling them special privileges, shut out such artisans as had naught but deft hands from every avenue to advancement. One main inducement that attracted skilled workers from all parts of the land to Paris was that here they could more easily slip from under the yoke of guild-privileges. As in this respect, so in every other, the capital was the polypus which drew to itself the life-blood of the whole body politic. Whatever considered itself among the *élite* in any sphere strove to get there. But the more brightly the light streamed out from Paris, the darker lay the shadows over the rest of the land. The more Paris grew to be the centre of intellectual and material delights, the more intolerable the seigniors and prelates found a sojourn in the secluded, uncultured provinces. The government sought to check this growth of Paris, not comprehending that in it there came to light only a symptom of the evils of their own system and of the whole structure of French society.

A centralized bureaucracy, absolute and arbitrary, capricious, and everywhere honeycombed by favoritism; a system of red tape without principle or consistency; a parasitic nobility; the most iniquitous allotment of burdens and privileges; a people long wont to let its fate for weal or woe be determined from above—such was the condition of France up to 1789. Thoughtful and sympathetic men, like Boisguillebert and Marshal Vauban, already in the beginning of the century, pointed out that the equal distribution of burdens was the only preventive of the evils they saw impending.

The brilliancy and glories of the reign of Louis XIV. hid from view the sores eating deeper and deeper into the body politic; but when the former ceased to dazzle, the latter were more acutely felt. The more the monarchy lost in personal dignity, the more fertile became the government in violent and dishonorable devices for relieving itself from its difficulties, and the more frequently and the more bitterly did the people feel themselves deceived. The regency of Philip, Duke of Orleans, with its boundless prodigality, its cynical irreligiosity, and shameless licen-

tiousness, worked the moral bankruptcy of the monarchy. From the days of Law's fraudulent financial schemes, people had begun to watch public affairs more narrowly, and to criticise them in a more suspicious spirit. During the personal rule of Louis XV., the crown, sullied by the debaucheries of its wearer, became an object of contempt and abhorrence. The shipwreck of France's influence and prestige abroad dealt the finishing blow to all respect for the ancient form of government. The miserably conducted Seven Years' War cost the nation not only its colonies, but its name as a military power.

The more the court of Versailles estranged itself from all consciousness of duty toward the people and state, the nearer to perfection did it carry the art of a social life, in which every natural emotion and every true feeling was choked out by conventional ceremonial and show. The king was the "glass of fashion and mould of form" for all about him. His manner of life left him scarcely an hour a day for business of state, but his *lever* was a solemn act performed with all the scrupulous formality of a church ceremony, and called daily for the services of a hundred nobles. The life of the courtiers and of the higher classes generally, all of whom aped court manners, was similarly one of busy and artificial frivolity, in which studied form took the place of reality; superficial wit, of knowledge; free-thinking, of faith; coquetry, of true passion; and sensual pleasures, of work. Even the children could not be early enough initiated into the art of gallantry. All earnest feeling and sense of duty were banished from these circles "that had nothing to do but play and amuse themselves," and regarded it as an arrangement of nature that the great should enjoy, and all others toil for them. Vice was not merely permissible; it was an accomplishment, and must appear in the garb of elegance. Conjugal love was an offence against *bon ton*; conjugal fidelity, an absurdity. Men and women strove to outdo one another in extravagance and wantonness.

It is vain to ask what the church did to elevate man from this sink of corruption, and to suggest to him higher conceptions of life. The Jesuitical ethics, which were dominant in the court from the days of Louis XIV., had nothing to say against the immorality of society, so long as the supreme claims of the church were left unmolested. Among the prelates of the eighteenth century there is not one who could be placed by the side of a Bossuet, a Massillon, or a Fénelon. Dearly did the French nation pay for its inability to enter upon a renewed spiritual life, as those Germans had done who accepted the Reformation. For the French, religion remained a mere matter of externals, and rapid transitions from unbelief to bigotry or the reverse, or a super-

ficial conjunction of both, had to serve as their equivalents for a true faith.

The office abdicated by the church was eagerly assumed by philosophy. The craving for proof and analysis, once awakened, received a special stimulus from the unnatural conditions existing in the state and society, and led to theoretical investigations to determine what the state and society essentially were, and how they must be constituted so as to be in accord with justice and reason. Writers, without rank, office, or wealth, became not only the most influential but the only politicians of their time; and undertaking, as they did, to guide and to voice public opinion, they maintained for a long time the position occupied in free countries by party leaders.

The only question was, whether these writers possessed the qualifications requisite for such an office. Assuredly not, so far as accurate acquaintance with existing conditions was concerned. Not one of them thought it worth his while to inform himself concerning the actual machinery of government, the wants and wishes, the views and fancies of the people in their various grades, or to seek a remedy for the evils afflicting France through investigation of their causes. From the writings of these men we derive not the most meagre scintilla of information in regard to the real condition of the French people. The schools in which they had studied were those of abstract philosophy and the exact sciences. From these they borrowed their methods and applied them, without modification, to the science of politics. But although natural science had reached its conclusions through experiment and observation, these apostles had this essential defect, that they altogether ignored experience and actual facts. That which was going on before their eyes and taking its place in history refused positively to conform to an abstract formula. They preferred to adopt conclusions based on data evolved by pure ratiocination; that which did not tally with these—and that was pretty much all existing conditions—was simply not worthy of consideration. Their efforts were not directed, therefore, to reforming the government of France where it needed reforming, but to creating an ideal state system which should be applicable everywhere and to all men. They aimed at being not statesmen, but world-reformers. What they lacked in political experience was made up by the incontestability of their faith in themselves and the infallibility of pure reason. Hence the claim of the new teaching to unconditional acceptance and the enthusiasm with which its prophets announced the coming millennium. It was a revelation, and, with the authority of such, it preached the dawn of the age of reason. Hence, too, its enmity toward the church, which set

herself up as an authority over that individual reason to which alone it appealed.

It is perhaps impossible to distinguish between what was characteristic of these men personally, and what of their age. In any case their influence was all the stronger because they gave voice boldly and explicitly to what was floating, indistinct and unexpressed, through the minds of the cultured world generally. To no one does this apply more truly than to Voltaire. No one else has ever exhibited, in a manner so masterly and incisive, the art of condensing into terse and easily carried sentences the grand discoveries and theories of the human intellect. That which made him especially admired was the spirit permeating all that he produced, so fully in accord with the taste, views and wants of that public for which alone he wrote. "*Cedipe*," his earliest drama, owed its enthusiastic reception to its allusions to the circumstances of the times; his "*Henriade*," completed under the impressions left by his involuntary sojourn in England, is a didactic poem on religious toleration; his "*Pucelle*," an effective satire on bigotry and superstition. History served him only to expose, in the name of humanity, what evil had been brought into the world through despotism and priestcraft.

The war which Voltaire began with the weapons of wit and frivolity the younger generation continued with fiercer earnestness. The "*Encyclopaedia*" became the great mine of human knowledge emancipated from the shackles of tradition, whence the streams of materialism and atheism flowed into literature. It is especially strange to see a man like Montesquieu, a parliamentary noble and so one of the privileged, carried away by this current, and in his "*Lettres Persanes*" criticising in a destructive spirit the actual conditions of France. Still more remarkable is it, that his later works, conceived in a more earnest spirit, should have become the armory whence the Revolution took more than one of its most effective weapons. Strictly regarded, his works no more deserve the title of historical writings than do those of Voltaire. The picture which he sketches in his renowned essay, "*On the Causes of the Greatness and of the Decline of the Romans*" ("*Considérations sur les Causes de la Grandeur et de la Décadence des Romains*"), is not so much that of the Roman republic as of a monarchy limited by an estate of notables, i. e., the ideal of a parliament jealous of its political rights. From the profound ignorance of the French public in regard to all matters of history, it was not difficult for an adroit writer to lend to propositions the most erroneous the semblance of accuracy by appealing to so-called historical facts. Thus the doctrine expounded in his "*Spirit of the Laws*" ("*Esprit des Lois*"), in regard to the alleged division, in the

British constitution, of the sovereignty into a law-making, an executive, and a judicial power, found such ready acceptance that it entered into the creed of all well-meaning patriots.

Rousseau was more extreme than either Voltaire or Montesquieu. The fundamental principle of his theory is that man is naturally good and happy, that civilization has made him vicious and wretched, and that through it the present condition of human society is one of progressive degeneration. The only, but the certain, cure for this is a return to nature. His premises were false, and his conclusions, consequently, erroneous; but, nevertheless, they operated to transform the world. His "Émile" delivered childhood from the perverting influence of education and restored to it its paradise. "La Nouvelle Héloïse" reinstated passion in its rights as opposed to the restraints and perversions of conventionality, and opened men's eyes to the beauties of nature. In his "Contrat Social" he shakes the very foundations of the state and society.

Of these three men all the foremost spirits of the France of the next generation were the ardent disciples. Above all, the teaching of Rousseau, ungarnished with wit and satire, but stamped with all the earnestness of deepest conviction and promising a future bright with happiness, sounded to this race like the note of its redemption from the woes of the present. Condorcet looks forward to a time "when the sun will shine only on free men, who recognize no other mistress than reason, when tyrants and their slaves, priests and their blind or hypocritical tools, will be found only in history or on the stage, and when men will trouble themselves about them only in order to watch for the first germs of superstition and tyranny . . . and smother them under the weight of reason." Thus, in contradistinction to the actual state, there sprang up in the fancy the vision of a state in which all should be simple and well-ordered, righteous and in accordance with reason; and this vision, being evolved from premises demonstrated with mathematical precision, claimed unconditional mathematical authority.

Nothing of this announcement reached that portion of the people pining in misery. All this literature had no word for them. It is a remarkable fact that it was precisely the highest of the land—the privileged classes—who most eagerly imbibed the poison that was to be so fatal to themselves. *Blasé* with pleasures and sick with *ennui*, they craved a new excitement. With all the volatility and excitability of the French character, they abandoned themselves to enthusiasm for philanthropy and fraternity, without letting themselves be for a moment disturbed in the comfortable enjoyment of their prerogatives, and without the slightest foreboding that these harmless speculations, these



charming strokes of genius, these sentimental emotions, might one day be changed into political passion and actual deeds. Sweet simplicity, a rural life, and a renunciation of etiquette became the fashion. In reality all this was but a new form of coquetry destitute of any moral effect. The foulness of the world of fashion was whitewashed, but not purged away; all this sentimental interest for the common people—whom they pictured to themselves, after the moving delineations of a Marmontel, a Florian, and a Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, as innocent, sentimental, kind-hearted, and grateful—was nothing but posing and affectation. It never once entered their minds to concern themselves about the actual condition of the wretched lower classes. Precisely in this age of enlightenment the means of public education and culture became less and less with frightful rapidity, and, while “humanity” constituted the question of the day, the cleft between the few thousands of the cultured and the utterly uncultivated masses became wider and wider.

But there were thinkers in France who did not always move in the cloud-land of philosophy, but put to themselves the question how the evils afflicting France could be remedied or lessened by practicable reforms. Among these a place of honor belongs to d'Argenson, a minister dismissed in 1747, and the first nobleman who, on principle, renounced the privileges of his order. In his essay entitled “Reflections on the Government of France,” he submitted propositions in regard to the improvement of agriculture, a new division of the kingdom into departments, and the abolition of the *corvée* with its abuses by giving over to the communes the control of the police, the maintenance of roads, the collection of the *taille*, the care of the poor, and even the administration of justice, so that the nobles would be driven to identify themselves with the nation and forego many of their privileges. Marvelous is his prophetic glance into the future. “Anarchy,” he writes, “advances with giant strides. . . . A philosophical breeze blows hither from England: we hear the murmur of words like ‘Freedom,’ ‘Republic.’ . . . All ranks are dissatisfied—the soldiers disbanded since the peace, the clergy with their prerogatives encroached upon, the Parlements humiliated, the common people crushed down with imposts. . . . Everywhere there is inflammable material. From a riot the transition is easy to a revolt; from a revolt to a revolution.”

About the middle of the century, Gournay, royal *intendant* of commerce, found that the industrial and business life of the people is ruled by laws not less fixed than those of the physical world, and recognized in the violation of these the source of the misery of the working classes as well as of the financial embarrassments of the state. Quesnay, the

king's physician, applied this discovery to agriculture, and, in seeking the cure for its decadence in its liberation from everything that impedes the labors of the husbandman or restricts him in finding a market for his produce, became the founder of the school of the Economists or the Physiocrats. While these men were hailing the approach of "democratic despotism," which was to be omnipotent to recast the forms of society, socialistic theories (Morelly, "Code de la Nature," 1755) came to light, which, in proclaiming the community of property, the right to employment, and the complete absorption of the individual by the state, wished to destroy society itself.

Those who were at the top of society heard nothing of the murmuring at the bottom. Even when danger began to make its first advances toward them, and the new ideas had descended from their *salons* into the parlors of the well-to-do middle classes, now conscious of their strength, their lips continued to overflow with words of rapture over the virtues of the people. But the growing equalization between these two classes in wealth and culture only made the barriers of caste, which the aristocracy still held up, all the more offensive, and discontent over their now unjustifiable prerogatives became blended with rancor against the government, which seemed only capable of working evil. When the minister Maupeou resisted the encroachments of the Parlement, and, banishing its refractory members from Paris, availed himself of the opportunity to make a general reform in the administration of justice, suspicion and dread of despotism saw in his measure only the hand of his patroness, the Countess du Barry, and surrounded the Parlement with the halo of martyrs for freedom. The suspicions seemed justified by the fact that this overthrow of the Parlement put the controller-general of finance, the hated Abbé Terray, in a position to increase the taxes and to perpetrate fraud. He abolished all the salable offices without compensation to the holders, and then, immediately multiplying the number of these positions, he again put them up for sale, to the great gain of the treasury. In such a period of misrule and arbitrariness, the conflict with the Parlement had the effect of spreading the rage for political discussion. Nothing consecrated by age was held in reverence. Paris began to be the headquarters of the opposition to the court of Versailles and to be the exponent of the feelings of the people. It was especially noted that from henceforth women of the highest rank went over to the opposition.

Such were the circumstances of France at the moment when the body of Louis XV. was carried, amid the curses and execrations of the people, to St.-Denis. Wherever men turned their eyes, everything was ripe for collapse, those who were to be the first to fall co-operating in

bringing it about, and every well-meant attempt at reformation only hastening the catastrophe.

Louis XVI., at the age of twenty, brought to the throne a heart full of piety and conscientious feeling, a pure, chaste spirit, and an earnest desire to become to his people a second Henry IV. But, poorly educated, without knowledge of men or affairs, shy, and destitute of resources, he was easily amenable to influence. He had remained perfectly unaffected by the new ideas which agitated the time. His horizon was, to the end, that of absolute monarchy. On May 20, 1770, he was, while still a mere boy, married to Marie Antoinette, the youngest daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa, then only fifteen years of age. Incapable of inspiring with love the heart of a lively and engaging girl, he was still less qualified to be the counselor and guide of a young and inexperienced wife, of character altogether unformed. She was little adapted for earnest business, but she could not resist the temptation of mixing herself up in the affairs of the state.

Her earliest experiment in this field failed utterly. Her husband's first measure was to dismiss the hated ministers, Aiguillon, Maupeou, and Terray, and the queen strained every nerve to bring Choiseul, the original author of the Austrian alliance of 1756 and of her marriage, once more back to the helm of state. The hatred of the Jesuit party for her favorite foiled her purpose. Louis's first choice was the tried and trustworthy Mahault, but unfortunately he let himself be influenced by his bigoted aunt, Adelaide, and set Maurepas at the head of the government, who, light-hearted and agreeable, and extricating himself from the worst perplexities by a happy *bon mot*, had one aim as minister—to keep aloof all that could disturb his serenity or lessen his credit. A very different impression was made by the naming of Turgot as controller-general of finance. First of all, in order to put an end to the abuses in the royal household, with its pensions amounting yearly to 28,000,000 livres, he, in spite of the vehement opposition of the queen and of the clique inspired by Choiseul that ruled her, nominated the capable and free-thinking Malesherbes (Fig. 1) to the ministry of the royal household; and, in order to bring order out of disorder in the military budget—of whose 90,000,000 livres the officers took 46,000,000—he appointed Saint-Germain minister of war. Vergennes received the ministry of foreign affairs. Against Turgot's advice the king let himself be moved by Maurepas to restore the Parlement. This body manifested the old spirit of opposition; instead of patriotism, it showed only jealousy for its own privileges. Too soon were Turgot's fears realized that it would prove a drag on his contemplated reforms.



FIG. 1.—Malesherbes (1721-1794). Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by S. Halle, after an anonymous original painting.

With the king Turgot's programme found ready acceptance. The expenses must conform to the income, and money must be set aside yearly for the liquidation of old debts. As Turgot found in existence a contract with the farmers of revenue, which had been renewed for

six years by his predecessor, he limited himself, in the first instance, to the reform of the direct taxes by relieving the communes of the compulsory guarantee for the full payment of the *taille*. His measure establishing free trade in grain and meal in the interior was followed by a rise in the price of grain, and this caused the first turbulence. Owing to the commonly received opinion that it was in the power of the state to make bread cheap or dear, it was not difficult for those whose interests were injured to rouse the lower classes to deeds of violence. Mobs, after plundering the meal-magazines and grain-ships, forced their way into the court of the palace of Versailles, extorted from the terrified king a promise that the price of bread should be lowered, and in Paris also indulged in plundering and ravages. Turgot remained firm. The "meal-war" was energetically suppressed, and by his six reform edicts of January 1, 1776, he struck the first great blow at the freedom of the privileged classes from taxation. The two most important edicts announced the abolition of forced labor on the roads and of the special privileges of the guilds. In place of the *corvée* the nobles and clergy were required to pay a road-tax in proportion to their property. The preparation of gunpowder and saltpetre and the postal service were next placed under the management of the state, a bank of discount established, and the wine-ban abolished. The nobles, the clergy, and the magistracy were all against these reforms. Necker (Fig. 2), the Parisian banker, now won his spurs as an authority on finance by a *brochure* against the system of the controller-general. The queen, who took the demand for economy as a personal insult, joined herself to his enemies. Malesherbes, weary of the fruitless struggle, was the first to desert the field of conflict. Turgot was ungraciously dismissed from office.

Whether Turgot by longer continuance in power could have warded off the impending evils may well be doubted; in any case, his overthrow was a fatality. The first trial had been made of the constancy of the king, and, the higher the hopes of the reformers had been, the more bitter was their disappointment. Turgot's successor, Clugny, re-established the guilds, the edicts regarding forced labor were not executed, and a convention of bishops demanded the maintenance of the privileges of the clergy and a new era of persecution of heretics. At court the lavishing of pensions and gifts went on in the old way. On Clugny's death, after four months' service, such hopeless confusion reigned everywhere that the king turned to Necker, whom the public voice designated as the man for the office. This penniless son of a Genevese professor had risen to be head of the first banking-house in



FIG. 2.- Necker. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Aug. de St. Aubin (1736-1807); original painting by J. S. Duplessis (1725-1802).

Paris and a millionaire, while his brilliant wife (Fig. 3) assembled in her *salon* all the fine wits of Paris. It was unheard-of that a *bourgeois* and a Protestant should receive such an appointment, and, as it was, Necker had no seat in the council of state and bore the title of director

of finance instead of that of controller-general. Yet his name worked the miracle of restoring the credit of the half-bankrupt state, and of enabling it to raise money at a moderate rate of interest without augmenting the taxes. Like his rival Turgot, he cherished the hope of not only increasing the revenue by his reforms, but also of redressing the most crying abuses. But the saving effected by the suppression of various superfluous offices was as nothing in comparison with the frightful increase of burdens to meet the interest on the loans. On the other hand, the application of torture was restrained, the fearful condition of prisons and hospitals ameliorated, and serfdom entirely abolished on the royal domains. Owing to the exposure of the



FIG. 3.—Madame Necker. Reduced facsimile of a steel engraving by Blanchard.

abuses associated with the system of *intendants*, he tried the experiment, in the province of Berry, of a new form of administration. He instituted here an assembly consisting of twelve of the clergy, twelve nobles, and twenty-four of the Third Estate, and an executive bound to carry out its resolutions. But Necker himself was not free from doubt about the way of enforcing his reforms and about their effect, and was often met by insuperable obstacles. The demands for the court expenses and for pensions were as incessant as ever. Ever since the Declaration of Independence of the United States such a violent spirit had taken possession of the nobility of the Versailles court that it precipitated the land into an extravagantly costly war, which effected the financial ruin of the

state. Necker must ever provide more money. Gradually he burdened the state with new debts to the amount of 530,000,000, without any provision for meeting the interest, not to speak of the liquidation of a sum so enormous for those days. The rose-colored report on the state finances (*Compte rendu*) which he presented to the king, February 19, 1781, showing an annual surplus of 10,200,000 livres of ordinary income over expenditure, had for its object the paying of the way for a new loan, and in a few months 236,000,000 flowed into the empty state treasury. This first report showed that the court swallowed every year 34,000,000, and that the pensions for which no service had been rendered demanded 28,000,000. The conviction became every day deeper that the



FIG. 4.—Minister Calonne. After a lithograph by Delpech.

country was the victim of a legalized system of robbery. On the other hand, among the swarm of aristocrats, who fattened at the cost of the public instead of their own, the report unloosed a storm of indignation. Necker felt that a firmer position was necessary to enable him to contend against the insatiable voracity of the court circle, and demanded the position of controller-general, with a seat and voice in the state council. When this was denied, he took his leave.

After Necker's immediate successors, Flenry and d'Ormesson, both honorable men, had succumbed before the intrigues of the court, Vergennes directed the king's attention to Calonne (Fig. 4), *intendant* of Lille, and the most disreputable of his class in the kingdom. He received



the appointment in October, 1783, and found, on entering office, a deficit of 600,000,000. But he had expedients for meeting all wants. His theory was that a state, like a man, in order to be able to raise money, must conceal the greatness of its needs and give itself the appearance of wealth by lavish expenditure. The lost confidence of the public was, therefore, to be won back by throwing dust in its eyes. The people swallowed his bait greedily, and the money which they advanced disappeared in the bottomless abyss of boundless prodigality. But the court was jubilant over the feats of the conjurer, who found money for every whim and revived the most brilliant days of Louis XV.

And yet how changed were the times and the men! The assault on the ancient edifice of the state had begun, and that not from below but from above. Even the king had proclaimed that the poor suffered bitter injustice, and that every law restricting their right to work was null and void. And the end of all these promising phrases was a reinstatement of the old abuses. The aristocracy acted in the same manner. These people, since Necker's retirement, had busied themselves with little else than securing and strengthening their privileges. And yet this aristocracy, so arrogant and exclusive, was the same that held it "good form" to rave over humanity and philosophy, and to wax enthusiastic in favor of the cause of democracy in America; from whose ranks Lafayette had gone to do service in the army of Washington, and whose oldest and proudest names were represented in the auxiliary corps of Rochambeau. Franklin, in all his simplicity, appeared like the herald of a new age amidst the court-world of Versailles, swelling in velvet and satin. Contemporaneously with Franklin, Voltaire appeared once more in Paris. The court of Versailles was left desolate, for all the world streamed to his apotheosis. Lafayette, on his return, was fêted as the hero of liberty. This was the same society that, in 1784, extorted from the king (Fig. 5) the long-withheld permission for the presentation on the boards of Beaumarchais's "Marriage of Figaro," and took pleasure in seeing all that was sacred and honorable besmirched with ridicule, aristocratic prejudices lacerated by the most biting sarcasm, and the stupid pride of family overthrown by plebeian intelligence. The constitution of society was still monarchical; the manner of thought was republican. Even in art the pieces of a Watteau and a Boucher had lost their attractions. Louis XVI. himself commissioned David to paint the "Vow of the Horatii," with which the renaissance of French painting begins. It was suicide that the ruling classes were committing.

Marie Antoinette was to learn by bitterest experience how low the regard for monarchy had sunk. The lively young queen loved to take



FIG. 5.—Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the Dauphin. Facsimile of a contemporary engraving by Klauber, which appeared in Augsburg.

refuge from formal and tiresome Versailles in the home-like Trianon, whence all constraint was banished. Here, in unreserved intercourse with the *confidantes* and favorites, whom her clinging and artless, but too indiscreet, heart had chosen, she passed the time now in rustic play, now in devising new and fabulous costumes, or in other childish amusements. In

consequence of her want of knowledge of mankind, her circle of friends was composed mainly of persons of doubtful reputation. Of her husband's family, the member who stood nearest her was the infamous Count of Artois. Calumny dogged her every step; each unguarded word was carried abroad and misinterpreted. From the first her position had been a difficult one. The popular hatred which was bestowed on the Austrian alliance was also directed against her, and she was suspected, not without grounds, of looking on the foreign policy as a family affair of the house of Hapsburg. In the War of the Bavarian Succession she had exerted herself to the utmost to secure the support of France for Joseph II. After the birth of a dauphin, October 22, 1781, her claims for political influence became more urgent. By reason of her well-known frivolity she was made mainly responsible for the wasteful extravagance of the court. From 1775 on, she was under the influence of the Countess Polignac, who regarded the bosom-friendship of the queen as an inexhaustible fountain for the satisfaction of the cupidity of herself and her relatives. It made the worst impression that this woman was nominated as governess of the royal children. Only this universal dislike of the queen makes the well-known story of the diamond necklace explicable. Cardinal Rohan, whose recall from his post as ambassador at Vienna the queen had brought about, fell into the toils of a female sharper, who persuaded the weak-headed, altogether characterless, prelate that she could restore him to favor at court. On the credit of her family name—Valois—she gave it out that she was of royal blood, and she was married to a pretended Count Lamotte. Another adventurer, Count Cagliostro, to whom men ascribed supernatural powers, was one of her confederates. The queen, she assured the cardinal, burned with eagerness to possess a necklace offered to her by the court jewelers, but rejected on account of its price—1,600,000 livres. This she wished to acquire through his agency, without the knowledge of the king. The dotard walked into the clumsily set trap, and purchased the necklace in the name of the queen. Once in the hands of the "Countess" Lamotte, it vanished. Discovery followed when, after two years, the jewelers pressed for payment. Deeply offended, the king caused the cardinal to be arrested and brought to trial. Then came the unheard of: notwithstanding the notoriety of the fraud, not only did the Parlement acquit him, but the public accepted the verdict with boisterous jubilation. The queen's fair fame was annihilated and her most innocent acts were ascribed to the basest motives.

At the same time, when all the world was gloating over the scandal of the necklace, Calonne's sun began to set. Since the days when Necker took office the state debt had been increased by 1,630,000,000—Calonne

alone had added 800,000,000—and the burden of the interest had been more than quadrupled since 1755. Despair forced on Calonne the conviction that the only means of relief was through reforms. An assembly of notables, which had not been convoked since 1626, was summoned by the king, and its sittings formally opened on February 22, 1787. It consisted of 7 princes of the blood, 36 dukes and peers, 38 counselors of Parlement, 12 high officials, 12 representatives of the provincial estates, 25 representatives of the largest cities, 14 archbishops and bishops. Calonne's programme comprised the institution of provincial estates, the abolition of internal duties, the introduction of a general land-tax, the abrogation of freedom from taxation, and the conversion of the *dons gratuits* (free gifts) of the clergy into a compulsory impost. But Calonne was opposed by the whole body of the privileged. Before taking a single step, the notables demanded a detailed statement in regard to the origin of the deficit and its amount. This it was impossible to furnish. The deficit could only be estimated approximately at 140,000,000 yearly. When Calonne endeavored to cast the responsibility for this on his predecessors, Necker answered him so warmly that the king banished his former minister from Paris. This opposition by the notables to the hated government made them popular. The *rentiers*, merchants, and manufacturers—a class generally so averse to revolution—made common cause with them, because, owing to the unreliability and the trickery of the state, they saw their interests threatened most seriously.

Calonne's attempt was utterly foiled, and, on April 9, he left office. The queen's influence nominated as his successor one of his fiercest opponents, Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse. On the notables showing themselves as little disposed to be compliant toward him as toward his predecessor, their assembly was dissolved by the king (May 26). The unsuccessful experiment bequeathed one enduring legacy of the highest importance: the general institution of provincial, district, and parish assemblies after the pattern of those inaugurated by Necker in Berry, in which not only the representatives of the Third Estate equaled in number those of the clergy and nobility together, but the vote was taken by heads. Their main function was the allotment of all state imposts and other public burdens. This innovation introduced disorder and disturbance not only into public affairs, but also into private life. For, not content with endowing these bodies with deliberative and legislative authority, and with an executive power such as can only be properly exercised by a single official, it permitted the *intendants* and their delegates to exist by the side of those bodies without any well-defined demarcation of their respective powers. The un-



PLATE I



Louis XVI. of France.

Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by J. Tamburini; original painting 1789  
by J. Boze

*Historical Atlas, Vol. XVI, page 41.*

avoidable came to pass—war, sometimes declared, sometimes concealed, broke out between these assemblies and the *intendants*. Thus, at the moment when revolution was knocking at the door, in consequence of this quarrel, which involved the whole administrative machine, the authority of the state was severely crippled.

The question had long been not merely a financial one, but a political and social one as well. But finance constituted the sensitive nerve, a touch on which made the whole body politic wince. Of all his predecessor's tax projects, Brienne had retained only the land- and stamp-tax, but the Parlement refused to register the edict without previous scrutiny of the state accounts. This demand the king rejected as being without precedent. The Parlement, in return, entrenched itself behind the declaration that the right to grant taxes was vested only in the States-General. The great word was spoken. An Abbé Sabathier was the first to bring it into the debate. The king (PLATE I.) had recourse (August 6, 1787) to the ancient expedient of "a bed of justice"; but, seized by a blind passion for contradiction, the Parlement protested. "The constitutional principle of the French monarchy," argued the President of the Parlement, "is that the taxes be voted by those who bear them, and it is not in keeping with the heart of a mild king to violate this principle, which secures his authority and ensures obedience." The king heard the threat in silence. Neither he nor Brienne believed that the Parlement could make it good. But this body on the following day pronounced the registration null and void, and decreed the impeachment of Calonne for squandering the public funds and for the abuse of the state authority. The king quashed the decree, but Calonne fled to England. The supreme courts of audit and taxation arrayed themselves on the side of the Parlement. The excitement spread ever wider, and again it was directed against the queen—"Madame Deficit." The Parlement, banished to Troyes, formally renewed its protest from that city, but it soon consented to a most unheroic compromise, by which the edicts were withdrawn, and the *vingtième* (twentieth) was doubled for five years.

The peace concluded between the crown and the Parlement rested on a basis so insecure that a circumstance, of itself insignificant, served to break it. In the milder form of a "Royal Session" the king proposed (November 19) a new loan of 420,000,000 for the extinction of the deficit, fixed the summoning of the States-General for 1792, and granted to non-Catholics the civil rights of citizens. The assembly was ready for registration, but, when Louis impolitely forbade a vote, the Parlement promptly refused to make the entry of the loan decree. Two of the

counselors were imprisoned. So soon as the Parlement saw its own members assailed, it contested the king's right of arbitrary imprisonment by *lettres de cachet*, frustrated the loan by declaring its registration illegal, and entered its protest against the levying of the second *vingtième*. The government resolved to break this defiant spirit once and for all, but the Parlement, hearing of this intention, took a solemn oath to maintain the "ancient fundamental laws of the monarchy," and demanded the consent of the Parlement to all laws, and that of the States-General to all taxes. But the government did not waver. It quashed the resolution, and commanded the arrest of its two main advocates, d'Esprémeuil and Goislard. In a new "bed of justice" (May 8) the king announced a reform of the judiciary system, much more aggressive than that of Maupeou. Its terms were: the restriction of the Parlements to their judicial functions; the institution of three courts of instance with jurisdiction over petty criminal and civil cases; and finally the erection of a *Cour plénière* for the formal certification and promulgation of general and simplified laws, in place of the chaos existing in the various cities and provinces on account of the many different sets of laws. But all the Parlements with one accord refused to serve in accordance with the terms of this ordinance. To the paralysis of the administration was now added a universal and complete arrest of the dispensation of justice.

The hereditary magistracy was now blind enough to provoke the mob of Paris to disturbances and deeds of violence. The military had to intervene, and blood flowed. In the provinces there were tumultuous risings. Hitherto the crown had made use of the magistracy against the feudal nobility. Now it saw both fused by community of interest into one hostile mass. Nothing was left the king but retreat. Assent was given to summoning the States-General for May 1, 1789. All magistrates and learned men were called on (July 5) to make investigations in regard to the mode of calling and the composition of the ancient States-General in the various provinces. On August 14, 1788, Lamoignon, the hated keeper of the seal, was dismissed; on August 24, Brienne. The latter, in spite of the necessities of the state, had enriched himself scandalously while in office. On September 23 followed the restoration of the Parlement. Necker was recalled as successor of Brienne. He advanced to the state, for its most pressing necessities, 2,000,000 from his own private means, and helped it by his credit through the difficult months that followed. The great drought of 1788 was followed by a severe winter, and in spring famine prevailed everywhere. But in every quality save good will this adroit financier fell short of being the statesman that France had need of in this her extremity. Necker had



neither the strong arm nor the clear head to enable him to control this medley of opinions and passions, and to give to them a safe direction. Rather he allowed himself to be driven by them till he had carried the monarchy to the abyss where it was to perish.

That which now occupied the minds of men was the calling together of the States-General. The Parlement had demanded that this assembly should be summoned by the king in the same way in which the States-General had been summoned in 1614. This demand contravened a chief claim of the Third Estate, which had been already recognized by Brienne in his speech on the closing of the assembly of notables—namely, a double number of representatives for the Third Estate, and that the vote be taken not by estates but by polls. The Parlement had now become unpopular on this account, and the crown might have supported itself on the broad masses of the Third Estate, as against the privileged classes, and popular reprobation might have been levelled against feudalism instead of monarchy, but Necker did not recognize this. He adopted the unfortunate expedient of referring the question of the constitution of the estates to the notables, an assembly composed purely of the privileged, and, on these expressing themselves against allowing a double number of representatives to the Third Estate and in favor of voting by estates, he nevertheless committed the unpardonable mistake of adopting the principle of double representation and of leaving the question of voting undecided.

The summons of July 5 did not remain without result. Among the countless pamphlets that poured forth from the now free and unbridled press, none attained such renown as that of the Abbé Sieyès (Fig. 6): "What is the Third Estate?" His answer is: "Everything." But the summons of the government to give expression to all complaints, wishes, and grievances in the *cahiers* of the representatives opened the mouths of a class, who, up to this time, had lain silent under the double burden of feudalism and official caprice—the peasantry. Their main concern was not with political theories and republican phantasies, but with their daily bread and personal freedom. These they hoped to have secured to them by the king in the face of their oppressors. The demands of the middle classes, on the other hand, culminated in a constitution based on the principle of the equality of all citizens. Summarizing the contents of these *cahiers*, we find them to crave nothing less and nothing more than the abrogation of all existing laws and institutions and a reconstruction of society from the ground up. That it was the duty of the government to sketch the plan of the new structure and superintend its erection, Necker never once made clear to himself. His great care was

to set the state free from its financial embarrassments, and this he hoped to effect through the much-vaunted readiness of the privileged to make sacrifices for this end. Thus it came that the government met the

# QU'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS-ÉTAT?

TROISIÈME ÉDITION.

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« Tant que le *Philosophe* n'exécède point les limites de la vérité, ne l'accusez pas d'aller trop loin. Sa fonction est de marquer le but, il faut donc qu'il y soit arrivé. Si restant en chemin, il oseoit y élever son enseigne, elle pourroit être trompeuse. Au contraire, le devoir de l'*Administrateur* est de combiner et de graduer sa marche, suivant la nature des difficultés..... Si le *Philosophe* n'est au but, il ne sait où il est. Si l'*Administrateur* ne voit le but, il ne sait où il va. »

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1789.

FIG. 6.—Facsimile of the title-page of Sieyès's work: "Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-État?"

States-General without any clear conception of what was likely to happen. And the nation was as much in the dark as the government. There floated before it only a vague idea that the States-General were to be the



PLATE II.



Mirabeau.

After a copper-plate engraving by Fiesinger; original drawing by J. Guérin (1760-1836).

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 45.*

infallible means of setting it free from all its perplexities and of healing its wounds. One man alone comprehended the vast import of the turning-point at which France had arrived. That man was Mirabeau.

Gabriel Honoré Riquetti, Count de Mirabeau (PLATE II.), was a descendant of an old Provençal family. In spite of his most undesirable reputation and of a pock-marked face, he exercised an irresistible charm over everyone whom he wished to win over or to impress. From childhood up at variance with a father as passionate as himself; made wretched by a marriage contracted on account of unfortunate speculations and without affection; repeatedly imprisoned through *lettres de cachet* issued at the request of his own father; condemned to death *in contumaciam* at Pontarlier for abducting the young wife of President Monnier; surrendered at Amsterdam, whither the couple had fled, on the earnest solicitation of his father, and shut up for three years in the frightful casemates of Vincennes, he had experienced all that constituted the misery of ancient France—the licentiousness of the higher classes, the destruction of family-life, the loss of his property, and the arbitrariness of absolute power. After he had regained his liberty, he set out for England, where he maintained himself by his pen. Returning to Paris, he was sent by Calonne as a secret agent to Berlin, where he remained till 1787. Returning to France, he threw himself into the strife of parties, full of deadly hate of despotism, ambitious, and conscious of his strength. He alone saw through the hollowness of Necker, while this man was yet the idol of the nation. Rejected by the nobles in the election to the States-General, he betook himself to Marseilles and Aix, in both of which cities he offered himself to the Third Estate as a candidate. The money necessary for the election contests he did not scruple to gain through a scandalous breach of trust practiced on the ministry, selling to a book-dealer the secret information he had brought from Berlin. He was elected in both cities by overwhelming majorities, and chose to take his seat for Aix.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE STATES-GENERAL AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.


(MAY 4, 1789—SEPTEMBER 30, 1791.)

ON May 4, 1789, the States-General and the court of France moved in solemn procession through the streets of Versailles. Every provision had been made for the scrupulous maintenance of the ancient etiquette, but the multitudes who had streamed hither from Paris greeted with their acclamations not the nobles and clergy, gorgeous in their robes of dignity, but the deputies of the Third Estate, clad in the sombre garb of the legists of earlier centuries. The king, too, was hailed with shouts of joy, but for the queen there was only icy stillness broken by an occasional cry of execration. Next day came the opening of the assembly (PLATE III.). The king in his speech acknowledged a prodigious increase in the national debt, the necessity of guiding the universal and half-blind impulse for innovation in a safe direction, and his confidence in the readiness of the first two estates to surrender their tax-privileges. After Barentin, keeper of the seal, had indicated by name some of the purposed reforms, Necker arose, and in a speech of three hours, wearisome with dry details of figures, strove to show that the finances were by no means in so desperate a condition as was represented. The word for which the public ear listened with eager suspense—the “Constitution”—was not once named, and on the question whether the estates should deliberate and vote separately or as one body both ministers touched only incidentally as being something reserved for the decision of the assembly itself and the government. Instead of placing itself at the head of the nation and insisting on the renunciation of their privileges by the clergy and nobles, the government gave up the helm, as it were, into the hands of the assembly. The same weakness showed itself in the smallest things as in the greatest. In the face of the defiance of the publisher and the general indignation, the government was utterly unable to enforce its interdict against Mirabeau’s “*Journal des États-Généraux*,” which had lashed Necker’s speech with unmerciful severity.

Left to themselves, the estates fell to wrangling on the question of voting. The nobles and clergy demanded that they should deliberate



PLATE III.



Opening of the French States-General at Versailles on May 5, 1789.

Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Prudhomme, original painting by Louis-Charles-Auguste Goussier. Versailles: Hist. et d'art. coll. 1.

*History of All Nations*, Vol. III, page 46.







1. Louis XVI.
2. Marie Antoinette.
3. Madame Elizabeth.
4. Madame de Lamoignon.
5. The Count of Provence, Louis XVIII.
6. The Count of Artois, Charles X.
7. The Duke of Berry.
8. The Duke of Orléans.


9. Princess of Lamballe.
10. Duke of Chartres, Louis Philippe I.
11. The Marquis of Brezé.
12. The Count of Brene.
13. Madame Necker.
14. Mlle. Necker, Madame de Staël.
15. Countess of Provence.

16. Viscount of Beaumarchais.
17. Viscount of Segur.
18. Viscount of Noailles.
19. Marquis of Rochefort-Mortemart.
20. La Fayette.
21. Duke of Angoulême.
22. The Duke of Orleans.
23. The Duke of Liancourt.
24. The Duke of Broglie.
25. The Duke of Liancourt.
26. Charles de Lameth.
27. Count of Montpou.
28. Viscount of Longueville.

29. The Abbot of Montcaul.
30. The Abbot of Montcaul.
31. The Abbot of Montcaul.
32. The Abbot of Montcaul.
33. The Abbot of Montcaul.
34. The Abbot of Montcaul.
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36. The Abbot of Montcaul.
37. The Abbot of Montcaul.
38. The Abbot of Montcaul.
39. The Abbot of Montcaul.
40. The Abbot of Montcaul.

41. Benazet.
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59. Benazet.
60. Benazet.





The Constituting of the National Assembly in Versailles on June 20, 1789. (From "L'Assemblée Nationale.")

Engraving by J. M. Moreau the younger (1781-1816), construction of the engraving by L. A. Poiré (1747-1809).

and vote, as formerly, as separate bodies ; the Third Estate, equal in numbers to the nobles and clergy combined, insisted on one common chamber. On the two other estates declining to agree to this, the third had recourse to a policy of inaction and waited quietly for these to come over to its views.

To the accidental circumstance that its hall served as the common meeting-place for the whole assembly, there was added the far weightier one, that discord showed itself in both of the privileged estates—a liberal minority of the nobles rallying round Lafayette, while among the clergy two hundred and eight of the village priests felt themselves repelled from the high dignitaries and attracted toward the class to which they belonged by birth.

Week after week passed, and yet no step toward work was taken by the estates ; nor did either the nobles or the clergy make any move toward laying their tax-privileges on the altar of the fatherland. But, meantime, in more than three hundred different places, anarchy broke forth. The lower classes were convinced that the dearth was artificial or intentional. The barns of the farmers, proprietors, and religious houses were ransacked for concealed grain ; the transports of the speculators attacked ; excise-offices demolished. In Paris, the mob, which already in the end of April had, on mere rumor, expended its fury on the house of a manufacturer named Révillon, was now under the sway of concerted demagoguery. The Palais Royal, protected by the privileges of the house of Orleans from any interference by the police, and the headquarters of prostitution, gambling, idleness, and pamphleteering, was also the hearth at which the torch of revolutionary passion was kindled.

After all negotiations had proved fruitless, the Third Estate, on June 10, resolved, on the motion of Abbé Sieyès (Fig. 7), one of the Parisian deputies, to address a last invitation to the other two estates, and, in the event of its refusal, to proceed independently with the task of completing its organization. The invitation was not accepted, and, on June 13, it began with the formal scrutiny of credentials. While this was proceeding, the first three priests came over to it. On June 17, the representatives of the Third Estate made public demonstration of the irrevocability of their breach with the feudal estates, and in compliance with the desires expressed in many *cahiers* assumed, by their own authority, the name of National Assembly (PLATE IV.). They further announced that the taxes and duties, although illegally imposed, would continue to be collected provisionally till the close of the session, placed the state creditors under the protection of the national honor, and promised promptly to examine into the causes of the dearth and to seek means for relieving it.




FIG. 7.—Sieyès. Facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by H. Lips (1758-1817); original painting by Bréa.

This usurpation at last awoke the court from its lethargy. The king came to the resolution of promulgating, in virtue of his own absolute authority, a constitution in which he made the cause of the privileged classes his own—those same privileged classes who had hitherto made implacable war on the royal prerogative. The Third Estate was not given proper notice of the closing of their chamber to admit of alter-

ations being made in it to adapt it for a royal session, and the Assembly saw in this a *coup d'état*. On June 20, it turned away from the doors closed against it and betook itself to the princely tennis-court, where, under the presidency of Bailly, a distinguished *savant*, and on the motion of the strongly monarchical Mounier, it pledged itself by a solemn oath not to dissolve before it had framed a constitution for the nation. On the tennis-court also being closed to the members, by order of the Count of Artois, they assembled, on June 22, in the church of St. Louis. Here entered, amid storms of applause, one hundred and forty-nine of the clergy, in order to join the Third Estate. Even this wrought no change in the resolution of the court. On June 23 the royal session was held; Necker was conspicuous by his absence. With anxious, wavering voice the king read a speech, in which he made known his will that the traditional separation of the estates be maintained; declared the resolutions adopted by the Third Estate on June 17 illegal, and null and void; promised a number of reforms, including the freedom of the press, the right of the estates to vote taxes and loans, the abolition of the *taille*, forced labor, serfdom, and *lettres de cachet*; and closed with the command that they should adjourn forthwith to meet next day in separate chambers. What the king granted comprehended nearly all that the public voice demanded, but the supplementary "separation of the estates" deprived the concessions of all worth, for the two votes of the nobility and the clergy against the one of the Third Estate was a sure guarantee that the essential preliminary to all reform, the abolition of privileges, would never be attained. The nobility and a part of the clergy left the hall with the king; the members of the Third Estate kept their seats. Then Mirabeau arose: "I confess," he said, "that what you have just now listened to might constitute the salvation of the land, were not the gifts of despotism always dangerous." On his motion the Assembly pronounced its members inviolable. The king, on hearing of this opposition, said nothing but: "They will not go? Well, then, let them stay." On June 25, a minority of the nobles passed over to the Assembly, whereupon desertion of the banner of privilege became general. The king gave up the cause as hopeless, and on June 27 gave command for those still remaining by the flag to join the National Assembly. Monarchy had suffered an utter defeat.

The National Assembly now proved utterly incompetent for the task that had fallen to it. These 1100 men, entirely inexperienced in public affairs, and possessed with the ideas of Rousseau's "Social Contract," thought that the total transformation of the state system could be accomplished without force, and solely by reason. They could devote them-

selves with a sort of holy zeal to formulating the rights of man, but they could not see the burning symptoms of anarchy. And yet the language of the Palais Royal demagogues grew wilder and wilder. In these brains, which brought from the *collège* only a defective education, republican reminiscences of Sparta and Rome and the phrases of Rousseau about the sovereignty of the people danced like *ignes fatui* over the black pool of passion, and deprived them altogether of any perception of the real, or of the difference between right and wrong. Here Camille Desmoulins, a lad of nineteen, hurled the firebrands of his oratory among the masses. It was now that the spirit of revolt took hold of the troops, among whom the common soldier felt toward his noble officer much as the peasant felt toward his feudal superior. Among the non-commissioned officers particularly, to whom, as mere *bourgeois*, every avenue to promotion was closed, there existed a deep feeling of disaffection. On June 25, a part of the troops consigned to the barracks broke forth to revel in the Palais Royal. The regiment of the *élite* of the French guards became a licentious rabble.

Such events sharpened the sting that the ignominious defeat of June 23 had given the court, and hastened its resolution of putting an end by one blow to the whole of this constitution-frenzy. The necessity of securing the capital as well as Versailles against the mob gave a pretext for drawing together a considerable corps of foreign, and therefore reliable, mercenaries—Germans, Swiss, Flemings, and Walloons—under command of the Duke de Broglie, a veteran of the Seven Years' War. In the midst of all the rumors aroused by this step, Mirabeau recognized the deadly danger in which the inevitable failure of a *coup d'état* must involve the royal authority. But the address to the king, moved by him and urging the withdrawal of the troops, was in vain. Necker, while at table, was surprised by a dismissal and an order to leave the kingdom (July 11).

The news of Necker's dismissal inflamed the excitement in Paris to fever-heat. The agents of the Duke of Orleans fomented the agitation. Under the trees of the Palais Royal, Desmoulins harangued the multitude (Fig. 8), and announced to them the "St. Bartholomew's Night" of the patriots, which the court was preparing. The mob, reinforced by 1200 French guards, made dispositions for forcibly driving forth the troops posted on the Champ-de-Mars—Swiss and a cavalry corps. To avoid a collision between royal troops, the officer in command, Colonel Besenval, in default of orders from Versailles, withdrew his men on the night of July 13. Paris was given over to the violence of a frenzied rabble. The toll-barriers were destroyed, and the collection of the excise, one of






FIG. 7. Canaille Desmoulines in the Palais Royal on July 12, 1789. After a contemporary copper plate engraving by Duplessis Bertaux.

the most important sources of revenue to the city, rendered impossible. The public danger moved the electors of Paris to assume authority themselves. They named a provisional committee from their own number, and empowered it to take measures for ensuring the public safety. The committee's first step was to establish a city militia under officers elected by the men; but, eager as the *bourgeois* were to enroll themselves, they were not yet in a condition to check the outrages of the mob. On the morn-




FIG. 9. — Storming of the Bastille on July 14, 1789. After a contemporary copper-plate engraving by Duplessis-Bertaux.

ing of July 14, the rioters broke into the Hôtel des Invalides and armed themselves with 32,000 muskets. Then resounded the cry: "To the Bastille!" This ancient citadel had become, since its conversion into a prison for persons arbitrarily arrested, an object of universal detestation. Its mere name gave to the unchained passions a definite aim. The commander, de Launay, was as little eager for fight as his slender garrison

of eighty-two old soldiers and forty-two Swiss, yet he rejected the demand for instant surrender; and, when the surging masses threatened to get possession of the drawbridge, he ordered his men to open fire on them. A section of the French guards joined the assailants, and de Launay offered to capitulate on receiving a guarantee that no life would be taken. An infantry officer named Hélie, and Hulin, a Genevese, gave the assurance and were admitted into the court; but a wild crowd that had forced themselves in, under the leadership of one Maillard, tore their prisoners from them and swept them off to the Place de la Grève. There de Launay and his officers were massacred, and their heads borne around on pikes as trophies. Flesselles, the provost of the merchants (that is, the head of the municipality of Paris), shared the same fate, on the pretext that he threw obstacles in the way of the patriots arming themselves.

Only five prisoners and two lunatics were found to be detained in the notorious Bastille, but to this day July 14 is celebrated as a national holiday in France (Fig. 9).

The National Assembly, on July 11, had demanded from the king the recall of the dismissed ministers. Yet the crown persevered in its indolent security, till the storming of the Bastille came on it like a flash of lightning. The Duke of Liancourt forced himself into the bed-chamber of the king with the alarming news. "It is a revolt," cried the king aghast. "No, sire," replied the duke, "it is a revolution." The court had now done with short-sighted confidence; the defection of the troops had broken the last weapon of the ancient monarchy. On the following morning the helpless king, accompanied by his brothers, appeared in the National Assembly, which received him, as Mirabeau had recommended, in solemn silence. But when Louis, with touching sincerity, announced the withdrawal of the troops and Necker's recall, it responded with joyful acclamations. To foil the intrigues of Orleans, who sought to bring about a march of the Parisians to Versailles, the king let himself be persuaded to visit Paris on July 17. At the Hôtel de Ville, a reconciliation was effected between him and his capital, intoxicated with victory. There, the committee of the electors had attempted to strengthen its authority by choosing the highly respected Bailly as mayor of Paris, and the most popular man of all France, Lafayette, as commander of the National Guard. The latter, by combining the white of the Bourbon lilies with the blue and red of the city, formed the tricolor, that was destined to be seen in its career of victory in every part of Europe. The king's appearance had a beneficial effect; but the mob, tiger-like, had tasted blood, and was not to be so lightly satiated. Foulon, a man seventy-four years of age, and his son-in-law Berthier,

whose names appeared in the proscription lists of the Palais Royal, became its victims after cruel maltreatment (Fig. 10). On July 30 the




FIG. 10. The murder of Foulon on the Place de la Greve, July 23, 1789. Reduced facsimile of a contemporary copper-plate engraving by Berthault after Picot.

new city council (the afterward so infamous Commune of Paris), consisting at first of two representatives from each of the sixty wards of the city, was organized.

Already, in the early hours of the Revolution, the incapacity for resistance of those who had heretofore been the ruling class manifested itself. The heads of the vanquished court party—the princes of Artois, Condé, and Conti, and Polignac, Breteuil, and Broglie—fled abroad, and thus gave the signal for emigration to the nobility. The National Assembly, on the other hand, turned itself again with all serenity of soul to philosophizing abstractly on the rights of man, till the universal collapse of all order in the provinces compelled it to open its eyes to facts. There, too, the troops were in mutiny. The electoral committees and National Guards, who, following the example of Paris, usurped the vanished powers of the *intendants*, the army, and the Parlements, represented not authority but anarchy. In the country districts a peasants' war raged, inspired with all the fury of an unchained passion for vengeance; yet it was directed less against the persons of the feudal lords than against the system of feudalism.

In all the land the National Assembly was the sole institution that presented even a semblance of authority. During the night session of August 4, the Duke of Noailles, a brother-in-law of Lafayette and a scion of one of the foremost families in the land, ascended the tribune and moved the promulgation of a decree that all taxes and public burdens should henceforth be borne equally by all, that all feudal claims should be redeemable, and that all unpaid personal services should cease. The assembly listened to the magnanimous proposal in silent amazement, which quickly gave way to storms of applause, and then to a competitive rivalry in self-sacrifice, so that, ere the gray of morning, the privileges of nobles and clergy, of communes and corporations, had been laid on the altar of the fatherland. Serfdom, feudal jurisdiction, game laws, salable offices, privileges, annats, exemption from taxes, the pension system, and guilds were all swept away in one night. Feudal imposts and tithes were pronounced redeemable, positions in the state and army were to be open to all citizens, and justice was to be free to all men.

This memorable session of August 4, where idealism, magnanimity, and patriotism break through the dark clouds of narrow-mindedness and partisan prejudices, constitutes the bright point in the history of the Revolution. But, so far as France was concerned, the very suddenness of the collapse of its old state system frustrated all possibility of gradual and peaceful reform.

Nothing more urgent now demanded the attention of the Assembly than the carrying out of the general principles so often affirmed by it. Instead of this, it turned itself yet again to leisurely debating its pet subject—the

rights of man. In vain did Mirabeau appeal to it to desist from fruitless disquisitions on mere abstractions, and to devote itself to the work of perfecting the Constitution. It was August 27 ere it had done with its bewildering wranglings over the competing claims of the freedom of the citizen and the rights of the sovereign.

In the course of such discussions the Assembly became gradually broken up into parties. The party of the Right, or the royalists, was, with the exception of the chivalrous Captain de Cazalès, much more intent on the defence of its own privileges than those of the throne. The party of highest importance, in respect to both number and character, was that of the Constitutionalists—true patriots with monarchical tendencies, like Lally-Tollendal, Malonet, and Mounier. This section might, at first, have been able to effect something of real benefit, had an energetic ministry cast itself on it for support and gone hand in hand with it in working in behalf of order. But Necker was never able to rise to the idea that a party was to be found in the Assembly on which the government could rely. To the inactivity of those in high places belongs the guilt that the democratic Left—men of the school of Rousseau, apostles of the rights of man and popular sovereignty, and members of the Breton Club, like Dupont, Lameth, Barnave—gained the real ascendancy. Undoubtedly there was in this Assembly much honest purpose as well as much real talent, but these qualities were largely offset by its want of practical experience, its over-estimate of its own qualifications, and a moral depravity which made it possible for the meanest vices—selfishness, envy, vanity, cupidity—to play their game under the veil of loud-sounding declamations on patriotism and the rights of man. The Duke of Orleans was head, not of a party, but of a following, infamous as himself—its paymaster. On the most extreme left sat the lawyers Pétion, Buzot, and Robespierre, yet in the shade, but biding their time. The sole statesman-like head in the house was that of Mirabeau. In popularity he was far excelled by the vain Lafayette, who, as commander of the sole armed force that had any real significance, was the most powerful man in France. But Mirabeau surpassed him in political insight.

Inexperience, in conjunction with a mania for theorizing, made the framing of the Constitution a work of slowest progress. The proposal of the committee to constitute two houses—an upper house named by the king, a lower house of elected representatives—was not thought worthy of serious consideration. The Assembly declared its sittings permanent, leaving to the king neither the power of summoning nor proroguing, not to speak of dissolving it. All that was left to him was the execution of its decrees, the initiative being vested in the National Assembly

alone. The question that occupied it longest was whether the king should be granted the power of vetoing its enactments. At length, on September 11, the king made the announcement that he would be satisfied with a suspensive veto, with which he might prevent a bill from becoming a law during the session of two consecutive legislatures. Not contented with the assumption of the law-making power, the Assembly seized also on the executive. The decrees of August 4 had by no means become the magic wand that was to calm the turbulent elements by one blow. In the country, anarchy was rampant as ever. The peasants slaughtered the game to their heart's content, cut down the forests, and paid not a sou of taxes. The greater part of the landed nobility were ruined.

In order to maintain at least the shadow of lawful order the Assembly appointed two committees—one administrative, the other of police—which conferred on the communal magistracies the power of making requisition for troops for the protection of life and property. This encroachment, though probably really a necessity, reduced the government to still greater insignificance. On the other hand, it failed to operate effectively, and even the most moderate were deterred from proceeding energetically against revolutionary disorders by the fear of a reaction. As for the court, in whatever it did it lost no opportunity of irritating its enemies. A plan was concocted by which the king should withdraw to some frontier city, possibly Metz, and there, surrounded by faithful troops, fall back upon his pledges of June 23. It came, however, to nothing. The king preferred to occupy himself with the chase and locksmith-work, rather than with the cares of government. The queen concerned herself about state matters, without being able to conceal her incompetency and her hatred of the new situation. Necker still lay under the intoxication produced by his triumphant reception on his return from exile, and was well content when the unpopularity struck, not him, but the king or queen. He demanded a new tax, but the Assembly resolved not to concede it till the king had endorsed the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the articles of the Constitution so far as framed. The king promptly complied with the latter condition. The former was not rejected, only he declared it expedient to postpone its consideration till the Constitution had been completed.

This incident was to have momentous consequences. The whole atmosphere was surcharged to that degree with inflammable material that the slightest spark was enough to cause an explosion. The spark was furnished by a banquet given in the royal opera hall by the king's body-guard to the regiment of Flanders and the Lorraine chasseurs to

welcome them to Versailles. Heated with wine, the officers had given free vent to their dislike of the democratic doings of the National Assembly, and the appearance of the king, just returned from the chase, with the queen and young dauphin (PLATE V.), gave occasion for stormy demonstrations of loyalty. The occurrence was distorted and made the most of. It was said that the banqueters had torn the tricolor from their caps, and trodden it under their feet. In how far this is connected with the events that succeeded has never been made clear. Certainly a scheme for a violent demonstration against both king and National Assembly, in the form of a procession of the masses to Versailles, had been talked of by the demagogues of the Palais Royal for weeks. There is scarcely any doubt that the Duke of Orleans had his ruffian hand in the game, with a view of creating a vacancy on the throne. On the morning of October 5, crowds, mainly consisting of women, gathered in the Place de la Grève, and forced themselves with cries for bread into the city hall. When the National Guard was about to interpose to quell the disturbances, officers sent by Lafayette, now vice-president of the Commune, made their appearance, and forbade the use of force. Already the general had reported at Versailles that the Parisians were threatening to march to Versailles and had suggested the transference of the court and National Assembly to Paris. The watchword, then, "The King to Paris," was given by Lafayette. All this was in harmony with the general's close relations with the heads of the democracy, and with the vanity of his whole character. It was he and no other who detained the National Guard from marching to Versailles, on the pretext that he must await the order of the city council.

Unchecked, the stream of the lower classes—women armed with pikes and other similar implements, commingled with the heroes of the storming of the Bastille—constantly crying for bread, rolled over the bridge of Sèvres, toward Versailles (Fig. 11). It overflowed the galleries and floor of the Assembly, which, with affected equanimity, did not permit itself to be disturbed in its deliberations. The president, Mounier, even accompanied a deputation of women to the king, who answered in a soothing manner their prayers for bread and their request that he should make his residence in Paris, and at the same time gave his assent to the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Not till four o'clock in the afternoon did Lafayette permit himself to be authorized by the Commune to march to Versailles. He bore with him the request that the king would be good enough to permit none but the National Guards to do duty in the palace, to communicate to the Commune what was being done for the relief of Paris, to approve the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and to



PLATE V.



Marie Antoinette with her Children.

After a steel engraving by Nargeot; original painting by Louise Élisabeth Vigée Lebrun. (Versailles.)

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 58*



choose Paris for his usual dwelling-place. On his arrival at Versailles, he made arrangements for the security of the palace, induced the king to give up thoughts of fleeing to Rambouillet, and then, exhausted, betook himself to the Hotel Noailles for repose. In the early gray of morning the assassins in the pay of Orleans found an unguarded side entrance to the palace, and, forcing their way in, murdered the soldiers guarding the entrance to the chambers of the queen. Half naked, she fled to her husband's apartment, where the two barricaded themselves as best they could till at the last moment Lafayette made his appearance, and, by the aid of the National Guards




FIG. 11.—March of the women to Versailles on October 5, 1789. A contemporary print.

and the body guards, drove out the ruffians, and rescued their intended victims. In the marble court below, the mob remained shouting "The King to Paris," till the sovereign appeared on the balcony, with the tricolor on his hat, and by gestures announced his assent to their wishes. But the curses and execrations against the queen did not cease till Lafayette induced her also to show herself, when, by kissing her hand and embracing a soldier of the body-guard, he intimated that the reconciliation was complete.

On the afternoon of October 6, the royal family set out on their sorrowful journey to Paris, surrounded by a mob howling forth: "Here we bring the baker, the baker's wife, and the baker's boy." The bloody heads of the massacred life-guardsmen were borne aloft on pikes. It was the funeral procession of the monarchy. Fourteen days later the National Assembly followed the king to Paris, there to hold their sit-

tings in the riding-school near the Tuileries, where they, too, were to fall even deeper under the thrall of this Paris rabble. In such manner were the doctrines of the rights of man and the right of revolution first realized. Of the members of the Right, a number withdrew from the scene of conflict; then followed the migration of members of the middle class. The much-compromised Duke of Orleans took refuge in England.

While Lafayette was living in a fool's paradise in the conviction of his unbounded power, Mirabeau, who saw with terrible distinctness the danger involved in the coming of the king to Paris, was working with all his might for the restoration of order. The Marquis de Favras, an officer of the guards, suffered death at the hands of the hangman, ostensibly because he meant, through Dutch bankers, to supply the Count

*je promets au Roi loyauté, zèle, activité, énergie, et un courage bon  
peut-être on est loin d'avoir une idée. je lui promets surtout en fin hors  
le succès qui ne dépend jamais d'un homme et d'une présomption mais  
de mériter et très coupable pour moi. je garantis dans la terrible malade  
qui mène l'état et menace son chef. ce serait un homme bien étrange que  
celui qui serait indifférent ou infidèle à la gloire de sauver l'un et l'autre,  
et je ne suis pas cet homme là. : de Comte de Mirabeau  
8<sup>me</sup> May 1790*

FIG. 12.—Conclusion of the letter of Mirabeau to the King, May 10, 1790. (Facsimile in original size.)

of Provence with the means for a counter-revolution, in reality because the populace longed to see a marquis at the end of a rope. The king's brother had to appear in the Hôtel de Ville and exculpate himself. When the mob broke forth anew and cut off the head of a baker, Lafayette came to an understanding with Mirabeau in regard to a riot-act for Paris. Through his friend, Count la Marek, afterward Duke of Arenberg, Mirabeau tried to open the eyes of the king, the queen, the Count of Provence, and the ministry to the abyss on whose brink they were moving (Fig. 12). Earnestly he raised his warning voice against a flight to the frontier, which must bring the monarch into a state of hostility with his subjects; but he recommended him to betake himself to Rouen in the centre of Normandy, now well-disposed toward the new order of things. Here he would be removed from the tyranny of the capital, and

free, honestly and without mental reservation, in conjunction with the representatives of his people, to frame the new Constitution. He was beside himself over the apathy of the king, with whom nothing could be done, and over the inconstancy and coldness of the queen, who looked on him as the most reckless of the revolutionists, and the instigator of the attempted assassination of October 6. Ambition stimulated him, and duty called on him to take service as a minister in the cause of the king. But he was too conscious of the mighty power that lay in his words from the tribune to be willing to sacrifice this for the sake of a ministerial post. Therefore, after he had come to an understanding with Lafayette and other men of influence, and after the king also had been won over to the idea of summoning him to take office, he moved that the ministers should be given a deliberative voice in the Assembly. But the little souls, who envied or dreaded Mirabeau's pre-eminence, were able to frustrate his views. Instead of his proposal, one directly the reverse was carried on November 7, to the effect that no deputy could be a member of the ministry. This not only had the effect of shutting out Mirabeau from the royal council, but it created a bitter antagonism between the government and the Assembly, and, from the popularity enjoyed by the latter, marked out the former as the enemy of the nation.

The first injurious effects of this antagonism consisted in this, that the great process of transforming the old France into the new was accomplished practically without the co-operation of the government, and purely in virtue of the sovereign power of the people vested in the National Assembly. The representatives were so entirely under the domination of theories propounded by writers, that the Assembly, instead of stopping to reform real abuses, gave itself entirely up to evolving a system of universal equality based on the conceptions of pedants. Creative this constituent body was in no single respect. To preceding generations is due the credit of having laid the foundations of the new civil society by developing the ideas of citizenship, of equality before the law, and of the right of the people to co-operate in legislation. The labors of this Constituent Assembly in drafting a constitution resulted only in anarchy. Symmetry and order existed only in their laws; in actual life, violence and confusion reigned.

With one blow, the Assembly, in virtue of its revolutionary power, broke up the ancient historical provinces of France, and, on the grounds of simplicity and symmetrical arrangement, remodeled the country, by its laws of December 22, 1789, and February 26, 1790, into 83 departments, named after natural landmarks, 574 *arrondissements*, 4730 can-

tons, and 43,000 communes. On this redistribution was based the whole administrative system. All offices were elective. Over each department was a council of thirty-six members; over each *arrondissement*, one of twelve—all elected for four years. At the head of the commune were the mayor, the *procureur*, the *procureur-syndic*, etc., who held office for two years. In the whole administrative machine there was not one official appointed by the government, and France fell asunder into as many petty sovereign republics as there were communes. The allotment of the taxes for each department was placed under the supervision of the National Assembly. The city government of Paris received, by the law of June 27, 1790, a common council of 32 members and a general council of ninety-six, and the number of the sections was diminished to forty-eight. By the law of December 22, the right of voting was conferred on all citizens (with the exception of servants and bankrupts) of at least twenty-five years of age, who had lived one year in their commune, and paid a tax equal to three days' wages. But citizens possessing these qualifications were not to vote directly for deputies in the national legislature, but for electors, who, in turn, elected the deputies from their department, the members of the local administration, and the magistrates. To be eligible for the position of elector a citizen must pay an annual tax equal to ten days' wages. Not less radically was the ancient system of judicature swept away by the law of August 16, 1790; but apart from the fact that, owing to the long transition-period during which France was without courts, violence took the upper hand, this boon transformed itself in the hands of the Assembly into a curse. Reforms of the highest value were the introduction of publicity, oral pleadings, and the jury-system into criminal procedure, the free distribution of justice, the establishment of justices of the peace and of courts of commerce, the abolition of torture and of arbitrary arrests; but, good as these were, they were robbed of real efficacy by the fact that, in place of the old feeling of independence that hereditary offices conferred on the magistracy, there came that of subjection to their constituencies through the judges being elected only for six years. A National Guard, with officers elected by the corps, and responsible to none but the municipal authorities, completed the annihilation of all central executive authority, so that, as Mirabeau later remarked, the complete disorganization of the state could not have been more artistically effected.

After the ancient state, came now the turn of the ancient church. The first assault was on its property. This was necessitated by the desperate condition of the finances. A contemplated loan of 30,000,000 was an utter failure, another of 80,000,000 yielded only 33,000,000, and,

on September 24, Necker had to announce to the Assembly that his own credit, as well as that of the state, was exhausted. Mirabeau helped him to obtain the desired income-tax of 25 per cent. for three years, but this worked only a momentary alleviation. In this extremity, it was Talleyrand, Bishop of Autun, who directed attention to the property of the church. On Mirabeau's motion these possessions were declared national property, the state taking on itself the financial responsibilities of the church—the payment of the clergy and the care of the poor. It required tedious negotiations and various preliminary measures, as, for example, the dissolution of the monasteries, before this resolution could be carried into execution. On March 17, it was decreed that church properties to the value of 400,000,000 should be made over to the communes, which were to sell them in separate portions, retaining  $\frac{1}{16}$  per cent. of the proceeds for themselves. To meet the most pressing needs, Mirabeau proposed the issue of redeemable obligations to the amount of 400,000,000, bearing interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Such was the origin of the *assignats*—the paper money—in which the credulous saw a panacea for all financial ills, but whose inevitable fate—their continuous decline and final collapse—the Abbé Maury, one of the clearest heads among the Right, pointed out on the spot with unerring precision. This act of spoliation was not the only blow struck by the Revolution at the church. By a decree of July 12, 1790, the Assembly overthrew the whole ancient church constitution, replacing it with another one more in harmony with the new political divisions of the country. The boundaries of the dioceses were made to coincide with those of the departments; all ecclesiastical jurisdiction was to end; all ecclesiastical positions were to be filled by election, the electors of a department choosing their bishop and those of a district their *cure*. Every priest elected must, before receiving consecration, swear to uphold the Constitution.

The disciples of Voltaire troubled themselves little about destroying the authority of institutions hallowed by age and faith, inasmuch as they were persuaded that in order to have done with the whole feudal system it was necessary to overthrow the mightiest of all feudal powers. But, in their ignorance of the common man's modes of thinking and feeling, they had not the slightest suspicion of the storm that they were provoking. The despised masses had remained altogether unaffected by the spirit of free-thinking and contempt for all positive religion, which the Encyclopædists had made fashionable among the cultured world. The coarse rabble of the capital might sneer at all that was called religion; but the people of the country—the peasantry—adhered with immovable tenacity to the church of their fathers. The greater part of the lower clergy,

also, in obedience to the dictates of conscience, were opposed to an attack at once so unscrupulous and so impious. Two-thirds of the priests refused to take the oath to the Constitution. Of 70,000 clergymen, 46,000 were driven from their charges, while the compliant pastors read their masses to empty churches. With warmer devotion the congregations of the faithful assembled in hidden places—in woods and deserts—there to have the unprofaned sacrament dispensed to them by non-juring priests. The arbitrary transformation of the church touched the consciences of the common folk, and made the same class that had hitherto exulted over its own deliverance from the fetters of feudalism enemies of the Revolution.

The Assembly saw nothing of the danger ahead. Behind the Third Estate there had already arisen a Fourth Estate, which as little recognized the right of the Third to rule as this had recognized that of the clergy and nobility, and which, holding a mere political revolution as altogether inadequate, demanded a social one also. This all came as a necessary consequence from the Declaration of the Rights of Man; and the first to urge it with inexorable logical precision was Robespierre, an advocate of Arras. With his repulsive appearance, dissonant voice, and frigid rhetoric, this deputy had played the reverse of a distinguished part in the brilliant circle of the Constituent Assembly. As well as a seignior of the court he had imbued himself with the sentimental phraseology of Rousseau; but, without ideas of his own, dry, hard logician as he was, he became the slave of the words of his teacher and translated his theories into deeds. This man, by opposing the tax qualification for the suffrage, on the ground that every citizen had a right to the free exercise of every political privilege, and to free access to every office, and by denouncing the man who, in a community of equals, would dare to debar another from the exercise of these rights for the purpose of plundering him to his own advantage, took on himself the office of advocate of the lower classes, and, even in the midst of their lawless and bloody deeds, was never weary of praising them as the true exponents of every civic virtue, and of setting them up in contrast to the self-seeking higher classes. The main scene of his activity was, not the National Assembly, but the Breton Club, founded by Barnave, Dupont, the brothers Lameth, and others, which, since its migration to Paris, had taken up its quarters in a Jacobin convent and had assumed the name of the Jacobin Club. This club began now to enroll on its list citizens in general, and, what was much more momentous, to extend itself over all France. By the end of 1790 there were two hundred Jacobin clubs, every one of which made it its duty to stir up the masses and



bring them under its control. Since the dissolution of every organization for maintaining order, the passions of the masses constituted the only real power, and it followed, therefore, that the party which knew how to flatter these and subdue them to its purpose would attain supremacy. In this way there grew up, by the side of the legal, but powerless, government, one not recognized by law, which every day became stronger, and, now that the people were free from the feudal aristocracy, began to direct its spite toward the National Assembly, which presumed to set up the will of 1200 men in the place of the alone legitimate and valid source



FIG. 13.—Danton. After a drawing by Jacques Louis David (1748-1825). (D'Héricault, "La Révolution.")

of power—the will of the people. Yet, at first, the Jacobins were rather theorizers about anarchy; those who practiced it were the Cordeliers. These also constituted a club named after its meeting-place—an old Franciscan convent—and were at first only a section of the Jacobins. Since November, 1790, their club had been independent. At its head stood Danton (Fig. 13). This man—a native of Arcis-sur-Aube—the Revolution, at its outbreak, found as a pettifogging lawyer of dissolute habits. His athletic form, his voice of thunder, his impassioned oratory, and his utter indifference in the use of means pointed him

out as a born demagogue. To the Cordeliers belonged also Marat (Fig. 14), formerly the Count of Artois's physician, a man of repulsive, reptile-like nature, who spurted his venom on everything higher and better, but who, as editor of the "*Friend of the People*," understood how to goad on the lowest passions of the mob. He was the first to cast the words "division of property" among the masses.

From the exaltation of spirit over the glorious triumph of freedom



FIG. 14.—Marat. After an engraving by Peronard; original drawing (April, 1793) by Boze.

and the dawn of the golden age, sprang the idea of celebrating the realization of the new Social Contract by a festival on the anniversary of the storming of the Bastille. But here, as all through the Revolution, the ridiculous went hand-in-hand with the sublime. A Baron Klotz from Cleves, who called himself Anacharsis Clootz and posed as the orator of the human race, appeared before the National Assembly at the head of a deputation of all nationalities, decked out in the wardrobes of the Parisian theatres, and obtained permission for himself and his following to take part in the festival. At the same sitting the principle of equality celebrated a new victory, for the abolition of all titles of nobility was decreed (Fig. 15). On July 14, the festival took place on the Champ-de-Mars. In the presence of hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic citizens, Tal-

leyrand, assisted by two hundred white-robed priests begirt by the tricolor, consecrated the banners for the eighty-three departments. Lafayette, in the name of the National Guard, took the oath to the new Constitution; after him the president of the National Assembly; and last, the king. All present repeated the oath with uplifted hand. The queen, caught by the general spirit of enthusiasm, raised the dauphin



FIG. 15.—Contemporary print on the abolition of the privileged orders, etc.; these had to be relieved of their insignia by the secretary of the city magistracy. (D'Héricault, "La Révolution.")

aloft to show him to the people. Dance and song followed on the religious solemnities. But now that the sublime and touching scene of the federation festivities was over, and the interregnum of lawlessness seemed to have been brought to a close by the election of fitting officers in every department, *arrondissement*, and *commune*, a condition began to show itself, which was more pregnant of consequences than almost any other in the whole history of the Revolution. The continuously recurring elections made the exercise of their sovereignty a burden to many, and the more moderate and sober-minded, especially, were thus induced, as it were, to disarm themselves. But the partisans of anarchy remained on the field of contest, so that the minorities, which, like the Jacobins, devoted themselves exclusively to politics, secured more and

more control of the elections, and ultimately became, to all intents and purposes, sovereigns of the whole land.

Mirabeau saw how the king and his counselors were letting the reins slip more and more from their hands, and how the unguided state was hurrying to destruction. The resolution of November 7 had closed for him the way to the highest power. Nevertheless, it pleased him to think of himself as the saviour of the state, if not in an official position, at least as a secret and trusted counselor. His first approaches to the court met with a rude repulse; but the peril of the state became at length so grave as to overcome Marie Antoinette's repugnance, and, on May 10, 1790, an arrangement was entered into through the mediation of Mercy and la Marek. Mirabeau entered the secret service of the king and received 208,000 livres for the payment of his debts, 6000 monthly, and the promise of a million at the close of the Constituent Assembly. He had not long to wait for an opportunity of making himself of service to the king. When Montmorin, the minister of foreign affairs, on May 14, communicated to the Assembly that a war threatened to break out between Spain and England over the possession of Nootka Sound, on the Pacific coast of North America, and that he, in accordance with the Bourbon Family Compact of 1761, was fitting out fourteen ships of war in aid of the former, the Left availed itself of the occasion to raise the question of who possessed the right of deciding upon peace and war. These zealots for the sovereignty of the people maintained that this right lay, not in the crown, but in the nation. Cazalès's warning: "You have stripped the king of two of his attributes—administration and justice; deprive him of a third, and you will no longer have a king," made no impression. But Mirabeau, on the other hand, depicted in such forcible manner the danger of transferring this right to an irresponsible body subject to all the impulses of passion, that the initiative, at least, was preserved to the crown. The power of deciding upon peace or war was declared to belong to the nation, but its actual exercise could take place only with the concurrence of both the legislative body and the executive.

Mirabeau's alliance with the court could not remain a secret, and he himself was at no great pains to conceal it. Although hitherto overwhelmed with debts, he now, quite ostentatiously, gathered around him all the comforts of wealth. The malicious calumnies against him as a court mercenary he demolished by the mace-like strokes of his eloquence: "But a few days ago," he said, "men insisted on carrying me hence in triumph; now, they are shrieking in the streets over the treachery of Count Mirabeau. I did not need to be told that from the

Capitol to the Tarpeian Rock is but a few steps, but a man who contends for reason and fatherland does not so readily admit defeat." But from day to day he became more deeply entangled in the meshes of contradiction, while he met with outside obstacles that impeded him in the work he had in hand. Among these last, not the least were the queen's want of judgment in state affairs, and, in particular, her incapability of recognizing what was justifiable in the Revolution, and Lafayette's vanity, which made him recoil from co-operation with a man who was stronger than himself and who put him in the shade. But nowhere did the Assembly find a stronger auxiliary in its ceaseless efforts to strip the executive of one prerogative after another, than in the weakness and pliability of the ministry. During the whole progress of the Anglo-Spanish struggle, Montmorin communicated to the diplomatic committee each dispatch as he received it, so that when the conflict came to a close in November, the Assembly was in possession of another important conquest—the supervision of foreign relations. The allegiance of the army, too, was transferred more and more from the king to this body. The greater part of the preferments were withdrawn from the king, and promotion made dependent on fitness. The non-commissioned officers were appointed by a sort of elective process, the pay of the privates advanced, and the right of citizenship reserved for soldiers out of active service. But the suspicion that the officers were reactionary and traitorous relaxed the bonds of discipline to a frightful extent, and tended to make the officers—already embittered through the abrogation of nobility—what the calumnies of the demagogic press pronounced them to be. Military mutinies were the order of the day; but the Assembly had gained its object—the army was made worthless as a tool for a reaction. The royal authority received a severe blow through the publication of the so-called Red Book, from which the deputy Camus extracted evidence of the extent to which the good nature of Louis XVI. had been abused by courtiers and state officials, that they might fatten at the public cost.

Among all these difficulties the want of money was always the most pressing. At first the confiscation of the immovable property appeared to the political hot-heads to disclose an inexhaustible sea of gold; but the compensation of the holders of hereditary judicial and revenue offices swallowed a full half of the confiscated church-possessions. The Assembly had, moreover, been compelled to abolish the hated indirect taxes—the salt-tax, the tobacco-royalty, and wine- and spirit-duties—without receiving a farthing from the direct taxes voted as an equivalent. A deficit of 220,000,000 had to be faced. To the old

debts the Revolution had added 1,430,000,000, and the new institutions demanded a large outlay. But the eating sores that exhausted the scanty resources of the state were the pacification of the capital and the feeding of its proletariat. The lack of employment, the influx of many thousands of unemployed and starving men from the provinces, and the powerlessness of the law combined to produce a condition of things that might well have overtaken a hand stronger than that of the gallant but unbusiness-like Bailly. To ward off the desperation born of hunger, the city was compelled to buy corn at a high price abroad in order to sell it cheap to the bakers, to furnish money to the poor to buy bread, and to employ 17,000 men, at a daily wage of 20 sous, in the public workshops of Montmartre on useless work or on none at all. Despoiled of its main source of income through the suppression of the *octroi*, it addressed itself to the state and set before it the choice: money or revolution. Mirabeau strove more and more earnestly for the dismissal of Necker, who stood utterly helpless before this calamity, which was largely due to himself. On September 10, this minister gave up his office. Mirabeau, compelled to choose between immediate bankruptcy or more paper money, decided for the latter, as the less of the two evils. On his motion the Assembly voted the issue of another 800,000,000 of assignats.

In proportion as the difficulties of Mirabeau's political position increased, his physical powers, owing to his profligate mode of life, wasted away. Only the pathos, which had been his element on the tribune, did not forsake him in his last moments. "I carry with me in my heart," he said on his death-bed, "the mourning-clothes of the monarchy, and the partisans of faction will divide their shreds." On April 2, he expired. The Jacobins, who had lately regarded him as one of themselves, celebrated his obsequies with imposing pomp. Great as was Mirabeau's confidence in himself—a confidence expressed even in his last words—it is hardly conceivable that, had longer life been granted him, he could have effectively put a stop to the disasters now coming upon France. He died at the right moment for his fame; but with him the monarchy lost its last remaining prop.

Paris became every day more intolerable as a residence for the royal family, and, for some time back, thoughts of flight had occupied their minds. But such was Louis's easiness of disposition, that it was not until the Assembly laid its sacrilegious hands on the church that he was roused from his lethargy. For the execution of Mirabeau's plan, that he should throw himself into some city in the interior, there to rally the well-disposed around him and confer the much-needed boons of freedom and order on his people, there was neither the intelligence

nor resolution. Much more readily was an ear given to Breteuil's counsel, from his exile in Switzerland, urging a flight to some frontier city and the suppression of the Revolution with foreign help. With this design a correspondence was opened with Bouillé, commander-in-chief of the eastern provinces, at Metz. But, like all that this unhappy court undertook, the plan was unripe and impracticable. Notwithstanding the mystery in which this scheme was enshrouded, the hate-sharpened instincts of the demagogues in some measure divined it. It was part of their tactics to keep the popular excitement always at fever-heat through spreading reports of conspiracies. Marat, especially, was unwearied in accusing the court, and especially the queen, of traitorous correspondence with foreign countries, of entering into a conspiracy with all kings against liberty, and of meditating flight. So deep-seated were these suspicions that the king's two aunts, though provided with regular passports, were stopped by the mob when in the act of setting out for Italy, and a decree of the Assembly was required to enable them to pursue their journey unmolested.

Fain would the king have performed his Easter devotions in the quietude of St.-Cloud, under the guidance of a non-juring priest, for Pope Pius VI. had decreed that all priests who had taken the oath should retract it within forty days on pain of being suspended from their functions and declared contumacious. But, on April 18, the mob prevented his departure, in the firm conviction that he contemplated flight. The National Guard refused to obey the orders of Lafayette. From the National Assembly the king received only the counsel to forego his purpose for the sake of peace. Robespierre did not let the opportunity escape him of accusing the ministers of consorting with enemies, foreign and domestic. The municipality added the demand that the king should avouch in the face of all Europe the perfect liberty he enjoyed and his devotion to the Constitution. With due obsequiousness, the king addressed a circular note to that effect to the ministers of France at foreign courts. Lafayette, whom Marat never ceased to accuse of abetting the flight, received at the Tuileries the assurance that no removal was contemplated.

In point of fact the experience of April 18 brought the court to decide for flight at all hazards, but blundering and short-sightedness were once more omnipotent. The plan was to reach Montmédy. There the king, surrounded by those of his troops who had remained loyal to him and backed by the concurrence of the foreign powers, should issue to the monarchists a summons for the election of a new assembly, and with this the new Constitution should be established. On the pretext of protecting

a convoy of silver, Bouillé posted details of troops along the roads, while the Russian ambassador had passes made out for the Baronesses Korff and Stegelmann with family and servants. Shortly after midnight (June 21) the fugitives left the Tuileries one by one, Marie Antoinette slipping, unrecognized, past Lafayette, who came to inspect the guard. Outside the barriers the party was re-united without misadventure and entered the carriage, which the faithful Count Fersen (Fig. 16), colonel of the Royal



FIG. 16.—Count Axel of Fersen (at the age of twenty-eight). After a miniature painted in Paris.

Swedish Regiment, accompanied to Bondy. Although the king had not once the foresight to conceal his face, which was repeatedly recognized, Ste.-Menehould was reached without challenge. A few stages more, and he was safe! Here, however, while the horses were being changed, he was recognized by the postmaster, Dronet. This man, a Jacobin fanatic, hurried by side roads to Varennes, and alarmed the National Guard and authorities. The bridge over the Aire was barricaded, the hussars posted on it joined the townsmen, and the royal family, on its arrival, was compelled to alight. After long parleying the king acknowledged himself. Unkingly, he stooped to supplications and prayers for leave to pass on. When the eagerly looked-for dragoons of Bouillé appeared from Dun, they met such preparations for resistance that they ventured



on no attack. Under escort of the three commissioners—Latour-Maubourg, Barnave, and Pétion—whom the National Assembly had dispatched on tidings of the seizure, the sorrowful return journey was undertaken. The Count of Provence was fortunate enough to make his escape over the Belgian frontier by another route. Bouillé, a few days later, fled to Luxemburg. From there he addressed a letter to the National Assembly, in which he took on himself the whole responsibility for the plan of escape.

The news of the flight fell on the capital like a thunderbolt. The lively imagination of the populace pictured the restoration of the old conditions by force of foreign arms. Even the friends of monarchy recognized the gravity of the wound it had received. The fiction that the king had been abducted was dispelled by the protest he had left behind him, in which he indicated the reforms he was ready to accede to. As soon as the National Assembly recovered its self-possession, it assumed the supreme authority, ordered the king to remain where he could be found, took measures for preserving the peace, and invited the ministers to appear at its bar. "The power of the executive," said one of the deputies, "returns naturally to its source." On June 25 the Assembly pronounced the sentence of the king's suspension, to continue, by a decree of July 16, till he accepted the Constitution. But Brissot, an unprincipled *littérateur* and an adroit demagogue, declaimed in favor of the subversion of the throne. The Cordeliers boasted that their lists comprised as many tyrannicides as members. Among the Jacobins, Robespierre, while disclaiming republican ideas, was never weary of heaping calumnies on others and glorifying himself. He unveiled a criminal plot for the overthrow of the Constitution, participated in by all the ministers and nearly all the deputies. The ministers and deputies who chanced to enter at the time were greeted by Danton with a torrent of reproaches. Marat demanded, as the only means of deliverance from treason, the naming by the people of a military tribune with absolute power, who should at once cause every traitor to be cut down. Leaf by leaf had the Constituent Assembly stripped the tree of monarchy bare, and now democrats asked if it would not be simpler to cut down the useless trunk. Yet while the republic thus for the first time showed its face, the moderate majority, on the other hand, were in favor of pausing and stopping the further progress of the Revolution. The royalists took no part in the debate whatever; the advocates of a democratic monarchy, like Lafayette, Dupont, and Lameth, separated themselves from the Jacobins, and formed themselves into an independent club in the convent of the Feuillants. This step gave the Jacobins

more completely over to the domination of the extremists. These now resolved to bring about the deposition of the king and the abolition of monarchy, and decided that with this aim a petition should be signed on the Champ-de-Mars. The measures shortly before adopted by the Assembly—the closing of the public workshops, the prohibition of unions of workmen, and the expulsion of non-Parisian artisans—brought the embittered masses in flocks to the place of signature; but, before the procession for the presentation of the petition could set itself in motion, the mayor caused martial law to be proclaimed, and a volley from the National Guard, led there by Lafayette, cleared the ground. The real movers in the matter, Danton, Robespierre, and Marat, had wisely kept out of the way.

The Constitutionals, after having given this evidence of their energy in the cause of order, felt now a double necessity of demonstrating their love of freedom and friendly disposition toward the people, by the completion of the Constitution and by keeping out of it all that could tend toward reaction. Thus was this opportunity for strengthening the state authority lost. The doctrines that the crown was hereditary and the person of the sovereign inviolable found acceptance—the latter, however, only on the condition that he did not forfeit his throne by encouraging a foreign attack. The whole mechanism of the Constitution was directed, according to the judgment of Napoleon, not to strengthening the social order and legitimate authority, but to limiting and to destroying the power of the government. The king was simply a titular official; the executive not the head to direct, but the arm to obey. But, under the circumstances, refusal was out of the question, and, on September 13, Louis XVI. accepted the Constitution and pledged himself to its maintenance and its defence against foreign assault. On September 14 he took the oath to it, and his suspension was removed.

Robespierre (Fig. 17) has the demerit of having made the already bad Constitution worse by the addition of three supplementary clauses. The first struck out the money-qualification (55 livres) for members of the national legislature; the second provided that no member of the Assembly should be called to join the ministry before the lapse of four years; the last provided that, to insure the nation against the too long duration of an oligarchy, no member should be eligible for re-election to the immediately succeeding Legislative Assembly. The result of all this was to take the practical carrying out of the Constitution out of the hands of the only persons who meant honorably by it, while France saw all who possessed any political talent shut out from the next chamber. Finally, the Constituent Assembly abolished the office of commander-in-chief of

the National Guards, and decreed that the chiefs of the legions should discharge its duties monthly in turn. The armed force of the capital was thus no longer the main pillar of order.



FIG. 17.—Robespierre. Facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

No less pernicious was another legacy left behind it by the Constituent Assembly when it closed its sittings on September 30. The financial

system, we have already seen, was in a state of excessive derangement. The measures of the Assembly, instead of curing this, tended to aggravate it. Independently of the old deficit, the receipts up to the end of 1790 showed a deficit of 112,000,000, and the first six months of 1791 a further deficiency of 115,000,000; and, as the first 1,200,000,000 of assignats were not applied (as promised) to the liquidation of debts, but to cover current expenses, a new issue of assignats was, on June 19, 1791, voted to the amount of 600,000,000, and shortly afterward a further 100,000,000 in small amounts, going down as low as five livres. But just in proportion as paper money was increased in volume, its current worth was lessened, while the wild speculations rendered possible by the sale of the national estates intensified and widened the area of the depreciation of property.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, AND THE CONFLICT OF THE REVOLUTION WITH EUROPE.

(OCTOBER 1, 1791, TO SEPTEMBER 20, 1792.)

THE transfer of authority to the Third Estate, the establishment of the equality of all citizens, the radical disorganization of property relations—in these three points were concentrated the results of the Revolution up to this time. But the Third Estate was not able to retain its ascendancy. Almost as soon as won, this passed out of its hands into those of the proletariat.

In intellectual power the new National Assembly stood far below its predecessor. Now that they had secured a constitution, the people were largely content. A period of relaxation in political activity on the part of the people set in, and the new body was really the representative of minorities. In Paris itself, of 81,200 electors, but 7200 cast their votes. Of the various parties, the democrats were by far the most active, and nothing more conclusively proves their numerical weakness in the country than the fact that they were in the minority in the Assembly. The monarchically-disposed Feuillants constituted the decided majority, but, owing to the exclusion of all the members of the last Assembly, they were by no means strong enough intellectually for their mission. Half of the 745 members were advocates and jurists; of landed proprietors there was scarcely one. In the midst of this general barrenness the more talented of the members of the Left had little difficulty in gaining a distinguished position for themselves, especially those of them called, after the department from which their leading men came, Girondists—Guadet, Vergniant, Gensonné, Isnard, Barbaroux, Condorcet, etc.—men with all the fiery energy of the south, but incapable of effecting anything permanent.

The meeting place of these men was the *salon* of Madame Roland, wife of the former inspector of industries at Lyons—a woman passionately addicted to dabbling in politics, who went into raptures over a republic which should realize the ideals of Rousseau and Plato. There was to be met the ambitious theorist, Abbé Sieyès, who sketched out for the party their plan of campaign. The last thought of this party was the doing of that for which the Assembly was specially called—namely,

the carrying out of the Constitution by enacting organic laws. On the contrary, the Girondists, though not properly republicans, were in accord with the Jacobins in the assault on the work of the Constituent Assembly. What, indeed, mainly distinguished them from the Jacobins was not so much their political principles as their more elegant manners, more refined culture, and far inferior ability in manipulating the masses. One event of supreme importance marking this period was the election for the municipal council of Paris, in which the Jacobins got a firm footing by the election of Pétion as mayor, Manuel as *procureur*, and Danton as his substitute. On April 9, 1792, the Jacobins seized the occasion of a banquet given by them to the pardoned mutineers of Nancy to assume as their cognizance the red cap of the galley-slaves.

The impression made on contemporaries by the first breath of the Revolution was at once powerful and seductive. "That was a glorious sunrise," avows Hegel. "Had I a hundred voices," sang Klopstock, "I would celebrate the liberation of Gaul." Bürger, Stolberg, Voss cherished the hope that the movement would extend to their fatherland. Wilhelm von Humboldt visited Paris, in 1789, to be witness of "the inspiring victory of humanity over absolutism." Johann von Müller praised the Fourteenth of July as the most beautiful day since the downfall of the world-empire of Rome. "At the cost of a few castles of rich barons, and the heads of a few, mostly guilty, aristocrats, freedom was cheaply purchased."

Very different was the attitude of foreign cabinets toward the Revolution. The first friction with foreign powers was a result of the resolutions of August 4, by which various states of the empire—the electorate of Mayence, Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Nassau—as well as some of the knights of the empire and several church dignitaries were deprived of rights and revenues in Alsace and other frontier provinces, which had been guaranteed them by the Peace of Westphalia. In particular the German archbishops claimed the maintenance of their metropolitan rights in the bishoprics of Lorraine. Such was the antagonism between the rationalistic uniformity of classes and privileges now established in France and the rigidly inflexible caste system of the empire that a friendly compromise was impossible. The repeal of the resolutions was not to be thought of; the parties aggrieved declined all money compensation; yet neither the emperor nor Prussia was at all eager to espouse the cause of the claimants. Still more vainly did the *émigrés* storm at the doors of foreign courts; not even in the Tuileries did their schemes find countenance, for none knew better than Marie Antoinette that an attack on France by the *émigrés* would involve the royal family

and the monarchy itself in deadly peril. She relied for help only on the great powers—above all, on her brother, the Emperor Joseph II.

Meanwhile the thoughts of her brother were occupied in quite another direction. His mind was full of the great war by which he hoped, in alliance with Catherine II. of Russia, to make an end of Turkish domination in Europe. These complications in the east kept the other cabinets of Europe in a state of extreme suspense. An alliance was entered into between England, Prussia, and the Netherlands for the maintenance of the balance of power and the preservation of Turkey. Count Hertzberg, minister of King Frederick William II. of Prussia, and in statecraft a disciple of Frederick the Great, bore ever in mind the principles of his illustrious teacher, that Prussia could not allow Austria to acquire any augmentation of strength unless she herself got a full equivalent. Without striking a blow, but merely by stirring up Poland, Galicia, Hungary, Belgium, and Sweden, he foiled the execution of the plans of the emperor and czarina. In the midst of these complications the emperor died on February 20, 1790, and was succeeded by his brother, Leopold II., Grand Duke of Tuscany. At home universal discontent, commotion, and defection; abroad, in place of the expected laurels and conquests, a resultless and inglorious war; and the prospect of being under the necessity of submitting to the dictation of a hated rival—such was the inheritance entered upon by the new emperor.

But the old and often-proved good fortune of Austria did not desert her in this juncture. No one was better qualified to set her free from the net in which she was involved, than this passionless, disreect, and supple prince. Through concessions within the empire and renunciation of all conquests, he soon had his hands free enough to come to an understanding with Prussia. Hertzberg, too, had to learn by experience that his over-intricate calculations involved more than one error. Neither the Sublime Porte nor the Poles would for one moment consent to purchase by sacrifices the mediation of Prussia. Thus his elaborate adjustment scheme was found to be impracticable, and through Leopold's superior adroitness a convention on the basis of the *status quo ante* was signed at Reichenbach, on July 27. The dismissal of Hertzberg (Fig. 18), in May, 1791, pointed to a closer relation between the two old rivals. But, in view of the newness of this Prussian friendship, and of the differences in regard to the interpretation of some of the articles in the Treaty of Reichenbach, Leopold was much too astute a statesman to mix himself up with the affairs of France. He sought, through Mercy, to persuade his sister to renounce all thoughts

of flight. The royal family should, in his view, continue their residence in Paris till the revolutionary combustible material had burned itself



FIG. 18.—Hertzberg. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by I. S. Klauber (1754-1820); painting by Friedrich Schroeder (born 1768).

out, and a durable constitutional arrangement had been arrived at by co-operation with the more moderate of all parties. In his view a con-



federation of all the powers of Europe should contribute to this end only by an imposing display of force on all the frontiers of France, while the



FIG. 19.—Leopold II. Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving, Vienna, 1790, by Jacob Adam; original painting, in April, 1790, by Joseph Kreutzinger (1750-1820).

people of Paris should be emphatically warned that they would be held to strict account for the safety of the royal family. Not till a renewed cry of distress came from Marie Antoinette did he promise to place an

army-corps on the Belgian frontier, to aid her if she succeeded in escaping from Paris.



FIG. 20.—Frederick William II. of Prussia. Reduced facsimile of an engraving, Vienna, 1793, by Jacob Adam; original painting, Dresden, 1792, by A. Graff (1736-1813).

Just as momentous complications abroad followed the French constitutional troubles, so the internal disorders convulsing Poland now began to produce corresponding effects on France. One lesson the Polish

patriots had learned from their frightful experiences of 1773, namely, that the main cause of the misfortunes of their fatherland was not to be sought for abroad, but in the permanent state of anarchy at home invested with the name of "Constitution." Already the sketch of a new constitution, elaborated by a committee of the diet, had, through its proposal to make the throne hereditary, given rise to the most violent dissensions, which were sedulously fomented from without; and when only thirteen of the provincial diets, which were called to consider it, gave it their approval, the champions of an hereditary monarchy—the patriot party—came to the unhappy resolution of enforcing their views by means of a *coup d'état*. On May 3, the old and feeble King Stanislaus Augustus, who served as their tool, appeared in the national diet (almost entirely made up of the initiated) to point to the adoption of a strong constitution as the only means of giving back peace to the land. The draft submitted—comprising regulations in relation to the peasantry, the granting of political rights to burghers, the erection of two chambers with an independent ministry, the abolition of the *liberum veto*, and declaring the crown hereditary in the electoral house of Saxony—was received with stormy acclamations. The slightest reflection must have told the originators of this *coup d'état* that, without the consent of the three interested powers, or at least of one of them, such a step was an impossibility. Russia and Prussia regarded every measure in any way tending to strengthen Poland as a menace to their interests, and, therefore, looked askance at this political revolution; the Emperor Leopold II. (Fig. 19), who saw in a stronger Poland a bulwark against Prussia and Russia, alone greeted it with favor. Its immediate effect was to intensify the mutual distrust of all the three. For a moment the tension was so extreme that it threatened to result in an open breach between the two German powers.

King Frederick William (Fig. 20) was of too susceptible a temperament and possessed too little strength of mind not to fall under the influence of favorites. While he was introducing to his court, as Countess Lichtenau, his mistress, the daughter of his court musician, two men—both of doubtful reputation—had skill enough to gain the king's confidence. These were Colonel Bischoffwerder, a native of Saxony, and Johann Christian Wöllner, first a village pastor, afterward a counselor of Prince Henry. Both zealous Rosierneians, they found in the king's qualms of conscience a handle admirably adapted for enabling them to turn him whither they would, and, with the view of rendering their control over him still more complete, initiated him into the pretended mysteries of their order, with its spirit-seeing and

other jugglery. In particular, the wily and hypocritical Wöllner confirmed him in his antipathy toward the "enlightenment" and toward the whole system of government of his great uncle, and, securing for himself, in 1788, the position of finance minister and head of the department of religion and education, endeavored to constrain the consciences of men and to erect a bulwark against revolutionary ideas. He even attempted to put a stop to the writings of Kant, who, as the representative of religious rationalism, was a thorn in the flesh of ostentatious pietists and fanatics; and, further, interdicted the docents of the university of Königsberg from treating, in their lectures, of religion as a subject within the bounds of pure reason. A general visitation was to drive neology forth from schools and universities. Nor did he and his clique scruple to intrude themselves into the other departments of government, till the consequences showed themselves in the paralysis of the administration, diminished revenues, and the growing impoverishment of the land. At length, in 1794, in spite of the impediments interposed by Wöllner, there came into operation the code of laws known as the "Allgemeines Landrecht" ("General Laws of the Land"), mainly the production of the high chancellor, Carmer, which—although retaining the distinction of classes and the hereditary subjection of the peasantry—by subordinating all authority, even that of the sovereign, to law, marks an epoch-making advance in the national life.

Bischoffwerder's dabbling in foreign politics had no better results than that of Wöllner in home affairs. This minister made his *début* with an unsuccessful attempt to oppose, to the threatening and growing power of Russia, a coalition of Prussia, France, and Austria. Bischoffwerder went to Vienna, where Leopold received the advances of Prussia with much satisfaction. Bischoffwerder paid the emperor a second visit at Milan, bringing with him a proposal for a personal interview of the two sovereigns at Pillnitz, a castle of the Elector of Saxony near Dresden. At the same time, tidings arrived of Louis's abortive attempt at flight. The emperor was deeply moved. He remained, however, firm in his original opinion that only a coalition of all the European powers could make head against the Revolution, and, on July 6, addressed a circular note to the other sovereigns of Europe, calling on them to unite with him in a common declaration calculated to bring the heads of the movement to their senses. Naturally, he was more than ever impressed with the necessity of attaching Prussia to himself. Accordingly, a treaty was entered into by which the present possessions of both contracting parties were guaranteed; and it was stipulated that neither should enter into an alliance with any third power without the other's




FIG. 21. Meeting of the Emperor, the King of Prussia, and the Elector of Saxony at Pillnitz, on August 25, 1791. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Fr. Heisehmann in Nürnberg. Original drawing by M. Heydelhoff.

knowledge, nor undertake anything against the territorial *status* or constitution of Poland, nor allow any member of their respective houses to marry the Saxon princess, who was looked upon as destined to wear the Polish crown; and, further, they promised to lend aid to each other, if the internal peace of either state was disturbed, and do their utmost to bring about a concert of the European powers in regard to the affairs of

France. Under the impression produced by the same event, Leopold hurried on the signing of a peace with the Porte, on August 5, at Sistova; but even now, as before, he was constant to his purpose of undertaking no hostile measures against France. Two considerations confirmed him in this: the express declaration of England that, in the event of a breach between France and Austria, she would preserve the strictest neutrality, and his conviction that, should such a breach occur, Poland would inevitably become the prey of Russia. The Czarina Catherine, together with the hot-headed Gustavus III. of Sweden, whom she had instigated to the crusade against the Revolution, recognized the emigrant princes as the only legitimate government of France. Leopold, on the other hand, reduced the effective force of his army by a half, and counseled reconciliation and mutual concessions in Paris.

At Pillnitz, on August 25, took place the concerted meeting of the two sovereigns (Fig. 21). Their views were found to be in harmony in regard both to the Polish constitution and the position to be assumed in respect to France. The king, like the emperor, was far from cherishing any desire for a war against the Revolution. The propositions of Artois, conceived without any regard to the peril of the royal family and having in view only the restoration of the former conditions by armed force, were rejected. Their own programme the monarchs embodied in a manifesto, in which they declared the situation of the King of France to be a matter of common interest to all sovereigns, and announced their intention, in case of an understanding being arrived at among these rulers, to carry out with the aid of their armed forces the measures deemed necessary. But, as the emperor well knew that England stood fast in her purpose to remain neutral, this declaration was really nothing more than a demonstration to intimidate the Parisian democrats.

This result was, in the main, in conformity with the views of Marie Antoinette, except that she held the European concert for something of more serious import than her brother did. She was quite at one with the sovereigns in their determination to keep the *émigrés* from taking action, for their interposition would infallibly give the signal for civil war. With the acceptance of the Constitution by Louis XVI., the clouds of war seemed to have dispersed. The emperor received the representative of France (PLATE VI.<sup>1</sup>), and announced this to the other courts,

<sup>1</sup> A letter of Louis XVI. to Frederick William II. of Prussia.

TRANSCRIPTION.

(Præsent. le 13 janvier 1792.) \*

Monsieur mon Frere, j'ai appris par M. du Moutier l'intérêt que votre Majesté avoit

\* Note as to the receipt of the letter at the Prussian court.

Paris, le 10 Janvier 1792.

Monsieur mon Frere, j'ai appris par M<sup>lle</sup> de Strouss l'intent que votre altesse  
avait benoquée non seulement pour ma personne, mais encore pour le bien de mon  
Royaume. Les dispositions de S. M. a m'en donner des benoquages dans tous les cas.  
on se voit pourroit en avoir pour le bien de mon Peuple, a cette occasion  
ma sensibilité je l'assume avec confiance dans ce moment cy. au malgre l'oc-  
cupation que je fais de la nouvelle constitution, les factious nous ont survenant  
le projet de changer l'existence des rois de la monarchie. je vous en mande  
a l'Empereur a l'Impératrice de Russie, aux Rois d'Espagne et de Sicile, et je  
vous presente l'idée d'un Congrès des principales Puissances de l'Europe, appelé  
d'une forte armée, comme la meilleure maniere, pour arrêter les factious  
donner les moyens de établir une ordre de choses plus desirable, et empêcher que  
le mal qui nous travaille ne soit que nous les autres États de l'Europe. j'espère que  
S. M. approuvera mes idées, et qu'elle me guidera le secret le plus absolu sur  
la demande que je fais auprès d'elle. elle saura aisément que les circonstances  
me je me trouve, m'obligent a la plus grande circonspection, c'est ce qui fait  
qu'il n'y a que le Baron de Breunel qui soit instruit de mes projets et S. M.  
ne lui fait rien savoir et qu'elle ordonne. je sais cette occasion de remercier  
S. M. des bontés qu'elle a eu pour le S. Keymann, et je goûte une véritable  
satisfaction a donner a V. M. des assurances d'amour et d'affection avec  
lesquelles je suis Monsieur mon frere de votre altesse bon Frere

Dans le 3  
2<sup>me</sup> 1791







Op. (Voulez-vous ci joint la lettre du  
Roi de France, et ~~la~~ celle du  
Roi de Bretagne ou il ne s'agit  
qu'en gros du projet du Conquies  
armé, pour <sup>démontre</sup> ~~me~~ je garantis le secret  
~~de~~ dont je fais toute consequence,  
mais je ne puis reprendre de ce qui en  
fera aux autres Cours, .....

13. Janvier 1772 J. P. La Roche

with the expression of his conviction that the dangers which existed at the time of his circular note were no longer imminent (PLATE VII.<sup>1</sup>).

The prospect of the interference of a congress of foreign powers in the affairs of France was something against which the easily aroused national sensitiveness of the Frenchman rose in rebellion. The mistrust remaining behind since the flight, the peevish magniloquence of the *émigrés*, and the war-cloud that had been impending since 1790 were well calculated to confirm the conviction that the whole of Europe was in league with the court, the priests, and the *émigrés*, and ready to appear in arms against his new-won freedom. It was thus that the Declaration of Pillnitz became a weapon in the hands of the demagogues. Their gloomy warnings seemed to receive their first confirmation from the contumacy of the non-juring priests, which threatened to kindle anew the torch of civil war in some provinces. Avignon—where, by the help of French emissaries and bandits, the papal authority had been overthrown and which had been incorporated with France by a decree of the Constituent Assembly (September 14, 1790)—was the scene of indescribable

temoigné non seulement pour ma personne, mais encore pour le bien de mon Royaume. Les dispositions de V. M. à m'en donner des temoignages dans tous les cas ou cet interest pourroit estre utile pour le bien de mon Peuple, a ont excité vivement ma sensibilité. Je le reclame avec confiance dans ce moment cy ou malgré l'acceptation que j'ai faite de la nouvelle constitution, les factieux montrent ouvertement le projet de detruire entierement les restes de la Monarchie. Je vient de m'adresser à l'Empereur, à l'Imperatrice de Russie, aux Roys d'Espagne et de Suede, et je leur presente l'idée d'un congres des principales Puissances de l'Europe, appuié d'une forge armée, comme la meilleure maniere, pour arrester ici les factieux donner les moyens de retablir une ordre de choses plus desirable, et empescher que le mal qui nous travaille puisse gagner les autres Etats de l'Europe. J'espere que V. M. approuvera mes idees, et qu'elle me gardera le secret le plus absolu sur la demarche que je fais aupres d'elle. Elle sentira aisement que les circonstances ou je me trouve, m'obligent à la plus grande circonspection, c'est ce qui fait qu'il n'y a que le Baron de Bretenil qui soit instruit de mes projets et V. M. peut lui faire passer ce qu'elle voudra. je saisis cette occasion de remercier V. M. des bontes qu'elle a eu pour le S. Heymann, et je goutte une veritable satisfaction à donner à V. M. les assurance d'estime et d'affection avec lesquelles je suis

Paris le 3 décembre 1791

Monsieur mon frere

de Vostre Majesté

bon Frere

*Louis.*

#### ADDRESS ON THE OUTSIDE.

A Monsieur mon Frere le Roy de Prusse.

<sup>1</sup> Beginning and signature of a note from Frederick William II. to his minister, von der Schulenburg:

Je Vous envoie ci joint la lettre du Roi de France, et celle du Ct. de Bretenille ou il ne sagit qu'en gros du projet du Congrès armé, pour de mon côté je garanti le secret dont je sens toute la consequence, mais je ne puis repondre de ce qui en sera aux autres Cours . . .

13 Janvier 1792.

*Fr. Guillaume.*

atrocities. On November 29, the National Assembly decreed that all priests, under pain of loss of income and office, should appear before their respective municipalities and there take the prescribed oath; and, further, that on the outbreak of disturbances they might be driven from their places of abode as suspects. Much more effective, however, as a war-cry for the Girondists were the foolish and mischief-working

ce 1<sup>er</sup> janvier 1791

je serois trop malheureuse, mon cher  
 frere, si je ne pouvois pas vous  
 parler de ma tendre amitié au  
 commencement de cette année, soyez  
 heureux autant que vous le méritez  
 et que je le souhaite cette année  
 et bien d'autres avec, embrassez  
 ma belle sœur et tous vos enfants  
 pour moi, et ne doutez jamais  
 des sentiments tendre et inviolable  
 avec lesquels je vous embrasse de  
 tout mon cœur

Le roi qui me voit avec une charge  
 de ses vœux et compliments pour  
 vous

FIG. 22.—Facsimile of a letter of Marie Antoinette to Leopold II. of Austria, dated January 1, 1791.

proceedings of the *émigrés* beyond the frontier. After eighteen months' sorrowful sojourn in Turin, Artois, with a whole train of expatriated noblesse, had settled in Coblenz. Thither followed him, in August, 1791, the Count of Provence. From that time forth Coblenz was the centre of all the plots against the new state order of France. The princes

were surrounded by a court similar to the corrupt one of Versailles. Calonne formed a regular ministry; and an army of 4000 men was organized and placed under the Prince of Condé. Day after day it was the vaunt of these circles that this imposing military display was to make a speedy end of the whole revolutionary swindle. A more effective means for filling the minds of the masses of France with the persuasion that all kings were in league with the *émigrés* against the Revolution, and that they themselves were threatened with the immediate re-establishment of the old order of things, could not have been devised. In vain did Marie Antoinette spend her strength in endeavoring to separate the cause of the monarchy from that of the *émigrés* (Fig. 22). Brissot—now one of the deputies of Paris, and an enthusiastic believer in the world-liberating power of the Revolution, as reckless and indifferent in his choice of means as any one of his Girondist colleagues—was the first, in a memorable speech (October 20), openly and unequivocally to demand war to show to old Europe how far it had wronged France, and to compel foreign courts to disarm and send adrift the *émigrés*. A people that had won its freedom after ten centuries of slavery required a war to confirm its conquest and to purge itself from the vices of despotism. Nakedly and without attempt at concealment these words asserted the principle that France, when it suited her interests, had a perfect right to visit other nations with all the horrors of war. "If the people of France once draw the sword," chimed in Isnard, "it will cast the scabbard far from it. Burning with the fire of freedom, it can, single-handed, transform the face of the earth and cause tyrants to tremble upon their thrones of clay."

The Jacobins proper were not so ardent for war as the Girondists. They were possessed of the true instinct, that demagogism and war are in large measure incompatible. On the other hand, a by no means inconsiderable number of the Right gave their voices for war, but on grounds very different from those of the Girondists. Lafayette decided for it from personal ambition—for the sake of the laurels that war promised him; the friends of the Constitution of 1791, because they recognized in a well-organized army the best bulwark for the throne against internal assailants. So it came about that the calculations of those who would preserve the crown for the king coincided in their results with those of the men who would tear it from his head. On November 29, the National Assembly resolved, amid the acclamations of all parties, that the king should call upon the Rhenish electors to disperse the host of the *émigrés*, should arrange forthwith the compensation to be paid to the German princes possessed of estates in Alsace, should make a change, in a

patriotic sense, in the personnel of the diplomatic corps, and should place immediately on the frontiers the forces necessary to give effect to these measures. The king had had courage enough to refuse to approve of the decrees against the priests, but, from motives of policy, he did not dare to oppose this unanimous demand of the Assembly. Even the queen interposed no objection. This warlike change determined the retire-



FIG. 23.—Madame de Staël After the painting by François Gérard (1770-1837).

ment of the ministry of Montmorin. His successors were taken from the ranks of the Feuillants. The new war-minister, Count Narbonne, a protégé of Lafayette and of Necker's gifted daughter, Madame de Staël (Fig. 23), who now, as wife of the Swedish ambassador, held her *salon* in Paris, burned with eagerness to distinguish himself by warlike

deeds. On December 14, the king in person made the announcement to the Assembly that he had declared to the Elector of Treves that, if by January 15 he had not put a stop to all assembling of troops and all hostile preparations of the *émigrés* within his territory, he would regard him as an enemy of France. At the same time he did not fail to make it secretly known through Breteuil to foreign courts that he held such language toward the elector only under the compulsion of necessity, and that in reality he looked on war only as the means of deliverance for himself. A manifesto composed by Condorcet proclaimed war upon kings and peace for their peoples. The 20,000,000 francs demanded by Narbonne were voted without hesitation.

To all these provocations Emperor Leopold had responded only by composure and moderation. So long as the affairs of Poland hung in the balance, he sought to avoid every complication. At his suggestion the Elector of Treves disarmed the *émigrés*, and so removed the only plausible pretext for war. But the Gironde needed war, and would have war. The sittings of the Assembly became tumultuous. Gensonné, chairman of the diplomatic committee, thundered out the most grievous complaints against the emperor for placing some troops in Luxemburg for the protection of the elector. Guadet left the presidential chair to inflame the hearts of all patriots against the coalition of the powers, that had for its object the alteration of the Constitution. Finally, on January 25, the Assembly passed a decree to the effect that, inasmuch as the emperor by his last measures had broken the alliance of 1756, the king should ask him whether Austria desired to remain at peace with France and was prepared to renounce every alliance against its independence, and should intimate that, if satisfactory explanations were not received by March 1, such reticence would be regarded as a declaration of war. It was further resolved to organize three armies on the northern frontiers, under Lafayette, Luckner, and Rochambeau. On February 9, the Assembly sequestered the possessions of the *émigrés*.

Insulted and exasperated, the emperor now deemed it high time definitely to conclude an alliance of a purely defensive character with Prussia. Kaunitz, the Austrian minister, was urgent that guarantees should be introduced in regard to an hereditary monarchy, under the Elector of Saxony, in Poland, that this land might be protected against the designs of Russia; but, as the erection of a Saxo-Polish kingdom was regarded in Berlin as hostile to Prussian interests, and as the threats of the Girondists seemed to the emperor to make the speedy conclusion of the treaty superior to every other consideration, it was signed, on February 7, without the wished-for conditions. Kaunitz's reply to the

decrees of January 25 was read to the National Assembly on March 1, by Delessart, the foreign minister. It cast the whole responsibility for the difficulties on the ever-growing anarchy in France and the instigations of the Jacobins, who inflamed the passions of the people from self-seeking motives. But, though stating only what was the truth and peaceably meant, the note heaped fuel upon the flames. The arraigned party raised an outcry over the unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of France. The peace party, indeed, for an instant so far recovered themselves as to effect Narbonne's dismissal. Shortly afterward came the unexpected news of Leopold's death. He expired on March 1, after three days' sickness. With his death there disappeared for France the last danger of a foreign war, for his successor, Francis II., was a weak, inexperienced youth of twenty-four, from whom no attack was to be feared. Moreover, Talleyrand brought from London the assurance that England would on no account depart from her neutrality. But the Girondists saw in this change of sovereigns only a more favorable occasion for an attack on Austria. Delessart was accused of high treason. The plan was that, as soon as war was declared against Austria, the king should be suspended, the queen made prisoner, and, on the charge of having incited her brother to form a coalition against France, brought before a tribunal. Without friends and defenceless, and utterly incapable of forming a resolution for himself, the king received his new ministry from the hands of the Girondists, the most of its members being men of little real account. Roland, whose wife (PLATE VIII.) was more the minister of the interior than himself, did little toward repressing the general lawlessness. In Dumouriez, the foreign minister, on the contrary, there stepped on the stage of public affairs one of the leading spirits of the Revolution. But Dumouriez was not of that class of enthusiasts who allowed themselves to be carried away by the Revolution. He regarded it rather as a road toward advancement, and now fomented war because he expected from it fame and profit. On the day of his nomination he appeared in the Jacobin Club with the red cap on his head, and vowed ostentatiously that, as soon as war was declared, he would throw away the pen and once more take up the sword. But he used the language of the Jacobins only to win the support of this powerful party, having it all the time silently in his mind not to go one step farther with them, after he found himself strong enough to walk without their aid. The war, he thought, would serve to make him master of the situation. It would enable him to engage the public mind, remove the unruly elements, and to organize an army on which the government could rely for support.



PLATE VIII.



Madame Roland.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 92.*



Three days after his nomination, on March 18, Dumouriez addressed to Austria the categorical demand that she should dissolve the European coalition and put a stop to her dispatch of troops to the Rhine and Belgium. But Kaunitz refused. On April 20, Louis had, by command of his ministers, to propose in the Assembly a declaration of war against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. The peace party, though undoubtedly the majority, submitted as usual to the yoke of the noisy minority. Only seven deputies had the courage to vote "No." A manifesto, prepared on the spot by Gensonné, declared that the French people, true to the sacred principles of their Constitution, took up arms only in defence of their freedom and independence against the unrighteous attacks of a king; but that Frenchmen would never confound their brethren with their enemies. Dumouriez knew enough of the state of the army, which had lost the larger number of its officers through the emigration, and whose discipline was entirely ruined by the Revolution, to see the approach of war with grave apprehensions. While Austria was thus being forced into war, he made a diplomatic attempt to attract Prussia and the smaller states of the empire to the side of France, or to induce them, at least, to declare their neutrality. To the latter powers—whom the Prusso-Austrian alliance alarmed nearly as much as the Revolution—he secretly offered French protection as a guarantee for their independence. To Berlin, where Narbonne had already made a vain attempt to detach Prussia from Austria, he dispatched the younger Custine with an offer of peace and friendship. At the moment, however, Custine could not gain a favorable reception. Frederick William II. was more and more under the conviction that it was his kingly duty to come to the help of the sorely afflicted Louis, and to hold a thorough reckoning with the infamous Jacobins. He began to lend an ear to the *émigrés*, who assured him that the mere sight of his troops would suffice to scatter the revolutionary hordes. The king, however, looked not only for an easy, but also for a profitable, war; and already, in Vienna, he had indicated Alsace and Lorraine as the prize of battle. The greater share was to fall to Austria; the lesser, to the Elector of the Rhine Palatinate, who should, in his turn, cede Jülich and Berg to Prussia. Equally fruitless were Dumouriez's attempts in Turin and Madrid. His error lay in underestimating the strength of the current on which he had been borne along, and thus he unexpectedly saw his plans crossed by the revolutionary propaganda. While he had in view a war undertaken from motives of policy, the Girondists were preaching a revolutionary crusade. The conduct of the war slipped from Dumouriez's hands the moment it was declared. The negotiations to which he had trusted for facilitating the

success of the war were rendered vain by the rash declaration of the Girondists; and, while he had hoped to confirm the authority of the state by a war confined to narrow limits and an honorable peace, the powerlessness of the government delivered over the land to the demagogues, whose triumph turned the war against Austria into a general European conflict, in which France, driven to develop her military strength to the utmost, turned to that dictator who was to put an end to the Revolution by the sword, and, carrying his conquests far beyond the borders of France, to make that country, for half a generation, the ruler of Europe. April 20, 1792, inaugurated an era of the most frightful wars, which at their close left the face of Europe altogether transformed.

Dumouriez's plan of campaign was based on the principle of natural boundaries, which for France were the Alps and the Rhine. The attack was to be made at the two points where these were not reached—Savoy and Belgium. The refusal of the commander of Alessandria to receive the French *chargé d'affaires*, Sémonville, was a pretext for a declaration of war against Sardinia. But punishment followed fast on the heels of these unwarranted proceedings. General Dillon opened the campaign on April 29, by an advance from Lille to Tournai, but on the first sight of the Austrians he changed his advance into a retreat, his troops fleeing in great disorder and killing their commander. Biron, who was leading Rochambeau's vanguard toward Mons, no sooner heard of this disaster than he too turned his back, and, on the first onset of the Austrians, his men also became a rabble and precipitated themselves into Valenciennes. Against Savoy, Montesquion was in no condition to begin operations. The army which he was to have commanded was not in existence.

After these demonstrations of the inefficiency of the French forces, there can be no doubt that, had the Germans energetically followed up their successes, the Girondists would have expiated their war fever by a severe military defeat. But neither the preparations nor the policy of the two powers warranted this. Poland, as usual, was the stumbling-block. The Russians were in full march toward that country, and, were the war once fully developed between Germany and France, neither Austria nor Prussia would have power to check them. Catharine easily overcame Prussia's scruples by holding out to it a share of the booty as a bait. Poland thus became the first sacrifice to the Girondists' eagerness for war. But, while Frederick William was now all fire and flame for war, this new partition of Poland, in which Austria was left out in the cold, quenched the last spark of eagerness in Vienna. It was only the actual attack of France that made the emperor put his hand to the sword,

Besides, the disposition of the other states of the empire was little calculated to induce him to war. Hanover declared she had no inclination to mix herself up in the Franco-Hungarian quarrel, and would furnish her quota only in case of a violation of the territory of the empire. The Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel alone promised co-operation. New delays, too, arose out of the question of compensation, and, till this was settled, Frederick William would not move a step. At length his proposal, that Prussia should have in Poland its compensation for the French war, and that Austria should have its compensation in the French possessions on the Rhine, met the views both of the young emperor and his vice-chancellor, Count Cobenzl. The old plan of exchanging the Austrian Netherlands for Bavaria was also revived. But the renewed friendship between the two powers was scarcely established, before it was again disturbed. In the midst of the festivities accompanying the assemblage of princes at Mayence, to celebrate the crowning of the Emperor Francis II., on July 5, Austria came suddenly forward with the demand that the indemnification which it was to receive by the exchange of Belgium for Bavaria should be augmented by the principalities of Ansbach and Bayreuth, which had been willed by their prince to Prussia.

The interruption of the war operations, due to these complications, had momentous consequences. It gave the Girondists time to recover their breath, and enabled them, by goading on the passions of the people, to carry on the war for the annihilation of the monarchy. Their hired press shot its arrows without ceasing against the Austrian committee in the Tuileries, which would deliver France over to the armies of the enemy. A law passed on May 27, by which any non-juring priest could be driven into exile on the complaint of twenty inhabitants of his parish, had no other object than that of exposing Louis (who was sure to withhold his consent) to the fury of the people. On May 29, the king was deprived of his body-guard. The Girondists were by no means satisfied to trust the soldiers of Lafayette, nor even the pikemen of the Cordeliers (with whom they had been at bitter enmity since the mootings of the war question), and desired, therefore, to have at their disposal an armed force devoted to themselves. With this view it was resolved, on June 4, that every canton might send five armed men to the Feast of Brotherhood on July 14. This would give them 20,000 "confederates," who, after the festival, would enter a camp for the defence of Paris and take possession of the cannon of the Parisian National Guard. The National Guards signed a petition by thousands against bringing these Jacobin tools to Paris. Lafayette determined to refrain from undertaking anything against the enemy, till he had held a reckoning with the Jacobins at

home. Even the king gathered courage enough to avail himself of the discord between Dumouriez and Servan, and, on June 13, dismissed the three Girondist ministers, Roland, Servan, and Clavière, replacing them by Feuillants; while he steadfastly adhered to his veto of the decrees in regard to the priests and the "confederates." In addition to all this, there came to the National Assembly a paper prepared by Lafayette—probably in concert with the court—filled with the bitterest reproaches against Dumouriez and the excesses of the Jacobins. Between him and the Jacobins it was now a life-and-death conflict.

The Girondists by no means thought of letting the power be wrested from their hands without a struggle, but they would gladly have waited till the clubs of all the departments—especially those of Marseilles—had, in defiance of the king's veto, sent their quotas of confederates (*fédérés*) to Paris. The Cordeliers, however, rushed on to further outrages. Their champion was Danton, who immediately demanded in the Jacobin Club a new impost on the rich for the benefit of the poor. A solemn procession of the masses of the faubourgs, on June 20, the anniversary of the day of the tennis-court oath, in order to bring before the National Assembly the wishes of the people, afforded a favorable opportunity for deeds of violence. Danton and his accomplices in the municipality—Marat, Panis, Sergent—placed the police of the capital at the service of sedition. The object was so to weaken the king's position that he must recall Roland and his colleagues. Under the leadership of the brewer Santerre, the butcher Legendre, a former nobleman, Marquis Saint-Huruges, and the goldsmith Rossignol, a mob, originating in the faubourgs St.-Antoine and St.-Marceau, came rolling in, growing as it advanced, till before reaching the National Assembly it numbered 40,000 armed men. Since April, this Assembly had permitted the illegal presentation of petitions by armed crowds. In spite of the remonstrances of the Right, Vergniaud secured the admission of this mob. After the reading of an address, the whole mass defiled, shouting and dancing, through the hall. It was now four o'clock, and the departing crowd seemed to be returning to the faubourgs, when, on a sudden, it changed its route and advanced on the Tuileries, "to shake up Mr. and Mrs. Veto a little." Its members forced their way into the interior through a gate opened by some unknown hand. They pounded at the door of the Oeil-de-Boeuf, where the king then was. He gave the order for the door to be opened, and, in an instant, he was hemmed in by weapons of all sorts. Legendre, howling out reproaches, pressed forward upon him, while the crowd bawled for the approval of the decrees and the recall of the ministers. In this terrible moment Louis main-

tained a spirit and self-possession that disarmed every thought of murder. Two hours had the torture lasted, when Pétion appeared, professing to have only now learned of the king's situation. He at length succeeded in coaxing the people to take their leave. Similar indignities had to be endured by the queen, who was in an adjoining apartment.

Bourrienne, as he tells us himself, was, along with his friend Bonaparte, the captain of artillery, a witness of the scene from the street. When they saw the king at the window with the red cap of the Jacobins on his head, the latter exclaimed: "What a fool! How did this pack gain entrance? If four or five hundred of them had been shot down by a volley of grape-shot, the rest would have taken to their heels." After the infamous scene had been enacted, its instigators vied with each other in disclaiming connection with it. The citizens were loud in their denunciations; Pétion was, on the demand of his department, suspended. Unfortunately the one man who might have stood forth as the leader against demagoguery was Lafayette. On June 28, he appeared suddenly in Paris from his headquarters at Bavay, taking his friends as well as his enemies by surprise. The terror of the latter was at first extreme, as they saw in fancy his battalions close at his back. As soon as they were satisfied that he came alone, their courage returned; and when he appeared before the National Assembly, armed only with an address of his corps, demanding the punishment of the insurgents, he was greeted by murmuring from the galleries, and Guadet spoke of the new Cromwell. He himself had no definite plan, unless it were the maintenance of the Constitution of 1791. When, after two days, he returned to his army, he left the foes of monarchy stronger than before. By the Jacobins, he and his friends were henceforward regarded not as suspected, but as declared, enemies.

To what a pitch the daring of the Left had now arisen was shown when Monciel, minister of the interior, forbade, on June 30, the march of the *jacobins* on Paris. Regardless of the prohibition, they provided free quarters in the capital for the arriving troops till the celebration of the festival, after which they were to march to a camp near Soissons. Louder and more shamelessly than ever, the hall of the Assembly rang with charges of treason against the king. Vergniaud in a masterpiece of demagogic eloquence denounced him as the assailant of the rights of the Assembly and the betrayer of his people; and this view, which more and more took possession of the masses, was fostered and, in some measure, justified by the emigrant press, which boasted unceasingly of the impending desertion of officers and regiments and of the terrible vengeance to be executed in Paris by the victorious Croats. At court

the situation was that of helpless submission, varied by occasional fits of self-assertion. The ministry, abused and threatened by the Gironde, handed in its resignation on July 10. On the day following, the National Assembly declared the country in danger. All authorities were decreed to be in permanence; the National Guard was called out; and citizens invited to report what weapons and ammunition they possessed. Everything, in short, was done to increase the fever-heat of the popular temper and to replace the royal authority by the dictatorship of the Assembly. Pétion's suspension was declared at an end.

The struggle was now between a government defenceless and robbed of all authority, and an Assembly from which not only all moderation, but also all sense of decency, was banished. The Gironde had no greater objections to the use of violence than the extreme Left—called, from their elevated seats, the Mountain—and were so blind as not to see that, when once the conflict was transferred to the streets, this party would gain from day to day the advantage over them.

On Danton's proposal, the *fédérés*, who had come for the festival—among them the scum of the ports of Marseilles and Brest, criminals by profession—solemnly vowed not to leave Paris before tyranny was overthrown. A "Central Committee" of the *fédérés* took part with the correspondence-bureau of the forty-eight sections of Paris in planning and leading the insurrection. Before such confederates the Gironde began to recoil, and to make advances to the king with a view to their common defence. But, on Louis summoning spirit enough to repel these and again to choose his ministry from the Fenillants, their anger was greater than ever. Most of them gave free vent to their wrath; the king should be deposed, and they themselves entrusted with the regency during the minority of the dauphin. But it was not they who were to rule, but the Jacobins and Cordeliers, who controlled the hosts of the Revolution. Having once lost the leadership, the Girondists had nothing else to do save to play the rôle of victims.

For facilitating a new storming of the Tuileries, the National Assembly, on July 25, placed the terrace of the Fenillants, which had hitherto been under the protection of the police of the palace, under that of their own men; while Pétion disorganized the guard of the palace itself by ordering that this duty should be performed by citizens from the various battalions. In the name of the sections Pétion demanded, at the bar of the National Assembly, the deposition of the king and the calling of a national convention. The court found itself in the most desperate situation. It had perfect knowledge of what was going on, but it found itself deprived of every means of defence. The city authorities themselves



were at the head of the conspiracy. The police of the Commune distributed over 50,000 cartridges. The carrying out of the plan for the deposition had been fixed for August 9, but, as the rejection on the day before of a motion for the impeachment of Lafayette, by 406 votes against 224, showed that the majority of the Assembly would not suffer the decree of deposition to be extorted from it save by external violence, it was postponed till the next day (August 10), when it would be effected in a different way. At night a handful of men of the lowest class used to meet in a low den in the faubourg St.-Antoine, under the presidency of an old registrar, named Huguenin. From this body came forth the resolution to constitute a new revolutionary commune, consisting of three members from each of the forty-eight sections, and to this alone obedience should be due. This new authority installed itself without delay in the Hôtel de Ville, side by side with the legal authorities. At first the number of those who turned out at the sound of the alarm-bells for the concerted attack on the Tuileries (August 10) was but small, till Danton brought out the men from Marseilles and the battalion of the Cordeliers rushed to arms. The march toward the Tuileries was now begun. Mandat, commander-in-chief of the National Guards, a man trustworthy and loyal to duty, had made all the dispositions for defence, but an order from Manuel, in the name of the municipal council, left the way over the Pont Neuf free for the insurrection. Mandat himself was summoned to the Hôtel de Ville to answer for the measures he had taken. There he was laden with reproaches and was declared a prisoner, and, while being led away, was attacked and killed. His head was cut off and carried through the streets, while Santerre was declared his successor. This latter hero cautiously took up his position in the Hôtel de Ville. The cowardly Pétion assured the king that he had done all that was needful for defence of the palace.

Nowhere did the conspiracy meet with resistance. The Legislative Assembly, in feigned ignorance, remained in debate over the question of the slave trade. In the Tuileries the queen sought to inspire her husband with something of her own energy. She prevailed on him to show himself to the National Guards, but his appearance—all too unkingly—had no inspiring effect. Some received him with gloomy silence; others, with open hostility. The artillery pointed their guns toward the palace. Even now the insurrectionists had not the courage to begin the attack, for eight hundred Swiss and nine hundred *gens d'armes* stood on guard without, and, besides, two hundred nobles had gathered within the palace for the protection of the royal family. The king, therefore, was, on false prettexts, induced by Roederer, the

*procureur* of the department, to leave the Tuileries and trust himself and his family to the protection of the National Assembly. The Assembly showed itself here, for once, most scrupulous in respect to the Constitution. As it was contrary to its principle to transact business in presence of the king, the royal family were assigned to a narrow, cage-like room—the reporters' gallery—as an abiding-place.



# EXTRAIT

## DU PROCÈS-VERBAL

### DE L'ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE.

Du 10 août 1792.


L'AN QUATRIÈME DE LA LIBERTÉ.

*Le roi est suspendu, il reste en otage, l'Assemblée nommera les ministres. Le point pour ce jour est pris.*

*Lecointe-Puyraveau*

FIG. 24.—Facsimile of the decree of the National Assembly of August 10, 1792. Written and signed by Lecointe-Puyraveau, secretary of the National Assembly. "Le roi est suspendu, il reste en otage. L'Assemblée nommera les ministres."

Immediately on the departure of the royal family, the people of the faubourgs and the *fédérés* appeared before the palace under the leadership of an Alsatian named Westermann. The National Guards had dispersed, the Swiss alone maintaining their posts, deaf to all seductions. As the masses pressed on them more and more vehemently, they at length fired, and the mob scattered in all directions. Then came an order, which had been obtained from the king, commanding the firing to stop and the Swiss to withdraw. This order delivered up the Tuileries to pillage and all living within it to murder. Of the retiring Swiss all but 200 were butchered with fiendish ferocity. The blood-besmeared rabble, carrying with them trophies from the palace, now defiled through



The image shows five handwritten signatures in cursive script, arranged in two rows. The top row contains 'Roland' and 'Clavière'. The middle row contains 'Monge' and 'Danton'. The bottom row contains 'Lebrun' and a large, stylized flourish or signature that is not clearly legible as a name.

FIG. 25.—Facsimile of the signatures of the ministry of August 10: Roland, Clavière, Monge, Danton, Lebrun. From a document of August 17, 1792.

the National Assembly, some crying for the deposition of the king, others for his death. The president, Vergniaud, had words of flattery, till, at length, through the tumult, he announced the decree providing for the summoning of a national convention, whose members should be chosen by universal suffrage, the suspension of "the chief of the executive power," and the naming by the National Assembly of a tutor for the dauphin and a new ministry (Fig. 24). After forty-six hours of anguish the royal family were conducted to the Luxembourg, where the coarsest treatment awaited them. The king bore all with silent submissiveness; his wife maintained a majesty of demeanor that compelled reverence even from their rough attendants.

So fell the monarchy. The Girondists believed they had managed matters with wonderful astuteness. On the nomination of the new ministry (Fig. 25) they expected that all they would have to do was to

repossess themselves of the portfolios which they had had to give up. But three of these they had to surrender to the party of the Mountain, and the one possessor of real power was Danton, who had behind him the whole Mountain, the Jacobins, the Cordeliers, and the Commune. The great majority of the people now wanted a strong government and were prepared to submit to the domination of the Jacobins, especially as this party, with wonderful adroitness, understood how to pose as the




FIG. 26.—Fountain of the "regeneration," erected on the ruins of the Bastille, August 10, 1792.

exponent and champion of the sentiments common to all—dread of the restoration of the old conditions, and indignation that foreigners should meddle in their affairs. The only person who could possibly be dangerous to this party was Lafayette, who was now at Sedan, but a few days' march from Paris. Deeply as he was moved by the atrocities, he was again prevented by constitutional scruples from doing more than making an ineffectual demonstration. He induced the authorities of Sedan to enter a vigorous protest, caused the government com-

missioners to be arrested, and made his troops take anew the oath of fidelity to the king. When, however, the other generals, following the example of the country, submitted to the new government, the Assembly issued a warrant for his arrest, the ministry appointed Dumouriez in his stead, and his troops began to waver in their fidelity, he gave up the game as lost. In company with twenty-one of his officers he fled over the border, hoping to escape to America, but he was captured by the Austrians, and detained in prison until the autumn of 1797.

With Lafayette disappeared the party of the Feuillants. The Gironde, too, began to find its Nemesis. Not it, but the revolutionary Commune, was the victor of August 10 (Fig. 26). This body, composed of men who had risen to the surface through their recklessness and audacity, and who, with liberty, equality, and fraternity on their lips, were in reality actuated by the basest motives, understood how, by never ceasing to extol the "Sovereignty of the People," to subject these same "sovereigns" to the yoke of their domination. The National Assembly they regarded with contempt, enduring it only because it was of use to them, and only on condition of perfect submission. If at any time it by chance ventured on a timid remonstrance, it was at once brought to reason by the threats of the galleries and the direful sound of the tocsin. By its arrogant insistence the Commune compelled the incarceration of the royal family in the Temple (Fig. 27), so that it alone might have this costly pledge in its hands. Still further to perfect its domination, it caused the barriers to be closed to prevent the escape of traitors, discharged at pleasure officials hostile to freedom, named an executive and vigilance committee of its own number, and reorganized the National Guard to the practical exclusion of the *bourgeoisie* by filling its ranks with men of the proletariat.

What Danton was in the ministry, Robespierre was in the Commune, to which he had belonged since August 11. His breach with the Girondists was irreparable, ever since their passion for power had so frankly unmasked itself. From the first hours of the Revolution, Robespierre had stood in close relation with the leaders of the democracy, without himself descending to their level. As he distinguished himself by his scrupulously perfect dress and powdered hair from the *sans-culottes*, whose garb was a type of their manner of mind; so, notwithstanding his understanding with Danton, he knew, here also, how to maintain his own perfectly distinct position. The former understood how to organize a powerful *coup de main* and lead the masses to the attack; Robespierre's sole weapon was his tongue. Danton promoted




FIG. 27.—The Temple, seen from the garden side.

anarchy largely from mere animal enjoyment; Robespierre knew no pleasure save that of satisfying his lust for power. He was master of the rare secret of appearing to serve the popular idol, and, at the same time, of making himself the idol of the masses. He made it easy for them to have faith in him by reiterating unceasingly the same commonplaces concerning the majesty, the power, and the virtues of the people. They, in turn, trusted him for his incorruptibility and disinterestedness, which so strikingly contrasted with the venality and cupidity of their other leaders. On the basis of his personal position, he constructed a system, by which the permanent rule of the proletariat—and on this his own rule—should be erected. Unweariedly he preached that the sovereignty was vested neither in a single individual nor in an assembly, but only in the whole body of the citizens. “No one,” he said, “has a right to be wiser than the People.” But with all the adulation which he offered to the noble qualities of the lower classes, he never forgot to stir up their worst passions—especially their envy and hate of the rich. In one point he was altogether at one with Danton and Marat—namely, that to the proletariat belonged not only all power, but also all the property of the wealthy. He thus succeeded in branding the rich, the cultured, and the politically capable as the enemies of the people, and in securing for himself the personal popularity which would lead him to the goal of his efforts. The dogma of the sovereignty of the people became transformed in the course of events into the dictatorship of a few, and ultimately into the absolutism of a single individual. In men like Marat, Billand-Varennes, and Collot-d’Herbois—persons of a certain amount of talent who, by their profligate habits, had fallen out with decent society—he found tools ready, out of envy and desire for revenge, to serve him.

More and more clearly did the aim of the Revolution disclose itself. This was nothing other than the transference of all property from its possessors to those who owned nothing. Marat, who took his seat in the Commune as reporter, and from that time acted as its official organ, demanded, as the simplest means for securing freedom and the prosperity of the proletariat, the murder of the aristocrats and the confiscation of their property. Despotically as the Commune ruled, it nevertheless looked with grave apprehensions to the future. If the approaching election of deputies to the National Convention resulted in a majority for the moderates—as was to be anticipated from the known disposition of the country—it was either all over with its usurped sovereignty, or the Commune must engage in a life-and-death struggle in its defence. From this sprung the atrocious design of carrying the election by spreading

terror over the whole land, and with this view a plan was formed to seize the greatest possible number of political adversaries throughout the whole of France, and make an end of them by general massacres in the prisons. The danger of a foreign attack served as a pretext. The fall of the inconsiderable fortress of Longwy came quite opportunely to enable them to denounce the aristocrats as traitors in league with the enemy. Had the danger been as great as they represented it to be, nothing was more urgent than the dispatch of the *fédérés* to the threatened frontier. But 1500 of them preferred to set out for Orleans, there to make short work with the prisoners. Danton declared that a new convulsion was needed for the salvation of the country, and, since the barriers could not be closed, owing to the marching out of the troops, all suspects must be put under arrest. Without more ado, he received full authority to make nocturnal house-to-house visits in search of arms. Of his own motion he issued an order for the seizure of the non-juring priests. The search for weapons went on simultaneously in all the sections of the city. Instead of Danton's fabled 80,000 muskets, only 2000 were found. Nevertheless, the prisons were filled with 3000 suspects.

The situation of the Gironde became more and more intolerable. Amidst a storm of excitement its members carried, on August 30, a resolution providing for the dissolution of the Commune of August 10, and calling on the sections to proceed to a new election. The Commune protested defiantly in name of the "sovereign people," who pressed on in shrieking crowds after its members, and the helpless Assembly bowed itself in mute obedience. Danton, with Marat, Robespierre, Billaud-Varemes, Manuel, and Tallien, fixed the execution of the scheme of butchery for September 2. The news of the appearance of the Prussians before Verdun served to inflame the fury against traitors to fever-heat. All citizens were called on to take up arms. All suspects were disarmed. The members of the Commune distributed themselves through their respective sections, there to depict the danger of the country and give the pass-word to the prisons. A new vigilance committee—Panis, Sergeant, Marat, and others—distributed to the bands of murderers money and provisions along with their instructions. Danton procured from the Assembly full authority for the ministers. Certain sections had in the meanwhile decided on emptying the prisons by the murder of the captives. Twenty-four priests, who were being conducted from the Hôtel de Ville to the Abbaye, were the first victims. Then the assassins hastened to the prisons. The feast of blood was seasoned with the farce of a semblance of judicial proceedings, while the members of the vigi-



lance committee went about praising and encouraging the butchery. Amid atrocities which the pen refuses to depict, the work of murder was carried on by regularly hired slaughterers (Fig. 28). The head of her slaughtered friend, the Princess Lamballe, was held up in view of the queen before the window of her prison. The assassinations lasted for several days, the number of victims being variously estimated at from 1000 to 1400. All the valuables taken from them came to the Hôtel de Ville, where they were at the disposal of the Commune. The population of Paris resembled a flock of lambs before wolves; the National Assembly remained mute—intimidated or acquiescent. By these horrors the Paris election was secured. The moderate party refrained entirely from taking part in it, so that none but democrats of the purest water were chosen—Robespierre, Danton, Collot-d'Herbois, Desmoulins, Marat, and even the Duke of Orleans. Most of the deputies, however, were obscure men. The country, on the other hand, for the most part, refused to follow Danton's order that it should imitate Paris. Only in a few places was it listened to, as at Orleans, and especially at Lyons, where the general in command—Charles of Hesse, a German prince, but a fanatical Jacobin—in person organized the massacre. Elsewhere, also, where scenes of blood were enacted, they were not the work of the people, but of the local officials and commissioners from Paris. The country as a whole returned a great majority of moderates and Girondists. Fuming with rage, the machinators were forced to admit to themselves that their plot was a failure, and they demonstrated their respect for the expressed will of the sovereign people by forthwith resolving that they would compel this sovereign to submit to their domination by new acts of violence. To the majority of the National Assembly the result of the elections imparted so much courage that they adopted some measures for the restoration of order, but their efforts were ineffective and nothing came of them. Less than a year had sufficed for this body to complete the overthrow of the throne—already deprived by the Constituent Assembly of its essential bulwarks—and, in its place, to set up the proletariat of Paris with its blood-thirsty and imperious leaders.

Weakened in all its members through anarchy, cleft to its very core by discord, with empty coffers and disorganized armies, France went forth to meet its foreign foes.

As Austria, since the death of the Emperor Leopold II., lacked a far-seeing, energetic leader, so Prussia, which, on July 26, had declared war against France, was no longer the state of the great Frederick. A master-spirit was needed by her for the impending struggle, and it was





FIG. 28.—Facsimile of a receipt for the payment of the executioners of September. Front and reverse sides.





The Departure of the National Guard from Paris, in September, 1792, to join the army.

Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Basset and Barrois from original painting by Leon Cogniet (Versailles).

her misfortune that Frederick William II. was no commander. Party spirit exerted its pernicious influence at once over the army and its leadership. The younger officers might look with confidence to this war against the Revolution for easily-won laurels; but, among the higher grades, there still lingered such fresh traditions concerning the Silesian war, that they could not at once reconcile themselves to the new Austrian alliance. At the head of this opposition stood no less a personage than the king's own uncle, Prince Henry; but still more unfortunate was it that his views were shared by Duke Charles William Ferdinand of Brunswick, who had been chosen as commander-in-chief. In his youth the duke had studied war under his renowned uncle, Ferdinand, and had lately added not a little to his repute by his conduct as a leader against the Dutch patriots; but he mistrusted the *émigrés*, and disapproved of the war generally. His name was now associated with a document issued in behalf of quite other views than those he cherished. Mallet du Pan, who had made his appearance at the conference of princes and diplomatists at Mayence, as secret agent of Louis XVI., and mainly for the purpose of keeping the *émigrés* from meddling with the war, urged, above all, the issuing of a manifesto explaining to the French people that the essential object of the war was the restoration of Louis to freedom without menace to the peace-loving people. Unfortunately the drafting of this manifesto fell into the hands of a zealous *émigré*, de Limon, who drew up a document containing the wildest threats against the Assembly, the city of Paris, the National Guard (PLATE IX.), and all the friends of the new order of things. The Duke of Brunswick (Fig. 29), not having the strength of mind to oppose the issuing of this manifesto, signed it on July 27, and thus placed a new weapon in the hands of the demagogues of Paris.

According to the concerted plan of campaign, the Prussian army—42,000 strong—was, in conjunction with 6000 Hessians, to make the main attack by way of Luxemburg, and, after taking Longwy and Montmédy, secure, by the capture of Verdun, the passage of the Meuse, on whose banks they should form a junction with 56,000 Austrians from Belgium under Clerfayt, after his capture of Mauberge, Philippeville and Givet. A second Austrian corps advancing from Mannheim under Hohenlohe-Kirchberg was to support these operations by movements on the Saar and Upper Moselle. But it was soon seen that the strength with which the Austrians took the field was far below what had been agreed on. This, with the distasteful conduct of the *émigrés*, gave the Duke of Brunswick the greatest repugnance to any serious undertaking, and confirmed him in his purpose of advancing no farther than




FIG. 29.—Duke of Brunswick. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by J. E. Nilson (1721-1788).

the Meuse for this year. Impatiently as Frederick William urged his army onward, it moved from its positions only at a snail's pace. Not till August 23 was Longwy reached. This surrendered in three days. On September 2, Verdun opened its gates. By the fall of these two strong places the way was opened into France.

Inadequate as were the forces of the invaders, those of the defence were yet more so. The efforts of the indefatigable Servan to bring the army and fortresses into a state of efficiency were constantly, in great measure, nullified by various impediments—party spirit, want of money, the indescribable disorder in the administration, and the perverse meddling of the new popular authorities. The impossibility of maintaining a successful defensive war with troops in such a state of unfitness inspired Dumouriez with the adventurous idea of staying the advance of the enemy on Paris by throwing himself into Belgium and leaving the fortresses to their fate. But while he remained inactive in Sedan, occupied with this fancy, Clerfayt had beset Stenay, and Verdun had fallen, and he would infallibly have expiated his procrastination by the annihilation of his army, had not the invincible dilatoriness of Brunswick afforded him time to take up the line of retreat already indicated to him by Servan. Only thus was it possible for him to reach the passes of the forest of Argonne in advance of the enemy, and there to form a junction with the reinforcements sent after him, while the army of the Centre—commanded by Kellermann in place of the incompetent Luckner—gradually drew near to him from the south. But even here the danger was only half over. Threatened by Clerfayt in the rear, he had, on September 14, to give up this position. But again the discontinuance of all pursuit enabled him to escape—this time toward Sainte-Menehould. The king was beside himself with vexation. Nevertheless the French seemed lost, for, on September 20, Kellermann found himself near Valmy in the most desperate situation—surrounded by the Prussians and cut off from Paris. Frederick William insisted on an energetic attack. A lively cannonade was opened. But the duke—who thought only of finishing the campaign on the Meuse, and felt himself too weak for an advance on Paris with troops exhausted by the execrable weather and prostrated with sickness—countermanded the king's order, and his columns were once more withdrawn. Insignificant as this artillery encounter at Valmy was from a military point of view, it was of high importance from its bearing on the events of the war. It was the first time that the suddenly levied, inexperienced French troops, emboldened by the strains of Rouget de Lisle's "*Marseillaise*," held their ground under the fire of the enemy.

Notwithstanding this partial success, Dumouriez did not conceal from himself the danger of his situation, and gladly welcomed the accident that made Lombard, private secretary of the Prussian king, a French prisoner. He made this man the bearer of proposals for the resumption of the earlier negotiations, warning the king, at the same time, of the peril in which a further advance of his troops would involve Louis XVI., and earnestly representing that Prussia's true policy was to keep Austria in check. The duke listened with eagerness to his views; and, although such a policy was in a high degree repugnant to the king, he was, as usual, brought to succumb to the influences by which he was surrounded. But what, above all, began to make this French war distasteful to Frederick William was the reserve in which Catherine II. had shut herself up ever since its outbreak and the question of compensation which was still unsettled with Austria. He empowered Adjutant General von Manteuffel to enter upon the proposed negotiations, and, by so doing, enabled Dumouriez to gain the first object he had in view—time for the reinforcement of his army. So effectually did this general avail himself of his opportunity, that the relative strength of the combatants began to change so much to the disadvantage of the Prussians, and it became, in turn, their object to delay operations by negotiations, till they had the defiles of the Argonne behind their backs. Austria had, from these negotiations, conceived suspicions of the blackest treachery on the part of her ally; Clerfayt and Hohenlohe were recalled from the main army, and with this the possibility of the duke's maintaining himself on French soil was removed. On October 12, the Prussians evacuated Verdun; on October 22, Longwy. Unmolested by the foe, but sorely reduced by weather and sickness, they found refuge in Luxemburg.

Within a few months the situation, political as well as military, had completely changed. Contrary to all expectations, the Revolution had succeeded in warding off the attack it had brought on itself. But, not content with this, it now became the assailant and invader, less with the purpose of instituting, through violence, a propaganda of its ideas, than of seeking booty and conquests in the neighboring countries. This aim the conditions of Europe assisted it in attaining.



## CHAPTER IV.

### THE CONVENTION UNTIL 9TH THERMIDOR (JULY 27, 1794), AND THE SECOND PARTITION OF POLAND.

THE National Convention, which was opened on September 21, 1792, consisted of 750 members, and held its sittings in the Tuileries. Its first act was, on motion of Collot, to declare the monarchy abolished (Fig. 30). With like unanimity it decreed a fresh election



FIG. 30 - Seal of the French Republic, 1792-1804

of all officers, administrative and judicial. But from this point on unanimity gave place to a wide diversity of opinion. To the Mountain, which numbered about 100 members, stood opposed the Moderate Right, some 150 strong; between these two principal parties was found the great mass of the irresolute and timid, called in derision the

Plain, the Marsh, or the Belly. Decided party discipline belonged to the Mountain alone; of the Right and the Plain, the greater part voted only according to the impressions of the moment; or, as the debates became wilder and fiercer in character, they remained away entirely, and thus the minority was transformed into a majority. Enthusiasm for political ideals, as these had animated the Constituent, and even the Legislative Assembly, now seemed no longer seasonable; for them was substituted naked selfishness. Respectable people held themselves aloof more and more from service in the National Guards, and likewise from the municipal elections, so that the former fell into the hands of the proletariat, and the latter were controlled by the Jacobins, who, although they never had more than 5000 votes, nevertheless succeeded in filling the important offices of *procureur* and his substitute with their people, the one with Chaumette, a former Capuchin monk, the other with Hébert, editor of "*Le Père Duchesne*," the foulest of all the democratic sheets.

In possession of the majority and also of the administration after Danton had given up his portfolio for a seat in the Convention, the Girondists immediately began the conflict with the Mountain; they thought to have a reckoning with it in regard to the September Massacres, and would no longer endure the tyranny of the Commune. At once there arose a fierce struggle. The Girondists charged Robespierre directly with aiming at a dictatorship; he defended himself in his accustomed manner, and, instead of justifying himself in reference to the accusation, he presented himself as a martyr menaced by the daggers of murderers, and denounced the Girondists on account of their federal tendencies and their incitement of the departments against the capital. But the Girondists, always more given to words than to deeds, now committed the capital blunder of provoking their enemies to the utmost, and then neither punishing them nor making them harmless. Henceforth their irreconcilable hatred was assured.

The whole bitterness between these parties burst forth, when the question concerning the fate of the king came up. Of one mind in thinking that he was to be judged by the Convention, they were divided in their motives and with regard to the ends at which they aimed. The Jacobins, well knowing how monarchical were the sentiments of the vast majority of the people, desired to quench in the blood of Louis every thought of a restoration of the throne. The Girondists were desirous of the king's condemnation, but not of his execution. Lebrun, the minister of foreign affairs, anticipated using him as a hostage, to exert an influence on pending negotiations with the King of Prussia, who was exceedingly anxious respecting the safety of the prisoner. It so hap-

pened that the first step toward instituting legal proceedings against Louis came from a zealous Girondist, Valazé, who depicted the king's crimes in a bombastic speech. Wholly different was the purpose of the Mountain, which wished by the king's death to deprive all enemies of the Revolution of the last remains of courage for resistance. Whoever aided in shedding the blood of the king, this party said to itself, was made over to it and belonged to it, and for this very reason Louis's blood must flow. On December 2, the sections appeared before the Convention and demanded the immediate and final sentence of Louis. Too late were the eyes of the Girondists opened to see that this was no theatrical performance, but that it was a question of the guillotine; that the trial could be of advantage, not to them, but to the Mountain; that the king's execution would cut off all understanding with foreign nations; and, in short, that they themselves must stand or fall with the king. The fact that the minister Roland laid before the Convention a quantity of writings found in the Tuileries, from which the treacherous communications of the court could be shown, made no change in their intention to save the life of the king, and, in doing this, to gather monarchists of all shades of opinion under their banner, and with their help to break down the supremacy of the Parisian proletariat. On December 11, Louis appeared for the first hearing before the Convention, now by its own authority converted into a court of justice; his shaggy beard, his hollow cheeks, and his neglected apparel were proofs of the harsh treatment which he had endured. But his bearing was firm; quietly and discreetly he answered every point of the accusation. On his return to the prison (Fig. 31), he found an order from the municipal council, which separated him from his family as probable accomplices. The permission, which he desired, to have legal assistance the majority were able to wrest only by a violent contest from the Mountain's thirst for blood. Robespierre, who, in the Constituent Assembly, had brought forward the proposal for the abolition of the death penalty, now not merely demanded death, but also rejected every pretence of judicial procedure. The king chose for his defence the advocates Target and Tronchet; when the former declined, the aged Malesherbes sought for himself the perilous honor; the two selected for their assistant young de Sèze. The question was not one of guilt or innocence, but of victory or defeat. With regard to this, it was not of the least consequence that the people did not desire the blood of Louis XVI. Robespierre's satellite, young Saint-Just, whom the Revolution had transformed from a sentimental fanatic into the most ferocious terrorist, candidly resisted an appeal to the people because that would



FIG. 31.—Louis XVI in the Temple; after Garneray

secure the safety of the tyrant, and this implied the restoration of the throne, the renewal of tyranny, and the overthrow of the republic. In vain did Vergniaud employ all the resources of his oratorical talent; the timid were overawed by the clamor of the galleries, by the fierceness

shown in debate, and more than all by the preparations openly pushed forward by the Commune for a renewal of the measures of terrorism. When finally the Convention, on January 15, 1793, came to a vote, of 749 voting, 683 were in the affirmative on the question, whether Louis was guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of the nation and of an attempt against the safety of the state; the appeal to the people was rejected by a vote of 423 to 281; the fixing upon the penalty was postponed until the next day.

The voting on this question continued from 10 o'clock in the evening of January 16 till the next evening. In view of the crowded galleries, every individual was required to ascend the tribune and deliver his vote *à viva voce*. Among the first of those who voted for death was Vergniaud. The Duke of Orleans, also, now styled Philippe Égalité, voted for death. Of 721 voting, 288 were for imprisonment or other penalties, 72 for death under certain conditions, while 361, that is, just one more than half, voted for immediate death. A respite of the execution was rejected by a vote of 380 to 310. Louis received his sentence with calmness and composure. On January 21, he ascended the scaffold. "People," cried he, "I die innocent!" but the roll of drums drowned his voice (Fig. 32).

From this time on there remained for the victors only the choice between the destruction of their adversaries or their own overthrow. The fury of the king's blood thus poured forth compelled them to wade deeper and deeper in the river of blood, until they perished in it. The crime which was committed in executing Louis XVI. was at the same time a stroke of revolutionary policy, the announcement of irreconcilable hostility toward all monarchies. On November 19, the Convention resolved itself, as Danton expressed it, into a great committee of insurrection against all kings, by promising, in the name of the French nation, fraternity and help to all peoples which desired to regain freedom, and instructing the generals to bring aid to peoples which, in the cause of freedom, had suffered any oppression. This declaration, it was decided, should be translated into all languages. The Convention bestowed French civil rights on foreigners who had done good service in the cause of freedom, among them the Germans, Klopstock, Schiller, and Campe. Its plans already covered an immense field; it was proposed to stir up the Porte and Sweden against Russia, that is to say, there was to be universal war.

In this instance the deed anticipated the word. At the same time in which the invasion of the allies came to a stand-still, General Anselme occupied the county of Nice without a blow, and Montesquieu entered

# PROCLAMATION

## D U

### CONSEIL EXÉCUTIF

#### PROVISOIRE.

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*EXTRAIT des Registres du Conseil, du 20  
Janvier 1793, l'an second de la République.*

LE Conseil exécutif provisoire délibérant sur les mesures à prendre pour l'exécution du décret de la Convention nationale, des 15, 17, 19 & 20 janvier 1793, arrête les dispositions suivantes :

1.<sup>o</sup> L'exécution du jugement de Louis Capet se fera demain lundi 21.

2.<sup>o</sup> Le lieu de l'exécution sera la *Place de la Révolution*, ci-devant *Louis XV*, entre le pied-d'estal & les Champs-élysées.

3.<sup>o</sup> Louis Capet partira du Temple à huit heures du matin, de manière que l'exécution puisse être faite à midi.

4.<sup>o</sup> Des Commissaires du Département de Paris,

des Commissaires de la Municipalité, deux membres du Tribunal criminel assisteront à l'exécution, le Secrétaire-greffier de ce Tribunal en dressera le procès-verbal, & lesdits Commissaires & Membres du Tribunal, aussitôt après l'exécution consommée, viendront en rendre compte au Conseil, lequel restera en séance permanente pendant toute cette journée.

*Le Conseil exécutif provisoire.*

ROLAND, CLAVIERE, MONGE, LEBRUN, GARAT,  
PASCHE.

*Par le Conseil, GROUVELLE.*

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A PARIS, DE L'IMPRIMERIE NATIONALE EXÉCUTIVE DU LOUVRE. 1793.

FIG. 32.—Proclamation of the Provisional Executive Council in regard to the execution of Louis XVI. on January 21, 1793. Reduced facsimile of a placard on exhibition in the Hôtel Carnavalet at Paris.



*Adam Philippe Custine*  
*General en Chef de l'Armée du Rhin*  
*Né à Metz le 4 février 1740*  
*Entré au Service en 1747 Colonel en 1763 et ayant*  
*assisté au Siège de Maestricht en 1748*  
*chez les freres Klüber à Augsbourg.*

FIG. 33.—Custine.

Savoy. Yet more brilliant by far were the results of warlike propagandism on the German frontier. The purpose of punishing the Rhenish ecclesiastical states, while the Prussians were in Champagne, originated with General Custine (Fig. 33), a marquis, who, by a restless and ambitious

spirit, had been driven to join the Revolution. On September 30, with 18,000 men, he fell suddenly upon Spire, ordered Worms to be seized, and with the declaration, "war on the palaces of tyrants, peace to the cottages of the just," captured the magazines, levied contributions on magistrate, bishop, and chapter, but spared the citizens. Far and wide this invasion produced terrible alarm. Nobles and clergy took to flight. The Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, although still hot in his hatred of the French, but now deaf to the cry for help from Mayence, made ready to withdraw his troops to Giessen; the Bavarian Palatinate placed on its boundaries tablets with the inscription, "Neutral Territory"; in the electorate of Treves, the government and council of war came to the conclusion to offer a contribution to the enemy, if he should draw near, and to deliver up to him the Prussian magazines in Coblenz and the Ehrenbreitstein, if required. This shameful, inconceivable dismay first encouraged Custine to extend his expedition as far as Mayence. Frederick Joseph von Erthal, a thoroughly worldly prelate, led in that city, as elector since 1774, a splendid court life. Vain of his liberal views he had out of the wealth of three suppressed cloisters handsomely endowed his university, and had also invited to it famous scholars, such as the historian Johann von Müller, the art critic Heine, and the young naturalist and circumnavigator Georg Forster. His army, numbering not quite 3000 men, was commanded by twelve generals, but for the sums assigned to the keeping up of fortifications better uses were found, and the ramparts themselves were transformed into English pleasure-grounds, or were rented to amateur gardeners. The favor which the elector showed to the haughty, riotous, and beggarly *émigrés* tended much to increase the discontent of the population and to gain admission for French democratic ideas. Consequently Custine counted upon support in Mayence, when he ventured upon his sudden attack. On his first appearance, on October 22, the fortress capitulated, and Frankfort was occupied by General Neuwinger. At Ratisbon the diet prepared for flight.

With these splendid military results those attained by the revolutionary propaganda did not correspond. To be sure, in Mayence there was founded a Jacobin club, the heads of which were Doctor Wedekind, Professor Hoffmann, Böhmer, a teacher in the Worms gymnasium, and the ecclesiastics Blau and Dorsch; Georg Forster also belonged with them. The masses, on the contrary, showed not the least inclination for republican ideas, especially after the Prussians, advancing over the Taunus, recovered Frankfort on December 2, and with little difficulty drove the French (Fig. 34) from the entire right bank of the Rhine, with the exception of Kastel. The commissioners of the Convention,



who proclaimed the sovereignty of the people, the abolition of taxes, burdens, and special privileges, and who were to summon primary electoral assemblies, felt constrained to threaten those who did not appear with confiscation, deportation, and death; but nevertheless only a small



FIG. 34—A National Guardsman on sentry duty. (From the "Journal of the taking of Frankfort by the New Franks," 1793.)

number of voters came together. The Jacobin craze in Mayence came to an end when the Prussians took the city on July 23.

Entirely similar were the experiences that awaited Dumouriez when the retreat of the allies enabled him to take in hand his old plan of conquering and revolutionizing Belgium. On October 28, he began his

march into Belgium; on November 5, at Jemmappes, not far from Mons, he defeated Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen, and on November 14 made his entrance into Brussels. But as soon as Dumouriez in concert with the democratic or Vaucl party announced the abolition of the existing constitution, and a new election of magistrates by universal suffrage,




FIG. 35.—A Jacobin Liberty-Tree in Mayence. (From the "Journal of the taking of Frankfort by the New Franks," 1793.)

then it was shown how weak in this country were the revolutionists. Nearly everywhere the elections were carried by force, and even then the choice for the most part fell on members of the old estates. The French propaganda soon became weary of the pretence of making the various peoples happy, and there appeared the desire for the spoils of victory. For the economic results of the Revolution in France were prostration of agriculture, stagnation of trade, the ruin of industries, decay of state institutions and of public edifices. The plunder of churches and of *émigrés* was lost in the abyss of anarchy, and, since within the country there was nothing more to be confiscated, the ravenous appetite of the new masters turned to their neighbors. As at first the kings, so now the peoples who wished to have nothing to do with the friendship forced upon them were menaced with the enmity of the Revolution. On the motion of Cambon, December 15, the Convention adopted the resolution: "Wherever the French armies come, all taxes, tithes, and class-privileges shall be abolished, all existing magistrates removed, provisional administrators shall be chosen by universal suffrage, the property of the overthrown govern-

ment, of privileged persons, and of their adherents shall be placed under French protection, commissioners of the Convention shall be sent to fraternize with the people, and commissioners of the government shall attend to the subsistence of French troops in the country" (cf. Fig. 35).

This system stood in direct opposition to the views of Dumouriez. He wished to gain over Belgium by indulgent measures, and to maintain his army in that rich country in a legitimate manner; the authorities at Paris, on the contrary, were seeking a market for their assignats, which were depreciating more and more, and a field in which to enrich themselves and their favorites. Moreover, an effective army, and especially one that was victorious, was to them not an object of pride, but of fear. The greater the displeasure of Dumouriez at seeing himself hampered in his victorious career, the more acceptable was the invitation of some Dutch democrats. A more pacific disposition no government in Europe could cherish than that of their high mightinesses in Amsterdam; long ago had they, in the comfortable enjoyment of their riches, discarded the proud policy of John de Witt; the army of the republic was scarcely capable of offering any resistance; for this very reason Dumouriez hoped to gain here easily laurels for himself and means of subsistence for his starving army. Only one weighty reason for hesitation stood in the way: the certainty that England would not look quietly upon the extension of French authority over the mouths of the Schelde and Rhine. But this, too, seemed not insuperable. The Revolution might still count upon the sympathies which it had received on its first soaring flight from men like Fox and Sheridan and a great number of the Whigs. The desire of the Catholic Irish for emancipation and for a separation from England promised other allies for France. In all French harbors preparations were eagerly made, that, if possible, possession might be obtained of the Dutch fleet, and, in that event, Dumouriez thought that France would be strong enough to cope with England on the sea, if necessary. But the more clearly the cosmopolitan propaganda, the call to a general revolution, and the radical reform of society came to the front, the more indifferent became the English friends of France. The British government still remained peaceable. William Pitt, who was at its head, was not a man who favored a warlike foreign policy; for the great internal reforms with which he sought to complete the work of 1689 peace was far too necessary to allow him to neglect anything in his power to secure its maintenance. But when the Convention, on November 16, without regard for the treaty stipulations of 1788, which secured to the Netherlands the closing of the Schelde, declared the navigation of that river to be free, Pitt replied to this, on December 1, by a royal proclamation, which summoned a part of the militia to arms, and convened the prorogued Parliament for December 13. All this caused the executive committee of the Convention to hesitate to such a degree that the plan against Holland, if not abandoned, was nevertheless




FIG. 36. William Pitt.

postponed, and Dumouriez, instead of turning to Holland, was ordered to support Custine on the Rhine, and advanced upon Aix-la-Chapelle.

If the necessity of renouncing plans for additional conquests was understood, yet the resolution was firm to treat as good booty the lands already occupied, and especially Belgium. Yet this purpose, also, encountered opposition from more than one quarter. First from Dumouriez,

and then on the part of the Belgians, who had no desire to be incorporated with France. The protest of England, however, was of the greatest importance. Although the horror caused by the execution of Louis XVI. rendered a war against the regicides popular, yet Pitt (Fig. 36) was prepared to make great sacrifices in order to maintain peace. He made it clear, however, by his utterances, that the occupation of Belgium by the French would lead to war. But the defeat of moderate men in the king's trial made the victors deaf to the voice of moderation and prudence in their foreign policy; even Robespierre, although no friend to a noisy policy of attack, now accepted war as the necessary consequence of preceding events. In a few there glimmered still a spark of the old enthusiasm for universal emancipation, but the most were pushed on by the robber-spirit. By the withdrawal of Roland, who, disheartened, gave up the struggle against the Mountain, and of Pache, who was removed by his own party, the executive committee was disorganized and the arbitrariness of certain individuals had freer play. The cessation on the part of the English of preparations for war was imperiously demanded, and then the dismissal of the French agent Chauvelin from London was seized upon as an occasion for declaring war—February 1, 1793—against England and at the same time against the Netherlands. The Convention decreed a new issue of 800,000,000 of assignats, and the levy of 300,000 men. The Hamburg senate having sent away the French envoy, an embargo was laid, on March 4, upon all Hanseatic vessels. The prostration of Spain invited an invasion of that country; after the French ambassador at Madrid had received his passports in consequence of the execution of Louis, a declaration of war against Spain was issued on March 7. In Belgium the commissioners of the Convention made great havoc; as if in an enemy's country, the public coffers and the churches were plundered. By the end of February the country was compelled to request its incorporation with France, a result which had already befallen Savoy in November. In all places, the voting was a mere piece of jugglery; in the absence of all respectable people, it was carried on by a handful of the proletariat under the protection of French troops.

On February 17, at Bergen-op-Zoom, Dumouriez crossed the frontiers of Holland. Well acquainted with the danger which threatened his right wing, he wished to reach Amsterdam before the Germans or English could come to the assistance of the Dutch. His wish was then to defeat the Austrians, and afterwards, at the head of his victorious army, to put an end to Jacobin management at Paris. But, before he could even take Dort, the catastrophe burst upon him from the German side.

On the retreat from Champagne, long and vexatious negotiations had followed between the two allies, Prussia and Austria. The coalition was not dissolved, but its aim and character were changed. Austria had renounced the purpose of restoring the Bourbon throne; it demanded, since Ansbach and Bayreuth could not be had, a French border-land in addition to Bavaria. Prussia claimed in payment of the expenses of the last campaign a piece of Poland, with a proviso of further compensation for the continuation of the war. On December 20, they finally reached an agreement. The German empire, also, now entered the lists of combatants. Although the disadvantages of a divided supreme command again made themselves immediately felt, nevertheless the superiority of the well-trained German troops over the undisciplined hordes of the republic was immediately and effectually manifested. After Aix-la-Chapelle, with aid from the inhabitants, was taken, and the division of the enemy there present was dispersed, Archduke Charles relieved Maestricht, and, pressing on rapidly, he seized Tongres and thereby compelled the French to evacuate Liège. In Belgium, the Sicilian Vespers, predicted by Dumouriez, were now threatening the French; when the country-people saw the preparations of the French to carry the silver and gold utensils of the churches across the frontier, they rose up in a body. In fact there was now no salvation for the army except the prompt recall of Dumouriez to Belgium. He came, but embittered and firmly resolved on his course. His first act was to lay before the commissioners of the Convention their fine work; in a letter he expressed himself unsparingly in regard to the proceedings of the Convention. Then he threw himself upon the Austrians; a bold offensive seemed to him the only means of restoring the spirit of his troops and of making sure of them, in order with their aid to be able to deal his blow upon the Jacobins. On March 18, he attacked the Prince of Coburg at Neerwinden, half way between Liège and Brussels. At the first his troops under Valence and young Louis Philippe de Chartres, son of Égalité, gained ground, but a determined assault by Archduke Charles upon his left wing compelled his retreat to Louvain. The condition of his army rendered it impossible for him to maintain himself on Belgian soil. Under semblance of negotiating an exchange of prisoners, he made known to Colonel Mack, the representative of Coburg, his design of marching upon Paris against the Jacobins and proclaiming the dauphin as Louis XVII. With a view to this, he stipulated with the Austrians for an armistice, to continue fourteen days. Even to the commissioners of the Convention, who had arrived in his camp, he made no secret of his purpose. But his enemies were active. The war minister Beur-

nonville and three commissioners delivered to him the summons of the Convention, and on his refusal to comply pronounced his suspension. Hereupon Dumouriez ordered their arrest, and delivered them up to the Austrians as hostages for the safety of the royal family; but his attempt to seize the fortresses of Lille and Valenciennes failed, the commissioners of the Convention ordered his arrest, and entrusted the supreme command to General Dampierre; the troops began to grow discontented; a manifesto issued (April 5) at his request by the Prince of Coburg, solemnly denying all views of conquest, no longer prevented a general desertion. Nothing now remained for him but flight to the Austrians, to whom some 800 men of his army followed him. But, being looked upon by the Austrians, also, with suspicion, he betook himself to England, where he died in 1823.

The northern army was now thrown into confusion, and the great preparations of the Convention were not yet completed, so that nothing could have hindered the allies from advancing upon Paris and there putting an end to the tyranny of the handful of democrats, had not the internal weakness of the coalition prevented their making a profitable use of the victory. The military strength of the two German powers was as much paralyzed through anxiety respecting Russian aggrandizement as by mutual distrust.

As soon as the Empress Catharine was free from the war with Turkey, she manifested the greatest eagerness to render herself mistress of Poland, while the German powers were not in a condition to oppose her plans. From the north and the south her armies pressed on, nearly 100,000 strong, avowedly as friends, for the protection of the ancient institutions of the kingdom, which were endangered by the Jacobin constitution of May. They were received with open arms by the malecontents, Branicki, Felix Potocki, Rzewuski, and their associates, who had leagued together at Targovitz, a small town of the Ukraine. The opposition attempted by the patriots, under the leadership of Thaddeus Kosciuszko, Ignatius Potocki, Kollontay, and others, was easily overpowered. The King of Prussia refused the assistance for which appeal was made. Supported by the foreign defenders of Polish freedom, the confederates renewed the former disorders, tyrannized over their adversaries, quarreled among themselves, and treated the fatherland as booty, to satisfy their covetousness and self-seeking, while on the other side the patriots, having a secret agreement with Paris, prepared for the contest against them and against Russia. But the greater the discord between the German powers became at this time, the more silent was the cabinet of St. Petersburg in reference to the Prussian indemnification. That

Prussia, in this affair, could not reckon at all upon the assistance of Austria, Minister von Haugwitz became convinced during the negotiations which he had to conduct at Vienna with von Spielmann on the question of indemnities; for, after Belgium was lost, and therewith the realization of the Bavarian exchange had become more doubtful than ever, the only apprehension still entertained at Vienna was that Austria would meet with nothing but disappointment, if Prussia should gain her prize. Upon this von Haugwitz threatened that his king would forthwith make peace with France, if the emperor did not guarantee to him definitely possessions in Poland; and now Cobenzl, in his perplexity, fell upon the crafty expedient of apparently acquiescing in this demand, but of secretly urging at St. Petersburg, with regard to it, that the Prussian indemnification should not only be diminished as much as possible, but, furthermore, should not be conceded until Prussia, by energetic participation in the French war, had deserved it, and the Bavarian exchange could be accomplished.

Catharine II. now changed her determination, and, being convinced that she could not carry out her plans in regard to Poland without the aid of an ally, came to an understanding with Prussia. On January 23, 1793, a secret treaty of partition between Russia and Prussia was signed. By a royal patent of March 25, the latter took the frontier district as far as a line extending from Czenstochowa through Rawe to Soldau, including the cities of Dantzic and Thorn. Important as was the acquisition of this territory, now called South Prussia, comprising more than 24,000 square miles with 1,500,000 inhabitants, which, by filling out the corner between Silesia and East Prussia, greatly improved the military boundaries of the state, nevertheless the lion's share fell to Russia; for, on April 7, Russia took possession of the Ukraine, Eastern Lithuania, and the remainder of Podolia and Volhynia, embracing over 108,000 square miles and 3,000,000 inhabitants.

Catharine made every endeavor to cast on Prussia the odium attaching to this violent proceeding, and to play the part of the protector of the Poles against the Germans. Since the elections to the diet, which assembled at Grodno on June 17, were conducted amid scenes of shameless bribery, and among the provincial deputies the meanest bickerings prevailed, this game was rendered easier for Catharine. If the cession to Russia were immediately carried out, then this power would arrange the transaction between the small states, Prussia and Poland, according to circumstances and her good pleasure. The Poles eagerly entered into this view; on July 22, the diet granted its approval of the cession to Russia, in order now to be able to reject with greater security every



Prussian demand. In truth, the Russian ambassador, von Sievers, manifested not the least inclination to bring the Poles to compliance with respect to Prussia, but positively refused to employ force in order to bring about in the diet a change of opinion. Thus Prussia perceived the fulfilment of her desire indefinitely deferred. A deep and justifiable distrust of Russian friendship herewith took root at Berlin.

But no less was that distrust of each other with which the two German powers were filled. Since Austria not only had sought to injure Prussia by machinations at St. Petersburg, but also showed a disposition to compel the Elector of Bavaria to give up his opposition to the exchange project, the view began to prevail in Berlin that Prussia should take care not to sacrifice for Austria in the French war the forces of which it might soon have need against Austria. But in Vienna there was accomplished about the same time a change in the ministry, which was destined to exercise a very decisive influence upon the entire future course of the war against the Revolution. The emperor (Fig. 37), young and inexperienced as he was, nevertheless perceived with growing dissatisfaction into what a sea of embarrassments his state had been steered. The Russo-Prussian treaty of January 23 was the rock on which Cobenzl's dishonorable policy was shipwrecked. On March 27, he was dismissed from office, together with his friend, von Spielmann. Baron Thugut, to whom the emperor on the recommendation of his former tutor and present favorite, Count Francis Colloredo, committed the management of foreign affairs, was a man of low extraction, but by his abilities and talent for intrigue, as well as by the reckless energy of his ambition, he had rapidly risen in power. Despotic and imperious toward inferiors, but crouching to superiors, he valued highly the possession of power. The emperor was very imperfectly educated and susceptible of no deep sentiment, whether good or bad; with him Thugut knew how to keep himself respected by means of a coolness that was imperturbable. With Thugut, Austrian policy turned back decidedly into the paths of Prince Kaunitz; among all the rivals of Austria, Prussia was in his view the most dangerous. He considered it of great importance to renew the old friendship with Russia, and win over England, in order to isolate Prussia completely; by means of the former he wished to prevent Prussian aggrandizement in Poland, and from the latter likewise to reap a sufficient advantage. Since England regarded it as important that Belgium should be in the hands of a great power, which would be able to protect it, he very willingly entered into her project: since Austria, also, was desirous of having indemnification, while there was no further prospect of the acquisition of Bavaria, she must therefore seek it at the

expense of France, by the conquest of the country as far as the Somme—that is, by confining France within the limits laid down by the Peace of the Pyrenees in 1659. Once familiar with this purpose, the government at Vienna rejoiced over every increase of the revolutionary turmoil,



FIG. 37.—Francis II. of Austria. After an engraving by Francis Wienk; original painting by J. Elteur.

which must facilitate the conquest, and considerations of relationship would not hold back the emperor in any degree.

With this altered conception, Coburg's manifesto of April 5 stood directly in contradiction. In the conference, which, on the part of Aus-

tria, Counts Metternich and Starhemberg held at Antwerp with the Duke of York as commander of the English auxiliaries, the Prince of Orange, and other diplomatists, for the establishment of a future course of action, this proclamation encountered general disapproval, and the prince was obliged to supersede it by another of April 9, which completely disclaimed the principles of the first and declared a war of conquest against France. At this same time Lucchesini, the most decided enemy of Austria, obtained a preponderating influence among the counselors of King Frederick William II. Both Thugut and Lucchesini looked only to the momentary advantage, and selfishness that knew no higher consideration drove the wedge still deeper into the cleft between the German powers, on whose firm concord the salvation of Europe chiefly reposed. Under such circumstances the conduct of the war lost all energy. At the theatre of war on the Rhine, the Duke of Brunswick, on account of the political considerations that have been mentioned, did not break up completely the remains of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, which had been driven back behind the Lauter and to the Saar, but sent away upwards of 40,000 men, the full half of his forces, to the siege of Mayence, while the king, although in failing health, spent the time in trips to luxurious Frankfort, in Zweibrücken, or in Darmstadt. In such a state of affairs nothing could be more preposterous than the manifesto of April 9, which threw out threats without the power or even the earnest purpose being at hand to follow them up by acts. It alarmed those on whose aid in the interior of France it would have been necessary to reckon, and it aroused against the allies not merely the revolutionary party, but all those who would defend the territory of the nation and the liberty that had been gained. Each one of the allies was pursuing only his own special interests. Coburg invested Lequesnoi, the Duke of York sought to capture Dunkirk that it might be held for England as a permanent possession, and between Austria and Prussia it came to a formal rupture, when Wurmser, instead of aiding the Duke of Brunswick in the siege of Landau, suddenly turned aside for the purpose of subduing Alsace. When the French, on September 14, ventured an assault upon the Prussian position at Pirmasens, they did indeed meet with a bloody repulse from the duke; but the pursuit, which would have promised decisive results, was not carried out, because the design of the Prussian leaders was to have the army at all times in readiness to act freely, in the event of its being needed at the east. For Austria now demanded a part of Poland, including Cracow, and in Grodno the demands of Prussia were opposed by Austrian intrigues and by the passive resistance of Russia. On September 23, Lucchesini informed

Count Lehrbach, the Austrian ambassador, that, since difficulties were raised in the way of the king's taking possession of the Polish districts promised him, he would find himself compelled to go to Poland in person and to take a part of his troops thither. On September 29 the king carried into effect his declared resolution. This energetic step at least ended the crafty delay of the Polish diet at Grodno. That they might have an excuse for agreeing to the treaty with Prussia, the leaders of the diet asked for a display of military force, and Sievers accordingly arrested four speakers and surrounded the diet with troops. In order to escape the necessity of an explicit assent, the assembly maintained an obstinate silence, until finally, deep in the night, one of the deputies made the motion that silence should be considered as consent, and upon this the marshal of the diet declared the Prussian treaty approved. But although Catharine had decided that she must resign a part of the Polish booty, she made so much the greater haste to secure possession of what was left of the republic. And, in fact, Poland was practically subjected to Russian rule by a perpetual alliance concluded on October 16.

Thus was the situation created which enabled those who held power in Paris to establish their sway in every part of France without molestation from abroad. The Girondists added to their many mistakes of an earlier day this fresh blunder, that, although they had such experience of the formidable character of their adversaries, they yet imagined that they still had the control of the government in their hands, and had time in which to establish at their leisure a new constitution. Many weeks were spent in considering this. The population, in need of rest, to whom all politics had become an object of disgust and dread, took not the slightest interest in this, but the docile disciples of Robespierre fell with fury upon a constitution that maintained a position which they had long since left behind. For a long time they had been understanding by democracy not equality of rights for all men, but the sole dominion of the proletariat. Measures regarded at first as expedients for combating temporary inconvenience, such as the procuring of food at the expense of the state on account of the scarcity and dearness of provisions, the prohibition of the exportation of gold and silver coins and utensils in view of the disappearance of hard money, became more and more identified with the communistic system, as Marat proclaimed it; and the Mountain made use of the most serviceable weapons against the Girondists, as a means of casting suspicion upon that party. The first strong petition of the sections, on February 12, concerning the establishment of a scale of prices, principally of grain, was indeed rejected, but the Commune, who, with the help of the sections, tyrannized over the



FIG. 33.—The Jacobin. After a contemporary engraving. On his cap under an open eye can be read the word: *surveillance*, as emblem of the popular clubs which called themselves *surveillantes de l'autorité*. On his breast he carries a membership medal of the Jacobin Club. In his right hand he holds a bell to show that he is ready to give the alarm to the fatherland of the first threatening danger. On the sheets of paper in his left hand are the dates July 14, 1789, and August 10, 1792. In his belt he carries two pistols and at his side a sabre. On his feet he wears wooden shoes.

peaceable inhabitants and formed the centre of this entire movement, learned from this failure only that they must have their violent masses more completely in readiness in order to humble the refractory Convention. In vain did the Convention seek to pacify them by imposing on the rich a progressive tax of 4,000,000 francs, avowedly for purchases

of grain; on February 25, the excited populace began to attack 1200 shops, generally those belonging to the constitutional National Guards, at first fixing the prices of goods, then simply plundering for hours at a time. This method had its effect upon the situation; the Convention granted a new advance of 7,000,000 francs, but this immediately gave rise to greater demands: prohibition of money-dealing and regulations against usurers and the aristocracy of property. Consequently, in order to appease the proletariat, there must be decreed the right to work, a new progressive tax upon the rich, and the division of the public lands among the city poor. It was not bitter need, the desperation of hunger, that urged these imperious demands, for the war had bettered the condition of the laborers. Still less could this despoiling of people of property be styled a desperate act for the defence of the country against foreign assultants. The news of the first disasters in the field were only employed for the purpose of strengthening the outcry against the conspirators, the rich, selfish men. To plunder the proprietors and to stir up the populace was certainly much easier and less dangerous than to defend the frontiers of the fatherland with arms in the hand. The enemy whom the extremists resisted was the Gironde, and that which they desired to conquer for themselves was power. On March 9, the populace for the first time burst violently in upon the Convention, but on this occasion they were successfully driven back with the help of the volunteers from Brittany.

Just at this time Danton returned from the theatre of war in Belgium. He had there seen the danger which was threatening to burst upon France. He knew that, to avert it, the most pressing need was a dictatorship, not that of the populace and the clubs, but a strong national government, formed directly out of the leaders of the Convention. Robespierre, who had long been secretly endeavoring to secure for himself the rôle of dictator, readily approved of this view. The sending out of eighty-two representatives of the people, well-approved patriots, had for its real object, under the guise of hastening the recruiting for the army, to stifle in the country all opposition to the democratic dictatorship. But Robespierre would not neglect such a favorable opportunity of dealing a blow at his chief enemy—the party of the Girondists. One of the deputies, unknown up to this time, Carrier, was consequently required to introduce a motion for the erection of an extraordinary court of justice. The new court, consisting of nine judges to be named by the Convention, was to sit in judgment upon every attempt against the internal or external safety of the republic or against the sovereignty of the people. The sentence of the guilty would be death, and condemnation would be

followed by the confiscation of property. In a moment the Girondists comprehended the danger. Even Danton refused to go so far as to agree to the establishment of such a tribunal; but the formidable character of the proposed court was mitigated by adding to it twelve jurymen, and the Convention reserved to itself the right of prosecution in every individual instance, by means of a commission of six members, to which again was added the appointment of committees of superintendence, and the duty of disarming suspects in all communes. Danton's aim was to reconcile all parties, and with the support of all to found a new government, and the Girondists so far overcame their detestation of the man that they entered into his plan. The first result of this agreement was the appointment of a committee of twenty-five members of the Convention to watch over the ministry of March 25. The new authorities consisted almost exclusively of Dantonists and Girondists—reason enough for Robespierre and his dependents forthwith to declare war upon them. Danton's situation became increasingly difficult. Suspected by the populace, whose idol he had been, he saw himself deprived, by the defection of Dumouriez, of the army of Belgium, the last means for maintaining a conflict with them. Thus he stood, irresolute and temporizing, but the blindness of the Girondists spared him the necessity of a decision. When they perceived his perplexity, they were unable to resist the temptation to rid themselves of an offensive confederate. On April 1, La-source, one of their party, arose to accuse Danton as a fellow-conspirator with Dumouriez. Danton now began a life-and-death struggle against the Girondists, and, without renouncing his political principles, he turned back to his old friends of the Mountain, in conjunction with whom, on April 5, he carried through a measure creating a Committee of Public Safety of nine members, chosen for a month, to support whom the Committee of General Security should serve. This new authority possessed the full powers of government, and of it Danton himself was the soul. He could not avoid, in reckoning with the Mountain for the price of their support, helping them sharpen the axe for every opponent. Again petitions of the sections were thrust upon the Convention, demanding justice on the enemies of the country, who had the audacity to sit in the Convention. In the extraordinary court, which later, after October 28, was called the Revolutionary Tribunal, the commission of the Convention was set aside on the ground that it hindered prosecutions. The regulation of the price of bread at the expense of the rich, and the arrest of all Bourbons living in France, even Égalité, were measures which were now carried through. On April 11, money-dealing was prohibited on the penalty of six years' imprisonment, and

the circulation of assignats made compulsory, although this did not prevent the ever increasing depreciation of the paper currency. Everywhere the authorities not in favor of the Jacobins (Fig. 38) were removed, and at the head of the departments were placed central committees with well-nigh unlimited power. With few exceptions the whole land lay at the feet of the Jacobin rabble; the victors already spoke of throwing the forces of the departments upon the capital.


There the Committee of Public Safety had with difficulty maintained order by continued payments to the insatiable Commune; when they at length wearied of this, a section made its appearance before the Convention with the demand for lower compulsory prices for the most important necessaries of life, while without the mob gave emphasis to the demand by acts of violence. The Girondists endeavored to anticipate the attack that awaited them, by a counter-attack, but their accusation of Marat failed utterly. He was acquitted, and, crowned with oak-leaves, was triumphantly brought back to the Convention. But the Commune took vengeance for this attack, when they hurled the charge of high treason against twenty-two Girondists. Among the Jacobins, Robespierre, in explaining the rights of man, exhibited a new theory of the sovereignty of the people, according to which the people as the true ruler could change the government at pleasure. After the praiseworthy example of the patriots of Montpellier, who, in order to obtain means for a great levy of 5000 men, had imposed on their own responsibility a forced loan of 5,000,000 upon their rich fellow-citizens, the Parisian Commune voted a similar loan of 12,000,000 for combating the refractory Vendéans, and, on May 2, the Convention allowed itself to be bullied by the threatening attitude of the faubourgs into fixing a maximum for the price of corn.

The fate of the royalists now befell the Girondists. The only field of conflict on which they knew how to be victorious was the orator's platform; they possessed too much cultivation to scuffle with the dirty mob, and for that reason they suffered defeat after defeat, although the number of agitators and brawlers with whom they came in contact scarcely exceeded sixty or eighty. There now appeared upon the field of conflict a defensive force, which, rightly led, would have been competent to equalize this disproportion—the middle class, who had renounced all politics, but who now, when the ruling party attacked their goods and chattels, began to bestir themselves not only at Paris, but also in the departments. But the Girondists did not know how to derive any advantage from this movement; they allowed the Mountain to make use of this opportunity to fill the ranks of the battalions with the proletariat, on whom they could rely.





PLATE X.



"Café of the Patriots."

After a copper plate engraving by J. B. Marnis; original drawing by Jacques-François Joseph Swetchach de Fontaine. 1791-1826.

Danton, who, supported by Hérault de Séchelles and Barère on the Committee of Public Safety, conducted foreign affairs, shared in no degree this wild fury of the Mountain. Brief as was his ministry, it had sufficiently aroused his statesmanlike qualities to convince him that a state cannot be governed by the forces of destruction. The fanaticism with which Robespierre, in the discourse above mentioned, had preached the duty of all peoples to fight every king and prince to the death, as an oppressor of humanity and a rebel against nature, was far from him. He even prevailed upon the Convention to renounce explicitly the revolutionary propaganda by the declaration that France, as she would suffer no foreign direction in reference to her internal policy, so also on her part would desist from all intermeddling with foreign institutions. The first state with which an agreement was reached was Sweden, and she was induced, by the want of money on the part of her rulers, by anxiety with regard to Russian predominance, and by dissatisfaction at England's maritime tyranny, to sign, on May 23, a formal treaty of alliance with the republic. Moreover, Danton was too accurately instructed in regard to the discord between the two German powers, not to enter into a plan proposed first by Desportes, former *chargé d'affaires* at Stuttgart, in pursuance of which he hoped to purchase the neutrality of Prussia and then be enabled to direct all his forces against the Austrians. According to this, of the three ecclesiastical principalities to be secularized the electorate of Mayence and a part of the electorate of Treves should fall to Bavaria, in return for which this government should cede to Prussia Jülich and Berg, long sought by her. With such plans the wild managers of the Commune were not in unison. Yet once more Danton attempted to come to an understanding with the Girondists, but for the second time they rejected his offered hand (PLATE X.). The inexpiable character of his bloodguiltiness bound him anew to confederates whom he despised and through whom retribution was to come upon him. He now connected himself with the Mountain more firmly than ever before. In a meeting by night at Charenton, a little place near Paris, a conspiracy was formed between him, Robespierre, Pache, Marat, and others, the victims of which were to be the Girondists. The city council undertook to provide arms, and held back near Courbevoie the battalions destined for the Vendée. At the bar of the Convention petitioners presented themselves against the Girondists as they formerly did against Louis XVI. The publicity with which these preparations for a new Tenth of August were pushed forward aroused the Girondists to anticipate the blow; on May 18, at their suggestion, a motion was made by Guadet that the Commune be suppressed and provisionally replaced by the directories

of the sections, that the Convention be dissolved, and deputies summoned to a new assembly at Bourges. If carried through energetically, this perhaps would have been the only method of crushing the rabble-rule at Paris, and setting free the legal representatives of the people from that tyranny. But Barère, a man without character, warded off the threatened blow by a counter-proposal for the appointment of a Committee of Twelve to examine into all resolutions recently adopted by the Commune. The Gironde obtained only this, that the inquiry should be extended to all intrigues against public order; but in choosing the Twelve they carried the election of their candidates, and these began their action at once with energy by prohibiting the night meetings of the sections. The imprisonment of Hébert, the favorite of the street democrats, spread consternation in the ranks of the Jacobins. All engines of persuasion and force were employed to excite the sections to a counter-demonstration, but to such an extent was the citizen element in them already strengthened that only twenty-eight of the sections were induced to bring in a petition for the release of Hébert and the suppression of the Committee of Twelve. In the midst of the tumult caused by the crowds of people pressing into the chamber, the president of the Convention did, indeed, announce the acceptance of the petition; but on the next day the Convention restored the Committee and acquiesced only in the release of Hébert. When, however, the Jacobins saw themselves menaced on the one hand by the Committee with judicial prosecution and on the other by the Gironde with a rising of the provinces against the capital, they determined to delay no longer the execution of the Charenton agreement; but, in order not to arouse and call up against themselves the citizens in arms, they provided, by an express resolution of the Committee of Insurrection, that all property should be put under the protection of the *sans-culottes*, and that all members of the same as well as the entire Jacobin Club should bind themselves by oath to perish rather than suffer property to be attacked. The Committee of Public Safety and the ministry, fully informed of that which was at hand, wavered between fear of the murderous bands of the Commune and distrust of the Girondists, until finally jealousy of the Twelve drove them to the side of the Commune.

The plan was similar to that of August 10. A provisional government, composed of chosen men in the sections, took possession, in the night of May 31, of the Hôtel de Ville; as commander of the National Guard a certain Henriot was named. But the plan of compelling the Convention to expel and arrest thirty-four Girondists failed, by reason of those sections who remained faithful and who had taken up their position

at the Palais Royal for the protection of the Convention. Thus only the removal of the Committee of Twelve was effected. Excited to greater fury by this failure, the conspirators resolved to renew the attempt without delay. On the next day the battalions were called up from Courbevoie, and the sections were checked by numerous arrests. On June 2, a deputation of the Commune appeared before the Convention and demanded the immediate arrest of twenty-two Girondists, of the members of the Committee of Twelve, and of the ministers Clavière and Lebrun. Forty thousand armed men surrounded the Tuileries, and allowed none of those within to pass out until their demand was granted. In the hall of assembly a wild uproar prevailed for three hours, and in the midst of it all orderly proceedings were defeated. The sneaking Barère sought to induce the accused to give up their seats of their own accord. But these men rejected every cowardly expedient. Since they pleaded that the Convention was not free, it was resolved, again on the proposal of Barère, to put this statement to the test, but on reaching the principal entrance they were met by the drunken Henriot and driven back by his command to his cannoniers to stand to their guns. After several similar futile attempts to leave by other exits, the Convention submitted to the populace. On Couthon's motion the list of the thirty-two members who were to be expelled and arrested was drawn up, the Plain refraining from voting. Danton procured for them the favor that they should be held provisionally in only light confinement.

Step by step the Girondists had suffered themselves to be won over by the Mountain to one outrage after another; they had even sacrificed the head of the king in order to secure their own safety. But the same means which they had employed to overthrow the monarchy had now become the instruments of their own downfall. That they fell in a manly struggle and in defence of order has often caused men to forget that they assisted in the destruction of that order, and to encircle their memory with a halo which, judged by their political acts, they did not deserve.

June 2 had put the Mountain in possession of supreme power, but the permanence of this possession was by no means secured. For the resistance of the country to the tyranny of the Parisian democracy, which had already made itself noticeable before May 31, gained in strength after several Girondists, having escaped from prison, had spread abroad through the provinces indignation at the last act of violence. Marseilles set the example in regard to this; it closed the Jacobin Club, brought the leaders before the courts, and expelled the commissioners of the Convention. At Lyons, the forced loan, the recruiting for the war against the Vendée, and the order to arm 4000 of the proletariat,

who were to constitute the garrison of the city, caused the storm to burst forth. In a bloody street-fight the *bourgeois* were the victors (May 29), the president of the Jacobin Club, Chalier, was executed, and the new common council renounced obedience to the Convention until the restoration of the expelled Girondists. Bordeaux likewise rose up and determined to prepare a military force for the liberation of the Girondists; in Toulon the citizens anticipated the murderous designs of the clubs, arrested the leaders, and caused five to be executed. In the Vendée and in Brittany the rural population prevented by force recruiting. And even the citizens of Paris, notwithstanding the subjugation of the Convention and numberless arrests, showed a want of the requisite compliance. This resistance produced the effect of rendering the Mountain more cautious, and for the moment all further attacks upon property were discontinued. An attempt was made by them to throw dust into the eyes of the irresolute and timid by means of a new, well-sounding constitution, to which the oath was taken on June 25, but of which the practical execution was never seriously contemplated. The proletariat, who found in it neither the assurance of bread to those who had none, nor the removal of poverty and beggary, were pacified with fine words. The Committee of Public Safety, hitherto composed of the middle parties and following Danton's lead, sought to act as mediator, but this was not according to the mind of the Jacobins. As a result of the new election of this Committee on July 10, it was made up almost exclusively of men of the Mountain; a few days later Robespierre himself entered it. Thus the power of the government passed over into the hands of the Mountain.

Robespierre perceived that the time had now come for the fulfilment of his ideal: annihilation of the vicious middle class, extermination of all traitors and conspirators, all enemies of his person and his system, continuance of the insurrection by the help of the stipendiary "people;" whoever did not belong to his devoted, zealous, exclusive friends must be put down. Already the sentence of outlawry had been issued against the chiefs of the rising at Lyons, when the assassination of Marat by Charlotte Corday (Fig. 39), on July 13, offered a welcome opportunity for increasing measures of terrorism. Beautiful, young, and full of exalted enthusiasm for freedom, this maiden had secretly withdrawn from the house of her relatives at Caen and betaken herself to Paris, with the determination of freeing her country from a monster in whom the representations made by fugitive Girondists had led her to see the chief author of all the crimes perpetrated. Received by Marat while he was sitting in his bath, she thrust a knife into his heart. With touching

composure she suffered death under the guillotine. But her deed only hastened the fall of those whom she had wished to save. On July 28 the Convention passed a decree of outlawry against twenty Girondist



FIG. 39.—Charlotte Corday. After a drawing by Baudran; original painting, 1793, by Vestier (died 1810).

deputies; nine others were brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal. Even the bad news from the theatre of the war, the capitulation of Mayence on July 22, which was followed by that of Valenciennes on August 1, was made use of only to exasperate the people by rumors of

treachery, of compact with the enemy, and thus to justify fresh measures of violence against all who stood in the way of the ruling faction. And this was done by the men who felt that their tyranny was nowhere threatened with greater peril than from a victorious general, and who did everything to disorganize the armies on the frontier by removing generals suspected by them, like Biron and Custine, and by destroying the military spirit by countenancing the lack of discipline. So little ground is there for the oft-repeated assertion, that it was the Mountain's Reign of Terror that first breathed into the French people the unity, force, and energy through which alone its salvation from foes without and within was rendered possible.

In a great degree the Jacobins were assisted in the attainment of their end by the centralization derived from the old monarchy, by the failure of the country, in matters of general interest, to adopt independent resolutions, and by the habit of always receiving the watchword from Paris. The chief difficulty, on the other hand, which they encountered, lay in the temper of those upon whom they were obliged to depend, the proletariat and the clubs, both of which, in the overthrow of existing conditions and the removal of adversaries, had performed excellent service, but, with their unbridled and insatiable characters, were wretchedly adapted for the establishment of a condition intended to be durable. Among the leaders of the Jacobins there was no one who was not persuaded of the necessity of having a strong government, but every one desired this for himself alone. While, therefore, these republicans (Fig. 40) bowed the people under an unexampled yoke, they were engaged among themselves in hot disputes with regard to the possession of supreme power. Since the fall of the Girondists, Robespierre had changed from being a member of the opposition to a member of the government, and with cool calculation he made use of the wild confusion of the low passions around him only for the purpose of more surely reaching his object.

After the acceptance of the new Constitution, which, with the wonted republican pomp, took place on August 10, in the presence of 8000 delegates from the departments, the Convention rightfully should have given way to a new assembly, and the mandate of the Committee of Public Safety should have expired. But the men in power knew too well what awaited them, if they once suffered power to go out of their hands, not to use all means for retaining possession of it. Even the monthly renewal of the Committee of Public Safety was discontinued. A trial of what the army would quietly allow was made in the condemnation and execution of Custine. This trial proved very satisfactory; the army did not move. Opposition was rather to be expected on the part of those






FIG. 40.—Faesimile of a republican placard: it was posted on the houses in order to show the loyalty of the occupants.

who, in the seizure of supreme power, had obtained nothing. The Hébertists availed themselves of the presence of those 8000 delegates to attempt to take an independent stand; in solemn procession they brought before the Convention the proposal that, in order to put an end to the intrigues of the enemies of the country and to save it by one great measure, the nation should rise *en masse*, seize upon all suspected persons, hold their families as hostages, and send the men themselves to the frontier to fight against foreign enemies. Danton now undertook the




FIG. 41.— Facsimile of a certificate of citizenship.

task of giving an altered direction to this silly proposal, so that out of it arose the law for a levy of the entire male population from eighteen to twenty-five years of age, able to bear arms, and instead of a party manoeuvre a comprehensive scheme for recruiting the army was adopted.

On the other hand, events in Toulon excited serious apprehensions. Well knowing that, after resistance was once commenced, reconciliation was no more to be thought of, the citizens of that place had proclaimed King Louis XVII. and the Constitution of 1791; but, on account of the fruitlessness of their endeavors to induce the neighborhood and the army stationed at Nice to join them, they suffered themselves to be driven to the desperate step of applying for aid to the English Admiral Hood, who, together with the Spaniard Langara, was blockading the harbor, and they consented to receive a garrison of the allies into the fortifications. The revolt of Toulon gave the signal "for making terrorism the order of the day," in order that the whole population might be put under police supervision, and every further attempt at resistance might be crushed in the germ. A forced loan of 1,000,000,000 francs was made,




FIG. 42.—Facsimile of a cartoon during the Revolution: "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité, ou la Mort." The French people, represented by a citizen blindfolded, seeks in vain to find Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, while Death alone approaches and opens his arms to him.

and Paris was provisioned as a fortress. The full establishment of the Reign of Terror was effected by means of the resolutions of September 5, dictated by the Commune: prohibition of the purchase or sale of assignats, under penalty of death; creation of a revolutionary army of 7200 men, in order to put down conspirators and to give emphasis to

the decrees of the Convention; daily disbursement of three francs to members of the revolutionary committees, of forty sous to those attending the meetings of the sections; repeal of the prohibition against searching dwelling-houses at night; finally, reorganization of the Revolutionary Tribunal; this was now divided into four sections, and, in order that they might work simultaneously, the number of judges was increased to sixteen and that of jurymen to sixty. The selection of the bloodthirsty Billaud-Varennes and Collot-d'Herbois as members of the Committee of Public Safety was followed on September 9 by new appointments on the Committee of General Security, and orders were issued to the departments to take all offices away from the *bourgeoisie* and deliver them to zealous *sans-culottes*; and on September 17 the terrible law against the suspects was passed, in pursuance of which every one who held no certificate of citizenship (Fig. 41) from his magistrate should be ranked among suspects. After the Right and the Centre of the Convention were rendered harmless by handing over to the Revolutionary Tribunal the imprisoned deputies and arresting the seventy-three signers of a protest against the acts of June 2, trial was made of the patience of the people. On October 10, upon motion of Saint-Just, the new Constitution was suspended; the provisional government should be a revolutionary government until peace was made, the Convention and the Committee of Public Safety should continue till then; the ministry and all the state officers should be under the supervision of the latter. The bloody work of the guillotine began to increase (Fig. 42).

In the several departments the carrying through of the Reign of Terror was the business of the commissioners of the Convention, rough and low men, who, in a manner that was partly terrible and partly absurd, boasted of their supreme power, and with the support of local patriots arrested and confiscated according to their pleasure, and quelled all opposition in blood by the aid of the army or Revolutionary Tribunal. Saint-Just caused himself to be dispatched to Strasburg, accompanied by sixty Jacobins, each of whom received fifteen francs daily and free subsistence. That man hastened at once to condemn the brewers of the city to pay a penalty of 250,000 francs, on account of avarice; the bakers, as enemies of humanity, to pay 300,000 francs; an apothecary, because of rhubarb sold too dearly, 15,000 francs. Thus it went on for two months. Saint-Just himself exacted numberless supplies and a loan of 4,000,000 francs from the rich of the city, another of 9,000,000 francs from the department of the Lower Rhine, and a third of 4,000,000 francs from the peasants of Alsace, of whom more than 30,000 fled across the Rhine. By such means the Revolution began to drive out of the Alsatians "their German



PLATE XI.



Last Portrait of Queen Marie Antoinette.

A pastel by Kucharsky, made in 1791.

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 147.*

stupidity." But this was not a solitary instance; the same proceeding was repeated in all parts of the country. In Paris and its environs the revolutionary army under Ronsin's lead attended to the plundering. With special barbarity Tallien punished the Girondist Bordeaux. Trustworthy estimates place the amount extorted from the population, within six months, at from three to four hundred millions, and the number of arrests at the same time at more than 200,000.

A kind of devilish pleasure was afforded these men by ill-treatment of the queen (PLATE XI.). On July 3, in the middle of the night, policemen forced their way into her prison (Fig. 43) in order to separate




FIG. 43.—Facsimile of a note from Marie Antoinette to the Count of Rougeville. The letters were made by sticking a needle into a piece of paper. "Je suis gardée à vue, je ne parle à personne. Je me fie à vous, je viendrai." Written in the Temple. (Paris, National Archives.)

her son from her, avowedly on account of some royalist attempts to effect her liberation. For more than an hour the mother in desperation offered opposition; she protected the boy with her body until the inhuman creatures threatened to slay her children before her eyes; then at length she suffered the child to be torn from her; after a few weeks she was separated also from her daughter and her sister-in-law, and taken to the Conciergerie (Fig. 44). On October 14, the "Widow Capet" appeared before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The dignity and majesty of the queen in her ragged clothes profoundly moved all the spectators, but not the hardened hearts of her persecutors and judges. With the same composure she suffered death on October 16, accepting it as a deliverance from an existence that had become intolerable. Her son was reserved for a lamentable fate (Fig. 45). The shoemaker Simon, his appointed guardian, knew no greater joy than to make of the young prince a filthy *sans-culotte*, to make him drunk with brandy, and to have him sing obscene songs. After his removal, the boy spent six months starving in body and mind, never having any society, in the deepest wretchedness,





FIG. 41.—The prison-cell of Queen Marie Antoinette in the Conciergerie.

in a dark, dirty hole, out of which he was released only by the 10th Thermidor.

On the day of the execution of Marie Antoinette, Robespierre and Saint-Just consulted with Barère in reference to future measures. The







The "natural" Divine service.

After a copper-plate engraving by Mallet.

result was that now the turn of the Girondists was to come. These men showed before the Tribunal the same lack of political principle which formerly, when they were the dominant party, had called down upon them their fate. But, at least, they died heroically, twenty in number, on October 31. In order to prevent in the future the repetition of such protracted and questionable judicial proceedings as those against the Girondists, authority was given the jury to declare the prosecution terminated after a three days' trial. Of the Girondists who fled, many met with a violent death at their own or other hands. Condorcet, Roland, and Clavière killed themselves. Pétion and Buzot were found in the country, half devoured by wolves. Shortly afterward Madame Roland died under the guillotine, with the exclamation, "O liberty, how many crimes are committed in thy name!" On November 6, the wretched Philippe Égalité was executed; on November 11, Bailly; by the end of the year, one hundred and twenty in all.

In addition to these measures a specially embittered conflict was waged by the communal council against all that was styled religion and church. Mockery of religion, persecution of priests, desecration of churches, were a part of the order of the day. The Christian Sunday and all other festival days were abolished, the churches closed and plundered. In the departments of Nièvre and Allier, Fouché, the friend of Collet and Hébert, imprisoned priests indiscriminately, sent to Paris church utensils worth many millions, and replaced the crosses in the churchyards by images of sleep. On November 10, Notre Dame was dedicated to the worship of Reason. In place of the abrogated Christian calendar, a republican era was introduced, beginning with September 22, 1792, and the year was divided into twelve months (named after natural phenomena<sup>1</sup>) of thirty days each, besides five intercalary days; the latter were festivals of the virtues, of genius, of labor, of thought, and of the rewards; the names of the saints gave way to those of animals or plants, the ass, ox, apple, cauliflower, artichoke, etc. Each month was divided into three decades, instead of four weeks. (Cf. PLATE XII.)

Robespierre conceived for this mummary of the worship of Reason a strong feeling of indignation. The people, who had quietly borne the loss of liberty and property, were very far from suffering now their dearest possession, their faith, to be torn from them by a band of crazy folk; the women at least, were of this mind. The abolished festivals were celebrated in secret, the usages and the servants of the church were tenaciously held in honor, and it was certainly impolitic to increase

<sup>1</sup> Vendémiaire, Brumaire, Frimaire, Nivôse, Ventôse, Pluviôse, Germinal, Floréal, Prairial, Messidor, Thermidor, Fructidor.

*ch'importe de signer le petit. Ça s'est vu. que mure l'ingénieur*  
*Salon de la guerre il est allé qui s'enfuit. Mure l'ingénieur*  
 Archives  
 SECT. 10  
 1000 1000  
 Louis CARVER  
 Simon aproude. en present de la nation  
 ante l'assemblée

Fig. 45. — Facsimile of the signatures of Louis XVII and of the cobbler Simon under the declaration demanded from the dauphin against his mother. Paris, National Archives.

needlessly the apprehension with which the country turned away from its new masters, and with regard to which the strictest suppression of every utterance of opinion could not deceive them. There still remained, after all this was done, in order to subdue the anger which was rising against them in the provinces, no means of appeasement, except destruction. The ship of the Republic could reach the haven only through a sea of blood. This was experienced in fullest measure by those who had ventured to resist the Parisian tyranny. Upon Lyons, which, after a three months' defence, had been compelled, on October 9, to yield unconditionally, the Convention decreed utter destruction. When the executor of this decree, Conthon, was humane or wise enough to proceed with the transaction slowly, he was recalled, and now in his place Collot and Fouché threw themselves into the work of annihilating this doomed city. As many as 14,000 laborers were employed in tearing down the houses; since the guillotine worked too slowly, they had recourse to grape-shot. Thus, according to the report of the commissioners, 1600 men, in reality probably 6000, met death, until finally the open resistance of the troops of the line suspended the butchery. Even the name of Lyons was suppressed, that which was left of the city was to be called

*Ville affranchie*, and on the ruins was to be erected a pillar with the inscription: "Lyons waged war against liberty, Lyons is no more." Toulon was rebaptized "Port-la-Montagne"; the English, who had been joined by Neapolitans and Sardinians as well as Spaniards, would have adequately protected it from a similar fate, if dissensions among the allies, and in the

city itself between the constitutional and aristocratic royalists, had not paralyzed the defence. Carteaux, the vanquisher of Marseilles, a painter by profession, commanded the investing army ; after him an equally incompetent man, the physician Coppet ; and at last the experienced General Dugommier ; but the real soul of the besieging force was a captain of artillery, Napoleon Bonaparte. With the glance of genius he detected, as the decisive point, the tongue of land that divided the harbor into an inner and outer basin, in which was situated Fort l'Eguillette, or Little Gibraltar ; in the night of December 17, he took possession of this commanding position, and thus compelled the enemy to evacuate the city and the inner harbor. Boundless was the consternation of the inhabitants, now aroused out of a feeling of profound security. Fifteen thousand fled in despair to the ships, and the forces of the Republic took possession of the city. The purpose of killing the entire population was not carried out, because here also the troops refused to do the hangman's work : yet, by the order of Fréron, at least 400 laborers at the arsenal were massacred on the spot for having served the enemy, and 800 more were put to death by a republican fusillade.

And yet all these horrors did not equal those in which the heroic uprising of the Vendée and Brittany was suppressed in blood. The forest, heath, and marsh lands on the lower Loire were the only districts of France whose nobles had not been corrupted by the seductions of court life. Here the lord of the manor dwelt in his castle in the midst of his bailiffs and peasants, differing little from them in bringing up. These simple men sorrowed when the nobles were driven away and the king dethroned, they were indignant at the destruction of their prosperity by the issuing of assignats, but they rose up as one man when the recruiting-officers reached their villages. In a few weeks, from the Loire to La Rochelle, many thousands were under arms ; they were, indeed, but poorly organized bands and little to be feared, had not the government placed its best troops on the frontiers, and had not the nature of the country, covered with hedges and thickets, fought for them. At first the National Guards employed against them were held in check successfully by Vendean peasants, under competent leaders, who, like the tradesman Cathelineau, and the forester Stofflet, had sprung from their own ranks, and who were soon joined by noblemen, like Charette, La Rochejacquelein, Bonchamp, Lescure and d'Elbée. Rossignol, clothed with the chief command against them, was admirably suited to execute his commission, which was to burn all houses, hedges, and woods in the Vendée, to cut down the grain, drive off the cattle, and transplant into other departments the old men and the wives and children of those executed. He was, how-

ever, incapable as a military commander, and the Vendéans, even after the garrison of Mayence was available for service in the West, in a series of brilliant engagements wholly liberated their country, and took from the intruders a hundred pieces of artillery. However, they soon sacrificed the fruits of their victories through their carelessness and the dissensions among their leaders. Thus it became possible for more competent subordinate officers, like Kléber, Marceau, and Westermann, to press forward systematically into the Bocage, the very heart of the country, and on October 17, at Cholet, to defeat the insurgents with severe loss. D'Elbée and Bonchamp were among the dead. Nevertheless, of the combatants, 30,000 escaped, together with 70,000 camp-followers, women, children, and old men, and, crossing the Loire, transferred the war to the right bank of the river, and, on October 27, under La Rochejacquelein, completely routed the republicans at Laval. Yet even this success was marred by want of foresight on the part of the victors; they did not at all see the need of stretching out their hands to the insurgents in Brittany, the Chouans, as they were called after the nickname of the family of one of their leaders, John Cottereau, a poor peasant smuggler; at their head stood the gigantic and daring George Cadoudal and the chivalrous Count Puisaye. On December 12, the Vendean army was annihilated at Le Mans by Marceau. No pardon was granted. Wounded, old men, and women, as well as soldiers, were shot, and more than 15,000 perished on that day. At Nantes, meanwhile, Carrier, representative of the people, labored with beastly bloodthirstiness for the extirpation of the population; every day 150 to 200 prisoners were shot; and, when this proved too tedious, they were tied together in pairs and drowned in the river. At least 15,000 perished there in four months. At last despair and desire for vengeance drove the peasants once more to rise, and they were not overpowered until the Committee of Public Safety decided to adopt a change of system and to employ mild and conciliatory measures.

With the subjugation of the Vendée the last resistance in the interior was extinguished. But the Committee of Public Safety found the effectual administration of the government more and more frustrated by the insubordination and resistance of the Commune under the lead of Hébert, Vincent, and others. To the pedantic, order-loving Robespierre this wild anarchy of the Hôtel de Ville was something horrible, but he saw in it also a menace to his position. The determination to fight those through whose aid he had become what he was he did not easily adopt, not merely because it was a dangerous contest, which once undertaken afforded him no retreat, but especially for the reason that in such an attempt it was indispensable to have the assistance of Danton and his

adherents, whom he equally hated. But once resolved, he prepared the attack with all the skill which he had acquired hitherto in prosecuting his enemies. Since it was not advisable to bring the Hébertists to account for those crimes which he himself had encouraged and in which he had participated, he devised a new accusation against them. In the report concerning foreign affairs which he laid before the Convention on November 17, he inserted warnings against suspicious moderation and hints with regard to a party consisting of emissaries of Pitt and Coburg. On November 21, he inveighed warmly at the Jacobin Club against those who sought to assail one kind of fanaticism by another, and demanded a purging of the Club. One of the first cast out was Anacharsis Clootz. Danton now felt the deepest disgust for the never-ending anarchy and for his own bloody past, and entered willingly into the views of Robespierre. With his support the latter carried through the law of December 4, which was equivalent to the subjection of the Commune to the Committee of Public Safety: to the immediate supervision of the latter all authorities were subjected by this law: the revolutionary committees of the sections were subordinated to the Committee of Public Safety instead of the communal council, and all revolutionary armies not formed by the Convention itself were dissolved. But Robespierre soon became aware that he had underrated his adversaries, and that the conflict was a hazardous one for him. Immediately he buried for the time being his revenge in his heart, and turned to the side of the stronger party. Thus the system of terror was revived anew. The confiscation of the property of the suspects, that is to say, of 200,000 Frenchmen, in favor of the poor proletariat, by a decree of February 26, 1794, announced the triumph of communistic principles.

By this change the Dantonists were exceedingly perplexed; they saw themselves suddenly cast down from the hope of an approaching victory into the gravest peril. Danton alone would not believe in any danger. The communal council had received with the highest dissatisfaction the yoke of the law passed December 4; it made preparations for a fresh insurrection. But it was to discover that its bands, formerly so reliable, for once refused to act; the decree of February 26 had thoroughly converted the proletariat into friends of the Convention and of the Committee of Public Safety. The failure of the contemplated rising was decisive for Robespierre's resolution (cf. Fig. 46); it showed him the weakness of the Hébertists, and gave into his hands the weapons for their destruction. Of the members of the Committee, Collot was their friend and companion, but he dared not protect them, since he was not willing to incur the suspicion of being their accomplice. All the more

Solvats républicains, ~~la patrie, vous regard, la~~  
~~la gloire, vous appelle.~~ les mains de vos frères égorgés vous  
 appellent implorant; la gloire vous appelle, la patrie  
 vous orgueille, ~~vous enorgueillissent~~  
~~vous enorgueillissent~~ les représentants <sup>de la nation</sup> ~~de la nation~~ ~~peuple~~  
~~peuple~~ vous encouragent et vous guident; marchez  
 frapper; que dans un mois, la peuple français  
 soit vengé, la liberté-affirmée, la république terminée  
 plantée, que les tyrans et les esclaves disparaissent.  
 Soit de la terre; qu'il n'y reste plus que la justice,  
 la bonté et la vertu.

Robespierre

FIG. 46.—Facsimile of a letter of Robespierre, in the name of the Committee of Public Safety and directed to the army, October 26, 1793.

obstinately he insisted upon the sacrifice of Danton and his adherents, and therefore the Committee united upon the great double offering. On the night of March 14, Hébert and twenty of his associates, among them Ronsin, Vincent, and Chaumette, were arrested, and on March 24 were put to death amid the rejoicings of a multitude of spectators. It was the



first time, since the outbreak of the Revolution, that victory remained not with the insurrection, but on the side of authority. The arrest of Hé-rault de Séchelles on March 17 introduced the second act of the conflict. Tallien undertook to effect a reconciliation; he brought about a personal interview between Danton and Robespierre, but to no purpose. In the night of March 31, the constables dragged to prison the once powerful tribune of the people, with his companions, Desmoulins, Fabre d'Églantine, and others. Once again, before the Revolutionary Tribunal, Danton regained that blasting power with which in former days he had struck down his adversaries, but now it only called forth an order from the Convention, which empowered the court to pronounce sentence immediately in case of the obstinate resistance of the accused. On April 5, the guilt-laden chiefs of the Dantonists fell for a crime which they had not committed.

The unlimited power of the Committee of Public Safety (Fig. 47)



FIG. 47.—Facsimile of the signatures of Collet-d'Herbois, Carnot, R. Lindet, Baire, Billard Varennes, C. A. Prieur. On an order of the Committee of Public Safety, April 21, 1794. With the stamp of the Committee.

was now established. The Convention also, which allowed itself to be congratulated by the sections on account of its deliverance, showed itself worthy of its former rôle. With the same cowardice with which it had once, contrary to its better convictions, condemned the king from fear of

the angry looks of the Mountain, had delivered up the Girondists, had assisted at the apotheosis of the despised Marat, and had participated in the disgusting farce of the worship of Reason, it now, a mute slave of Robespierre and Saint-Just, saw those men dragged to the guillotine by whom it had allowed itself previously to be ruled.

But if now the victors, who alone remained upon the field of conflict, looked around them, there was to be seen as the results of the Revolution not the slightest creative work. The industries of the citizens, from which politics, executions, the emigration, and conscription had withdrawn fully one-half of the laboring force, were completely ruined, the war had annihilated agriculture and trade, the wages of labor had fallen to a fourth, a fifth, and still lower, the roads and canals were going to ruin, and the forests were laid waste to an unparalleled extent. The very compulsion which sought to relieve the prevailing destitution created a more frightful increase of public misery. All threats of Draconian severity to secure the circulation of the assignats, of which, up to May, about five milliards had been issued, were answered by an unrelenting and increased fall of exchange. If the Convention, for the revival of business, passed the strongest laws against speculators and usurers, and subjected one article after another to a compulsory tariff, the transactions in merchandise were only concealed the more closely; absolute want threatened to prevail, and, if the Convention continued making fresh advances of money to the communal council of Paris, and even granted to its agents the right of levying military requisitions, yet, notwithstanding this, bread became scarcer and scarcer, and of poorer and poorer quality. A man was allowed to purchase only so much bread, meat, etc., as was absolutely necessary for himself and for those dependent on him, and this was sold to him only on presentation of a card issued by the authorities. From four, even from two o'clock, in the morning, one could see hungry people forming a line in front of the bakers' shops, and fortunate was he, who, after seven hours' waiting, was satisfied. Since collection of taxes had ceased long before this, the government existed by means of assignats, confiscations, revolutionary imposts, and extortions, or, without further formality, they seized all that pertained to the needs of the army—horses, forage, provisions. The administration, twice as numerous and twice as expensive as under the old *régime*, accomplished unspeakably little; the ministerial committee for trade, with 10,000 salaried assistants, brought in, during the nineteen months of its existence, 2,500,000 quintals of grain, scarcely a three days' supply for the country. But the vilest acts, in this confusion, were the boundless frauds and embezzlements, which were practised in all departments with utter shamelessness, as well in the issuing of assignats

as in provisioning and equipping the army. Of all that was wrung from the people, in this universal system of robbery and theft, only the smallest part reached its destination (Fig. 48).




FIG. 48.—Facsimile of an assignat of the French Republic.

Thus it was sufficiently evident that the moral decline brought about by the Revolution was not less than the material. With almost incredible rapidity the highest degree of over-refinement in the tone of society was supplanted by utter rudeness of manners. The inborn sense of the French for elegance and pleasing form appeared to be wholly lost in sans-culottism, which, in the universal use of "thou" and "thee," in the exclusive use of the address, "citizen," in a mean, grotesque, and even unseemly costume, and in coarse modes of speech, sought for the expression of genuine republican sentiment. Never has immorality been found so shameless in France, as when the leaders of fashion in the Revolution continually had the name of virtue in their mouths. The haste and eagerness with which usurers and purveyors, stock-jobbers, and fortune-hunters sought to become rich at the expense of others, the luxury and extravagance which they proudly displayed before the eyes of the poor, were the counterpart of the dissoluteness, debauchery, and voluptuousness which, for those highest in authority, with the single exception of Robespierre, constituted the real substance and value of the power acquired by them. It is easy to understand that among such men in power each one felt for the others only hatred and contempt. Gouverneur Morris

avows that he felt himself contaminated by the intercourse which he was obliged to hold with this refuse of mankind.

The intellectual condition exhibits an equally frightful picture of degeneracy. In order to withdraw the educational system from the influences under which it had previously stood and to train the youth in the ideas of the new epoch, the Convention placed upon the state the cost and care of the public schools; but this did not prevent the elementary schools from remaining empty, notwithstanding a law making attendance compulsory. The reason for this condition of the schools was that parents were not disposed to send their children to schools where, instead of the Christian religion, the republican moral code was taught; and, when the law of October 25, 1795, abolished compulsory attendance together with the payment of teachers by the state, the public schools were completely deserted, and the people remained without instruction. One of the strangest fancies of the Convention was unquestionably the desire to care for popular education. The higher (central) school to be erected in every department existed only on paper, and the Paris Normal School, in which distinguished men of learning were to give to future teachers outlines of their respective sciences, naturally failed of its object. The only thing in this domain which the Reign of Terror vigorously prosecuted was the introduction of French instruction into parts of the country where other languages were spoken. The Polytechnic School established at the end of 1794, solely in behalf of military interests, did not obtain its excellent organization until 1796. The National Institute, in which the academies of the old *régime* were merged, was opened in December, 1795. In the province of civil legislation the Legislative Assembly and the Convention accomplished little; the only monuments which they left behind them consist of the law which facilitated divorce, even to the extent of licentiousness, and a second law which forbade the preferring of one child above others in the inheritance of property, thus suppressing the rights of primogeniture.

This chaos, with innumerable individual wills crossing one another, resembled not even remotely the ideal of Rousseau's "Social Contract," which Robespierre with consuming eagerness sought to realize. From a note by Saint-Just, intellectually the most gifted among the Terrorists, we may learn with some accuracy how this state would appear: a Spartan training of children, directed to physical development; the employment of citizens solely in agriculture, with vigorous supervision by the state; the destruction of all separate, individual living in favor of the unrestricted universal will of the community and its organs. In order to realize this the pitiless annihilation of all opposers was of necessity presupposed. That

which must follow in consequence of Robespierre's victory over the Hébertists and Danton was not the cessation, but the increase, of the Terror. This now attacked also the revolutionary oligarchy of the Mountain, and the Plain enjoyed in quiet trepidation the satisfaction of seeing its tyrants of yesterday now also trembling.

Constantly had Robespierre spoken of the daggers that threatened his breast, although not one of them was willing to appear; he was enraged that a certain Lamiral fired a few shots at Collot, as if that man was of more importance than himself. As fortune willed it, a young maiden, Cecilia Renault, who had a knife on her person, was seized at his door; she averred that she only wished to know how a tyrant looked, but for Robespierre she was and continued to be an assassin, sent out against him by Pitt and the allied despots. This was the introduction to a decree that hereafter no English or Hanoverian soldiers should be given quarter.

The men of the Mountain were warned. Their anger was increased, when Robespierre to his political dictatorship added a religious dictatorship, and, as the crown of his ideal state, projected by an arbitrary will so despotic and narrow, sought to force upon the people a state religion (PLATE XII.), devised in a correspondingly arbitrary and narrow spirit. In this arid soul there dwelt no breath of real faith, but he was enraptured at the thought of becoming a second Moses or Mohammed. Although gnashing their teeth, the members of the Convention, on May 7, were compelled to decree that the French people acknowledged the existence of the Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul; and the thirty-six *décadis* were set apart as feast days. On the 20th Prairial (June 8), the festival of the Supreme Being was celebrated for the first time; Robespierre had caused himself to be chosen president of the Convention expressly for this occasion. A kind of intoxication possessed him, when in the garden of the Tuileries he looked upon the many thousands in festal attire. Like a master, he suffered them to wait for him a whole hour, before he became visible, arrayed as a high priest in vestments of blue velvet, and pronounced the festival discourse. Then, at the head of the Convention, at a carefully regulated distance from the other members, having a huge bouquet in his hand, with which he graciously thanked the people for their applause, he proceeded to the Champ-de-Mars, where the second part of the festival, as theatrical as the first, was performed. The Convention execrated the entire festival, yet ordered that Robespierre's discourse should be publicly read on every *décadi* for a whole month in all the communes.

Already by the law of the 27th Germinal (April 15), according to

which all conspirators in the whole land were to be brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris, this mockery of justice had come to be absolutely dependent upon the men in power. Since September the court had continued without interruption its bloody work. For the public prosecutor, Fouquier-Tinville (Fig. 49), who again acted entirely according to



FIG. 49. — Fouquier-Tinville. After an engraving by C. Muller, 1795.

Robespierre's instructions, revolutionary justice consisted in the extermination of all who, by birth, nurture, property, or position, seemed to him to be the natural enemies of the Revolution. The twenty, on an average, whom he put to death (Fig. 50) every week did not satisfy him. For this monster murder was an enjoyment; for Robespierre, a political measure. On the 22d Prairial, his confidant, Couthon, even without previous notice to the Committee of Public Safety, brought before the Convention a new law intended to set free the Revolutionary Tribunal from the absurd and ruinous fetters which delayed the course of national justice. No defence, no previous investigation, no evidence of witnesses, should hereafter be allowed. The Assembly were appalled on hearing the bloody law; they desired postponement, but Robespierre rushed to the tribune, showed in vehement language that it contained no article that was not founded on justice and reason, and it was accepted without discussion.



**TRIBUNAL**  
**CRIMINEL, EXTRAORDINAIRE**  
**ET REVOLUTIONNAIRE,**

*Etabli au Palais, à Paris, par la Loi du*  
*10 Mars 1793,*

L'AN II<sup>e</sup>. DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE.

**ACCUSATEUR PUBLIC.**

**L**E citoyen Gardien de la maison *Dumet de l'abbaye*  
 laissera  
 communiquer *le Cit. Jean Christophe Kieulint, maître procureur*  
*104636 & 104637 de 1797, Rég. de l'administration du contentieux*  
 avec *seigneur* actuellement  
 détenu en ladite maison *trouffou par Delade*  
 FAIT à Paris, le *vingt uni Ventose*  
*mil sept cent quatre vingt* de l'an *deux*  
 de la République *tit d'on Grouse*  
*H. G. Fouquier*

FIG. 50.—Facsimile of an order of March 11, 1794, with the signature of Fouquier-Tinville.

According to the law of the 22d Prairial, the Revolutionary Tribunal became an axe which struck down whatever came within its reach. Accusation before the tribunal was equivalent to death. A bench of jurymen, composed of the worthless rabble, gave the verdict of "Guilty" on any charge whatever; in the haste and confusion it happened not unfrequently that through mistake the wrong man was sent to the guillotine. The executioner, Samson, was obliged to increase the number of his assistants to twelve and afterward to sixteen. Day after day the streets resounded with the monotonous rattling of the tumbrils conveying to the guillotine the victims to be sacrificed. The Terror sought its victims by no means merely in the higher ranks; after the 22d Prairial two-thirds of them were peasants. All, to whatever class they might belong, knew how to die with heroic courage, although they had not understood how to defend themselves; many hastened joyfully to encounter the death which should deliver them from a life unspeakably horrible. On May 10, died the sister of the last tyrant, the Princess Elizabeth; the day before, the great chemist, Lavoisier, who, to his request for a reprieve for fourteen days, that he might be able to complete an important investigation, received as an answer the statement that the republic had no need of learned men. In the fourteen months from its erection till the 22d Prairial the Revolutionary Tribunal had pronounced about 1200 sentences of death; in the next six weeks, till the fall of Robespierre, 1366 were added. The total number of persons executed in the whole land, not including the massacres at Nantes, Lyons, and elsewhere, is estimated at 17,000, of whom 1200 were women. To these are to be added the victims of the civil war; far more than a million, it is computed, perished from hunger and wretchedness. This persecuting fury was aided by the most disgusting espionage. Never has a country suffered more irritating annoyances from the police than did France at that time, when every day the pompous invocation of liberty and equality was heard. Robespierre instituted his own secret police. He pretended to find, partly from conviction, and partly from fear and hypocrisy, a great conspiracy in the prisons, in order that he might annihilate the enemies of Jacobinism by a single blow, and he was very angry with Collot because he would not send to the scaffold at one time all who were pointed out, but, out of regard to the temper of the city, desired to distribute the executions over three days. But, in order to attain his final object, he was not content to destroy declared enemies; he must annihilate, also, his dissatisfied allies and his jealous rivals.

The majority of the Convention were heartily weary of their degrading situation. On every imaginable pretext, whoever could do so with-



drew from the sittings, so that even the most important affairs were transacted in the presence of only one hundred, or, indeed, of only thirty, members. The Committee of Public Safety, nominally the agent of the Convention, had been for a long time its master. The majority of the Committee still bowed before the "triumvirate," Robespierre, Saint-Just, and Couthon, either because they themselves were conscious of a participation too deep and long in their crimes, that furnished the three with a hundred proofs against them, or because they regarded themselves as indispensable for the welfare of their native land and wished to save their own necks from the guillotine. Nevertheless, violent scenes occurred. Carnot, who had been saved from Robespierre's hatred only because indispensable in military matters, one day cried out to Saint-Just: "You are ridiculous dictators." Robespierre brooded over the way to break this opposition. Personally he attended the Committee but seldom, and at length not at all, partly because he was disgusted with these associates, and partly because this invisibility increased his majesty, and the boundless disorder in the public business permitted him, although absent, to interfere as much as he wished in the acts of government. He used to answer in the Jacobin Club the attacks made upon him in the Convention or the Committee. Probably he would have come forward sooner to the attack, had he perceived in the weary population greater inclination for another June 2.

Thus it came about that the attack proceeded from the other side. Nine Dantonists, Fouché, Lecointre, Tallien, Barras, and others, pledged themselves to Robespierre's fall. The Committee of General Security ventured upon the first skirmishing against the all-powerful man; on their complaints, directed against the encroachments in which Robespierre's police bureau had indulged, the suppression of this bureau was ordered by the Committee of Public Safety. Then came the denunciation of an eccentric woman, Catharine Théot, who, together with the sect founded by her, venerated Robespierre as the Messiah. At him the arraignment was really aimed, and he felt bitterly the scold's with which she was overwhelmed. Weeping with rage he vowed never to enter again either the Committee of Public Safety or the Convention. The decisive moment was approaching, but, in the uncertainty as to the result, both parties hesitated to go on. Robespierre made a final attempt at an understanding, when he, on the 5th Thermidor (July 23), summoned both committees to a joint consultation. He began with complaints respecting the inadequacy of the republican administration of justice, and demanded that the same be made stronger; this was conceded to him, although reluctantly. After some delay Saint-Just seized the op-

portunity to speak; he depicted the prevailing anarchy, and sought to show the need of having a dictator in the person of Robespierre. But the majority refused to comply with his demands. Notwithstanding all the protestations of devotion with which they accompanied the denial, war was thus declared, and the Mountain deserted its leader. Robespierre must now eliminate the Montagnards, as he had eliminated the Hébertists and Dantonists. With the Commune and the Jacobin Club behind him, he reckoned, in the Convention, upon the oft-experienced timidity of the Right and their bitter hatred of the Mountain. The threatened men were sensible of the nearness of the danger; their chiefs, expecting at any moment to be arrested, changed their sleeping-places every night. They offered to their old adversaries of the Plain an alliance in this conflict for emancipation, but twice the offer was repelled.

Robespierre appeared again in the Convention on the 8th Thermidor. Amid breathless suspense he requested of the Assembly permission to open to them his oppressed and torn heart. He denounced a conspiracy against liberty in the very bosom of the Assembly, and demanded punishment for the traitors. The Convention heard the long discourse in silent stupor. So great was their intimidation, that the printing of the discourse and its transmission to the departments were voted unanimously. But then Cambon pushed aside the weight that was resting upon the Assembly. He spoke in language constantly increasing in bitterness and violence, and closed with the exclamation: "A single man paralyzes the labors of the government, and that man is Robespierre!" (Cf. Fig. 51.) Robespierre was now required to name the evil-doers whose death he sought. The sitting ended in a storm. Robespierre's *coup d'état* was foiled, but he did not regard himself as beaten; he only removed the conflict to the Jacobin Club; there in the evening he read his speech for the second time. "If my downfall is certain," he concluded, "you shall see with what calmness I will drink the cup of poison." Couthon proposed the expulsion of all members who, in the Convention, had voted against the printing of the speech. Billaud and Collot, amid wild outcries, were thrust out. Henriot issued to a part of the National Guard the command to hold themselves in readiness for the morning.

In this extreme danger the Mountain besought the Right for their aid, and now it was granted. On the 9th Thermidor an unusually large number of the deputies had assembled. Saint-Just began with a long-winded accusation against the enemies of Robespierre, but Tallien, urged onward by anxiety for the fate of his sweetheart, Thérèse de Cabarrus, who was in prison, interrupted him; on his motion the arrest of Henriot and of Dumas, president of the Tribunal, was ordered. Now Robespierre

rushes to the tribune and struggles to gain a hearing. "Wretches!" he cries to the Mountain; but his voice is drowned in the uproar. "Danton's blood chokes thee!" cries out the deputy Garnier. He turns to





FIG. 51.—Cartoon. Facsimile. Robespierre, after he has had all Frenchmen guillotined, executes the executioner with his own hand. Each guillotine stands for a category of sacrifices: A, The executioner; B, Committee of Public Safety; C, Committee of General Security; D, The Revolutionary Tribunal; E, Jacobins; F, Club of the Cordeliers; G, Brissotins; H, Girondists; I, Philipotins; K, Chabotins; L, Hebertists; M, Nobility and clergy; N, People of talent; O, Old men, women, and children; P, Soldiers and generals; Q, Existing magistrates; R, National Assembly; S, Societies of the people.

the Right, the "honest, virtuous men," but they repulse him with horror. With rage he hears the resolution for his arrest. Proudly Saint-Just and Couthon submit to the same fate. Lebas and the younger Robespierre desire of their own accord to share it. The five under arrest are led

away to different prisons ; Henriot, also, who, hurrying through the streets, endeavors to stir up the people, is outlawed and placed under arrest.

But as yet there was but half a victory. The Jacobins, meanwhile, in concert with the city council, had come to the conclusion to surround the Convention with armed men as on June 2, and to extort from it the surrender of Robespierre's enemies. Those under arrest were liberated, and met together at the Hôtel de Ville. Hastily a committee was appointed to take charge of the rising, and Henriot was ordered to proceed with the insurrection. Robespierre, by throwing himself into the arms of the Commune, became an armed insurgent, and the Convention did not suffer this advantage to pass unimproved. It pronounced the rebels outlaws, and named the deputy Barras, a former officer, as commander of the armed force. This energy immediately had a good effect. For the first time the citizens gathered around the lawful authority ; Robespierre, on the contrary, had to realize that by the overthrow of the Hébertists he had destroyed the forces which might have saved him. A part of the Parisian cannoneers Carnot had been careful to remove from the city ; the remainder refused to fire, and Henriot was obliged, in their presence, to take to flight. This raised the courage of the Convention. The Jacobin Club was broken up and their place of meeting closed ; a second column was directed against the Hôtel de Ville, where the outlaws were sitting in gloomy helplessness. Before the troops arrived, a young *gendarme*, by the name of Meda, shattered the jawbone of Robespierre by a pistol-shot.<sup>1</sup> Lebas shot himself. Extended on a table, the fallen and wounded dictator was compelled to hear around him the curses and rejoicings of the victors. His brother threw himself from a window, and was taken up severely wounded. Since the outlawry made any semblance of a judicial proceeding superfluous, the prisoners, among them the brothers Robespierre, Couthon, Henriot, Saint-Just, in all twenty-two, were sent to the guillotine without delay. On the next day seventy-one members of the Commune, and on the second day twelve more, followed. In their blood was quelled the resistance of the Commune to the Convention. (Cf. PLATE XIII.)

<sup>1</sup> According to another version, Robespierre did this with his own hand, in an attempt to put an end to his life.



“La nuit du 27 au 28 Thermidor, An II” July 26-27, 1794  
 After an engraving by H. F. Tassart, original drawing by Fulgion Jean Harriet (died 1805)  
*Revue de l'Asie, t. VII, page 106.*



## CHAPTER V.

### END OF THE CONVENTION AND THIRD PARTITION OF POLAND.

THE horrors of the last months appeared so wholly and utterly comprised in the one name Robespierre, that his downfall was hailed with loud and universal joy as the return to a condition of order. It was not thus, however, that the victors, the Collots, Billauds, and Barères, understood the 9th Thermidor. These men had but the one thought,—to carry on the same régime as Robespierre, but under their own names. The Jacobins remained, afterward as previously, possessors of the supreme power. It happened, therefore, very much in opposition to the will of those who had overthrown Robespierre, that the force of circumstances, after all, rendered the 9th Thermidor the great crisis of the Revolution. Montagnards as well as Moderates were agreed that the Convention should shake off the tyranny of the committees and take to itself again the sovereignty of which it had been deprived. Hardly was the first breach made in the system of terrorism by the reorganization of the committees and of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and by setting aside the law of the 22d Prairial, when one piece of the system after another crumbled of itself. The office of general of the National Guard was abolished; the power and number of the revolutionary committees, of which there had been hitherto 52,000, with a membership of 560,000, and at a yearly expense of 600,000,000, were restricted; commissioners of the Convention, in great numbers, were recalled and replaced by others. The prohibition of all affiliations between the clubs rent the net in which for three years the Jacobins had held the country. A protection against a new dictatorship was found in the division of the affairs of government among committees of the Convention, together with the regulation that thereafter three members of the committees should withdraw every month, and only after the interval of a month be again eligible.

Once set free from the incubus of fear, the enslaved citizens ventured also to lift up their heads and to give free course to the long withheld vengeance on their former oppressors. It was now the turn of the “patriots” of yesterday to tremble; the press, which had become free since the Thermidor, began against them a series of fierce attacks; every-

where they were cast into prison, and accused of theft, ravishing, and fraud. Harmony among the members of the government soon ceased, giving place to the old hatred between Hébertists and Dantonists, or Thermidorists, as they now styled themselves. Again the Convention was the scene of wild disorder and of personal insults; now, however, the Mountain had exchanged the part of assailant for that of the assailed. In the galleries, in the streets and cafés, the strong-armed citizen youth, the "Muscadins" (later called, also, *jeunesse dorée*), had obtained the upper hand; they had learned from the bands that formerly ruled the streets that the knotted stick must be used; they sang down the revolutionary "Marseillaise" with the "Réveil du Peuple" ("Awakening of the People"), and burned with a desire to avenge their murdered relatives and friends. Fréron, who shortly before had been one of the fiercest terrorists, was now eager for revenge on the murderers of his bosom friends, Camille and Lucile Desmoulins. The first attempt to bring an accusation against Collot, Billaud, Barère, and four members of the Committee of General Security, for participation in all the crimes of Robespierre, was indeed foiled. When, however, soon afterward, the atrocities perpetrated in Lyons and the Vendée were brought to light in their full extent through the declarations of those who had been dragged to Paris and imprisoned, but had been saved from the guillotine by the 9th Thermidor, the weight of the universal abhorrence came down crushingly upon their authors and executors. Carrier was condemned and, on December 16, executed; the Jacobin Club, the members of which had been already scattered by the Muscadins in a brisk hand-to-hand fight, was permanently closed on December 12. On December 1, the Convention issued an amnesty in favor of the insurgent Vendéans. In pursuance of the treaty of La Jaunais, Charette laid down his arms; Stofflet followed his example; finally (April 20, 1795) the Chouans of Brittany also made peace, a reconciliation which was facilitated by the fact that the Convention, in order to end ecclesiastical strife, the chief source of civil war, had re-established freedom of worship, with the exception that the churches as national property remained closed and the laws against non-juring priests were still in force. The Convention broke the dangerous power of the Commune, by distributing it among twelve municipalities corresponding to the newly established *arrondissements* of the city. On March 2, the Convention, on the report of its committee, decided to bring the four terrorists, Barère, Billaud, Collot, and Vadier, before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The Jacobins now decided to save their threatened leaders and themselves by violent measures. In carrying out this plan, they had good reason to count upon the need and misery of the lower classes.



The harvest of communistic legislation was now ripening; a few months of it had sufficed to complete the ruin of agriculture, industry, and trade. The war had taken the farm laborers and the horses for the armies; the landed proprietors were incarcerated by thousands; the low price fixed by the maximum had frightened the peasants away from the markets. The compulsory system of the maximum, never observed with rigor, vanished with the Reign of Terror, but from fear of depreciating still further the value of the assignats, the only means of subsistence remaining for the state, the Convention ventured only with the greatest caution to depart from the former principles of economy. After it had previously established free trade in the necessities of life, and then in all merchandise not expressly prohibited, it made bold, on December 29, to abolish the maximum. But these measures could have only a slow effect, while the steady sinking of the assignats intensified the scarcity from one day to another. Despair reached its height, when the daily bread ration was reduced, on March 31, to one-fourth of a pound for each person. The entire frivolity of the French character was now manifested. Never were taverns and coffee-houses and theatres more frequented; drawing-rooms were again thrown open, but the society that moved in them was no longer the elegant aristocracy of former days, but an impudent medley of parvenus of doubtful antecedents, the men talking politics and dissipated, the women shamelessly solicitous to turn to some account their naturalness (after the precepts of Rousseau) by so-called antique costumes and a free deportment. Such circumstances necessarily rendered the great mass of the people susceptible to the machinations of the Jacobins; and these men, as the day of trial for their old chiefs drew near, redoubled their efforts to save them. On the 12th Germinal (April 1), a howling mob once more overpowered the guards of the Convention and, amid wild cries for bread, filled the hall for four hours, until the National Guards, summoned from the well-to-do quarters, came up and drove them out. Hardly were they freed when the members of the Convention decreed the immediate deportation of the four accused persons to Cayenne; several others among the Montagnards were arrested; and Pichegru, who had been placed in command of the troops at Paris, re-established quiet without difficulty.

The affected coarseness of republican manners now gradually disappeared from social intercourse, Sunday began again to be celebrated, the churches, notwithstanding the law of February 21, were restored to the service of God, a multitude of *émigrés*, without awaiting the repeal of the decrees issued against them, returned to their native land, and even took possession of their former estates. Now rapidly followed the disarming

of all who in any way had promoted terrorism, the reorganization of the National Guard according to the principles of 1791, the abrogation of all acts of political outlawry, the limiting of confiscation to a few special cases, the restoration to their families of the property of those executed, the reopening of the exchange, and the permission to trade with gold and silver. On May 7, Fouquier-Tinville and fifteen other judges of the Revolutionary Tribunal were guillotined. But still the Convention did not merit thanks and consideration for this; such a view was forbidden by the remembrance of its guilt-burdened past and by the universal and wholly correct opinion that its course was dictated not by political or moral conviction, but only by the endeavor to keep possession of power. To the ardent thirst for revenge in the south this gradual reaction seemed too tedious. In Lyons, Aix, Toulon, prisons were burst open and terrorists under arrest were sacrificed to a fierce popular vengeance; Marseilles and Avignon followed the example. Fresh fuel was furnished the Counter-revolution by the renewed attempt of the Jacobins, aided by the hungry proletariat, to seize again the power which they had lost. Again, on the 1st Prairial (May 20), Paris heard the clang of the alarm-bells, amid which the men of the faubourgs pressed into the Convention; Feraud, a deputy, was murdered, and his head carried on a pike through the streets; in the midst of the wild tumult the Mountain had already undertaken the naming of a new executive committee, acceptable to them, when the faithful battalions of the National Guard again made their timely appearance and liberated the Assembly. Toulon also had become the scene of a rising of Jacobins, and to subdue it had cost a severe conflict. The complete removal of a faction so incorrigible seemed therefore doubly desirable. Six principal criminals of the 1st Prairial were sentenced to death by a court-martial, and the Revolutionary Tribunal was abolished. Subsequently the churches were legally restored to public divine service, and the return of the *émigrés* was facilitated. Soon in the counter-revolutionary current a royalist coloring was very plainly observable. Upon many lips was the name of Louis XVII., but only a few individuals knew in what a deplorable condition this royal child was languishing, and his death on June 8 came so very opportunely that the assumption of its having been purposely brought about could hardly be rejected. Since, by the dauphin's death, Louis XVIII., the Count of Provence, was legitimate king, a restoration of the throne was equivalent to that of the entire ancient régime. This prospect put an end to all royalist plans. Of the commission on the constitution even the minority, the constitutional-monarchists, decided for the maintenance of the republic.

After six weeks the commission was able to submit its scheme. Corresponding to the general situation, this last product of the Revolution was an attempt at reconciliation between it and order. Necessarily, a declaration of the rights of man could not be omitted, but these rights were restricted to liberty, equality, security, and property, and duties were set over against them; the sovereignty of the people remained nominally untouched, but, since the possession of property and a fixed residence were requisite for the exercise of the right of suffrage as well as for eligibility to office, those without property were really deprived of the right of voting; the administration was simplified; the number of officials was diminished, and, instead of being chosen by the people, they were appointed to their positions; the functions of the state were separated one from another. The legislature was divided into two bodies, a Council of Five Hundred and a Council of Ancients, half as large; the sole additional distinction between the two consisted in the fact that no one under thirty years of age could be elected to the former body, and no one under forty years of age to the latter. Every year they were to be renewed by one-third of their number; both were to meet without interruption; the government had no right to dissolve them. In regard to the formation of the executive it was decided after some vacillation to establish a directory of five members, who should be chosen by the Five Hundred out of a list prepared by the Council of Ancients. The fear of the members of the Convention that their work would be swept away by the election of a monarchical majority led them to decree that every department at first should appoint two-thirds of its deputies from the members of the Convention and only the last third by free election. Thus the transition from anarchy to order was fully counterbalanced by the exasperation growing out of the arbitrary manner in which a body, which had become so detested and despised, sought to keep itself in possession of power. So in the new constitution, at its very birth, a germ of death was implanted.

Lively dissatisfaction over this arbitrary measure was expressed on the part of the royalists, who saw themselves, when so near their goal, suddenly thrown back again into uncertainty. They prepared to answer the Convention's *coup d'état* by a royalist insurrection. Their numbers were strengthened from the ranks of the moderate republicans. The Convention looked upon these intrigues with a certain malicious joy. It regarded itself as sure of victory on account of the closing of all clubs and popular associations, as well as by the coming up of trustworthy troops. With a confident mind it therefore proclaimed, on September 23, the result of the popular vote, by which the new constitution was accepted

by a vote of 914,853 against 41,892 ; and it reckoned, by means of audacious falsification of the returns, the vote for the decree confirming the choice of two-thirds of its members at 167,758 against 93,373.

That which was foreseen occurred. On the morning of October 4, the entire forty-eight sections, four excepted, were in open insurrection ; they had at their disposal over 30,000 National Guards. But, at the very first signs of resistance, the Convention had taken its measures ; it declared its sittings permanent, a commission of five members was appointed for the protection of public order, the irresolute General Menou was superseded as commander-in-chief by Barras. To the 5000 troops in readiness were added 1500 men from the faubourgs. Barras himself did little, but General Bonaparte, whom he had accepted as his second in command, vigorously undertook the defence. On account of the great superiority in numbers of the assailants, the situation of the Convention on the 13th Vendémiaire (October 5) was not wholly without danger, but, by the fire of grape-shot from his skilfully posted cannon, Bonaparte cleared the approaches to the Tuileries, and then pursued the retreating National Guards till they were completely dispersed (Fig. 52).

This 13th Vendémiaire was a portentous day for France, for all Europe. It decided first of all the provisional continuance of the republic, although it only sharpened the opposition existing between the government and public opinion. But the same day brought into prominence the wonderful man who was destined not merely to put an end to the republic, but also to raise himself to an unequalled supremacy and to transform all Europe.

Napoleon Bonaparte (Nabulione Buonaparte) is said to have been born on August 15, 1769, at Ajaccio, but perhaps he was born on January 7, 1768, at Corte in Corsica, and in that case he was not the second but the eldest son of his parents, the jurist, Charles Bonaparte, and the beautiful but poor Lætitia Ramolino. The family was originally from Sarzana in Tuscany, but had been settled in Corsica for a long time. The father, at an earlier day an adherent of Paoli, had joined the French when they became masters of the island in 1769. In the year 1778, when he came to Versailles as delegate of the Corsican nobility, he obtained the boy's admission into the military school at Brienne ; that the child had already exceeded the prescribed age of ten years was presumably the cause of the falsehood by which the date of his birth was exchanged for that of his brother Joseph. He attended the military school at Brienne until October 17, 1784, when he removed to that in Paris. He showed a boundless desire for knowledge ; mathematics, history, and geography were his favorite studies ; his young



FIG. 52. The 13th Vendémiaire, October 5, 1795. After a copper-plate engraving by Jean Duplessis-Bertaux (1747-1813).

soul was filled with enthusiasm not only for the heroes of Plutarch, but also for those of his native land, a Saniopiero, and a Paoli.

On September 1, 1785, he was made second lieutenant of artillery in the regiment *La Fère*, and relieved the monotony of garrison life at Valence, and later at Auxonne, by restless zeal for his further improvement, enthusiasm for Rousseau and Raynal, and the forming of extravagant plans for the future. At that time his soul was aglow for the liberation of his native land from the French yoke. The outbreak of the Revolution excited in him a feverish tumult; yet all was confusion in his mind, except the firm purpose to rise to the summit. Hastening home, he found Corsica in complete anarchy; he formed a club in Ajaccio, organized a national guard, and aided in getting rid of the last functionaries of the old régime on the island. In February, 1791, he was again with his regiment at Valence, but in September, with the grade of first lieutenant, he returned to the island, where a national assembly, convened at the monastery of Orezza, had elected for president the aged Paoli, who had returned from exile. On account of exceeding his leave of absence—his second offence of this sort—he was dismissed from the army on February 6, 1792, and now determined to seek his fortune exclusively in Corsica. By an act of violence he secured his election as second in command of the battalion of Ajaccio, composed of mountaineers. Because of a bloody tumult, in which his battalion came into collision with the common council, he forfeited the favor of Paoli and ruined his prospects of further advancement in Corsica. He hastened therefore to Paris; the breaking out of the war, the great dearth of officers, and the progress of the Revolution promised indulgence with regard to the past, reinstatement in the army, and the opening of a new path for his ambition. For a time deprived of all means of subsistence, he found himself in the worst possible situation, but then his good-fortune willed it that the 10th of August made Monge, his former teacher at the military school, minister of marine. To him he owed his restoration to the army, and also the rank of captain. But, instead of looking for his regiment, he went to Corsica once more. Neither the refusal of Paoli to give him back his former position, nor the failure of Admiral Trugnet's attempt—in which he participated—to conquer the island of Sardinia, quenched the fire of his ambition.


Already the dissensions between Paoli and the Convention had commenced; in a fiery address to the latter the young captain spoke in favor of his revered countryman. But suddenly he changed his party, caused himself to be appointed by the Convention's commissioner, Salicetti, inspector-general of artillery in Corsica, repeatedly made ineffectual attempts to

seize the citadel of Ajaccio, and warmly denounced to the Convention Paoli and his adherent, Pozzo di Borgo. The Corsicans, however, ranged themselves with spirit around their hero, and a national *consulta* withdrew obedience from the commissioners. On July 17, Paoli was outlawed by the Convention, but the English fleet ruled the sea, and the French were therefore in no condition to maintain themselves upon the island. Corsica declared its independence, and in April, 1794, Paoli placed his native land under the protection of the King of England. After many disagreements with the new protectors, Paoli suffered himself to be persuaded to go personally to England; and there he died in 1807.

After the overthrow of the French party in Corsica, the outlawed Bonaparte fled with his family to Toulon. His Corsican dream was past. The share which, as one of Carteaux's army, he had in the subjugation of Avignon and Marseilles, as well as the friendship of the younger Robespierre, who accompanied that army as commissioner, procured for him the appointment of chief of a battalion; his services at the siege of Toulon were rewarded by promotion to the rank of general of brigade. As a principal adherent of Robespierre he received, in April, 1794, command of the artillery in the army of Italy, but after the 9th Thermidor found that he was involved in the fate of his patrons; since, however, he made haste to renounce Robespierre, he was, on August 20, set at liberty. The government apprehending some danger from the assembling of so many Corsicans in the army of Italy, he was transferred to the army in the Vendée. Under pretence of sickness he obtained permission to remain in Paris. He fell into the severest pecuniary embarrassments. But his star did not desert him. Thanks to Boissy d'Anglas, Doucet, who was now at the head of the war department, took notice of him. With astonishment, the minister heard from the mouth of this general, twenty-six years of age, a complete plan of campaign for the conquest of Lombardy. He named him chief of the topographical bureau established by Carnot. Letourneur, the successor of Doucet, insisted that he should repair to his post in the Vendée, and, since he was not willing to comply, he was for a second time, on September 15, dismissed from the army. But the 13th Vendémiaire made the dismissed officer second in command of the army of the interior, and from this time the European war opened a boundless field for his ambition as well as for his talents.

The army of the republic, as Bonaparte (Fig. 53) now found it, was essentially different from that in which he had passed through the lowest military grades. The Terror, by the expulsion of all officers obnoxious on account of birth or sentiments, had rendered the military

forces of France incapable of resisting the enemy. The generals, of noble families, were one after another dragged before the Revolutionary Tribunal. The inevitable result was the complete relaxation of discipline, the troops gave themselves up to all imaginable excesses, and the Parisian democracy rejoiced in now being safe from the danger of a military dictatorship. True, no conflict occurred in the field without showing how infinitely below the troops of the enemy were the freshly-levied bands of the French. It was, however, the great good-fortune of the French that the laggard movements and the dissensions of their assailants allowed them more and more to counterbalance this deficiency. The recruits, whose zeal for the service was so small at first that it was necessary to check the numerous desertions by orders of Draconian severity, soon acquired the martial energy which lies in the blood of Frenchmen; once torn from their homes, they discovered a taste for the wild life of warfare; the possibility of the attainment of the highest military rank by



The image shows a handwritten signature in cursive script. The top line reads 'Buonaparte' and the bottom line reads 'Lieutenant Colonel'. The signature is written in dark ink on a light background.

FIG. 53.—Facsimile of the signature of Buonaparte, Lieutenant-Colonel; Olmetta, January 11, 1793.

the common soldier inflamed his ambition; the thought of defending freedom and the fatherland against the vile plots of the *émigrés* and of foreign despots had its animating effect; the republican spirit, which would thrive nowhere else in the country, found its abode in the armies; and finally, as the reward of bravery, booty beyond the frontiers beckoned them onward. As the monarchical crusade against the Revolution degenerated into a war for purely selfish interests, so the freedom-bringing propaganda of the Revolution became thoroughly transformed into a most sordid war for plunder.

It was now of decisive importance that the direction of military affairs came into the hands of a man who, although in political convictions a companion of Collot and Billaud, yet combined with the greatest republican disinterestedness military professional knowledge and a singular talent for organization. Lazare Carnot (Fig. 54) was the creator of the new French army-system; through him method and unity prevailed in the employment of the immense levies of men. Conscription,



equality in pay and uniformity in dress, suppression of the old appellations for officers' grades, division of the troops into half brigades (of 2437 men each), brigades, divisions, and armies, constituted the foundation of the new organization. Not reckoning the cavalry and artillery, the army consisted of 196 brigades, with 14 half brigades of light infantry. The commissioners of the Convention, who, clothed with unlimited power, accompanied the armies, left to the commanders only the choice between victory or the guillotine; the war itself, the longer it lasted, was producing a young generation of generals, who, by dashing,



FIG. 54.—Lazare Nicolas Carnot.

adventurous courage, supplied their lack of experience and theoretical knowledge. Necessity became the instructor in a new scheme of tactics, whose essential peculiarities were indifference to the number of men lost, the scattering style of fighting learnt from the Vendéans, and the employment of great masses of artillery to prepare for attacking with the bayonet.

But for such great reforms time was required, and, meanwhile, France remained as defenceless as hitherto against an energetic attack. But the senseless war-methods of the allies were transferring the advantage to the side of the French. With the King of Prussia the last one disappeared

who had spoken the word for a sincere prosecution of the war. Only once more did the Duke of Brunswick and Wurmser (on October 13, 1793) join hands for a combined assault on the lines of Weissenburg. This succeeded completely, but, owing to unhappy dissensions, again it was without result. The incredible slowness with which the Duke of York managed the siege of Dunkirk enabled Houchard, commander of the army of the North, on September 8, at Hondschooten, to force back the Dutch and Hanoverians, who had been separated by the opening of the sluices from the main army, and by this movement to relieve the besieged fortress. It was the first military success of the French in this campaign; the troops gained self-confidence, but the fall of Le Quesnoy and the investment of Maubeuge counterbalanced the advantages that had been won, and Houchard expiated under the guillotine his neglect to profit by the victory. His successor was Jourdan, who had been merely a subordinate officer at the opening of the Revolution; Carnot hastened up in person in order to conduct the defence of the frontier. At Wattignies, on October 15 and 16, the northern army contended with the Austrians, without decisive result, but, since Coburg abandoned his positions and raised the siege of Maubeuge, the French rightly claimed the victory.

Just at this time there came forward two able and important commanders at the head of the French armies, Pichegru (PLATE XIV.) and Hoche (Fig. 55), both genuine sons of the Revolution. The former, like Jourdan, still a subordinate officer in 1789, a man of reserved, earnest character, received, on Saint-Just's recommendation, the chief command of the army of the Rhine; the latter, a young man, who, spurred on by ambition and desire for knowledge, had worked his way up, was placed over the army of the Moselle, with instructions to relieve Landau at any cost. On November 28 Hoche threw himself impetuously upon the enemy at Kaiserslautern. In a hot conflict, lasting three days, the greater numerical force of the assailants was broken by the intrinsic superiority of the Prussians, but, in the uncertainty as to whether the war would still be prosecuted, the duke contented himself with having foiled the attempt to relieve Landau. Hoche, on the contrary, united two-thirds of his troops with the army of the Rhine, which, furthermore, received a reinforcement from Belgium; and he did this for the purpose of being able to renew with irresistible force the attack on Wurmser's right flank. Wörth and Fröschweiler were stormed by the French on December 23, and Wurmser compelled to retreat with his troops in confusion till he was directly before Weissenburg. In order not to suffer the advantage derived from this success to be endangered by Pichegru's awakening jealousy, Hoche himself proposed to commit the

PLATE XIV.



General Charles Pichegru.

After an engraving by Pierre Charles Coqueret (born 1761); original drawing by  
Péris Hilaire (1780-1833)

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 178.*





FIG. 55.—Hoche, French general in the Vendée and on the Rhine; died in the year 1797.

supreme command of both armies to Pichegru, but the commissioners of the Convention decided that not Pichegru but Hoche should receive this trust. In a fiery onset he wrested from the Austrians the Geisberg and the entire Weissenburg lines; Wurmser would have been lost, had not the duke arrived in season and protected his retreat across the Lauter.

Landau was relieved, and in blazing wrath the two German commanders cast each upon the other the blame of the failure, and led the retreat over the Rhine. Thoroughly out of humor, the duke sought release from his supreme command; Field-marshal von Möllendorf took his place. The fruit of the whole campaign was lost; at all points the Revolution had victoriously beaten back the assailants from the frontier.

Thugut's anger at the ill success of the German arms exceeded all bounds. His suspicion of Prussia made him think that she was planning the complete destruction of Austria, or at least a trick by which she might indemnify herself. In Berlin, on the contrary, the profound exhaustion of the Prussian state brought up the question whether Prussia should venture to bear still longer the costs of a war that did not immediately concern her interests. At all events, her further participation was made conditional on her receiving subsidies to the amount of 22,000,000. But, certain as it now was that without the armed aid of Prussia the vanquishing of France was impossible, yet Thugut was indignant at the demand that Austria should purchase the services of so uncertain an ally. To raise the funds so much needed in Austria Thugut had already proposed to the emperor various new and not exactly honorable expedients, such as the issuing of fresh paper money, which however was not to be circulated in Austria itself, but where the Austrian armies were stationed, in the empire and in the Netherlands; the sale of the state domains; a compulsory loan from the Jews; and partial payment of the higher salaries and pensions in interest-bearing paper. Therefore Thugut referred Prussia to the maritime powers as being less exhausted, but it was just as little in accordance with his purpose when Prussia declared to Lord Malmesbury, the ambassador of Pitt, that in return for the subsidy she was ready to put on foot an army of 100,000 men; for with such a force the King of Prussia would be able to render himself arbiter of peace and then to hold in sequestration the part of Germany pleasing to him; it would be possible, he thought, to go on even without Prussia, if only the contingents from the empire were vigorously collected. After all negotiations failed, Möllendorf received orders to retreat and to leave on the Rhine only 20,000 men, the contingent called for by treaty.

For Thugut, with his suspicion and hatred of Prussia, it would have been a dictate of the simplest prudence to seek for peace with France as soon as possible. But his pride would not permit him to end the war without the hoped-for gain. It suited better his restless craving to cast out the net for the prey in all possible directions, here for Bavaria, there for Flanders, for Alsace and Lorraine, or even for a piece of Poland. For a moment he was controlled by the thought of attaining his object by

taking up again the old friendship with Russia, by renewing the unhappy policy of Joseph II. In vain did the Prince of Coburg wait for the necessary supplies, in order to be able to open the campaign in Belgium; in vain did the Archduke Charles warn his government against the error of supposing that this was an ordinary war, or that France would squander her powers within herself; in vain did the experienced Mercy prophesy that this bloody struggle could end only in the humiliation or destruction of France, or of all the monarchies. When finally the archduke himself hastened to Vienna in order to bring about a change in the dominant system, he met with a very ungracious reception. For his imperial brother had already embraced the resolution of undertaking personally the supreme command in Belgium. Upon the King of Prussia, however, the withdrawal from the struggle against the Revolution fell so heavily that Lord Malmesbury succeeded once more in fastening together the broken league. In a treaty, signed by Haugwitz at The Hague on April 19, 1794, between Prussia and the maritime powers, the King of Prussia pledged himself, in return for the subsidies necessary for the continuance of the war, to put in the field an army of 62,400 men, which should be employed where it seemed most advantageous to the interests of the maritime powers.

But now occurred the catastrophe in Poland, which with one blow changed the entire situation.

Although the greater part of the Polish magnates were in Russian pay, yet the majority of the inferior nobles and the army were enraged at the disgrace and unexampled degradation of the Polish name occasioned by the Russians. Since the summer of 1793, measures had been concerted in secret for a rising. The number of the conspirators, who pledged themselves to be obedient for life and death to all the commands of the "great father," Thaddæus Kosciuszko, amounted to 20,000, and not one traitor was found among them. Warsaw received with rejoicing the news of the French victories at Toulon and Landau. The departure of a large number of the Russian troops to Volhynia for the impending Turkish war raised the hopes of the conspirators; not more than 20,000 men were left to Igelström, the general commanding in Poland. Kosciuszko's purpose was to wait until the forces of the enemy were engaged by the opening of the war on the Lower Danube and the Schelde, when suddenly the order of Catharine to reduce the Polish army to 15,000 men rendered any delay impossible, because dependence was placed chiefly upon this army in the plan for the uprising. The resistance interposed at Pultusk by Madalinski to the reduction of his brigade of cavalry gave the signal for insurrection. As soon as the military

revolt had broken out in Cracow also, Kosciuszko hastened from Dresden and assumed the dictatorship until the country should be liberated; he was a man free from every base passion, but with no great amount of hope, and devoid of the recklessness of the demagogue. The fortunate conflict at Raclawice, on April 4, when his scythemen for the first time made themselves formidable to the Russians, caused the insurrection to



L. U. NIEMCEWICZOWI TOŚWIECA ZIOMEK A. S.

FIG. 56.—Kosciuszko. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Anton Oleszcynski.

break out on April 17 at Warsaw also. Igelström completely lost his head; after a struggle, in which not more than 2500 men had participated on the side of the Poles, he abandoned the city. The weak king, Stanislaus Augustus, announced his adhesion to the national cause; in a few days the rising had spread throughout Lithuania and Samogitia.



Less successful was Kosciuszko in the palatinates of Cracow and Sandomir; all endeavors for a general arming of the population were frustrated here by the stupidity of the peasants and the selfishness of the landowners. Kosciuszko could not follow up the victory of Racławice until the troops of the line at Lublin had joined the insurrection and 6000 men from the Ukraine had forced their way through to him. At Warsaw the wealthy and industrial classes drew back on account of the spreading anarchy, and, when Kosciuszko sent Ignatius Potocki and Hugo Kollontai to assume direction there, their disputes only occasioned fresh disturbances.

Russia now with one voice demanded vengeance against Poland. Regretfully the King of Prussia was obliged to give up the expected return to the Rhenish seat of war and undertake the supreme command of his Polish army. In conjunction with the Russian Denisoff, the king totally routed Kosciuszko (Fig. 56) at Rawka on June 6. The Polish peasants had manfully stood their ground; the scythemen had even repulsed several attacks of cavalry, inflicting great loss; but when the commander, threatened in his rear, ordered a retreat, his undisciplined troops scattered in disorderly flight. From this day, Kosciuszko, in honor of his brave men, wore only the frock of the peasants. In order to keep up his connection with Warsaw, Cracow was necessarily sacrificed, and on June 15 capitulated to the Prussians. A vigorous pursuit would have completed the destruction of the Polish army, and within a few weeks would have brought the king to Warsaw as victor, but here also the prosecution of the war was hampered by the pressure of diplomatic considerations and scruples. Instead of proceeding with a strong hand, the conviction became more and more established in the circles of the leading statesmen that Prussia should not go further until Russia had assured to her the reward for her efforts. In Warsaw, indeed, the two parties of royalists and democrats knew of no better use of this unexpected interval than to devote it to fresh strifes. But precisely the same want of harmony prevailed among the allies before the gates. The Russians, envying the Prussians the triumph of taking Warsaw, sought to hold them back from any decisive undertaking until Suvaroff with the main army should have come up from Podolia. On September 5, the Prussians raised the siege of Warsaw and withdrew to South Prussia, and the king, vexed, went to Berlin. But to the joy of the Poles over the departure of the enemy an end was put only too soon by the terrible news that Suvaroff had arrived at the Bug and had completely destroyed a Polish division at Brzesc. In greatest haste Kosciuszko sought to block his way, but at Maciejowice he was attacked

by General Fersen, on October 10, and was defeated after a hot combat of six hours' duration. The Russians gave no quarter; 6000 Poles met their death; Kosciuszko himself, severely wounded, was captured. The fate of Poland was sealed. While the Prussians still continued in inexplicable inactivity, Suvaroff stormed the suburb Praga on November 4, and unarmed and aged men, women, and children were indiscriminately sacrificed. On November 7 Warsaw capitulated, the army dispersed, and the leaders of the rising were taken to St. Petersburg.

Thus ended Poland, brought to destruction by its own sins. The chief advantage from the death-struggle of Poland was reaped by revolutionary France.

While Carnot, restless and untiring, was training the armies of the republic for the field, the Committee of Public Safety had employed the winter in preparing for the war by diplomatic successes. Immense sums were expended for the purpose of exciting revolutionary outbreaks in Holland and Switzerland; with the cabinets of Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Constantinople, alliances were cultivated. On the continent the chief attack was to be directed against Belgium and Italy, in order, by decisive results at these two points, to relieve the country from the excessive sacrifices, too heavy to be borne any longer, and to bring about a speedy peace. But the Committee laid the chief stress upon the landing in England, which had been decided upon in the autumn of 1793; by this the most dangerous of all the enemies of France was to be struck to the heart. Carnot's plan for the operations in Belgium was formed with due regard for the contemplated invasion of England: the army of the North, augmented to 100,000 men, was to march through Flanders to Ostend; the weaker army of the Ardennes was to advance from the Sambre; and both would thus enclose the enemy. Contrary to expectation, the enemy anticipated the attack, and again proved in the most striking manner the superiority of the Austrian troops. Before Schwarzenberg's 2400 horsemen, at Le Cateau-Cambr sis, on April 30, 30,000 Frenchmen fled, leaving behind them 30 cannon; within a few days the French lost 15,000 men and 143 cannon. No better fared Jourdan on the right wing; his repeated attempts to cross the Sambre were repelled every time by Beaulieu and Kaunitz, and ended finally in a disastrous retreat (May 10). An energetic onset upon the weakened French centre must have proved fatal. But Emperor Francis, who now held the nominal supreme command, was of all men the one least qualified to accelerate Coburg's prudent movements. Pichegru seized the opportunity to fall upon Clerfayt in Flanders, and after a hard conflict utterly to defeat him at Tournai. To complete the mischief, Clerfayt and York continued to divide their

forces, and Pichegru, supported most admirably by his subordinate generals, Souham, Moreau, Macdonald, and Reynier, on May 18, with great superiority of numbers, crushed the English at Tourcoing, while the Austrians, only five or six miles distant, remained motionless. That four days later, on May 22, a second attack by Pichegru was beaten back by Coburg victoriously at all points changed nothing in the main fact, that the Austrian offensive movement had failed. Furthermore, the relations to the Prussian headquarters proved again to be as bad as before. On May 23, at Kaiserslautern, Möllendorf forced the French behind the Saar and the Queich, and thus regained about the same positions as those held by the Prussians before the reverses at Weissenburg. But dissensions now broke out with the maritime powers, when the latter, relying upon the Treaty of The Hague, wished to transfer the Prussians, as a contingent of mercenary troops, to Belgium. Möllendorf, for military reasons, refused decidedly to make this move. Thugut now decided, since Catharine was compelled to call on the Prussians for help against the Polish rising, to withdraw his emperor from Belgium, in order that in the division of the Polish booty he might not be a second time disappointed. Cracow lay nearer his heart than Brussels. In Belgium, according to his opinion, a defensive war only should be carried on, in order that the army might be held in readiness every moment for the complications in the east. Hence it was necessary for Prussia also to keep her whole force together in the direction of Poland; this Lucchesini and Manstein constantly sought to render evident to the king, and, while at this time he was not yet accessible to thoughts of peace, still Möllendorf's duty was restricted to protecting in a strong position the frontiers of the empire.

Only too soon was it shown that Thugut's plan of an imposing defensive campaign in Belgium could not be carried out, in view of the superior numerical force of the French and their increasing confidence in victory. Since in Paris the landing on the English coast formed still the chief feature in the projected military operations, Pichegru received the order to direct his principal attack against the coast of Flanders. He began by investing Ypres, whose commandant, General Salis, capitulated on June 19, before Coburg could bring relief. On the Sambre, on the contrary, the triumph which Saint-Just, as commissioner of the Convention, desired to bring about was not at first obtained. It was Jourdan who first brought about a decisive change at this point. Instead of making the required diversion against Namur or Liège with only 25,000 men, he transferred twice this number of troops from the Moselle to the Meuse; Carnot committed to him the chief command over the united Sambre and Meuse army, and with this he undertook the investment of

Charleroi. He was driven back across the Sambre by Orange, but he returned and stationed himself a second time before Charleroi. For its relief Coburg, on June 26, gave battle at Fleurus, but, on the intelligence that the fortress had surrendered on the day preceding, he discontinued the battle, which was already lost, and retreated in good order. In the beginning of October the French made their entry into Cologne, Bonn, and Coblenz. Coburg, upon whom reproaches rained from all sides, resigned his command, and Clerfayt took his place.

Of necessity the Prussians also were obliged to experience in the Hardt Mountains the effects of the loss of Belgium. Nevertheless the Hereditary Prince of Hohenlohe threw himself once more upon the enemy, and in a series of brilliant engagements, September 18–20, drove the French from the much-contested positions at Kaiserslautern; but then Möllendorf received instructions to withdraw to the right bank of the Rhine, and on the left bank to hold only Mayence. The Duke of York was fortunate, since Pichegru was obliged, at the bidding of the Committee of Public Safety, to consume the time in recapturing fortresses, but so great was the demoralization of his army that his retreat over the Meuse was unavoidable. Sick of the war which he had conducted so ingloriously, the duke returned (December 2) to London. The army of the North, although but 48,000 strong, badly armed and destitute of siege artillery, captured the fortresses of Hertogenbosch and Venlo. Already the anti-Orange patriot party were greeting the advancing French as liberators. The army of the Netherlands was in a most deplorable condition, and the republic had no other defence than its numerous watercourses. But of this it was deprived by the unusual severity of the winter. A firm covering of ice enabled Pichegru to cross the Meuse and the Leek; wholly cast down, the allied army, leaving behind them artillery and vehicles, sought shelter behind the Ems; the English went on board their ships at Emden; the hereditary stadtholder with his family embarked in a fishing boat for England, and there found safety. Before the expiration of January, 1795, the French were in possession of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. The Dutch fleet surrendered when a band of French cavalry appeared on the ice. The Batavian Republic, established in place of the States-General, was obliged to cede Dutch Flanders and Maastricht to France, to pay 100,000,000 florins for the expenses of the war, and to bind itself to provide subsistence for a French army of 25,000 men (PLATE XV.).

But as formerly the dissensions of the two German powers had frustrated a successful prosecution of the war, so now they rendered impossible the obtaining of an honorable peace. After Thugut had once become rec-



A celebration on the Place de la Revolution in Amsterdam over the alliance between the French and the Batavian Republics.

From an engraving (1796) by R. Vinkeles (1711-1816); original drawing by Abraham Gijzel (1764-1833).

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI., page 186.*



onced to the thought of giving up Belgium, he transferred the struggle against Prussia to St. Petersburg. The undisguised anger of Catharine because Prussia was unwilling to enter more deeply into the French war, but instead of this made new demands for Polish territory, raised the hope that this latter power would have to bear the costs of the renewed Austro-Russian friendship. Catharine rejected the demands of Prussia, and Thugut agreed unhesitatingly to her wish to take the country as far as the Bug for herself, it being understood that in return for this the Prussian share should be reduced in favor of Austria, and Catharine should expressly promise her aid in case Prussia should attempt to prevent these or other acquisitions of Austria. The negotiations, which Tauenzien on the part of Prussia and Cobenzl for Austria were conducting with the Vice-Chancellor Ostermann at St. Petersburg, took a very stormy direction and were finally broken off without result. On the contrary, Cobenzl signed, on January 3, 1795, a secret treaty with Russia: the emperor acceded to the January Convention, each of the two courts promised the other to give aid with all its power in the event of a Prussian attack, the emperor was to support Russia against Turkey and give his co-operation in erecting an independent principality for a Russian prince out of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, in return for which Austria should receive Servia and Bosnia, already intended for Joseph II. When the two produced at Berlin their agreement concerning the division of Poland, great was the amazement there, but Tauenzien persuaded himself that under the circumstances nothing could be changed, and on October 19 he therefore signed, on his own responsibility, the partition treaty. Prussia was thus compelled to acquiesce in the relinquishment of the palatinates of Cracow and Sandomir, of which possession had already been taken; she received the remainder of the country as far as the Vistula, together with Warsaw, about 24,000 square miles; Russia twice as much; the remainder, some 17,000 square miles, fell to Austria.

The scornful and haughty manner in which Russia and Austria confronted the claims of Prussia made Berlin favor peace with France. The king was at first reluctant to hold out his hand to the regicides; but Möllendorf, who on his own responsibility had sounded the French authorities through an agent in Paris, was enabled to speak of the inclination to peace and friendship prevailing there, and the Elector of Mayence summoned the diet to commit to the King of Prussia, in conjunction with the emperor, the task of negotiating peace. The king consented that Count Goltz should go to Basel for the purpose of beginning negotiations with the French representative, Barthélemy, and that

Harnier should go to Paris for direct conference with the Committee of Public Safety. In this manner he hoped to be extricated from the burdensome French war, without being compelled on that account to break with his old allies. But unfortunately the circumstances of the time when these negotiations began shaped themselves very much to the disadvantage of Prussia; for the loss of Holland had now changed very considerably the military position of this state. The effect of this showed itself at once in the proud language of the Committee of Public Safety; the Prussian proposals—namely, cessation of hostilities, the integrity of the empire, and Prussian mediation for the latter—were unconditionally rejected, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine was insisted upon, and demand was also made for an alliance. Hardenberg, successor of the deceased Count Goltz, advised his government not to yield, but to threaten, if necessary, to close the negotiations. But real firmness was lacking on the Prussian side of the negotiations, and on April 5 peace was made at Basel on the following conditions: France pledged herself to evacuate within fourteen days the Prussian territory on the right bank of the Rhine, the definitive territorial arrangements being deferred till the general peace; Prussia undertook the mediation of peace on behalf of those states of the empire who should apply for it. In secret articles France guaranteed, in the event of her frontiers being extended to the Rhine, a corresponding indemnification for Prussia's loss of territory.

In this manner Prussia, after three inglorious and unsuccessful campaigns, withdrew from the league that had been formed against the Revolution. The acquisition of a part of Poland was more than counterbalanced by the important increase of territory obtained by Russia, and was a wretched equivalent for the sacrifice of the left bank of the Rhine, of which Prussia had been the guardian since the days of the Great Elector. Strangely her statesmen, and especially Hardenberg, flattered themselves that this very incomplete arrangement of Basel would form the transition to a general peace, or at least to a peace for the empire, and that France in such a peace would readily acquiesce in the restoration of the left bank of the Rhine; but these short-sighted hopes were wholly deceptive. The estates of the empire would not follow the lead of Prussia, and still less was any support of the Prussian views on the part of the emperor to be looked for. On the contrary, Thugut had at this time but the one purpose of chastising Prussia for her desertion. This was his object in concluding, on September 28, a triple alliance between Austria, Russia, and England; the Austrian force in Bohemia and Moravia was increased to 80,000 men; the emperor's obligation to pro-



teet the frontiers of the empire gave him very little concern. The diet at last entrusted to the emperor the beginning of negotiations for peace, and asked Prussia merely to promote their success. The first feeble attempt of Prussia to take in hand the leadership of the empire had failed; the division of the empire into a neutral half and a war-waging half was only the beginning of its utter dissolution; the separate peace which the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel concluded with France, on August 28, was a precursor of the general desertion of the standard which was speedily to prevail among the states of the empire.

Other members also withdrew from the coalition. The Grand Duke of Tuscany had already come to an understanding with the republic in January. In the wretched court of Madrid, ruled over by Godoy, the queen's unworthy favorite, the news of the negotiations at Basel, together with the course of the war, which had been in the highest degree inglorious for the Spanish arms, led to conclusions favorable to peace. To the Committee of Public Safety, who would gladly set free for the Italian war the troops then stationed in the Pyrenees, this inclination for peace came as something greatly desired. Concessions were made on both sides, and the Spanish part of the island of Santo Domingo was ceded to France by Spain in the treaty signed at Basel on July 22. The dastardly Godoy, raised to the dignity of "Prince of the Peace," was carried so far by anxiety for his position and by fear of England's vengeance that, on August 18, 1796, he entered into the treaty of San Ildefonso with France, which provided for a perpetual offensive and defensive alliance. Agreeably to an oral understanding, Louisiana and West Florida were to be ceded to France immediately after the taking of Gibraltar, and the king's son-in-law, the Infant of Parma, was to be provided with an Italian kingdom.

While on the Rhine, during the summer of 1795, the deep destitution of the French armies enforced an almost entire suspension of operations, the republic found itself menaced in the west by a new rising in Brittany and the Vendée. Pitt suffered himself to be won over by Count Puisaye to support an expedition—which should be wholly composed of *émigrés*—destined for the coast of Brittany. After a severe conflict with the republican fleet, an English squadron disembarked the first division at Carnac on June 27. But it was as if the old régime would exhibit once more its utter degeneracy before the eyes of all the world. While still upon the high sea, vehement disputes broke out among the leaders; the royal agents labored wherever they could against Count Puisaye because he was suspected of constitutional sentiments; Stofflet from jealousy of Charette held back the Vendéans, and the dis-

embarked forces, instead of advancing as rapidly as possible with Cadoudal's 10,000 Chouans into the interior, shut themselves up, 20,000 in number, including the Chouans and many women and children, at Quiberon, a narrow sandy tongue of land. Consequently Hoche gained time to assemble 15,000 men in a fortified camp at Sainte-Barbe, and, when he had taken by a night attack Fort Penthièvre, situated at the point where the peninsula joins the mainland, the unfortunate people found themselves hedged in between the fire of the republicans and the roaring waves of the sea. A storm and a rough sea prevented the English ships from approaching them; in terrified crowds they sought, as each one could, to reach the boats. Over 6000 surrendered. The hangman's business Hoche handed over to Tallien and Blad, commissioners of the Convention. Upon a green at Auray, which still bears the name of Champ des Martyrs, the prisoners were murdered, in all 681 men. In spite of this lamentable issue the intelligence that the Count of Artois, at the head of a troop of *émigrés*, would in person join Charette's army, excited the liveliest enthusiasm in the Vendée; even Stofflet forgot the old jealousy. The courage of the prince, however, fell at sight of the coast and of the danger before him; after long, aimless consultations, he caused Charette to be informed that the landing would be deferred till a more favorable time. Both Stofflet and Charette were taken and shot.

The termination of the war on the frontier of the Pyrenees and the fortunate repulse of the descent of the *émigrés* encouraged the Committee of Public Safety to pursue with fresh energy the career of conquest upon the Rhine. On September 7 Jourdan, with the army of the Meuse and Sambre, crossed the Rhine below Düsseldorf and captured that fortress. Clerfayt was compelled to retreat across the Lahn and the Main. Meanwhile Pichegru had also crossed at Mannheim with the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and this place was likewise delivered up to the enemy without delay by the minister Oberndorf. Jourdan's half-famished, ragged, and savage bands marked their advance on German soil by robbery and every kind of violence. At Paris the rejoicing over these victories wholly drowned the voices of the peace-loving moderates; on October 1 the Convention announced the annexation of Belgium. But this joy was of short duration. Wurmser, who hastened from Freiburg, succeeded at the last moment by an engagement at Handschuchsheim in holding Heidelberg and the Bergstrasse, while Jourdan was obliged, when Clerfayt threatened him in flank and rear, to retreat across the Lower Rhine, and this movement destroyed the last remains of discipline in his demoralized troops. Committing the further pursuit to the enraged peasants of the Taunus and the Westerwald, Clerfayt hastened back to Mayence,

and, on October 28, by an energetic assault, he forced the French to evacuate the intrenchments with which they had enclosed the fortress in a half circle, leaving behind them 138 pieces of artillery and 1700 prisoners; and then, after Wurmser had cleared the south bank of the Neckar of the enemy, he attacked Pichegru on the Pfriem, and, after a hot conflict of four days, drove him back behind the Queich and the walls of Landau; upon this Mannheim capitulated on November 23.

The Italian campaign ended more fortunately for the French, where already in the previous year General Bonaparte, who was the soul of those operations, had gained possession of the entire Ligurian coastline from Nice to Finale, had pressed back the Piedmontese to the Col di Tenda, and had even stormed the heights of the pass. Between Austria and Sardinia, after a long and bitter dispute, an alliance was finally concluded on May 23, 1795; but the whole following summer and autumn passed away without any noteworthy incidents in the war. On the part of the French, Schérer, who now commanded the army of Italy, was not until November so far reinforced that he was able to begin operations; on November 23, by a victory at Loano over the Austro-Sardinians under Wallis and Colli, he rendered himself master of the entire Riviera. How few could then foresee that, only a few months later, the change in the war which would be decisive for the destinies of Europe would take its start from this place!

## CHAPTER VI.

### THE DIRECTORY: TO THE PEACE OF CAMPO-FORMIO.

WITH the dissolution of the Convention, on October 26, 1795, and the inauguration of the new constitution, the democratic dictatorship, under which France had groaned for more than two years, came to an end. But whoever expected from the new government a return to the inalienable principles of every well-ordered state, to security of person and property, to culture, justice, and freedom, soon found himself bitterly deceived. Not such was the aim of the victors of the 13th Vendémiaire, the heirs and political kinsmen of the old Jacobins; their object, afterward as formerly, was to maintain their supremacy by means of force. What a small minority their party formed among the people was shown once more with indisputable clearness by the elections to the legislative body. Three-fourths of the members elect were adherents of the monarchy, and even in the choice of those who were to pass from the Convention to the new legislature the great majority rejected all that was styled Jacobin, Independent, or Thermidorian, and gave the preference almost exclusively to Moderates and Girondists. Such great dismay seized upon those still at the helm of state, that they came near annulling, by a fresh deed of violence, the elections that were displeasing to them. The new government, however, was satisfied at first, in a circular to its officials, with stigmatizing the country's indifference toward the republic as a sign of culpable demoralization and with announcing the relentless crushing of any movement in opposition to its will. There soon followed a plainer proof of its regard for the will of the people, when it removed the elected officers of anti-republican sentiments, and in their place forced Jacobins upon the country.

Although the Convention had been careful to name as members of the Directory (PLATE XVI.) only men of the Left, and, indeed, regicides, yet anything but unity prevailed at the Palace of the Luxembourg, where they had established their seat. Two parties were found opposed to each other within the Directory itself; on the one side, Barras and Rewbell; on the other, Carnot and Letourneur, while the visionary philosopher, Laréveillière-Lépeaux, had no will of his own. The real force of the government was soon centred in Carnot and Rewbell. From the first



A Public Audience under the Directory.

Original drawing from life by Chataignier.




day of its existence, however, the Directory suffered from the general aversion, which was transferred to it as the successor of the Convention. After the fearful visitation of the Revolution, the country would have welcomed any government that promised to be helpful in restoring an existence suited to the dignity of mankind. But people looked with anger and derision upon the pomp in which these rulers strutted, the prodigality with which they furnished their banquets, the contemptible selfishness, whose only concern was to get profit from holding office and to prolong its tenure, the effrontery and immorality, the debauchery and luxury, worse than in the times of Louis XV., in which, under their protection, successful adventurers and upstarts expressed their scorn for the misery of the people. However great had been the despair of the country, in consequence of the violent acts of the Committee of Public Safety, still it was under the new constitution that confusion was to reach its height. Even an act of justice, such as the restoration of the property of persons who had been executed to their families, increased the want, for it lessened the value of the security pledged for the paper money, and thus hastened the sinking of its value, and in the result it was doubtful who suffered most from this cause, the official who received his pay in assignats, the creditor of the state who was compelled, under penalty of death, to invest his capital in government funds, or the landowner, to whom his tenant paid his rent in assignats. The insecurity of all conditions, the ravages of the civil war, and the annihilation of credit had caused an immense decrease in the products of the soil and a corresponding depreciation in the value of land. Budgets, collection of taxes, and regular revenues had for a long time been things unknown. Assignats stood at  $\frac{1}{2}$  of one per cent; a bill for 10,000 francs was worth 50 in silver. On Carnot's proposal the imposition of a forced loan was decreed, which should be applied for the liquidation of all assignats; the failure of the measure forced the exchange down to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of one per cent. The Directory restricted the daily expenditure to that which seemed to them of the very greatest necessity—namely, their own salaries and those of the ministers and deputies, discontinued all other payments, dismissed 12,000 useless officials, and on February 1, 1796, took courage to suspend the distribution of bread and meat, which cost 6,500,000 every month, or, according to the existing rate of exchange, 1,900,000,000 of assignats, but was compelled to return to this at the end of two weeks. The manufacture of assignats it was decided to discontinue on the completion of the fourth milliard—in truth, four and a half were already issued—and, on February 21, press and plates were solemnly burned on the Place Vendôme. The announcement, however,

of new financial operations, that is, of new measures for the plundering of property-owners, depressed the value of assignats to  $\frac{1}{4}$  of one per cent.

On July 18, 1796, the republic made its first great bankruptcy, when it declared its assignats to be worthless. The government now made trial of a new kind of paper money, the so-called territorial mandates, to the amount of 2,400,000,000; these were to pass in all business transactions as cash, and were to be taken at all treasuries of the state at their nominal value, and whoever paid down the assessed value of national property in these notes should have the privilege of acquiring it without public sale. Notwithstanding the compulsory rate, they sank even before they were issued to 10 and soon to 5 per cent., and, by reason of the possibility of purchasing national property with these mandates at their face value, a wild spirit of speculation was let loose. After ten months the mandates were worthless paper, and for the second time the state had gone into bankruptcy.

Discontent arose on all sides. Some were angry at the government because it did not understand how to heal even one of the wounds from which the country was bleeding, and kept down by violence the desire for the restoration of the monarchy. Among others there was growing up a venomous hatred that looked back with longing to the golden days of the Commune. The head and spokesman of this remnant of the former Hébertists was Babeuf. Sentenced for forgery during the Reign of Terror, and a second time arrested, but liberated in consequence of the 13th Vendémiaire, he established the "Society of Equals," also named the Pantheon Club. In his sheet, "The Tribune of the People," he glorified the murders of September, the Reign of Terror, and the memory of Marat. With him were associated the remains of the old Commune, Amar, once president of the Committee of General Security, Debon, Buonarrotti, Lepelletier, Darthé, and others. That which Marat and his companions had demanded merely by rude instinct, these men elaborated into a system: community of goods, public rearing of children, removal of every inequality, and, to this end, restoration of the Constitution of 1793. There were in all seven unknown and unimportant men who constituted themselves a committee of insurrection for the subversion of the state and of society. The Directory hesitated to interpose against the criminal movement; it was not undesirable to them to cause the Damocles sword of the Commune to be suspended over the heads of the royalist *bourgeoisie*. But the Moderate opposition in the legislature spoke out plainly. They denounced the treatment of the *émigrés*, and required that an end should be put to the existing unprecedented and arbitrary management of the lists of *émigrés*, by bringing





First Sitting of the National Institute for Sciences and Arts.

In the year IV, of the Republic (1796), on 15th Germinal (March 21 to April 19).

From a copper plate engraving by Berthault; original drawing by Girardet



the same before the courts. The ruling party, who saw in this movement a menace to their existence, threw themselves with extreme vehemence into opposition to the views of the Moderates, and the emigrant lists remained, as before, subject to the pleasure of the officials of the administration. Even for closing the different clubs the Directory did not assign as a reason the declamations of the Communists, but the machinations of the royalists. The conspirators, however, felt that they must make haste; they appointed the outbreak for May 8. But one of them, Captain Grisel, who was charged with the business of working upon the troops, turned traitor, and at the right moment the government effected a great capture, which delivered into their hands nearly all the ring-leaders, together with their papers. Before the court the prisoners had not the courage to acknowledge their work, but sought to get free by cowardly lies. Babeuf and Darthé were executed, seven others deported; the postmaster, Drouet, escaped from prison.

The alarm occasioned by the designs of Babeuf was so deep that the Directory was forced to use greater moderation and prudence in internal affairs. In its foreign policy, on the contrary, it followed, like its predecessors, tendencies which were not in harmony with the popular temper. The longing of the people for peace, and not adherence to a dynasty, was the source of that royalist current which of late had become so noticeable. The Directory, on the other hand, needed war. How otherwise could they justify the dictatorship against the opposition of the population and bring the people to endure their government still longer? In what other way, after consuming all internal sources of supply, would they be able to meet the most urgent necessities of the state, if not by means of robbery and booty? After the last defeats on the Rhine, and with the utter destitution, which, in spite of the plundering of Belgium, Holland, and the left bank of the Rhine, existed in the army of the Meuse and Sambre, the thought of an advance must have seemed audacious even to madness. The French might regard it as an undeserved piece of good-fortune that Thugut, constantly tormented by anxiety on account of Prussia's plans of aggrandizement, left the brilliant victories of Clerfayt wholly unused. But it was the will of fate that this government, which was incapable of acquiring either esteem or adherence at home, advanced abroad from one triumph to another. Beside the disunion and want of spirit of its adversaries, this result was owing to the fortune and genius of its commander in the field.

The 13th Vendémiaire had pointed out to the Directory the man whom they needed. The young General Bonaparte (Fig. 57) was brought into still closer relations with the ruling circles by his marriage

with Josephine de la Pagerie, six years his senior, the widow of General Beauharnais, who was executed during the Reign of Terror. Through Madame Tallien, whose friendship she gained in prison, Josephine had been introduced into these circles. On March 9, 1796, the civil marriage



FIG. 57.—General Bonaparte, about 1796. After a contemporary portrait.

occurred, and her former lover, Barras, for a wedding present to her, gave the supreme command of the army of Italy to her second husband. The principal point, however, was the fact that the services of the man were indispensable.

According to the plan of campaign projected by Carnot, in agreement with his ideas, the armies of the Meuse-Sambre and of the Rhine, pressing through South Germany, and the Italian army, far weaker in number, making its way through Lombardy, were to be united and concentrated in the Tyrol, in order to dictate peace to the emperor in the heart of his hereditary dominions. The genius of Bonaparte, however, brought it to pass that the decisive action occurred on the battlefields of Italy. The young commander-in-chief found his troops in the same condition of destitution and disorder that prevailed in all the encampments of the republic, but inured to war, hardy, and commanded by tried leaders,

such as Masséna, Augereau, and Serurier. In the lower grades were names of future renown, such as Junot, Murat, Marmont, Lannes, Victor, Suchet, and Berthier. These troops formed an unequalled instrument which only awaited the master's hand in order to accomplish great things. Well might the generals of divisions, so much older in life and in years of service, look askance at first at the new commander, insignificant in appearance, who had been appointed over them; but, in an incredibly short time, they felt the ascendancy of his character. A new spirit swept along with itself both officers and soldiers. "Soldiers," he addressed them in his famous first proclamation, "you are wretchedly fed and almost naked; the government owes you much, but it can give you nothing. Your endurance and your courage are worthy of admiration, but they bring you neither fame nor profit. I shall lead you into the most fruitful plains of the world. Rich provinces, great cities, will be at your disposal there; you will find there honor, fame, and riches. Soldiers of Italy! will you be wanting in courage?" No longer is anything said of country, duty, or freedom for the nations.

The Italian army numbered 45,000 men and 239 cannon, not much less than the combined Austrian and Sardinian forces, the latter commanded by Colli, and the former by Beaulieu, a man grown gray in the conventional mode of warfare, and, like the entire Austrian army system, sluggish, but a gallant warrior. Of the three passes leading from the Ligurian coast over the Apennines, the Col di Tenda, the pass of Montenotte, and the Bochetta, Bonaparte had chosen for his first stroke the central pass—the road from Savona to Carcare, which on the north side of the mountains forks, the road to the right leading by way of Dego to Alessandria, and the road to the left leading through Millesimo to Turin. This was exactly at the point of contact between the Sardinians and the Austrians and would give him access to the plain of the Po. Contrary to all expectation, Beaulieu anticipated him; solicitous with regard to Genoa, which the French commissioner Salicetti wished to compel to advance three millions, he pressed his way over the Bochetta pass and at Voltri forced the enemy back, while a second division under Argenteau was to cross at Montenotte. Should this movement succeed, the campaign, scarcely begun, would be decided; and Bonaparte, hemmed in between the mountains and the coast, which was blockaded by Nelson, would be surrounded and captured. Only Beaulieu's slowness and the valor with which Colonel Rampon and his 1200 men defended the fort covering the pass of Montenotte enabled him on the following night to escape from the trap. He now threw, on April 12, the divisions of Laharpe and Augereau upon Argenteau, who was isolated at Montenotte,

and drove him in disorder back upon Dego; on the following day, Augereau and Masséna defeated at Millesimo 5000 Sardinians and Austrians under Provera; engagements at Dego, Ceva, and Mondovì, April 13–21, completed the separation of the Sardinians from the Austrians; and now the troops who, in the mountains, of necessity had become bands of marauders, poured without hindrance into the rich plain of the Po. Already in these earliest conflicts the young commander proved his mastery, in being able by rapid movements always to appear with superior forces at the decisive point, while his opponents then and long afterward held fast to the mistake of dividing their troops. These sudden blows destroyed the Austro-Sardinian alliance. King Victor Amadeus became immediately desirous of peace, and on April 28, at Cherasco, Bonaparte accorded to him the desired truce, during which the fortresses of Cuneo, Tortona, and Ceva were to remain as security in possession of the conqueror. On May 15, he signed a peace with Sardinia; the latter power ceded Savoy and Nice to France, and pledged itself to the expulsion of the *émigrés*. The pursuit of the Austrians was not delayed. On May 7, Bonaparte crossed the Po at Piacenza, turned their position on the Agogna, and on May 10 stormed the bridge over the Adda at Lodi, which was obstinately defended by the Austrian rearguard of 9000 men with 30 cannon, whereupon Beaulieu withdrew across the Oglio and Mincio, in order to collect the remains of his army under the walls of Mantua. On May 16 the victor made his triumphal entry into Milan.

The universal enthusiasm over these brilliant successes left the Directory no other choice but to overlook the arbitrary course of the commander who had achieved them, yet they regarded it as necessary to clip the wings of this self-willed ambition. They determined, indeed, to strengthen the Italian army with the army of the Alps, but to divide it between Kellermann and Bonaparte; the former was to undertake the pursuit of Beaulieu; the latter, on the other hand, was to turn southward and deliver the peninsula from English influence; all diplomatic negotiations were reserved for the commissioner of the government, Salicetti. This attempt, however, only brought home to the Directory the lesson that this general was not dependent upon Paris, but Paris upon him. By threatening to lay down his command Bonaparte brought about the revocation of these measures, and from that time on he considered himself the sovereign commander of the Italian army. Deciding the course of military operations, the questions of diplomacy, and the fate of the conquered countries, according to his individual judgment, he left nothing for the Directory to do but to confirm his decisions. Complete agreement existed between the two only with regard to the immediate object




FIG. 58.—Taking away the antique horses from the Church of Saint Mark at Venice. After an engraving by Jean Duplessis-Bertaux (1747-1813).

of the war—the plundering of the conquered regions. Lombardy was obliged to purchase its liberation with a war-contribution of 20,000,000 francs; Bonaparte organized the carrying away of all imaginable articles, provisions for his army, articles of equipment for the fleet, works of art and science, of which he had need as trophies to gratify the curiosity of the Parisians (Fig. 58). The Duke of Parma was compelled to expiate his guilt in having joined the coalition by the payment, according to the armistice of May 9, of 2,000,000 francs, by furnishing supplies, and by giving up twenty valuable pictures. On May 17 the Duke of Modena was obliged to experience the same treatment. Along with these official exactions there went those of purveyors and soldiers, stimulated by their individual greed, to which the commanding general was wont to put a check only when discipline was threatened. They speedily put an end to the rejoicings of the Italians over their liberation. In the Milanese territory an insurrection broke out, which Bonaparte suppressed with merciless severity; Pavia was given up to plunder.

In the soul of Bonaparte victory had set free soaring projects, thoughts of unbounded presumption. Even now the end, which he pursued with the fire of youthful genius and with the coldness of a selfishness that scorned mankind, stood complete before him—the vision of his future power and greatness. His next effort was directed to driving the Austrians completely out of Italy; in the position which he had taken on the Adige and on the southern extremity of the Lake of Garda, he covered the investment of Mantua by Angereau and Serurier against any relief coming from the Alps. This did not occur without violation of Venetian territory, but he had few scruples about that. That the Austrians made their retreat through that territory, as they had by treaty the right to do, he made use of as a pretext for occupying Brescia, together with Bergamo, and seizing the dilapidated fortress of Peschiera, as well as Verona, which was far more important. The once proud republic of St. Mark, which, conscious of the weakness of old age, had chosen to adopt an unarmed neutrality, the most convenient but also the most dangerous course of all, found its independence menaced, its subjects pillaged, and a French democratic party engaged in machinations among the people. The intermediate time, which must necessarily elapse before the arrival of another army, sufficed for Bonaparte to render the other states of the peninsula harmless. No one of the Italian courts cherished greater enmity toward the French than that of Naples. Queen Maria Carolina, an energetic and passionate woman, who was at that time the real head of the government in place of her stupid husband, Ferdinand IV., burned with hatred of the



Revolution, which had brought her sister to the scaffold. The employment of informers and spies, inhuman sentences, torture, and executions were of no avail in excluding the revolutionary poison from Naples. England's influence at the court increased by reason of the bosom friendship of the queen with Lady Hamilton, wife of the British ambassador, a woman of talent and of great beauty, but of a past more than doubtful. In July, 1793, Naples concluded an alliance with England and gave assistance to the defenders of Toulon; in the following year it joined its troops to those of the Austrians in Lombardy and its ships to the English Mediterranean fleet. But now this Bourbon court was frightened into submitting, by the Treaty of Brescia (June 5), to the French conqueror, withdrawing its troops from the support of the Austrians, and closing its harbors to the English. The republic of Genoa, on account of the peasants' war, which had arisen in the rear of the French, in the Genoese territory, was punished by the severest threats and the burning down of entire places. The Grand Duke of Tuscany vainly relied upon the peace concluded with the republic; while Bonaparte craftily deceived him by a friendly visit, French troops, by forced marches, pushed on toward Leghorn. The chief object, the surprise of the English ships in that harbor, was not attained, but the pillaging of the rich warehouses produced 40,000,000 francs. With regard to the States of the Church, the Directory had long been bent on attacking them. But here, too, Bonaparte followed his own course. With a just appreciation of the power which the church and religion exercise over the human mind, he selected these as instruments for ruling men. As a pretext for hostilities he made use of the murder of the French agent Basseville (January 3, 1793). Without meeting opposition from the utterly unwarlike troops of the pope, he occupied the legations of Ferrara and Bologna, whereupon the affrighted pope submitted (June 23), and left the legations, together with Ancona, in the hands of the French until peace should be made; he further paid 21,000,000 francs, and delivered up also 100 pictures and 500 manuscripts.

Thus was the entire peninsula within the space of a few weeks brought into subjection to the French arms. The British fleet, after Spain had gone over to the side of France, no longer ventured to hold the Mediterranean, and as a consequence Corsica was likewise evacuated by the English. With admiration and with fear the eyes of governments and of peoples were fixed upon the son of fortune, who, laden with treasures and trophies, now hastened back to the Mincio, in order to complete the conquest of Italy by the reduction of Mantua. The situation of the fortress, the occupants of which, in consequence of

exhalations from the neighboring marshes during the summer, suffered severely from sickness, began already to be critical, when Wurmser, who had been summoned from the Rhine to take the place of Beaulieu, descended from the north through the Tyrol with 54,000 men to its relief. With the main body he came down the east shore of the Lake of Garda; on the west shore, toward Salò, came Quosdanovich with the remainder of the force. Bonaparte was placed in the greatest danger of being caught between the two and crushed. Already, after the capture of Brescia, the vanguard of Quosdanovich stood at Lonato upon his line of retreat, while he himself, after a hot engagement, was obliged to leave the high grounds of Rivoli in the hands of Wurmser. Reaching a speedy decision, he raised the siege of Mantua at the sacrifice of all his heavy artillery, in order to throw himself with his undivided strength upon Quosdanovich before the other foe should come upon the scene. But already it seemed too late; Wurmser had already reached the Mincio; a space of only about fifteen miles now separated him from Quosdanovich. For the first time Bonaparte lost composure and self-reliance; contrary to his custom, he called a council of war. This also declared a retreat inevitable; only the daring swordsman, Augereau, objected. The commanding general passed the night in distressing uncertainty; a second council of war regarded a retreat as no longer practicable. Knowledge of the danger served only to enkindle the courage of the troops. All depended on this, whether it would be possible to fight Quosdanovich before Wurmser should arrive, and the latter did the French the favor to wait until August 3 before he passed over the Mincio at Goito. Bonaparte was thus able, in the meantime, to fall upon the former, and in a series of engagements, August 2-4, between the Lake of Garda and the Chiese at Lonato, to force him to retreat. Then turning about, he threw himself with lightning-like rapidity upon Wurmser at Castiglione and drove him likewise back across the Mincio. The relief of Mantua was frustrated; the Austrian army, weakened to the extent of 10,000 men, was thrust back among the Tyrolese mountains; the fame of Bonaparte shone brighter than ever; for fortune on this occasion had forced victory upon him. Being obliged to defer resuming the investment of Mantua until the arrival of more artillery, he ventured upon a bold advance as far as Trent, for the purpose of uniting with Moreau, who had pressed forward to Munich. But then intelligence reached him of a new advance on the part of Wurmser from the Brenta, while a division under Davidovich was descending the Adige. Should Wurmser succeed in crossing this river, the French would be shut up in the mountains and lost. The plan was skilfully devised, but the boldness and rapidity needful for its execution

were wanting. Without hesitation Bonaparte renounced the enterprise against the Tyrol, and, after having, on September 6, driven Davidovich northward beyond Trent, he crossed the mountains into the valley of the Brenta, and at Bassano on September 8 fell with crushing weight upon the rear of the widely scattered Austrians under Wurmser. To the marshal, thus cut off, there remained no choice, after the loss of 27,000 men and all his artillery and army supplies, but to throw himself into Mantua.

But meanwhile the plan of co-operation between the Italian army and that on the Rhine had become impracticable on account of events at the German seat of the war. The French commanders there had finally decided, notwithstanding the wretched condition of their troops, to cross the Rhine. Jourdan began operations by causing the Austrians to be driven over the Lahn by Kléber; meanwhile he crossed the river himself at Neuwied. Clerfayt, who was at variance with Wurmser, had been removed from his command, and his place was now filled by the Archduke Charles (born in 1771), the only one among the younger Austrian generals who had given proof of decided military talents. The reduction which the Austrian army suffered by the drawing off of 25,000 men with Wurmser to Italy was abundantly compensated by the restored unity in the chief command. Rapidly hastening up, the archduke compelled Jourdan, after a successful contest at Wetzlar, on June 15, to return to the place from which he had come. The chief object of Carnot was, however, completely attained; he designed to prevent the enemy from assuming the offensive on the left bank of the Rhine, to turn him northward, and thereby also to make possible for the army of the Rhine the invasion of the empire. Moreau with great skill accomplished, on June 24, the crossing of the river at Strasburg, surprising and scattering the troops of the Swabian circle, who were guarding the stream. Leaving 30,000 men under Wartensleben to oppose Jourdan, the archduke hastened to the assistance of Latour, who was hard pressed. After an unfortunate engagement at Malsch, on July 10, he retreated as far as Nördlingen. Entrusted with the double task of covering the Austrian frontier and also the rear of Wurmser in his operations for the relief of Mantua, it was of the greatest importance for him to contest Moreau's advance at every step, to prevent Moreau from uniting with Jourdan, and constantly to keep open his own communications with Wartensleben, who, before Jourdan's fresh advance, had withdrawn as far as Würzburg, and then as far as Bamberg. Fortunately for him and for the welfare of Germany, the eyes of Moreau were directed to Italy rather than to Jourdan, while the latter, following the instructions of the

Directory, turned toward the more northern districts, which had not been ravaged hitherto, and gave promise of richer booty. The Rhineland, Franconia, and Swabia were meanwhile given up to the most outrageous pillaging. Ecclesiastical and temporal lords had only the one thought of placing their persons and goods in safety. Defection spread among the states of the empire. Würtemberg and Baden hastened to transform the armistice which they had purchased into a peace. They pledged themselves to heavy contributions and to the cession of their possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, but it was secretly stipulated that they might obtain compensation for the loss of their possessions west of the Rhine by secularizations. The Swabian and Franconian circles followed their example and recalled their motley troops from the imperial army, an act which induced the angry archduke to disarm by force six battalions of their soldiers that were within his reach; even the 8000 Saxons, decidedly the most efficient among the imperial troops, turned back, and the circle of Upper Saxony concluded with Jourdan a treaty of neutrality.

In such disgrace and suffering the rotten constitution of the empire fell irretrievably. Of not less moment, however, was the success which French diplomacy achieved at the same time over Prussia. The connection with France was desired by the ministers at Berlin, but only that they might be able to give themselves up to the undisturbed enjoyment of peace, and they deceived themselves with the idea that the Parisian government would be disposed, in consequence of friendly advances, to a return of favors, that it would give back willingly the left bank of the Rhine, and would establish a new line of neutrality. Since the Directory needed Prussia's friendship in order to conduct the war against Austria more energetically, the siren allurements were heard repeatedly at Paris: If Prussia would only abandon entirely the empire and the integrity of the empire, she could be repaid by secularizations, and could take upon herself the hegemony of the Protestant states; and that this power suddenly, on the ground of old Hohenzollern claims, took military possession of two suburbs of Nuremberg, is an indication that Prussia was not insensible to such insinuations. But as soon as she brought forward her demands in explicit language, she encountered prevarication and non-compliance, and the more brilliant the news from the seat of war, the higher was the key-note struck by the Directory. On Prussia's further opposition the Directory threatened to come to an understanding with Austria and to yield Bavaria to her. Thus there gradually matured in Berlin the decision to yield, and, on August 5, Haugwitz signed a new treaty with the republic. The public

part of it only established the new line of demarcation, but its special importance lay in the secret articles: Prussia gave her assent to the cession of the left bank of the Rhine in a future peace with the empire, and accepted the principle of the indemnification of the dispossessed princes by the secularization of church property; for herself Prussia was to receive the bishopric of Münster and other ecclesiastical foundations; to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, in addition to ecclesiastical territory, the long-desired elector's hat was promised; the house of Orange was to receive an electorate formed out of the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg. No wonder that the public conduct of Prussia, compared with the war which Austria was carrying on against France, excited lively indignation.

But scarcely was this settlement reached, when a sudden change occurred at the seat of war, which fundamentally altered the situation. The Archduke Charles, who had retreated to Nördlingen, placed all his remaining hopes on being able to get Wartensleben to join him, but the latter, being hard pressed by Jourdan, found the movement southward too hazardous, and therefore struck out from Forchheim in the direction of Amberg and the Naab. Charles decided to go forward on his side to meet his endangered subordinate. He placed Latour with 30,000 men over against Moreau, whom he had kept at a distance by the engagement at Neresheim. He himself at Ingolstadt led (August 17) 28,000 men to the left bank of the Danube, and pushed on with them to meet Wartensleben. Jourdan became immediately aware of his critical situation; only to cover his retreat he delivered battle on August 24 at Amberg to his adversary's superior force, and the result was unfavorable. Menaced on his flank by the enemy, assailed on all sides by the exasperated inhabitants, his only safety was the deliberation with which the archduke followed him. The Austrians, however, reached Würzburg before him. Here, on September 3, Jourdan again made a stand against his pursuers; he was completely routed, and escaped utter destruction once more only in consequence of the dilatory movements of the conqueror. After a final disastrous engagement at Altenkirchen in the Westerwald (September 19), in which General Mareau met his death, Jourdan was compelled to recross the Rhine, full of rage against the members of the Directory, who, by separating the two armies, were chiefly to blame for his misfortune. Just before this, Moreau (Fig. 59) had been prevented, by an express command from Paris, from following up the archduke toward the Danube, for the duty was assigned him of forming a connection with General Bonaparte by way of Munich and Innsbruck, for the purpose of crushing Wurmser. He was already posted on the Isar. But

after the defeat of Jourdan his retreat was inevitable. The Bavarian government, however—in the absence of the elector, who had fled—besought him for protection, and accepted from him, on September 7, an ignominious armistice at Pfaffenhofen. But Moreau was not able to main-



FIG. 59.—Moreau. From a copper-plate engraving by P. Audouin (1768–1822); original painting by François Pascal Gérard (1770–1837).

tain his position even on the Iller. He passed by the Höllenthal through the Black Forest, for the purpose of crossing the Rhine in safety at Breisach and Hüningen. The object of the campaign had not been at-

tained, except that, for four months, the armies of the republic had subsisted at the enemy's expense, and the empty coffers of the state had been filled with a rich booty. In the empire everything tended to return to the former condition; Prussia evacuated Nuremberg; the Elector of Bavaria refused to ratify the Treaty of Pfäfershofen; the Duke of Würtemberg showed disfavor to the negotiators of the armistice; the Franconian and Swabian circles brought their excuses to the emperor; and the diet, which had fled before Jourdan, assembled once more in Ratisbon.

No one saw this result with livelier satisfaction than Pitt, for it increased the prospect of greater compliance on the part of the Directory. The increasing burden of the debt of Great Britain, the growing distress of the poorer classes in consequence of the failure of the harvests, the very threatening conditions in Ireland, rendered peace more desirable for him than ever. He went so far, indeed, as to send Lord Malmesbury to enter into direct negotiations at Paris. But to no purpose. Every attempt to reach an understanding failed on account of Belgium, on the possession of which the Directory insisted unconditionally, while Pitt was equally unwilling to leave it in the hands of France. Thugut would have had no objection to purchasing peace by ceding Belgium and the Rhenish territories of the empire, it being pre-supposed that Austria should receive its compensation in Bavaria and in Italy. The Directory were, however, obliged to undergo the experience of discovering that the disposal of Italy no longer lay in their power. Bonaparte was determined that the Austrians should never again set foot on the soil of the peninsula. It was indifferent to him, whether he acted diametrically against the views of the Directory; his purpose was not to yield up again his conquests, but to make them the pedestal of his future greatness. And this he endeavored to compass with terrible power and insatiable desire, with a wonderful gift for laying hold of fortune, but without respect for that which is prized as sacred on the earth, without love for or trust in any fellow-creature, valuing everyone only according to the measure of his serviceableness for his own ends. His examples were not, as were those of the feeble finatics about him, Gracchus and Brutus, but Caesar and Charlemagne. Nothing, even the least thing, was overlooked by him, while his eye ever remained directed to the greatest. Never perhaps has nature endowed a mortal with so wonderful a gift for subjugating others as this man possessed.

Bonaparte, therefore, and not the Directory settled the future course of Italian affairs. He now granted a burdensome peace (October 10) to the King of Naples. The Directory also committed to him the further negotiations with the pope (Fig. 60). But, notwithstanding the respectful

language which he studiously employed, he had no influence whatever with the Roman Curia, which still continued to count upon an Austrian victory. Furthermore, Thugut was inspired by the victories of the archduke to undertake a third trial of arms for the deliverance of Mantua. The greatest pains were employed to fill up the gaps made by the last expedition. A surprise was planned. Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Alvinczy left Friuli and crossed the Brenta, while Davidovich was to second him along the Adige in the direction of Verona—in all 50,000 men. To oppose this force Bonaparte had only 32,000 men, but they were full of



FIG. 60.—Pope Pius VI. From a medal.

blind confidence in their commander, and in intrinsic efficiency far surpassed the Austrians. But the first attacks of the French on Alvinczy's positions at Bassano were repulsed at all points, and, greatly prostrated, they retreated to Verona. Bonaparte's situation at that place began to be critical; but he was now sufficiently informed as to the weak side of his adversaries, their heaviness and dilatoriness, to build upon it a plan for turning them on their left flank. At Ronco, a little above the mouth of the Alpone, he led his army over the Adige. Then there occurred at Arcole a three days' combat, November 15–17, of an exceed-



ingly bloody character. This village, the key of the Austrian position, lay in a piece of ground pierced by numerous canals, approachable only by a single dyke. Charges were made upon this to no purpose; in vain did Bonaparte place himself, banner in hand, at the head of the column; he was borne by his fleeing soldiers obliquely into the morass, and came near falling into the hands of the pursuing enemy. He was obliged to recross the Adige. Through the entire following day the fierce and useless struggle was renewed, until finally during the night the French succeeded in constructing two bridges over the Alpone, above and below Arcole, so that the Austrians, attacked on both flanks, were compelled to abandon their position. The result would have been different, had it not been for the negligent conduct of Davidovich, whose attack was not made till November 17 at Rivoli, when he likewise was driven back to the mountains of the Tyrol. Thus the third attempt to relieve Mantua had miscarried, but it had failed of success by so little, that at Vienna courage for a fourth effort was increased.

On October 4, Bonaparte declared the Duke of Modena, who had withdrawn to Venice, deprived of his government, on the ground of alleged annoyances, and invited the Modenese to constitute themselves a Cispadane republic. Besides this, he began before the close of the year to prepare the fate of Venice also, with regard to which the Directory had been constrained to grant him a free hand; on the pretence that the government had been guilty of favoring the Austrians, he seized the important castle of Bergamo. The arrival of reinforcements enabled him to oppose Alvinczy with 45,000 men. This time Alvinczy determined to make his principal advance from the north, from the direction of Roveredo, against the position between the Adige and the Lake of Garda, which was defended only by Joubert's division, while Bonaparte was to be held in check on the lower Adige by a feigned attack which Provera was directed to make. But for the fourth time the separation of their forces was the misfortune of the Austrians, whose movements among the snowy mountains were even more dilatory than ordinary. Bonaparte penetrated their purpose in time; he now ordered Augereau to maintain the position against Provera and hastened with all his troops to the assistance of Joubert, who was sorely pressed at Rivoli. Already (January 14, 1797) the Austrians were beginning to climb the table-land on which the place lies, when the sudden appearance of a small party of the enemy's horse on their flank spread a panic through their ranks. Beside themselves at seeing the victory, which was almost won, torn from them again, Alvinczy and his staff sought in vain to arrest the senseless flight. Provera, who, deceiving Augereau, had turned toward Mantua to

give aid to Wurmser, was also overtaken by Bonaparte, and forced to lay down his arms with 6000 men. In prisoners alone the Austrians had lost 20,000 men, and they were unable to make a stand till they had crossed the Piave. This battle decided the fate of Mantua; its power of resistance was exhausted. On January 19, Wurmser capitulated; to honor his valor, Bonaparte allowed him to pass freely with 700 men; 15,000 were made prisoners of war.

While awaiting the arrival of the reinforcements that were on their way to join him, intending with them to aim a blow at the heart of the emperor's hereditary possessions, Bonaparte employed the intervening time in having a reckoning with the pope. Intercepted letters had convinced him of the futility of his hope to be able to win over the Curia by indulgence. Upon the population, deadened by poverty and ignorance, a greater impression was made by the friendly treatment on the part of the French and the rigorous discipline which their general maintained, than by the crusade preaching of the monks. On February 19, Pius VI., defenceless, had to accede to the Peace of Tolentino; he renounced Avignon and the Venaissin, ceded Ferrara and Bologna, promised to pay an additional 30,000,000 francs, shut his ports against the enemies of France, and left Ancona in her hands until a general peace.

Meanwhile the time had come for resuming the campaign against the Austrians. Joubert was dispatched to the Tyrol with 18,000 men, and at the head of the remaining 31,000 Bonaparte began operations with the passage of the Isonzo. He found himself opposed here by the Archduke Charles, who, with a heavy heart, had taken the supreme command of an army, which was in the worst condition: all military supplies inadequate; the reinforcement of 20,000 men ordered from the army of the Rhine still at a distance; officers and men discontented, without confidence in him, or in one another, and the less the daring and fire in the deliberate nature of the new commander and the smaller his confidence of victory, so much the less was he able to lift up the sunken spirits of his troops. Not until behind the Isonzo did he attempt a serious resistance. On the snow-covered heights of Tarvis, on the road to Carinthia, occurred a fierce conflict with Masséna; by the loss of this important pass not only was an entire division on the upper Isonzo cut off and obliged to surrender, but also the shortest road to Vienna was opened to the French. The enemy with whom they had to contend was not so much the Austrians as the season of the year, the climate and the mountains. Bonaparte had already reached Klagenfurt; Joubert advanced from the Tyrol, after driving the enemy across the Brenner, in order to

unite with him by passing through the Pusterthal. This far advanced position, however, was by no means free from danger; the population began their attacks, and the expected diversion under Moreau was not executed. This state of affairs rendered Bonaparte desirous of ending



FIG. 61.—Archduke Charles of Austria. From a drawing by F. Green. Original painting by J. Johns.

the struggle; but it was of greater weight with him, that after all the laurels which he had won for the French banners, only one yet remained, a glorious and profitable peace, in order to make him appear in the eyes of his people as the unique, the unequalled benefactor. It stood him in

good stead that, amid the unbroken succession of strokes of misfortune, the war spirit at Vienna was on the point of giving way. Although the emperor personally favored the continuation of the war, the peace party was constantly increasing its ascendancy; even the Queen of Naples was now anxiously pleading with her daughter, the empress, in behalf of peace. The court and aristocracy sided with the people against Thugut, who had, however, throughout made no opposition to a peace, only insisting that it should be advantageous. Well informed with respect to this disposition, Bonaparte, on March 31, dispatched a letter to the archduke. Charles (Fig. 61) replied, coldly, that he was not in possession of plenipotentiary powers for negotiation, but in Vienna the suggestion was well received. To Judenburg, where Bonaparte had established his headquarters, only seventy-five miles from the capital, two imperial negotiators repaired, and obtained a cessation of hostilities for six days. On the part of Austria, negotiations were, singularly, conducted by the Neapolitan ambassador, de Gallo. It happened at this time, for the purpose of making an impression, that the French, after a long period of inactivity, began to move on the Rhine; on April 18 Hoche, in the direction of Nenwied, and shortly after Moreau, from Strasburg, appeared on the right bank, when the intelligence that on the same day the preliminaries of peace were signed at Leoben put an end to their advance. Thugut had now renounced the thought of acquiring Bavaria, in order not thereby to call forth demands by Prussia for indemnification. But Bonaparte, although he had no authority to negotiate, and well knew that he was thus directly crossing the purposes of the Directory, already had in preparation another indemnification for Austria that should permanently separate her from former allies. For this object the Venetian territory was selected by him. In order to obtain a pretext against the helpless republic, he provoked, through emissaries, a rising in its territory. First Bergamo rose, Brescia followed with a proclamation of its independence, but the attack of the mountaineers on the French at Salo first created the wished-for pretext. Immediately Bonaparte sent his adjutant Junot with a threatening letter to the Doge Manin, and without even awaiting an answer, he proceeded at Leoben to dispose of the territory of the republic. The main land belonging to it, as far as the Oglio and the Po, together with Istria and Dalmatia, Austria was to receive as compensation for her possessions on the left of the Rhine, and on the left of the Oglio; this last territory was to be constituted into an independent republic; for this cession Venice was to be indemnified by Ferrara and Bologna. The general peace was reserved for a congress to be held in a neutral city, and was to include a peace for the empire, having its integrity as a

basis; on this occasion the Duke of Modena, also, was to obtain his indemnity.

It would be difficult to say which of the two in this transaction acted the more immoral part, the French general, who divided and disposed of the territory of a foreign state, or the emperor, who made himself a partner in the robbery. The overthrow of the old political system of Europe in general, and especially that of the old Austria, was sealed at Leoben. This power, as the price, not of her victories, but of her defeats, had won a frontier on the south, which admirably rounded off her possessions, but by the sacrifice of the left bank of the Rhine, she loosened the ancient connection of that region with the empire; and with Belgium she lost the foundation, on which, since the Peace of Utrecht, had reposed her community of interest with the maritime powers.

The preliminaries signed at Leoben were the death-knell of the republic of St. Mark. In vain the signory did all that was possible, in order to avoid every pretext for hostilities; they even submitted without resistance to the disarmament ordered by Bonaparte; this decrepit oligarchy could by no humiliation purchase a further prolongation of its existence. A rising at Verona (April 17) supplied the watchful enemy with that which he needed. Scarcely had Bonaparte issued his declaration of war on May 1, when the Revolution broke out everywhere, and the lion of St. Mark was supplanted by the tree of liberty. In their dismay the Great Council sought to appease the wrath of their powerful foe by changing the constitution in a democratic sense, the state inquisitors were put under arrest, and finally the council itself resigned in favor of a democratic city council. As if in mockery, Bonaparte concluded with the republic he had devoted to destruction a treaty of peace and friendship, while at the same time he possessed himself of its entire territory, its fleet and arsenal, and, through Admiral Gentili, seized the Ionian islands. It was not long before the fate of Venice overtook the oligarchy of Genoa also; and here, too, the intrigues of the clubs, led by the French envoy, prepared the way. Genoa was changed into the Ligurian Republic with a democratic constitution.

While the young conqueror was transforming political relations according to his own mind, and held his court like a powerful sovereign at the castle of Montebello in Milan, the same favor of fortune did not attend the French arms in naval warfare. The Dutch, and even a part of the Spanish possessions, had become the prey of the English. But the internal condition of Ireland still showed the sore place, where an attack upon the sea-girt foe promised success. All the endeavors of the Irish patriots, like Edmund Burke (Fig. 62) and Henry Grattan,

had obtained nothing from the selfish and bigoted tenacity of the English Tories. The entire Irish population struggled by means of refusal of taxes, intimidation, conspiracies, and incendiarism, against their English lords and oppressors. Two of the chiefs of the secret league of "United Irishmen," which aimed at utter separation from England, and the establishment of an Irish republic, Lord Edward Fitzgerald and




FIG. 62.—Edmund Burke. Engraving of 1797.

Arthur O'Connor, secretly repaired to Paris, to concert with the Directory the plan of a French landing in Ireland. The success which this scheme promised was the principal reason of replying to the offers of peace, brought over by Lord Malmesbury, by the simple command to leave Paris within twenty-four hours. But this insult roused the English people with one mind to rally around their government. Within a

few hours the loan of £18,000,000, desired by Pitt, was subscribed. Parliament granted new imposts, 60,000 militia were enrolled in the army, and a force of volunteer cavalry was formed. But nature herself undertook the defence of the land. The fleet on which Hoche had put to sea with 20,000 troops, designed to effect a landing, was obliged, being scattered by storm and fog, to turn back. The hope placed on the Spanish fleet was disappointed; with 25 ships of war it was to have joined the French in the Channel, but by the brilliant victory of Admiral Jervis and Commodore Nelson at Cape St. Vincent, February 14, 1797, it was driven back to Cadiz.

France, though victorious in Italy, had trouble enough at home. An attempt to kill the Directors and to surprise the camp at Grenelle gave proof that the anarchist party was not destroyed. Then the traces of a royalist conspiracy were discovered. But the attempt made in both instances by the astounded Directory to set aside the regular courts, and the resistance to this attempt by the Court of Cassation, only strengthened the impression that this pretended republic was in truth nothing but a rule of arbitrary will. Besides, the Directory still turned with ever growing readiness to the old Jacobin principle that the democracy stood above the will of the people, and possessed the right to maintain itself against it by violence if need be. And thus while it was hardly a matter of doubt as to the result of the supplementary elections to the legislative body, yet the Directory set in motion all possible intrigues and tricks, in order to prevent its opponents from exercising their electoral rights. Nevertheless the country declared itself (April 9, 1797), with overwhelming majorities, against the Directory, and in favor of the Moderates. With the admission of the recently chosen third, the Directory lost its artificially created majority in the legislative body; and the first use which the Moderates made of their majority consisted in this, that in place of Letourneur, withdrawn by lot, they chose into the Directory Barthélemy, a Moderate. To Barthélemy Carnot, who had broken utterly with Barras, joined himself; in the Directory there stood therefore a minority of Moderates, and against them a Jacobin majority, composed of Barras, Rewbell, and Larévellière, while in the legislative body the opposite relation prevailed; and since the constitution placed the executive and the law-making powers wholly apart and independent of each other, the contest between the two could not be decided on the ground of the constitution, but only by the violent overthrow of one or of both. By the choice of Pichegru as president of the Five Hundred the new majority declared war against the Directory, for Pichegru had been deprived of his supreme command forcibly

because suspected of implication in Bourbon intrigues. The repeal of the detested measures against the priests, the church, and the *émigrés*, was only the precursor of the first public attack upon the Directory, the occasion for which was afforded by the situation of the island of Santo Domingo. On this richest of all the French colonies, whose prosperity had been completely ruined by the folly of democratic bungling, the white planters, scarcely one-eighth of the entire population, had demanded for themselves equality of rights with the citizens of the mother country; but with extreme indignation they resisted the grant declared by the National Assembly, in May, 1791, of civil rights to the free colored men; whereupon the latter called to their aid the 100,000 negro slaves, who now threw themselves with brutal rage upon their white masters, tortured them to death, and ruined their plantations. Notwithstanding this, the Mountain in the name of human rights had decreed the abolition of slavery, and then placed the negro unconditionally on a footing of equality with the whites; the commissioners sent to the island by the Committee of Public Safety inflamed still further the rage of the insurgents against the white aristocrats, aided as far as they could in plundering them, and dragged hundreds of planters, as prisoners, to France, where they languished in dungeons and always without any judicial procedure. The Five Hundred now censured the Directory for this. Far worse still was the embarrassment of the Directory when the majority began to look somewhat closely into its governmental proceedings. With regard to the subsistence of the army, especially, the most incredible things came to light. Jourdan avowed, for example, that his army had never received more than 10,000 rations out of the 150,000 for which the state paid the contractors. With the same emphasis the majority made known their dissatisfaction with the war policy of the Directory, and especially in respect to the arbitrary manner in which the war was conducted by Bonaparte. If that general had ever entertained a doubt as to which of the two parties he should join, it now disappeared. Not in the path of peaceful self-restraint, only in that of revolutionary violence, of Jacobin destructiveness, was the aim of his ambition to be reached. What increased his anger was the suspicion that the cabinet of Vienna was purposely delaying the conclusion of a definite peace in the hope of profiting by the royalist intrigues. Since the negotiations with Gallo did not advance, he was convinced that Thugut's opposition would cease as soon as the Directory positively put an end to the opposition of the representatives of the people. He wrote on the spot an angry letter to the Directory, and, as usual, offered his resignation. He could count upon his troops; the greater part of them since the siege of Toulon had





PLATE XVIII



A Meeting at Baroness de Staël's.

After a copper-plate engraving by Louis Philibert Debucourt (1757-1832).

*History of All Nations, Vol. XVI, page 317*

been wholly separated from home and its political movements, and knew only the one sentiment of enthusiasm for their commander.

To the "triumvirate," Bonaparte's letter was a real consolation. It confirmed them in the purpose to attempt a *coup d'état*; the only question now remaining was to find the requisite instruments, and these were to be immediately procured by a change of ministry, upon which, in the zealously republican salon of Madame de Staël (PLATE XVIII.), people were busily employed. Talleyrand, who had recently returned from America, the man "who served the strong, despised the incapable, and forsook the unfortunate," became minister of foreign affairs; Hoche was selected for minister of war, but when he was found not to have reached the legal age, Schérer was appointed. Hoche, however, came to Paris, and was united with Barras in preparing the *coup d'état*. But the legislative body took alarm and the affair had failed. Now the conspirators turned to the general who so plainly and positively adhered to their principles; Talleyrand especially was eager to place himself in relations with Bonaparte, for his fine sagacity discerned in him the man of the future. Bonaparte certainly hesitated to lay himself open for men whom he despised in the very depth of his soul; suddenly he wrapped himself in deep silence, but he sent, in Augereau, the man needed by the Directory. Presumptuous and rash, always the hot Jacobin and indefatigable swordsman of former days, he was suited, as no other man, to push them on to the attack upon the majority of the popular representatives. Received with open arms, he was immediately appointed to the command of the seventeenth military division, that is, of the garrison of Paris; he made no concealment of the fact that he was sent thither to put an end to the royalists. Pichegru, indeed, had no fears for his person,—he considered it incredible that anyone would lay hands upon the conqueror of Holland,—but he projected a plan for a counter-stroke against the triumvirs, which, however, was not attempted, because Carnot refused co-operation. Yet the report of these incidents now put an end to the delays of the opposite party.

On the night of September 4 (18th Fructidor) the triumvirs constituted themselves at the Palace of the Luxembourg as the Directory, and declared their sittings permanent. At the same time Augereau, after closing the city gates, took possession of all important points, especially of the assembly rooms of the legislative body in the Tuileries; when the Five Hundred sought to enter their hall, bayonets bristled before them, and those who were on the proscription list were arrested. This befell Barthélemy; Carnot had saved himself at the last moment by flight to Geneva. By eight o'clock in the morning all was over; the populace

remained indifferent spectators. The rump of the council of Five Hundred passed its decrees obediently according to the directions of the plotters. Two hundred and nine men, among them the most eminent in the land, like Pichegru and Barthélemy, were banished to Cayenne. In forty-eight departments new elections were held, which now resulted wholly in favor of the victors; in place of the directors thrust out, Merlin de Douay and François de Neufchâteau were chosen, to the bitter annoyance of Angereau, who had depended upon having a place in the Directory, and saw himself paid off with the supreme command of the army in Germany. Moreau, also, was superseded in his command.

It was a violent *coup d'état*, but one of a different character from the other revolutions which had been accomplished. These were now brought about from above downward, by the rulers and their parliamentary adherents, without the shedding of blood. The real originator, General Bonaparte, was delivered by the 18th Fructidor from three men, who, with the first opportunity, would have been a hindrance to his lust for absolute power—Pichegru, Carnot, and Moreau; from the fourth, Hoche, an early death (September 18, 1797) freed him. He continued to order affairs in Italy according to his good pleasure. From Pius VI. he extorted the immediate dismissal of the Austrian general, whom the pope had invited to reorganize his army; in view of the supposed near approach of the pope's death, he directed his brother Joseph, then ambassador at Rome, to hasten forward the revolution in that city; to the conclave he indicated the election of Cardinal Albani, in advance, as if an incident of war. In like manner he ignored the extravagant demands prescribed to him from Paris for the negotiations with Austria, demands which would have rendered peace impossible. He had already succeeded in gradually forcing the yielding de Gallo from a good part of the preliminaries of Leoben, to the prejudice of Austria; but Thugut, who desired to keep a hold on Northern Italy, now recalled Gallo, and replaced him by Count Louis Cobenzl. But, notwithstanding all the activity employed by the new negotiator, he found himself still confronted by an unfulfilled mission. The intelligence arrived that Russia declined any support to Austria against the demands of France, and what he aimed to procure was that which Bonaparte absolutely would not concede; no other than France should be master on the Italian peninsula. Therefore the negotiations were much further protracted than Bonaparte had anticipated. Soon he attempted to beguile Cobenzl, now with amiability and now with explosions of anger, both of which he knew how to employ in a masterly manner. When Cobenzl, besides all the Venetian territory, demanded also Ferrara and

Bologna, he gave orders that the army should be prepared to march on September 29. Cobenzl was finally obliged to yield to the inevitable. On October 17, at the castle of Campo-Formio, he signed the treaty which sealed the triumph of the Revolution over ancient Europe. In it Austria renounced Belgium and Lombardy, and recognized the Cisalpine Republic, to be formed out of Milan, Mantua, Bergamo, Brescia, Modena, Ferrara, and Bologna. In consideration of this, she received Venetia as far as the Adige, with the exception of the Ionian Islands, which fell to France; the Duke of Modena was to be compensated with the Breisgau. In order to attain a peace for the empire, a congress—all other powers being excluded—should be assembled at Rastatt, but the foundations for this peace were discreetly hidden in secret articles. In these the emperor pledged himself to evacuate all fortresses lying without his hereditary lands—Mayence, Mannheim, Ehrenbreitstein, Philippsburg, Königstein, Ulm, and Ingoldstadt—as well as the entire left bank of the Rhine, and to support the cession of the latter from Hünningen to the Nette by the empire; the temporal states of the empire affected thereby—these were Palatinate-Bavaria, Zweibrücken, Württemberg, Baden, the two Hesses, Nassau, Wied, Salm, Löwenstein, and Leyen—should be indemnified according to a common stipulation with France. France pledged herself to restore to the King of Prussia his possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. Austria yielded furthermore the county of Falkenstein and the Frickthal, the latter to be given to the Swiss, and for these received the archbishopric of Salzburg, and the Bavarian districts east of the river Inn. Should France in the peace with the empire make acquisitions in Germany, a corresponding gain should accrue to the emperor.

By this transaction Austria received, in lieu of the ceded 18,000 square miles and 3,600,000 inhabitants, 20,000 square miles with somewhat more than 3,000,000 of inhabitants. Thugut had the satisfaction of having dealt a blow to Prussia, since the stipulation to restore her possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, Cleves, Mörs, and Geldern, deprived that state of any claim for indemnification; while these possessions, being surrounded by French territory, could not possibly be long retained. Nevertheless, he concluded the peace with a heavy heart.

Twelve hours after the signing of the treaty, a courier of the Directory arrived, who delivered to Bonaparte the express prohibition to concede the line of the Adige, and also the intelligence that he had been superseded by another negotiator. For a moment the Directory thought of refusing to ratify the treaty, but such paroxysms were quickly drowned in the outburst of joy which the news of the conclusion of peace called forth in France, and it was compelled to hide its resentment.

## CHAPTER VII.

THE DIRECTORY: FROM CAMPO-FORMIO TO THE 18TH BRUMAIRE.

BONAPARTE might with great justice glory in this peace (Fig. 63) as the most advantageous which France had made for centuries. But while he protested to the Directory that in his shattered health nothing remained for him but to grasp the plough of Cincinnatus, this peace was for him only a short halt on the road to that boundless supremacy for which his soul thirsted. He considered only in what way he could now destroy England's maritime ascendancy, and thus be able to lay Europe at his feet.

After Bonaparte, in a pompous proclamation, had taken leave of Italy, he repaired by way of Geneva to the opening of the congress at Rastatt, in order here also to make his appearance at the earliest moment as the dominant ruler. He scarcely disguised the fact that for the German empire a fate should be anticipated similar to that of Poland. How could he fail to look down contemptuously upon this "metaphysical body without cohesion of parts," whose emperor found it not beneath his dignity to invite the imperial states to a consultation respecting the common weal, on the basis of the integrity of the empire, which he secretly had already delivered up to the French; whose most powerful state, Prussia, was in the leading-strings of France; and whose smaller members either trembled for their lives, or acted like the great as regards greediness? The blind passion to come finally into possession of his booty, Venetia, still impelled the emperor to conclude a secret treaty with Bonaparte, on December 1, in which he promised to withdraw his imperial contingent into his hereditary possessions, and himself to assist in putting the French in possession of Mayence, whereupon they were to deliver up Venetia to him.

A few hours after the execution of this treaty Bonaparte was on the road to Paris. For good or ill, the Directory were constrained to prepare for the victor a splendid reception; on December 10, he delivered to them, amid great festivities, the full text of the treaty; in his reply to the superabundant praise with which Talleyrand overwhelmed him, the concluding words were immediately and generally remarked: "When once the happiness of the French people reposes upon better organic

laws, all Europe will become free." A look at France sufficed to give him assurance of his future rule over the country; everywhere only opposition to this caricature of a republic, hatred and contempt for a government, which, without comprehension of great national interests,




FIG. 63.—Scene from a fête given in the national palace of the Directory to General Bonaparte after the Peace of Campo-Formio. From an engraving by Berthault; original drawing by Girardet.

was able to maintain its power, acquired by violence, only by fresh acts of violence, by heightening to greater severity the regulations with regard to *émigrés* and priests, and by thrusting out all royalists from

official positions; by their base avarice in the midst of national bankruptcy the rulers had destroyed the last remains of public consideration. Already strife had broken out between them and the terrorists, their confederates of the 18th Fructidor, and since the recent supplementary elections, in consequence of the mass of the people declining to vote, resulted throughout in favor of the terrorists, on the 22d Floréal (May 11, 1798) sixty elections were declared invalid by a new act of arbitrary power. Bonaparte still kept himself, however, aloof from political movements; he occupied a modest dwelling, sought the intercourse of artists and learned men, and in his letter of thanks, on being chosen a member of the Institute, he declared that the true conquests, those alone that were followed by no regret, were such as were achieved over ignorance. He had therefore the advantage that all parties believed that they could reckon upon him. With the Directors, who were filled with anxious forebodings by his boundless popularity, and whom he despised from the bottom of his heart, his personal relations continued to be strained. It was not long before the young general became the soul of the government, and all that was done was his work.

That Campo-Formio served only to stimulate the hunger of the victor for still wider conquests and extortions, it befell the German empire first of all to experience. The same causes that prepared so disastrous a result for its wars against the Revolution, displayed the empire at the worst advantage also in the negotiations with the victorious enemy. Envoys from nearly all the imperial states had flocked together, for every individual desired to secure his peculiar interests according to the best of his ability. While the "Right Reverend, Honorable, Right Honorable, and especially the Most Venerable, and the Very Venerable Lords, the imperial plenipotentiaries," that is to say, the members of the deputation on which was devolved, in the name of the empire, the negotiations for peace, consumed time with disputes as to the presidency, and the order of the voting, and the triple imperial embassy, Count Lehrbach (Fig. 61), as representative of the imperial state of Austria, Cobenzl, representing the King of Hungary and Bohemia, and Metternich-Winneburg as imperial plenipotentiary, gave themselves all imaginable pains to hold diplomatic intercourse according to the artificial forms of the customary ceremonial, the French ambassadors, Treillard and Bonnier, on every occasion brought into view their republican contempt for all etiquette, and even surpassed the haughty tone which their fellow-countrymen had introduced into diplomatic intercourse since 1792.

Assuredly the chief difficulty of the negotiations lay not in the bosom of the imperial deputation, but in Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, between





Ludwig Konrad des H. R. M. Graf von und zu Lehrbach  
 k. k. Majestät Franz des II. würd. Geheimen Rath, Staats-Minister.  
 der Zeit des französischen Kriegs bevollmächtigter Hof-Bevollmächtigter

FIG. 61—Ludwig Konrad, Count of Lehrbach. From a copper-plate engraving by A. Nindl; original painting by Joseph Schopf (1745-1822).

which cities intermediate negotiations were passing together with those of the congress; but in these, also, the French had the advantage by far. For the alienation and division of the two German powers played into the hands of France. Thugut recognized no higher aim than the humiliation of Prussia, and it was his constant desire so to obtain the indemnifications assigned to Austria at Campo-Formio, that out of them no similar claim for enlargement should grow on behalf of the detested rival. It was thus an easy matter for French diplomacy to keep each in jealousy and distrust of the other, and to obtain for itself the greatest gain; and especially did the protest of Prussia against the robbing of Bavaria form a good pretext for again and again postponing the fulfillment of this promise. The foolish attempt to observe secrecy with regard to the treaty of December 1 had, indeed, originated only from the custom of the cabinet of Vienna with respect to intrigues and artifices; after a few weeks it became necessarily public to all the world, when after the retiring of the Austrians the French advanced, surrounded Mayence, and compelled the helpless elector to capitulate on December 29, and took the Mannheim bridgehead by storm. The entire west shore of the Rhine was incorporated into the French republic, constituting the four departments of Roer, Rhine-Moselle, Sarre, and Donnersberg; clergy, nobility, city and proprietary dignitaries now lost their positions. The Austrian ambassadors, shrugging their shoulders, thrust the blame upon the states of the empire, which for two years had left the emperor without support, and even concluded separate treaties and family neutralities with France; to the diet nothing remained but to impart full powers to the deputation. This easy victory only increased the audacity of the French; they no longer demanded simply the left bank of the Rhine as far as the Nette, as had been conceded to them at Campo-Formio, but the whole. The situation of the empire continued to be hopeless. It was of small concern to the court of Vienna what became of the left bank of the Rhine, if only it received that which was accorded to it; the hands of Prussia were bound by the treaty of August 5; the greater part of the lesser states, who already had quietly come to an understanding with France with regard to indemnification, declared themselves "ready to offer the painful sacrifice."

Nine archbishops and bishops, six abbots, the Teutonic Order and that of St. John, seventy-six princes, four imperial cities, and a great number of knights of the empire, lost, on the left bank of the Rhine, their rights as lords of the soil. The immediate consequence of this decision was the question of indemnification, but even this absolutely internal matter was placed by the disordered state of the empire in the

hands of the hostile power which had robbed it of the finest and most important frontier. And this power now brought forward openly the principle of secularization; the conversion of ecclesiastical territories to indemnify the loss of the temporal. Doubtless those withered and lifeless members of the imperial body were long since ripe for such a process, but the manner in which this act, in itself necessary and beneficial, was accomplished, was a fresh source of disaster. For it completed the separation between Austria and Prussia, and destroyed the poor existing remains of union and solidarity among the states of the empire. The former opposed the secularization for the same reason that led France to sustain it, namely, because thereby the pillars that supported the consideration belonging to the emperor in the states of the empire were torn away; Prussia, on the other hand, favored secularization as the only means of obtaining a compensation for her losses on the left bank of the Rhine; and the intermediate and smaller states acted most impatiently, not reflecting that one day their amalgamation could also be demanded from the same consideration of general welfare, which was now applied to ecclesiastical possessions. The haste with which, by means of gifts and bribes, they carried the favor not merely of the French envoys, but also of their attendants, spared the arbiters the pains of seeking their support.

On April 4 the imperial deputation gave its assent to secularization. Within three months France had made good all her demands; of the Peace of Campo-Formio there remained, to the great injury of Austria, several of the most important stipulations that were not carried into effect. The compensation in Italy for the entire left bank of the Rhine was simply refused; nothing more was said with regard to the acquisition of the Inn district; Prussia had not retained her Rhenish territory on the left of the river, and her claim for indemnification was consequently recognized. The great transformation at Rastatt could not, however, become a settlement; events arose which, for the present, interrupted the proceedings.

The thought which wholly possessed the Directory was the attack upon England. In February, 1797, a great crisis befell the Bank of England; it was obliged to suspend the redemption of its notes, but the London merchants declared themselves ready to receive the notes of the bank in every business transaction at their face value. Then there broke out in the navy a very dangerous mutiny. On the news of the Leoben preliminaries, Lord Malmesbury was dispatched once more to resume negotiations, which were conducted at Lille. But the rudeness of the Directory made it impossible to come to any understanding, and again the

decision must be made by arms. A second attempt at landing in Ireland by Hoche was once more defeated; the Directory now urged the Batavian Republic to take up arms earnestly against England, but, on October 11, 1797, at Camperdown, not far from Texel, Admiral Duncan inflicted a severe defeat on the Dutch fleet under de Winter. After the conclusion of peace with Austria, preparations for the war with England were made in all French ports with the greatest energy. Before his return to Paris, Bonaparte received his appointment as commander-in-chief of the army of England. He entered apparently into the views of the Directory, but though this appointment put at his disposal substantially the entire military power of the republic, his thoughts took a higher flight and another direction. Since the taking of Ancona he had burned with impatience to tread a new and boundless field of fame in the east. Immediately after the seizure of the Ionian Islands he formed connections with the proud and warlike Mainotes, and with the Knights of Malta. Well might the French fleet, which ruled the Mediterranean, appear sufficient to warrant an expedition to Egypt, yet to lead the flower of the French army into a distant and unknown country, while all that still remained of old Europe was inclined to an upheaval, and the new possessed as yet no stability, was a rash adventure. A kind of intoxication had seized upon Bonaparte in consequence of his previous success; and, in general, gigantic as was his endowment, the faculty of securing, by prudent limitation, that which had been attained, was denied him. But the Directory joyfully acceded to a plan that delivered it from a man whose ambition increased with his good-fortune.

The costs of preparing so powerful a warlike expedition, enormous for distracted France, were again to be borne by foreign countries, and in the first place by those subjected and allied. The practice of the great eastern monarchs in regard to Poland was now repeated on the part of the democratic republic. All the arbitrary acts, which the weak are obliged to endure, were practiced by Bonaparte (Fig. 65), but the odium of them he quietly laid upon the Directory. He had already formed the purpose of striking England through her trade; by the law of January 8, 1798, without regard to the rights of neutrals, every ship at sea laden with English merchandise was pronounced a lawful prize, and any ship touching at an English port was prohibited from entering a French harbor. When the court of Madrid, deeply irritated by the treatment of the pope and of Parma, sought to withdraw itself from reinforcing the French fleet and declined to assist the march of Augereau's army through Spain against Portugal, this opposition temporarily cost the favorite Godoy his position. In the Batavian Republic, when resistance

was attempted to the fresh exactions, a change in the constitution was made by force after the style of the 18th Fructidor, and the new directory proved its absolute devotion to its protectress by delivering, as demanded, ten ships of the line and two hundred and fifty gun-boats, and placing the Batavian troops under French orders. The



FIG. 65. Napoleon Bonaparte. From an engraving by F. Bartolozzi (1730-1813); original painting by Andrea Appiani (1754-1818).

Austrians did not obtain Venice until all materials of war were removed. In the Ligurian Republic the opposition to the new constitution was broken down by French troops; the Cisalpine Republic, after the opponents were thrust out of the council of ancients, became bound in an

oppressive league. Now the last hour struck also for the States of the Church. In a fray between papal troops and democrats, who had fled to the French embassy, the young General Duphot was shot; the ambassador, Joseph Bonaparte, immediately demanded his passports. Berthier marched into Rome, but was satisfied, since he only reluctantly served as constable to this revolutionary policy, with the possession of the Castle of Sant' Angelo, the prosecution of the slayers of Duphot, and with the payment of 31,000,000 francs. But, notwithstanding, when a handful of bawlers on February 15 cried out, "The republic!" he could not forbear to establish it. The pope (Fig. 66), because he would not abdicate, experienced the harshest treatment and was removed to Siena. The downfall of the papal supremacy was the signal for a general system of robbery, in which Haller, the financial administrator, surpassed others in brutality and greed. Masséna, who had taken Berthier's place, was rendered infamous by his cupidity to such a degree, that he was finally told by his officers and soldiers that they could no longer bear this plundering, which was a disgrace to the French name, and would no longer recognize him as their commander. The constitution elaborated for the new republic placed the power in effect in the hands of the French commandant. Everywhere the same demagogical tactics took place; first, instigation and bloody collision, then intervention, and finally robbery and subjugation.

In Switzerland as in Venice it was dissatisfaction with the rule of an ossified oligarchy, the exasperation of the subject and dependent districts against the rule of the sovereign cantons, which rendered efficient service to the French. The intolerable nature of these conditions drove many of the best men to hope for deliverance from that quarter. The banished Vandois, César Laharpe, the instructor of Czar Alexander I., had sworn long years before never to rest till his home should be freed from the degrading subjection in which it was held by Bern. More fatal was the course of the Basel head warden, Peter Ochs, a restless person, whose immeasurable vanity led him to further readily the plan of placing the confederacy among the French vassal states. No sooner had the Directory, as pretended legitimate successor of the bishop of Basel, introduced troops into that city (December, 1797), than the movement was quickly promoted in the remaining cantons. To this storm it was impossible to present effectual resistance. The French, as protectors of the exiled democrats, had already entered the canton of Vaud. Brune, their commander, an old Dantonist, precisely the right man to "break the old pots," found his work facilitated by the division prevailing in the great council of Bern. True, the landammann, Steiger, had carried through the measure of summoning the population able to fight, and in

a few days 30,000 peasants rushed to arms, but still the peace party prevailed with the resolution to avoid a breach, if possible, by fulfilling the wishes of the French and altering the constitution. Indignant at



FIG. 66. — Pius VI. Reduced facsimile of an engraving, 1782, by J. M. Winkler in Vienna.

this, the commander of the Bernese army, von Erlach, at the head of seventy-two officers, appeared in the assembly, and wrested from it the full power to make use of the valor of his troops: when, deluded by

the hypocrisy of Brune, it revoked the vote, the cry of treachery was universal. The people of Uri, Schwyz, and Glarus withdrew in order to protect their homes. Suddenly, on March 1, Brune opened hostilities, by seizing upon Freiburg and Solothurn; the government was dissolved on his demand, and not until he demanded to be put in possession of Bern did it rouse itself to a determination of resistance. At Neuenek the Bernese drove back the enemy, but at Fraubrunnen they heroically succumbed, and Bern was obliged to open its gates. In place of the ancient confederacy there arose immediately the Helvetic Republic, one and indivisible; only the old cantons, with Glarus and Upper Valais, animated by their priests, continued the struggle under the leadership of the headman of Schwyz, Aloys Reding. But soon, recognizing the inutilty of further resistance, they acquiesced in their admission into the new republic. Like others, the Swiss were compelled to requite the services of their liberators by painful sacrifices, and by an offensive and defensive alliance. The sums thus captured as booty were forwarded for the most part to Toulon, to aid in preparing Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition. Mülhausen and Geneva were compelled to ask incorporation into France. After the subjugation of Switzerland, King Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia (since 1796), surrounded on all sides by democratic republics, remained only through the favor of the French. Brune soon found occasion in the brawls wantonly stirred up at Genoa and Milan to extort the cession (June 28, 1798) of the last fortified place yet remaining to the king, the citadel of Turin, and the king was made a prisoner in his own capital.

Such was the situation of Bonaparte at the close of the preparations for his great undertaking. There came then from Vienna intelligence which jeopardized at the same time the continuance of peace in Europe and the practicability of the expedition. Notwithstanding the disinclination of the imperial court to a renewal of diplomatic relations, Bernadotte had been appointed ambassador to Vienna; his mission was to induce Austria to assent to the Rastatt demands, and incidentally to sound her with regard to the re-establishment of Poland, or a partition of Turkey. Without waiting for his passports, the Gascon forced an entrance into the Austrian estates at Vienna, put himself at once in communication with the disaffected, and appeared to aim at being obnoxious to the court and to the population. On April 13, immediately before the annual muster of the militia, which was to be observed as a festival, he unfurled, in front of the legation, a large tricolor standard, a defiance the more offensive, that at the time such a spectacle was unusual. In vain were all requests for the removal of the offensive banner, until



finally it was torn down and dragged away by the angry multitude. In spite of all apologies, Bernadotte demanded his passports on the instant. But to neither of the two parties was a breach opportune at this moment, and, therefore, in Selz, a small town of Alsace, Cobenzl met with François in conference, in order to ascertain if he might not here with better success than at Rastatt obtain the extension of territory in Italy and the fulfilment of the Treaty of Campo-Formio. With the fruitless breaking up of this conference, on July 6, disappeared at Vienna the last hope of peace; the only question now was concerning a brief postponement of war. But Bonaparte resolved to leave domestic affairs for a few months to themselves. In order that he might become master of France, the Directory, in his absence, should experience disaster, until his return should recall victory to the French standards.

All preparations for the eastern expedition were managed with astonishing sagacity; the generals chosen from all the armies of the republic were the most efficient in the service; Bonaparte also took with him a number of learned men, Monge, Bertholet, Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, Denon, Comte, Dolomieu, to explore the wonderland upon the Nile. His calculation rested upon a capital error, which caused the shipwreck of the enterprise, namely, the supposition that the Mediterranean was to be free from English forces. On April 29 Nelson was dispatched to blockade the harbor of Toulon. Yet a violent storm, that dispersed the blockading squadron and compelled Nelson to repair damages in the harbors of the island of Sardinia, rendered it possible for the fleet commanded by Admiral Brueys to leave port on May 19. On June 9 this fleet was joined by divisions proceeding from Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Ajaccio, which brought up the number to 13 ships of the line, 14 frigates, 72 corvettes, in all 500 vessels, containing about 25,000 soldiers and 10,000 seamen. Without hindrance they reached Malta. The least resistance would have saved this sea fortress, which was impregnable by nature and by art, for Bonaparte would not have dared to run the risk of being surprised there by the English; but the Order of the Knights of St. John shared the decrepitude of all aristocracies. On the 30th the fleet cast anchor before Alexandria, and the city was taken on July 1, after a short but bloody conflict.

At that time Egypt constituted, though only in name, a province of the Turkish empire; the actual rulers of the country were the twenty-four beys of the Mamelukes, an equestrian order numbering some 10,000 combatants and recruited from Caucasian slaves. Bonaparte summoned the population to throw off their yoke and join him, but not the slightest impression was made upon the stupid people. A march through the

desert to Cairo, under a glowing, burning sun, during which the troops were compelled to protect themselves against the sudden attacks of the Mameluke cavalry, brought terrible hardships upon them. At the village of Embabeh, near Cairo, the Mameluke army of Murad Bey, a mob of 10,000 men, wretchedly armed, and ignorant of European military art, were driven into a disorderly flight after the failure of their first onset (July 20). The loss of the French amounted to fifty men. This was the battle of the Pyramids, vaunted to excess by Bonaparte. The other bey of the Mamelukes, Ibrahim, he also repulsed, and had driven as far as Syria, when the alarming news arrived that his fleet, his sole dependence for connection with the mother-country, had ceased to exist.

Burning with desire to measure himself with Bonaparte, Nelson had hastened through the Mediterranean in all directions, in order to find his enemy who had slipped away; but neither at Naples nor before Alexandria did he discover any trace of him whom he sought; on the coast of Candia, at night, the enemy passed by him. Consumed with feverish impatience, he went into the Archipelago and again westward, where the favor of Queen Maria Carolina of Naples procured for him in the harbor of Syracuse the victualling of his ships, which was indispensable for the continuance of the pursuit; finally he discovered the right track, and, on August 1, found the whole French fleet still in the roadstead of Abukir. The want of provisions and insufficient information concerning the situation of the army had prevented Admiral Brueys from removing the fleet earlier to Corfu, as Bonaparte had ordered. Without any delay, without regard to the dangers of the shallow water, Nelson advanced to the contest with an enemy superior in force. A fearful engagement followed; by a daring flank manoeuvre the French left wing was placed between two fires. Nelson was severely wounded in the face, Admiral Brueys was torn in pieces by a cannon-ball. Of the entire French fleet, Vice-Admiral Villeneuve saved two ships of the line and two frigates.

After this blow Bonaparte regarded his enterprise as shipwrecked, but with wonderful power he sustained himself and his men in this desperate situation. He laid before his learned associates, whom he had formed into an "Institute of Egypt," the problem of exploring and opening the resources of the country, which, since Desaix had subjugated Upper Egypt as far as the cataracts, was almost wholly in the military possession of the conqueror. He established an administration and judiciary, and alleviated, as far as possible, the wretched condition of the native fellahs. The streams of blood in which the insurrection of Cairo (October 21) was extinguished, conveyed the fearful lesson that the hearts of the natives were not to be won by mildness. Bonaparte

passed the winter in examining the shores of the Red Sea and exploring Sinai; he announced to Tippoo Sahib, the Sultan of Mysore, that he was preparing to free him from the iron yoke of the English. But the Sultan Selim III. ordered his ambassador Beauchamp to be thrown into the Seven Towers, declared war against France, and gave aid to the Russian fleet in its attack on the Ionian Islands. Bonaparte did not await the attack of the Turkish army assembling in Syria. Committing the guardianship of Egypt to Desaix, he pushed forward with 12,000 men. After a three days' march through the desert, El-Arish was taken on February 20, the cavalry of Jezzar, pasha of St.-Jean d'Acre, was beaten back at Gaza, Jaffa was stormed and the execution of the bearer of a flag of truce sent to demand its surrender was avenged by shooting the survivors of the garrison, who had surrendered, to the number of 2000. The defence of St.-Jean d'Acre was conducted by the English commodore Sidney Smith, aided by Philipaux of Picardy, a former schoolmate of Bonaparte. The regular investment to which Bonaparte was compelled to resort was threatened by the approach of a Turkish relieving force. He immediately dispatched Kléber to meet the Turks, and the vanguard commanded by Junot held their ground at Nazareth for eight hours against a force ten times greater, till Bonaparte himself hastened up, and on April 16 administered a complete defeat to the Turkish army. Anew he employed all his strength to effect the reduction of St.-Jean d'Acre; but fourteen assaults failed, and on May 25 the siege was raised. The miscarriage of this expedition, which cost him a third of his army, was a fresh evidence of the failure of the entire undertaking. In Egypt, on the intelligence of the approaching arrival of a Turkish army, Murad and Ibrahim Bey bestirred themselves anew. Fortunately for the French, the Turks, who had landed, did not venture into the interior. With lightning-like speed Bonaparte hastened to meet them, attacked the enemy, threefold stronger than himself, as they were entrenched on the peninsula of Abukir, and hurled them (July 25) into the sea. But now anxiety respecting the situation at home weighed heavily on him. From a packet of newspapers maliciously transmitted by Sidney Smith he first gained an accurate understanding with regard to the war recently commenced by the coalition, the defeats of the French armies, the weakness and incapacity of the French government. Immediately his decision to return was positively formed. He summoned the brave Kléber to Rosetta in order to impose on him the thankless office of commander-in-chief. Without awaiting his arrival, he embarked with 500 men upon two small vessels, and reached France on October 8.

Upon the failure of the conference at Selz, Thugut would at once have taken up arms, if he could have done so in view of the consequences, and if he had not been obliged to secure powerful allies. Scarcely were the last demands conceded at Rastatt, when the French envoys brought forward an entirely new series: freedom of navigation on the Rhine, removal of all imposts, cession of all the islands in the Rhine, demolition of Ehrenbreitstein, and the assumption by the indemnified districts of the debts of those ceded. Ehrenbreitstein, which since the withdrawal of the Austrians had been valiantly defended by the brave commandant, Faber, against incessant violations of the truce on the part of the French, was invested without even waiting for the granting of the demand, and on January 31, 1799, was compelled by famine to surrender. The dependent republics saw themselves exposed to such brutal treatment that even beneficial reforms became objects of hatred. The governmental wisdom of the potentates at Paris appeared to consist simply and solely in repeating the 18th Fructidor in the dependent states.

These incessant acts of violence, in which the Directory took part audaciously, imposed on all other states the duty of self-defence. In England, on account of the menace to the coasts, public opinion had undergone a very decided change in favor of war; but the Irish, whose exasperation seemed to be increased by the frustration of their hopes of French aid, continued to conspire with Paris indefatigably. The league of United Irishmen increased to half a million, and was joined by the greater part of the Catholic clergy. The uprising was already appointed for May 23, 1798, when the government, informed by traitors, anticipated the movement. A French squadron was almost entirely destroyed in the Bay of Killala, the body of troops that had landed were captured, and over the disarmed island a fearful judicial trial impended. Of the leaders, Fitzgerald received a mortal wound when arrested, Wolfe Tone escaped execution by suicide in prison, Napper Tandy fled to Hamburg. This new experience, and especially Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, inflamed the efforts of the English to oppose once more a coalition to French encroachments; but the difficulty of attaining this object was increased by the lingering dissension with the cabinet of Vienna, which arose out of the fruitless negotiations with regard to an English subsidy, and received fresh sustenance from the Peace of Campo-Formio. The more important, consequently, was the accession of Russia.

On November 17, 1796, the death of Catharine II. had conferred on her son, Paul (PLATE XIX.), the throne withheld from him since the downfall of his father. A weak character, embittered by his mother's

PLATE XIX.



Paul I. of Russia

After a copper-plate engraving 1797 by I. S. Klüber 1794-1820; original painting 1789 by Voille.

*History of Art Nations, Vol. XVI, page 14*



want of affection and by the refusal of all participation in the government, he ascended the throne with the firm resolution to do the opposite of all which his mother had done. He therefore turned back to Prussia and refused to the emperor the auxiliary corps which Catharine had promised him. The bones of Potemkin, torn from their grave, were thrown into the moat of the fortress, Catharine's statesmen and marshals were obliged to give place to upstarts, like Kutaissoff and Arakcheyeff. Upon such a character as Paul's the immediate transition from utter dependence to unlimited power could have no other than a fatal effect; his passions, long and violently suppressed, threw off all restraint. A self-esteem immoderately increased caused him to discover in himself alone the sole law for his actions. The principles of government, which elsewhere, even in autocracies, are of decisive weight, were transformed in his mind into evanescent caprices, which corrupted the sincere and chivalrous inclinations of his soul and led him astray. This was made especially plain when his passion for a young woman named Lapukhin, and Kutaissoff's intrigues, poisoned his relation to his once tenderly beloved consort, Maria Feodorovna, and to her great grief deprived her of all political influence. Decisions, which demanded the ripest reflection, depended upon inclination, anger, or fear; and where he desired to effect reform, his own hasty action only resulted in confusion. His horror of the Revolution was changed into a worship of absolutism. Hence his original love of peace was overcome by the continued acts of violence perpetrated by the French. He gave an asylum to the Count of Provence, and received into his service the *émigré* corps of Condé. The immediate attacks of the Directory upon Russian jurisdiction, interference with the Poles, the taking possession of the Ionian Islands, but, more than all, the seizure of Malta, were the causes that first determined his resolution to give the aid of his arms to Austria in the impending war. And thus it occurred that for the first time Russian troops entered as participants into the military affairs of Western Europe.

On the other hand, Prussia could not be induced to enter the coalition. The state which Frederick William II., on November 16, 1797, bequeathed to his son of the same name, was far more considerable in area and population than that which he had received from his great uncle; it had grown during the eleven years of his reign from 85,000 square miles, with 5,000,000 of inhabitants, to not less than 135,000 square miles, with 8,500,000 of inhabitants. But to this increase of surface that of power did not correspond. The vigor of the old system was impaired by a relaxed and enfeebled condition at home. The young King Frederick William III., the happy husband of Louisa (Fig.



FIG. 67.—Crown Princess Louisa of Prussia. From a contemporary oil painting in the possession of H. R. H. the Grand Duke of Hesse.

67) of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who was as beautiful as she was noble, gave to his people once more that which was wanting during the last reigns, the example of a thoroughly pure and beautiful family-life at court. But of a timid and somewhat pedantic nature, on account of a



narrow education never accustomed to independent action, and during the lifetime of his father anxiously kept aloof from participation in all public affairs, he was not formed in such a manner as to impart a powerful impetus to the policy of his state. Although the danger of French aggression was not hidden from him, yet the neutrality which he found established on his assumption of the government was too much in accordance with his character for him willingly to cease to maintain it. From the campaigns in Champagne and Poland he had conceived so deep a dislike to war that he easily convinced himself that were he to secure peace for his country he would thereby concentrate the resources of the state, and impress his neighbors with such respect that they would hesitate to injure him. Utterly opposed to this view was his minister Haugwitz. He anticipated the ill-fortune of Prussia, if it did not, in union with the other powers, set limits to the stormy onset of the Revolution. But the warnings of his minister had no effect on the king's unqualified love of peace. In vain did Bonaparte remind him that if Prussia expected to maintain her neutrality to the length of complete passivity, she would virtually resign her position as a great power; neither threats nor flatteries were able to prevent him from repelling the French proposals of alliance. But just as little success had the proposals of Russia and England to undertake jointly with Prussia the liberation of Holland. In the belief that France, for the sake of Prussia's friendship, would be prepared willingly to renounce Holland, he rejected those proposals, with the declaration that Prussia thought of giving a greater extension to her defensive system, and therefore desired to come to an understanding with the two powers with reference to the contingency of an aggressive movement on the part of the French. But to any concert of action with Austria insuperable obstacles existed. To draw the sword in behalf of her claims to supremacy in Germany and Italy was no Prussian interest. Thugut, however, after he learned the war-like zeal of the Emperor Paul, felt very little desire to purchase the alliance of Prussia by concessions. At the same time, indeed, all negotiations between Prussia and France likewise remained without result, since the latter was well informed as to this disagreement between the views of the king and those of his minister; and on the whole Prussia reaped nothing more from her reserve, than to trifle with the friendship of the one without gaining the confidence of the other party.

By reason of this, the French statesmen, especially Talleyrand and Sieyès, found only the more inducement to secure among the second-rate states of Germany that accession of strength against Austria which Prussia withheld. Sieyès was the first to give expression to this purpose;

what remained of Germany after Austria and Prussia were expelled—the latter was to be thrust beyond the Elbe and to be compensated in Poland—must be formed into a league under the protection of France. These plans were greatly favored by the death of the Elector Charles Theodore of the Palatinate Bavarian, which occurred on February 16, 1799. In order to save himself “from the clutches of Austria,” his successor, Max Joseph, hastened to assure the Directory that it had no better friend than himself; in like manner the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt invoked the protection of the Directory, with the declaration, that, in spite of the house of Austria, he would proffer, and in case of need, unite his feeble means, to the powerful forces of the French republic.

It was of bad presage for the Russo-Austrian coalition that it began at once with a dissension. Before the Russian forces had reached the frontiers of Galicia, disputes arose with regard to subsistence. While Thugut yet hesitated to make the first onset, Naples had already rushed headlong into the war. The situation of the Neapolitan court was indeed becoming increasingly intolerable. The revolutionary propaganda, under protection of the French ambassador, boldly urged its way onward; the Roman republic not only ventured to claim recognition of its sovereignty by the payment of a yearly tribute, but furthermore to demand the cession of Benevento and Pontecorvo and the dismissal of Aetna. Apprehensive that the French maritime preparations might have for their object a sudden attack upon Sicily, Naples concluded, on May 19, 1798, a protective alliance with the emperor. On the queen's request for an able general, Thugut dispatched Mack. Nelson, the “victor of the Nile,” was received enthusiastically at Naples; the king went out to meet him in his flagship, he was made Duke of Bronte, his birthday was celebrated as a national festival, and the hero of the sea—who was more captivated by the charms of Lady Hamilton than was conducive to his fame—importuned the court to throw off the mask, and thus urge Austria onward. The English were now once more absolute masters of the Mediterranean, La Valetta was blockaded, and Minorea was wrested from the Spaniards by Admiral Duckworth. Thugut, on the contrary, angry that this little state sought to drag him after it, declared most positively that it could not count upon Austria's aid in the perilous adventure; Mack also desired more time in order to put the army upon a war footing; but the passion of the queen brooked no longer delay. On November 23, Mack led the Neapolitan army across the frontier, “in order to restore to the Roman people their rightful sovereign;” on the 29th, the king made his entrance into Rome. But the intoxication of victory was brief. On December 6 was issued the French declaration of war against Naples, and at the same

time against the King of Sardinia, who, because he refused to open his arsenal to the French for the impending war, was compelled to abdicate, and with his family to fly across the sea to Cagliari. The French general, Championet, after receiving reinforcements and defeating Mack, advanced toward Naples. The court fled in greatest haste to Palermo. Mack and Prince Pignatelli (appointed regent), on January 11, 1799, concluded a truce; but when the country-people, instigated by the priests and monks, rose against the Jacobins and traitors, and Mack himself, whose army was entirely disbanded, was obliged to seek protection in the French camp from the furious insurgents, then Championet pronounced the truce broken, and immediately marched upon Naples. Only a bloody conflict with the madly fanatical populace delivered the city into his hands. Royal government was immediately declared abolished, and a Parthenopean Republic established. And so intolerable had become the kingly and monkish despotism of the last years, that a large part of the educated class joyfully attached themselves to the new order.

Such was the tragic-comic commencement of a war, which, undertaken to restore the old conditions shaken or demolished by the Revolution, was destined to terminate, after fearful struggles, in the complete breaking up of the old Europe. On December 29 was subscribed the treaty of alliance between Russia and England, and a few days later that of both powers with the Porte. Only Thugut, who had confidence neither in the strength of his own country nor in the reliability of her allies, constantly held back, although the Austrians had already advanced into the Grisons. Archduke Charles had chosen, with 90,000 men, South Germany as the scene of hostilities; for the liberation of Italy 86,000 men stood ready in Venetia under Melas, who were to be joined by 31,000 Russians; for commander-in-chief of this army Thugut had sought and obtained from the Emperor Paul the highly renowned Suvaroff (Fig. 69) conqueror of Turks and Poles; between the two stood 26,000 men in Vorarlberg and the Grisons, under Hotze, and in the Tyrol 46,000 under Bellegarde. These troops, which were brought into the field by the coalition, were in number nearly double those of the enemy, were well disciplined, the cavalry excellent, and they could count upon the population, who everywhere looked upon them as deliverers from French oppression.

To this powerful preparation France could oppose only one in the highest degree incomplete. Deprived of her best general and a portion of her best troops, she was compelled to defend a line extending from Amsterdam to Naples. But the Directory knew that its situation was yet more hopeless in peace than even in an unsuccessful war. On Jan-



FIG. 68. Suvoroff. Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by Nicolas Ivanovitch Utkin; original painting by Schmit, court painter to the Elector of Saxony.

uary 2, 1799, the French ambassadors at Rastatt demanded in a tone of menace the assurance that the advance of the Russian army would be arrested; if not, the republic would consider it as a cause of war. For reply, Thugut gave the archduke orders to enter Swabia and Franconia. Yet before these were executed, Jourdan, on February 28, had crossed the Rhine with 38,000 men at Basel and Strasburg; though the Directory took care to announce to the empire that this was not at all a hostile act toward it, and the French declaration of war (March 1) was addressed only to the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Five days later the advance of the archduke crossed the river Lech; not till after many conferences did he engage the Elector of Bavaria to promise to send 15,000 men in the event of a war of the empire. The first collision, however, did not occur here, but in the Grisons, at the most remote point on the west of the Austrian position, and turned out decidedly to the advantage of the French. Favored by the wretched management of the Austrians, Masséna, who here for the first time appeared as commander-in-chief, with only 12,000 men won a series of splendid successes. Hotze's advance under Auffenberg was cut off (March 5) and at Reichenau compelled to lay down its arms. Lecourbe and Dessoles, both masters of mountain warfare, took possession, the former of the Engadine as far as Martinsbrück, the latter of the upper valley of the Adige; the most important roads leading into the Austrian monarchy thus came into the hands of the French. But Masséna's assault upon Feldkirch was repulsed with great loss, and the disaster which meantime had befallen the French arms in South Germany forced him to relinquish the offensive. Jourdan, indeed, did not deceive himself in the least with regard to the danger of his enterprise against an enemy numerically so far superior, but the vehement urgency of the Directory drove him onward against his better judgment. Between the Danube and Lake Constance, he found himself, when near Ostrach, on March 20, suddenly attacked by double his own numbers, and thrown back toward Singen and Tuttlingen. His desperate attempt, on the 25th, to retrieve his loss, was foiled by the enemy's superiority in numbers, and it was owing only to the pedantic methods of the conqueror that he retreated across the Rhine unmolested. Exasperated at having been sent against the enemy by the Directory with a force so inadequate, he, as well as Bernadotte, hastened to Paris, and for this both were removed from their commands.

At Rastatt, where the congress meanwhile continued to meet, the French ambassadors, in order to alienate the states of the empire from the emperor, had perpetrated the unparalleled faithlessness of making known the republic's secret stipulations with him. When the Viennese

cabinet, by recalling its plenipotentiaries, declared that it considered the congress dissolved, the other deputies, who received their powers, not from the emperor alone, but also from the empire, resolved to remain assembled until after official instruction from the diet. On April 25, two days after the imperial deputies had decided to cease their sessions, the French ambassadors first made known their purpose of quitting Rastatt within three days and of repairing to Strasburg, where they would be ready at all times to continue negotiations. Upon the side of the Austrians, on the contrary, there was no recognition of the neutrality of the place of meeting for the congress nor of the continued inviolable character of the ambassadors. Colonel Barbaczy, stationed at Gernsbach, received orders from the archduke's headquarters to send them from Rastatt, but he had besides an additional secret order. While the French envoys postponed their departure until the evening of April 28, Burkhard, a captain of horse, occupied the town and closed the gates; although provided with passes from the electorate of Mayence, they were sent back, and it was night before permission to pass was obtained. But at a short distance from the gate some hussars fell upon the wagon train. Two of the ambassadors, Bonnier and Roberjot, were killed; the third, Jean Debry, escaped, wounded by many sabre-cuts, and feigning death. The carriages were plundered, and the archives of the embassy were carried off.

Performed in the darkness of night, the act itself, its originators and their object have remained until this day veiled in darkness. The most probable supposition is that it was undertaken on suspicion of traitorous correspondence on the part of the states of the empire with the French. The Directory improved it to inflame the national passions against Austria and the *émigrés*. Bonaparte, on the contrary, found it more advantageous, at a later day, to direct the suspicion of having originated the crime to the Directory itself. The investigation immediately ordered by the archduke was arrested from Vienna. But of the commission that took its place it was only learned that its labors ended in October. The acts of the commission have disappeared from the Vienna archives.

The fruitless conclusion of the congress of Rastatt placed the empire again in a warlike attitude toward France, but it was far too stiffened to be able to raise an arm for its own defence. There were loud voices that praised the Archduke Charles as the deliverer of Germany and the restorer of the emperor's power. Some cities, also, after the Austrian victories, showed greater zeal; the greatest was, surprisingly, manifested by the new Elector of Bavaria and his minister Montgelas. The very judicious plan of the archduke was directed to the clearing of the south-

western part of the empire, and, with the aid of Hotze and Bellegarde, wresting from the French their most important position, that which they held in Switzerland. Pitt assented to the plan of directing the second Russian army under Nummisen toward the Rhine, and secured the approval of the Emperor Paul. But this alteration gave the highest offence to Thugut; according to his view, the corps of Nummisen ought to serve Austria as a covering against her German rivals, Prussia and Bavaria. Furthermore, being dissatisfied with the rapid advance of the archduke, to which he attributed the disasters in the Grisons and the Tyrol, he forbade him to undertake any serious enterprise against Switzerland. Without this prohibition, Masséna, surrounded by thrice his own numbers, would have been lost beyond redemption. Sick from anger and grief, Charles demanded his discharge, but finally he suffered himself to be persuaded to continue in the chief command.

On the theatre of Italy, Schärer opened the struggle upon the part of the French, since, determined to attack before the arrival of Melas and Suvaroff, he crossed the Mincio on March 25; but the brave Wallachian, Kray, stood his ground, and on April 5, in a battle at Magnano, south of Verona, compelled Scherer to retreat. Now arrived Suvaroff with 17,000 Russians, an old man of almost seventy years, but a youth in fire and power. He was a master of the art of inflaming the religious and national feelings of his Russians, and using them for his military objects. With his assumption of the supreme command, the conduct of the war was changed into a direction entirely opposed to the previous deliberateness of the Vienna council of war. Ever smiting the enemy, he pushed onward unrestingly, not sparing his troops; but he was stubborn, also, and offended his allies by insufferable arrogance. Moreau, who had been put in place of the incapable Scherer, did, indeed, maintain an unequal struggle against him for long hours on April 27, at Cassano; yet, after the brigade of Serurier was surrounded and forced to lay down its arms, he fled, now scarcely 30,000 strong, over the Ticino into Piedmont, and soon retreated as far as Asti. On the 29th, Suvaroff, in a dressing-gown, a hunting-whip in his hand, and sitting upon a shaggy Cossack horse, made his entry into Milan, and on May 27 into Turin, whose inhabitants had compelled the French commandant to open its gates.

The French now suffered for the great blunder in strategy of having attempted to maintain themselves in the south of the peninsula, while in the north their army was outflanked by the enemy. Had Macdonald, who with 28,000 men was stationed uselessly in Naples, been at hand on the Mincio at the right time, another direction could have been given to the entire campaign. Now, however, Moreau's last hope rested on

him, and, after Macdonald had increased his force to 55,000 by gathering up the scattered garrisons, he advanced across the Apennines to the assistance of Moreau. As soon, however, as Suvaroff was informed on which side the attack menaced him, he hastened with the utmost speed of man and horse to meet Macdonald. For three days, June 17-19, the two adversaries contended with each other on the Trebbia until strength was utterly exhausted, Suvaroff full of lively concern lest he be assailed by Moreau in the rear; but, in the night of the third day's engagement, Macdonald, leaving behind him 5000 dead and 12,000 wounded and prisoners, withdrew to the Riviera, where he was now joined by Moreau with the remains of his army. Joubert was now made commander-in-chief by the Directory. Filled with ambition for great achievements, he set forth to relieve Mantua, but suddenly, on August 15, on the heights of Novi, he saw himself opposed by the entire force of the enemy. He himself fell at the very beginning of the battle, one of the bloodiest of recent times; the appearance of Melas in the rear of the French forced them to make a disorderly retreat; all their artillery was lost. At this favorable situation for the allies, political disputes intervened and ruined the successes gained at the expense of so much blood. The Russian commander had long been incensed by the everlasting interruptions on the part of the Austrian council of war. For the Emperor Paul, the final object of the contest against the Revolution was the disinterested lifting up of the overthrown thrones; and this was directly in opposition to Austria's lust for a splendid indemnity in Italy. That Suvaroff had proclaimed the restoration of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont drew upon him a sharp reproof from Thugut. He suspended his advance and asked his recall of the Emperor Paul. Thugut tasted the malignant joy of having thwarted the purposes of Russia. But under the circumstances Moreau was enabled confidently to dismiss the thought of evacuating the Riviera.

Just as the Cisalpine Republic was wrecked on Suvaroff's appearance, so after Macdonald's (Fig. 69) departure the Parthenopean Republic went to pieces. At the head of an "army of faith," composed of peasants and a general rabble, Cardinal Ruffo in a few weeks subdued all Calabria; Apulia declared for the king; leaders of banditti, like the ferocious Mamunone, Fra Diavolo, and Pronio, carried on indiscriminately this robber work, and the contest in behalf of the throne and altar. Yet the republicans, aided by a reign of terror and supported by the French garrison, kept possession of the capital. The cardinal decided to take possession of the city, although he was forbidden to do this before the coming of the king, and on June 19, the French commandant, M<sup>re</sup>jean,





MACDONALD.

FIG. 69. — Macdonald. From an engraving by Coqueret (born 1761 and La Chaussée; original drawing by Hilaire le Dru.

delivered up the forts by capitulation, on condition of safe exit for all persons. But the court, which was so blinded as to consider the revolt as the work only of disaffected nobles, did not return to establish peace, but in order to practice revenge. The gray-haired admiral, Carracciolo, was hanged at the yard-arm of a ship of war, and the lazzaroni, at once criminal judges and hangmen, bathed in the blood of those who had been guilty in the least of favoring the republic. With equal rapidity was accomplished the fall of the Roman republic; and when, on August 29, Pope Pius VI. died in captivity, King Ferdinand provisionally took possession of the States of the Church, with the exception of Ancona, Umbria, and the Marches, which the Austrians proceeded to occupy.

So many battles and such losses had been needed in order to bring the Directory to adopt the only reasonable measure, and place the command of all their troops from Düsseldorf to the St. Gotthard in the hands of one man, and that indeed the most capable, Masséna (Fig. 70). Bernadotte, as war minister, displayed extraordinary activity in order to fill up gaps by means of a fresh conscription; and the present commander-in-chief lost not a moment in concentrating his entire strength, 70,000 men, on the most important and most threatened points in Switzerland. The Archduke Charles, leaving 28,000 men to cover Swabia, crossed the Rhine on May 21-23, at Diersenhofen and Stein, with 40,000 men, and formed a junction with Hotze, before whom Masséna, after bloody engagements, had been forced to retreat as far as Zurich. At this point, where the most important connecting lines united, Masséna had prepared an entrenched camp, of sufficient extent to receive him with his whole army. The attempt of the archduke (June 4) to drive him from it succeeded only in part. Masséna, perceiving the impossibility of maintaining himself there for a length of time, evacuated his encampment on the night of the 6th, but took up on the declivities of the Albi and Utliberg a new position, here obtained reinforcements, and not only protected the line as far as Basel, but also by seizing the Furka and Grimsel, the St. Gotthard and Simplon passes, cut off the Austrian connection with Italy.

Thugut was angry that the second Russian corps, at this time commanded by Korsakoff, was now also destined for Switzerland; for its liberation he was not willing to sacrifice another drop of Austrian blood. The archduke was hotly indignant at Suvaroff because he did not sufficiently cover and support him on the south. Just at this juncture the British cabinet, who were not pleased to see the Italian ports in Russian hands, came to the Emperor Paul with a new proposal: Suvaroff with his Russians should be transferred to Switzerland, to wrest it from the French, and to excite a royalist rising in Franche-Comté, and, at the



FIG. 70. Masséna. From an engraving by Pierre-Charles Coqueret (born 1761) and La Chaussée; drawing by Hilaire le Dru.



FIG. 71. --Baron von Hotze, Imperial General and Lieutenant-Field-Marshal.

same time, a British-Russian landing was to be made in Holland for the purpose of reinstating the house of Orange. Full of displeasure and vexation on account of the previous course of the campaign, Paul could not but assent with his whole soul to this deliverance of his commander from altercations with the Austrians. For Thugut, also, nothing could

be more acceptable than that the Russians should be removed with a good grace from Italy. The announcement of this new plan of operations, and the positive instructions to remove to Switzerland, tore Suvaroff from his inactivity. He was filled with dissatisfaction, indeed, at the prospect of leaving Austria a free hand in dealing with Sardinia and Naples. But such important intelligence now arrived from Switzerland as made the march from Italy imperative. The archduke, notwithstanding his spirited remonstrances, had been obliged to withdraw, and not, indeed, as the Emperor Paul had supposed, gradually, but completely; only Hotze (Fig. 71) was left behind with Korsakoff. Thus Suvaroff, on September 21, began the ascent of the Alps, but unfortunately for him he chose as the place where he would cross not the open Bernard or Splügen pass, but the one defended by the brave General Lecourbe, impracticable and leading over the St. Gotthard directly to the Lake of Lucerne. Under pouring rain and icy wind, every step upward to the top of the pass, every step downward to the roaring Reuss, was won by bloody conflicts. At the Devil's Bridge, which had been destroyed, the Russians clambered down into the abyss of the Reuss and up on the other side. On September 26, Suvaroff finally reached Altorf, but here the lake barred the way. Necessity forced him to strike into a path over the Rossstock and Kinzig pass into the Muthenthal. But it was too late. Availing himself of the favorable moment, Masséna had attacked at Zurich the isolated armies of Korsakoff and Hotze, and in a two days' fight had utterly routed them; Hotze himself had fallen. Suvaroff, with his 15,000 remaining men, had now to climb through the new-fallen snow over the Prägel pass to Glarns, and over the Panixer pass to Ilanz (October 5-10); it was only on reaching Feldkirch that the wretched remains of his proud army found themselves in safety. The Russians were full of intensest bitterness against faithless and treacherous Austria, to whom they assigned the whole blame of their disaster.

A few days later, the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland also met with its inglorious issue. On August 27, General Sir Ralph Abercromby landed at Helder with 17,000 Englishmen; at the sight of the Orange colors which he had hoisted, the sailors of the Batavian fleet broke out into open mutiny, and made over themselves and their ships to the enemy. But the English manned the ships with their own people and placed the Batavians on shore. With this the last trace of Orange enthusiasm passed away. A precipitate and badly managed attack made by the Russians, who arrived somewhat later, on the Franco-Batavian army under Brune and Daendels at Bergen, on September 19, ended in an

utter defeat. A second attack on October 2 had a better result, but the incapacity of the Duke of York, the commander-in-chief, suffered the enemy to take up a new and stronger position in which he defied all further attacks.

These two disasters completed the rupture of the coalition. It scarcely needed in addition the astonishing inactivity of the archduke to carry into effect the threat of Russia's withdrawal. Extremely irritated, the Emperor Paul recalled his troops, broke off diplomatic intercourse with England, and renounced definitely further participation in the war. Suvaroff on his return home was at first received with honor; but he soon fell into disfavor with the czar. Shunned by all, and deeply humiliated, he died on May 18, 1800.

For the second time the discord, shortsightedness and preposterous management of the allies had caused the failure of the attempt of monarchical Europe to restrain revolutionary France. But during this war it was true that France had met her enemies with forces wholly differing from those engaged in the first. Trained in numerous campaigns, her troops went into an engagement full of confidence in themselves and their leaders. Italy alone was lost; at all other points, notwithstanding individual mishaps, assaults had been repulsed. But to those relatively favorable results beyond the frontiers, the internal situation bore little correspondence.

After Bonaparte's departure, the war of conspiracies and *coups d'états* that began with the 18th Fructidor was now again quieted. But everywhere a feeling of insecurity prevailed. Since the 22d Floréal the Directory had encountered on all sides only hatred or contempt. For the disorders in administration and in finances inherited from its predecessors, public opinion made it responsible, as well as for the shamefully sudden breaking up of the daughter republics. The supplementary elections in May, 1799, were a unanimous sentence of condemnation of the government; the opposition in the legislative body had a majority by union of Jacobins and Constitutionalists, and the time had arrived for avenging itself on the government by which it had been twice forcibly repressed. The first breach in the government was effected by choosing in place of Rewbell, who retired, Sieyès, who had just returned from Berlin, and was a known opponent of the constitution of the year III. (1795); then in concert with him, and by the special aid of Lucien Bonaparte, one of the leaders of the constitutional opposition, the three directors Treillard, Merlin, and Larévellière-Lépeaux, were on the 30th Prairial (June 18) compelled to retire. It was the counterstroke

to the 18th Fructidor, the *coup d'état* of the legislative body against the Directory. Sieyès perceived true safety to consist in the discovery of the right form of constitution, and in order to achieve this had desired Talleyrand for a colleague; but the council's distrust gave him as associates three inconsiderable men, Gohier, Moulins, and Roger-Ducos. Little as Sieyès and his friends wished to break with their associates of the 30th Prairial, they could not venture to tolerate the relapse attempted by the Jacobins to the old disorders of the Reign of Terror. By the help of Fouché, appointed minister of police, the press organs of the Jacobins were put down and their club closed. Sieyès needed a man of action. Finding Bernadotte inaccessible, he cast his eyes upon Joubert; but Joubert fell at Novi; Moreau, whom he now approached, was too timid. Then Talleyrand presented the name of his friend Bonaparte. The recalling of the Egyptian army and its general was determined upon. Admiral Brueix, who was lying before Savona, was directed to unite the Spanish fleet with his own, defeat the English, and then bring home the army that had been severed from France. But the dispatch which recalled Bonaparte found him already on French soil.

On the news of his arrival, a mountain, as it were, was lifted from all hearts; wherever he came he was fêted as the expected deliverer. Scarcely had he arrived in Paris, when he was master of the situation. No one thought of calling him to account because he had abandoned his army; no one saw in his unsuccessful expedition anything except its daring character. To him who hitherto had not compromised himself by fellowship with any party whatever, flocked men of all parties, warriors and politicians. The most important advantage for him was, however, that he found a conspiracy already prepared and long since organized, which still lacked only the man of action. Yet there were obstacles to be overcome. The Jacobins, whom he first approached, would hear nothing of a dictatorship, and Fouché's attempt to bring him into unison with his friend Barras failed. Now first Bonaparte turned to Sieyès. On October 30 the agreement between the two came to a conclusion. The chief thing was to make sure of the troops. It was not difficult for Bonaparte's companions in arms to work upon the soldiers, who cared nothing for the republic, but much for this favorite of the goddess of fortune. Bonaparte undertook personally, with the assistance of his wife, to lull to sleep the suspicions of the two directors Gohier and Moulins.

On the morning of the 18th Brumaire (November 9), two of those privy to the plot opened the session of the Council of Ancients with a moving representation of the dangers that menaced the republic. As

care had been taken not to invite those members from whom opposition was apprehended, three decrees, previously prepared by the conspirators, were adopted without delay. The first exercised the power by the constitution pertaining to the Council of Ancients, of removing (avowedly for protection against a Jacobin conspiracy) the legislative body to St.-Cloud; the second, to secure the execution of this decree, committed the supreme command of the entire military force to General Bonaparte; the third contained a summons to the population to maintain a peaceable attitude. Meanwhile, under pretence of a review, Bonaparte had assembled a great number of superior and staff officers before his dwelling in the Rue de la Victoire. One of the generals who had little knowledge of the movement, Lefebvre, the commandant of Paris, suffered himself to be easily won over. Bonaparte read the decree to those assembled; to his question, could he count upon them? an enthusiastic assent replied. At the head of a splendid suite he repaired to the Council of Ancients, in order to take the required oath; it was immediately observed that he swore only to maintain true freedom and not to the constitution of the year III., yet the president cut off discussion. On the same pretence Lucien Bonaparte, as president of the Five Hundred, anticipated all questions. The troops drawn up for review received the general with enthusiasm. As soon as the success of the enterprise was decided, Fouché and Angereau hastened to give their assent. Bernadotte, on the contrary, although the brother-in-law of Joseph Bonaparte, remained immovable. Moreau was charged with the most disagreeable post: it devolved on him to keep watch at the Luxembourg over the directors, Gohier and Moulins, who refused to resign. From the timid Barras his resignation was wrested by Talleyrand without difficulty. Sieyès and Ducos had already resigned, according to previous agreement; thus there was no longer any government in existence, a puff of wind had carried it away. So sure did Bonaparte feel of the result that he rejected the suggestion made by Sieyès of arresting the most dangerous members of the two councils. Behind the despised constitution there stood neither a people capable of self-government, nor an harmonious and resolute party. But in earnest opposition to a political body, which was undergoing decomposition, there stood as the only organized power a proud army, through which was poured forth the entire national energy of France.

On the following day (19th Brumaire) it was not till two o'clock that the sessions of the two councils could be opened at St. Cloud. The great majority of the Five Hundred, who were sincerely republican in sentiment, adopted with enthusiasm a resolution to renew their oaths to sup-



port the constitution. The time-wasting ceremony in connection with the calling of the roll only gave the conspirators time for completing these preparations. When Bonaparte at four o'clock appeared in the Council of Ancients, he was in great agitation; he saw that all would not pass off so smoothly as on the day preceding. Being required to disclose the plot by which, as pretended, the republic was menaced, he spoke confusedly and disconnectedly, and when one of the council demanded of him to swear to the constitution, Bonaparte overwhelmed him with cutting reproaches in regard to the numberless violations by which this constitution had been rent in pieces. In the Five Hundred the sight of the grenadiers that accompanied him raised a storm of indignation. The most courageous rushed upon him, thrust him back, heaped invectives upon him: "Away! outlaw the dictator!" He was seized by the throat and violently shaken. Pale, half-fainting, his grenadiers brought him out of the hall. In vain did Lucien seek to appease the storm. Lucien, who had caused his brother to be brought out by soldiers, harangued the grenadiers, who hesitated to lay hands on the representatives of the people. At a charging step, with beat of drum, Murat led them against the assembly; in a few moments the hall was cleared.

At a late hour in the evening some twenty of the Five Hundred came together under Lucien's presidency, and expressed to the commanding general and his officers the thanks of the country; furthermore they decreed the erection of a provisional consulate, consisting of Bonaparte, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, the adjournment of the legislative body to the 1st Ventose (February 20), and the expulsion from it of fifty-seven members. A few days later, a decree of the consuls sentenced thirty-seven persons to be deported to Cayenne, and twenty-two, including Jourdan, to be banished to the island of Ré. With regard to others it was considered sufficient to place them under police supervision.

The first and most decided step toward the restoration of monarchical power was made; the rule of a petty minority, which for six years had held down the struggling people under a harsh and unworthy yoke, was at an end.



## BOOK II.

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### THE RISE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.



# THE RISE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### THE CONSULATE.

THE ease with which the political stratagem had been executed was equaled by the readiness with which the country recognized the finished transaction. To the people this laurel-crowned son of the Revolution seemed to be the one destined by fate to end the Revolution and at the same time to endanger none of its benefits. Having remained aloof from parties, he became the reconciler of them all. His saying, "I belong to no party but to France; whoever loves France and obeys the government, is of my party," spoke the truth, but it was not the utterance of disinterested love of country. For the moment his personal ambition was in harmony with the longing of the nation for the strong hand which should deliver it from lawlessness. That the 19th Brumaire placed three consuls at the head of the state was from the first practically dis-regarded; the chief power was embodied exclusively in the person of Bonaparte. So exclusively were the eyes of all directed to him that the services of Masséna were overlooked, and the victor of Zurich was obliged to suffer himself to be transferred to the head of the Italian army, which had been pressed back to the Riviera, while his command in Switzerland was given to Moreau. Brune quickly abandoned his original purpose of marching on Paris to save the constitution, and joined the new government. The barbarous law relating to hostages, passed on July 12, was immediately repealed; by the rescinding of the enforced loan, peace was restored with the financial world; and the return of the *émigrés* to France was facilitated.

Sieyès flattered himself that now the time had come to put in operation that masterpiece of a constitution which he had long had in mind, a bungling and wholly chimerical performance, which, with its complex electoral system, its artificial partition of functions among different representative bodies, its combined executive consisting of two consuls, the one for peace, the other for war, and a grand elector, superior to both,

appointed to represent the nation in foreign affairs, served only as proof of the weakness and folly of its author. But Bonaparte would not have this. The bloodless phantom of the grand elector was supplanted by a first consul, from whom, as possessor of the united governing power, all appointments should proceed; to his two colleagues there remained only the restricted province of covering, with the appearance of republican forms, the establishment of monarchical authority, which was actually accomplished. Among the corporate bodies standing by the side of the government and appointed by it, the most conspicuous place was assigned to the council of state, to whom were entrusted the preparation and presentation of proposed laws. The right of universal suffrage was nominally maintained, but the election of the members of the legislative assemblies, as well as its own, was made by a senate of eighty members from a list of 5000 notables obtained by a double process of election; to the tribunate pertained only the right to discuss propositions with the representatives of the government, yet without a vote; on the other hand, the legislative body had the right to vote upon the propositions of the tribunate without debate. Every state councillor and senator received 25,000 francs, every one of the hundred tribunes 20,000 francs, and of the three hundred legislators each received 15,000 francs. The senate was soon converted into an asylum for aged celebrities or such as by special devotedness had rendered themselves worthy of reward; in the tribunate all opposition was obliged to exhaust itself in mere words. Under the hand of Bonaparte the skilfully contrived scheme of Sieyès became only an instrument of despotism, but not once did its author summon courage to act in opposition. Bonaparte, by satisfying his love of gold, had made him harmless, and he was base enough to be content with the presidency of the senate. The formality of a popular vote concerning the constitution of the year VIII. secured an almost unanimous approval. The two other consuls were Cambacérès, a distinguished jurist, and Lebrun, a useful administrator. Once more the Tuileries received a monarch, only he was styled First Consul.

The legacy upon which the consulate entered was a great chaos. Only the situation of the rural population, in comparison with former times, was considerably improved, amid the general overturning of business relations, and despite the heavy burdens imposed by war; to such an extent had the abrogation of the old system of taxation and of feudal rights stimulated the industry of the husbandman. On the contrary, everything that proceeded from the government was in utter confusion. The state, bankrupt and without credit, paid neither officers nor soldiers. The administration and maintenance of justice even

as yet were scarcely in existence, streets and bridges were impassable, the canals had become unnavigable, the harbors filled with sand, and charitable institutions were destitute of means. It required a will as absolute and a mind as fertile in resources as that of Bonaparte to create coherence out of this dissolution, and to bring order out of this confusion. To meet the most urgent demands a loan of 12,000,000 francs at  $12\frac{3}{4}$  per cent., the rate to which the business community of Paris had become accustomed, was secured; in a fortnight the boards of assessment were regulated; in less than a year's time the tax-rolls were prepared, and the arrearages of 1799 were collected; in the year next following began the great labor of the registry of lands, the indirect taxes were re-established under the name of *droits réunis*, and the Bank of France was founded. In order to provide maintenance for the army, new contributions were exacted from the great merchants of Genoa, the Batavian Republic was compelled to furnish subsistence for troops that were no longer in its territory, and to pay to France a ransom of 40,000,000 francs for the city of Flushing, and Hamburg was obliged to buy back, at an expense of four to six million francs, the friendship of France, forfeited by delivering up the Irish refugees. From the first, Bonaparte had considered the obtaining of booty the principal object of war. The first requisite for removing the anarchy that pervaded the administration was to substitute for boards chosen by the people single officers appointed by the government. Bonaparte in this respect went back to the centralization of the old régime, only he completed it by converting it into a mechanism which allowed the government to direct a nation of thirty millions as if it were a regiment of soldiers. The prefects as chief officers of a department were, according to Bonaparte's expression, merely so many first consuls in small; and the whole system with its prefects, subprefects, and mayors, was a hierarchy of dictatorships, one rising above another, all of which were combined in a supreme head. This machinery, admirable so far as respects facile administration and the furtherance of material prosperity, has become so rooted in the life of the French people, that it has survived all later changes in the form of government, and up to the present time remains undisturbed; but it put a final period to the overturning which began in the year 1789. The Revolution freed the soil of France utterly from the fetters of the feudal system, but it did not bring political freedom to the French people, and the complete disappointment in the attempt at self-government only made them ripe for slavery. Furthermore, the administration of justice, for which a court of cassation was erected as a court of last resort, came into complete dependence upon the government. The jurymen were no longer elected, but named by the

prefects, and the permanence of the judges was virtually abolished by the fact that the government held in its hands the entire power of promotion. With the church, the state established peace by giving back to the parishes their places of worship and by releasing all imprisoned priests on their engagement to observe the constitution. The persecution of the *émigrés* was discontinued, and on their application they were allowed to return. Instead of republican turmoil the silence of obedience prevailed; all the Parisian journals were suppressed, to the number of thirteen, avowedly during the continuance of the war only, but the press remained mute for the entire period of Bonaparte's supremacy. The only place where a free word could be spoken was the rostrum of the tribunate. Never has a more anxiously moderate opposition existed than that which came from the minority of this body; yet this did not protect it from the reproach of factious animosity.

For the establishment of peace and order in the interior was needed only the close of the civil war in the west. La Vendée suffered itself to be won over by the prospect of the restoration of the rights of the church, and accepted the proffered reconciliation. In Normandy and Brittany, on the contrary, the royalist chiefs, Cadoudal, Bourmont, and Comte de Frotté, sought negotiation only as a means of gaining time. As soon as Bonaparte understood this, he determined on their pitiless annihilation. The insurgents were outlawed, the provinces were declared in a state of siege, the too humane General Hédouville was replaced by the unfeeling Brune, and all opposition was cruelly beaten down.

Notwithstanding this comprehensive activity, the thoughts of the First Consul were above all directed to war. To him war was not a means, but an end; he also needed fresh laurels in order to justify his usurpation. It was only because he perceived the great need of his people to establish themselves peacefully in the new conditions, that he sought to create the appearance of having done all in his power to restore peace to the world. And no one understood better than he how to place such a piece of deception on the stage. Again, in a pathetic letter, he conjured the King of England and the German emperor in the name of humanity to offer their hands in peace, and to put an end to the war which had desolated the world for the past eight years. No worse service could have been rendered to the writer of this letter than to have taken him at his word. But Pitt counted upon the exhaustion of the enemy and the capture of the French army in Egypt; he believed in the inconstancy of the French and did not believe in the durability of the dictatorship of Bonaparte, and hoped, therefore, that if the coalition could only be maintained for two months, it would be able to secure a





FIG. 72.—Frederick William III. From an engraving, 1817, by F. Forster (1790-1872), original painting from life, at Paris, 1814, by F. Gérard (1770-1837). Frame by L. Visconti (1791-1853).

far more advantageous peace than at present. The answer, addressed by Lord Granville, in the name of the English government, to Talleyrand, as French minister of foreign affairs, demanded, as the first condition of any negotiations, that France should renounce her system of land robbery and propagandism, and that her internal condition should offer a sufficient security for this by the restoration of the ancient dynasty. This was the manifesto of that great and embittered contest against the universal supremacy of Bonaparte which England was to carry on for fifteen years more. Thugut, now master of nearly all Italy, also declined to negotiate without his allies and on the basis of Campo-Formio.

A far more friendly reception did Bonaparte's envoy, Duroc, experience at Berlin. Even at the beginning of the war, King Frederick William III. (Fig. 72) had withstood the efforts of his minister, Haugwitz, to induce him to join the coalition. The furthest point to which he ventured in a conference with the Duke of Brunswick at Petershagen, in June, 1799, was the decision to propose, in the negotiations for peace, the freedom of Holland and the left bank of the Rhine, and in case of necessity to enforce this by raising an army. A policy favoring a general restoration was far from him; the elevation of Bonaparte was hailed at Berlin as a security for the return of order with peace, but the disposition to agree to Duroc's suggestions with regard to an alliance was still wanting; the king promised only to abide by the pre-existing neutrality, to keep back the smaller states from formally acceding to the coalition, after the example of Bavaria and Würtemberg, and to promote a connection with Russia. To play the part of intermediary and umpire, and to spare the resources of Prussia, while the other powers should utterly exhaust themselves, this was and remained the purpose which the faintheartedness prevailing at Berlin took pleasure in cherishing.

The Austrians planned for the campaign of 1800 an attack on Switzerland; the possession of this commanding position was to be rendered useless for the French by operations on their flanks, Kray on the right keeping himself rather on the defensive, to prevent the French from passing into South Germany, until on the left Melas should have crossed the Apennines; Genoa was to be taken, and, in combination with an English land force which was assembling at Minorea, an invasion of southern France was to be commenced. The confidence of success was great, so great that more than anything else it assisted Bonaparte's plan to attack Melas in the rear and to destroy him. Moreau, at the head of 110,000 men, was to press back the Austrians along the Danube; Masséna, with 25,000 men, was to hold Melas fast on the Genoese coast by a stubborn resistance, in order that the way over the Alps to Upper



FIG. 73.—Crossing the St. Bernard. Fresco by Napoleon's court painter, Andrea Appiani 1754-1817, in the Imperial Palace at Milan.

Italy should remain open to Bonaparte. The daring nature of the enterprise charmed him. The noisy publicity with which the pretended army of reserve at Dijon was spoken of, where, however, only a few battalions were to be seen, completely answered its purpose in deluding the enemy. The real army, unobserved by the enemy, was quartered in detachments between Châlons-sur-Marne and Lyons, ready to concentrate at a moment's notice. Time pressed, for at the beginning of April, Melas, after hot opposition, had made himself master of the passes of the Apennines; from the 21st, Masséna was blocked up in Genoa by General Ott, while Melas was following up, toward the Var, the other division of the French under Suchet. Moreau could delay no longer. He crossed the Rhine simultaneously at Strasburg, Altbreisach, and Basel. The brave Kray, who had the chief command only because Archduke Charles, angry with the council of war, had resigned, was now occupying a far extended line reaching from Vorarlberg through the Black Forest to the Rhine, and so managed that he always found himself, at the decisive point, with an inferior force. Attacked on May 3, at Engen, he retreated on receiving intelligence that Lecourbe had crossed at Schaffhausen and had taken Stockach; on the 5th he was obliged to yield Moeskirch to the enemy, and after Saint-Cyr had gained possession of Biberach and the Mettenberg, he sought protection under the walls of Ulm. The efforts of Moreau to draw him out of this position were long fruitless, but his chief object, to throw the Austrians on the Danube and thus to remove them as far as possible from the passes of the Alps, was attained. From the further prosecution of the advantages obtained Moreau was prevented by the order to send 20,000 men toward the St. Gotthard. When Kray saw that he was threatened in the rear, he evacuated his position and retreated, after several engagements, upon Nördlingen and Neuburg, whence he reached the Inn unmolested. Then Moreau, to whom it was of greater importance to maintain his connection with the army of Italy than to follow up the Austrians, turned his course toward the Isar, and on June 28 occupied Munich. A truce was concluded at Parsdorf on July 15, after the Austrians in these battles and on the retreat had lost 30,000 men out of 76,000.

Masséna's call for help induced the First Consul to give the preference to the pass of the Great St. Bernard (Fig. 73) in order to cross into Italy. Since the constitution did not allow him to take the supreme command in person, it was nominally assigned to Berthier. The difficulties of this crossing of the Alps, executed between the 15th and 20th of May, have been greatly exaggerated by Bonaparte and his eulogists, but the skill with which it was carried out deserves admiration. (For a letter





written by Bonaparte to Josephine at this time, see PLATE XX.<sup>1</sup>) From Geneva by way of Martinach the ascent commenced; for the transportation of the army baggage, a great number of mules were provided; the gun-carriages were taken apart, the pieces of artillery were put into the trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose, and to these the soldiers eagerly harnessed themselves; at the hospice on the summit of the pass refreshments were awaiting those who came up; the unvarying favorable weather increased their zeal and lightened their fatigue. Everything promised the happiest success, when suddenly, as the vanguard was descending the narrow valley-road of the Dora Baltea, Fort Bard blocked up the way, presenting an insurmountable obstacle. A rocky path, however, was discovered, which men and horses could traverse. Marmont brought the cannon safely by in a dark stormy night, the soldiers who drew them receiving a high reward. Smaller detachments had followed the path over the Little St. Bernard and Mont Cenis. At the head of 40,000 men the new Hannibal now stood suddenly upon the plain of Lombardy, and by a rapid attack gained possession of the important crossing of the Po at Piacenza. He made his entry into Milan (June 2), and proclaimed the restoration of the Cisalpine Republic. But Masséna, after consuming the last thing eatable, had to surrender Genoa on June 4, securing an unmolested retreat; out of 15,000 men, he led away some 8000. Already, Melas, when he could no longer doubt of the unexpected appearance of an enemy in his rear, had hastened personally to Turin; he appointed Alessandria as a rendezvous. General Ott, who endeavored to deliver Piacenza from the French,

<sup>1</sup> PLATE XX.

Facsimile of a letter from Napoleon I. to his wife Josephine.

Dated: Martigny, Floréal 28 (Floréal=April 20 to May 20) in the year VIII. of the republic.

(In the possession of Herr Lessing [Landgerichtsdirektor] at Berlin.)

TRANSCRIPTION.

*Martigny, le 28 floréal an 8 de la République.*

Je suis ici depuis trois jours au milieu de Valais et des alpes dans un couvent de bernardin. Ton ny voit jamais le soleil jûge si lon y est agreablement j aime bien de te voir gronder toi qui es a paris au milieu des plaisirs et de bonne compagnie.

L'armée file en Italie nous sommes a aost mais le St. bernard offre bien de difficultes a vaincre.

Je t'ai écrit souvent quant a mille hortence quand elle sera grande dame on lui écrira aujourd'hui elle est trop petite l'on ne écrit pas aux enfants.

cette pauvre mad lucie est donc morte! elle a bien souffert. Son mari doit etre bien triste. Je le plains!! perdre sa femme cest perdu si non la gloire au moins le bonheur.

Mille choses aimables a hortence et mille douceurs a ma josephine.

*B.*

On the outside: a Madame Bonaparte.

encountered Lannes at Casteggio, June 9, and in a stubborn engagement was thrown back upon Montebello. Meantime Bonaparte remained at Stradella, without sure intelligence respecting the enemy's position; finally on the 12th he marched toward Alessandria. Firm in the delusion that the enemy sought to escape him, he aimed to throw himself upon Genoa, and therefore, contrary to his wont, dispersed his forces over different roads. Melas, however, had come to the conclusion to seek his antagonist and open the way to Piacenza. While thus advancing, on the 14th, he came upon the corps of Victor and Lannes at Marengo (Fig. 74). The battle raged around the village for six




FIG. 74.—Vicinity of Marengo: to illustrate the battle on June 14, 1800.

hours, until finally it remained favorable to the Austrians. The coming up of the division of Monnier, and immediately after of Bonaparte with the small force of his guard, renewed the conflict, but these troops were also repulsed by Ott, and the right wing and centre of the French were driven back in a flight that could not be checked. Sure of the victory, and overcome by fatigue, Melas handed over the pursuit to his chief of staff, von Zach, and rode back to Alessandria, at the same moment when Desaix, with 5000 men, appeared near St. Giuliano on the battlefield; on his march to Novi he had turned hither, hearing the cannonade, before Bonaparte's call for help had reached him. He threw himself against the enemy who were pressing after the French; he himself fell; his brigade retreated in confusion, but the victors also had carelessly



loosened their ranks. With quick decision Kellermann rushed with three squadrons into the breach. A panic fell upon the enemy; the pursued took breath, they turned and renewed the attack; 6000 Austrians were cut off and laid down their arms, Zach and his entire staff were made prisoners.

So ended this memorable battle, the actual particulars of which Bonaparte utterly disfigured in his reports. Completely overcome by this unprecedented change of fortune, Melas on the 15th signed a convention at Alessandria, in virtue of which he withdrew behind the Po and Mincio until the arrival of an answer from his government to Bonaparte's proposals of peace. By one blow all the fruits of Suvaroff's victories were lost.

The First Consul then gave up the supreme command in Italy to Masséna and returned to Paris. He contemptuously declined every kind of festal reception. It wounded him deeply that, in his absence, some, out of honest care for the state, and others, in the secret hope of becoming his heirs, had discussed the irreverent question, who, in the event of something mortal befalling him, should take his place. But he was still more angry with the tribunate because they had ventured, with their acts of homage offered to him, to mingle the recollection of the heroic death of Desaix (Figs. 75, 76) and the conspicuous services of Moreau. According to his previous purpose, to show himself to the French people not merely as conqueror, but also as the bearer of peace, he had again, in a letter written in glowing style and dated from the battlefield of Marengo, made appeal to the philanthropy of the emperor. There were by no means wanting approving voices in Vienna; the empress, Archduke Charles, several ministers, and the entire population were for peace. Only Thugut warned against precipitation, which he held to be the worst of all evils. Indeed, the blow at Marengo, severe as it might be, had fallen on the flanks at too great a distance to have brought ruin on Austria. Thugut concluded (June 20) a new treaty for subsidies with England, in which he pledged himself to continue the contest and to enter into no separate treaty with France before the 28th of the next February. Yet, in order to avoid an evil appearance and to gain time for new preparations, he replied to Bonaparte by sending General Saint-Julien to Paris, but refused Campo-Formio as a basis. However, in the field of diplomacy the unpracticed Saint-Julien suffered himself to be so far overreached by Talleyrand, that he signed a preliminary draft on that very basis. For this he atoned in prison. But Bonaparte, dissatisfied at not finding the expected compliance, ordered Moreau to give notice of the cessation of the truce, and, as Austria did not yet feel herself prepared for war,



FIG. 75.—Death of General Desaix. Engraved by Napoleon's court-painter Andrea Appiani 1794-1817, in the imperial palace at Milan.

she was compelled, in the convention at Hohenlinden, September 20, to purchase the prolongation of the truce for forty-five days by a new and more severe sacrifice: the delivery of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, whereby the French became masters of all southwestern Germany. Thugut, without whose knowledge the convention had been concluded, resigned. Yet his influence still remained so strong that his antagonist, Count




FIG. 76 The monument of General Desaix; erected by the Consulate in the Hospice of St. Bernard

Lehrbach, who was appointed as his successor, was obliged after a few days to surrender his charge to Counts Cobenzl and Colloredo, and as the former went to Lunéville immediately afterward, in order to prosecute the negotiations at that place, Thugut still remained the actual manager

of foreign politics. From Lunéville, Cobenzl suffered himself to be enticed to Paris, where he was obliged to submit to hot and rough upbraiding from the First Consul on account of Austria's untrustworthy and unvaracious proceedings, but an agreement was not reached; Bonaparte desired a separate peace excluding England, but Cobenzl was instructed to insist on the inclusion of England. Thus once again the decision was committed to arms.

The Austrians had not allowed the period of truce to pass away unimproved; their active force was brought up to 130,000, almost equal in number to that of the enemy, but as respects intrinsic worth as little comparable as were the leaders. Nothing showed the mental poverty of the military men of Austria at that time so much as the fact that Kray was superseded by an utterly inexperienced young man of eighteen, the Archduke John, with Lauer as his mentor; and Melas was replaced by Bellegarde: both of them generals of such recognized incapacity that the troops received them with outspoken distrust. The young archduke, giving up the strong defence of the river Inn, took the offensive; an unimportant success gained by his troops at Ampling, strengthened him in the conviction that he needed only to march on to Munich; he recklessly plunged into the difficult forest-region about Hohenlinden, and on emerging from it (December 3) suddenly found himself confronted by the whole strength of Moreau. Attacked by Moreau in front and assailed in the rear by Richepanse, he suffered a complete defeat, left 15,000 dead or prisoners, beside eighty cannon, on the field, and was obliged to be content with reaching the river Enns in safety. At the same time Macdonald, under infinitely greater difficulties than Bonaparte had encountered at St. Bernard, crossed the Splügen in the depth of winter, over snow and ice, and by his advance into the Tyrol facilitated the march of the army of Italy toward the Adige. From all sides disaster befell the Austrians. The Archduke Charles, to whom the council of war had now at last appealed, found the army in such a condition that it was impossible to risk a fresh campaign; there was no means of holding back the enemy except a truce at any price. In the compact made at Steyer on December 25, Austria submitted to the demand to conclude a peace without her allies and delivered up the fortresses of Würzburg and Braunau, as well as the Scharnitz pass, and evacuated the Tyrol. For the army of Italy an armistice was agreed upon at Treviso, January 16, 1801.

Thugut was no longer able to make headway against the storm let loose upon him by the defeat at Hohenlinden. That which placed Bonaparte in a position to dictate peace in conformity to his own views, was

not merely the destruction of Austria's ability to resist, but also his specially friendly relations with Prussia and Russia. Both these powers, bound together by the treaty of July 28, 1800, the aim of which was to secure the peace of Eastern Europe, were filled with concern lest Austria should establish an agreement with the conqueror, as at Campo-Formio, which should be disadvantageous to them. In order to prevent this, they sought to draw near to France. Furthermore, the Czar Paul, with the natural sympathy of a despot for a despot, was filled after the 18th Brumaire with a passionate enthusiasm for the vanquisher of the Revolution, while his bitterness against his ally England had reached its height, because England, having taken Malta, September 5, after a two years' blockade, declined to give it back to the Knights of St. John. Bonaparte spared neither promises nor flatteries in order to complete this conversion. The fact that he sent back 7000 to 8000 Russian prisoners of war without ransom and well equipped, and that to Paul he proffered Malta and the grandmastership of the Order, produced precisely the contemplated effect. Paul sent the Bourbons from Mitau, laid an embargo on English ships in Russian harbors, and renewed with Sweden, Prussia, and Denmark, the Armed Neutrality of 1780.

The consequences of this change Cobenzl was obliged to experience at Lunéville. The threat of the First Consul that if the conditions of peace offered by France, viz., the banks of the Rhine and of the Adige, were not accepted, peace would be made at Vienna, Prague, and Venice, decided all further negotiations with regard to both these main points. On February 9, 1801, peace was signed on the terms which he had prescribed. The emperor retained Venice, in pursuance of Campo-Formio, but in three particulars he was compelled to accept conditions more severe: that he should, although without full powers, settle peace at the same time in the name of the empire; that besides the Duke of Modena, the Grand Duke of Tuscany should forfeit his territory; and that he, in conformity to the principle of secularization, should make indemnity to the "hereditary" princes who were affected by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine. Under the same compulsion of necessity, the German diet granted its sanction.

Of the entire coalition, formed with such brilliant prospects, there remained now England, the Porte, Naples, and Portugal. Naples bowed itself while yet in time, as Murat was approaching, and was obliged to be content, on the mediation of the Czar Paul, to conclude at Florence, March 18, 1801, a tolerable peace, in pursuance of which it closed its harbors to the English, agreed to maintain on its soil a French corps of 12,000 men, and to grant amnesty to the patriot refugees. As

respects Portugal, the First Consul desired to have it as a pledge in hand that he might make the same use of it in the future peace with England which he had made of Venice with Austria. It was not difficult for Bonaparte to urge on the Spanish government to seize upon Portugal. In the treaty of Madrid, March 21, Spain pledged itself to hold possession of a part of Portugal until a general pacification, and sanctioned again the cession of Louisiana. Bonaparte made over Tuscany to Louis of Parma, as a kingdom of "Etruria," in return for which the duchy of Parma, after the death of his father Ferdinand (died October 8, 1802), was to belong to France. Eager for military laurels, the "Prince of the Peace," Godoy, at the head of 60,000 Spaniards, followed by 15,000 Frenchmen, burst into Portugal, and in a few days was master of all Alentejo. The court of Madrid now ventured, in its own name, to conclude a treaty with Portugal at Badajoz, on June 6, according to which the latter closed its ports against the English, and delivered up the fortress of Olivenza to Spain. Bonaparte was very indignant at this arrangement; when the "Prince of the Peace," having sold himself to England, persuaded the king and queen to hostile measures against the republic, the last hour of the Spanish monarchy had struck. Then at once the idea occurred to Bonaparte that he might seize Spain as an easy booty. When, however, it remained firm beyond expectation, he changed his purpose, and was satisfied that Portugal should pay 25,000,000 francs, should enter into an onerous commercial treaty, and cede a part of Guiana.

Great Britain alone stood unconquered and unconquerable. Its business suffered severely in consequence of the war, but this effect was now produced in a less degree, since it was freed from continental rivals in the markets of the world. Supremacy on the ocean inclined, since the outbreak of the Revolution, more and more in favor of England. The French had lost Martinique, St. Lucia, their Indian possessions, and Malta; of the allies, the Dutch had lost Ceylon, the Cape, and Guiana, and the Spaniards Minorca; these they had seen fall into the hands of England; and even the renewal of the Armed Neutrality contributed to a further increase of British power at sea. While the ice confined the Russian fleet in the harbor of Reval, a powerful expedition under Parker appeared before Copenhagen to elastise Denmark for its participation in the league. But the anxious prudence of the aged admiral did not accord with the purpose of the victor of Abukir, who commanded under him; when Denmark refused to withdraw from the league, Nelson proceeded to the attack. Courageous as was the result, the defence equaled it in stubbornness. For a moment the conflict was so critical

for the English that Parker gave the signal for retreat. But Nelson, holding his spy-glass to his blind eye, swore that he saw nothing, and gave orders that his own battle-flag should remain flying; and after fighting five hours he gained a victory, which, in the language of Lord St. Vincent, minister of marine, surpassed everything in the glorious annals of the British navy. The Danes had double reason to conclude an armistice (April 9) as speedily as possible, for intelligence had arrived from St. Petersburg of an event which threatened to change the entire political situation.

The Emperor Paul (Fig. 77) had fallen into a kind of madness. Everyone meeting him must kneel; anyone driving, even ladies, must



FIG. 77.—Medal to commemorate the marriage of the Grand Duke Paul

alight and prostrate themselves, even if it were in the snow. Dress-coat and hat were scouted as Jacobinical. Transgressors were punished with blows and stripes. Many distinguished families had severe mortifications, bodily injuries, and even the undeserved death of near kindred to be avenged. Still it was not chiefly revenge, nor the hatred of a political party which completed the destruction of Paul, but the apprehensions of those favorites who had been loaded by him with riches and honors, and who now lived in constant fear of his tyrannical caprices. The first one to suggest the plot was the vice-chancellor, Count Panin; it spread the more easily because the chief of the secret police and governor of St. Petersburg, Count Pahlen, took part, and after him the three Suboff brothers, General Bennigsen, and many others. The czar was now sur-

rounded and watched by traitors. The Czarina Maria Feodorovna, who was badly treated by her husband, suffered herself to be flattered by those about her with the prospect of becoming another Catharine II. For a long time did the young Grand Duke Alexander (Fig. 78) strug-




FIG. 78.—The Grand Dukes Alexander and Constantine, sons of Paul I. From a sketch by Lampi; in the Imperial Hermitage at St. Petersburg.

gle against the dethronement of his father, until the czar's sudden and passionately manifested inclination for his nephew, Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, his publicly avowed purpose to give him the succession,



and his ambiguous utterance that in a few days he would be obliged to cause heads to fall that had been dear to him, finally overcame Alexander's opposition. In the night of March 23-24, 1801, the conspirators rushed into the emperor's bedchamber, and after a desperate resistance he was strangled by a sash.

The death scene in the Michaeloff palace put a speedy end to the Franco-Russian alliance for a joint conflict with England. The young czar at once suspended all hostile measures against that power, and, although he was not in a state of declared hostility with England, he clothed his renunciation of Malta and of the maritime rights claimed by the Armed Neutrality in the form of a treaty of peace (February 17). At the same time he continued the good understanding with France, with whom peace was concluded on October 8. Egypt formed the principal obstacle to the reconciliation of France with England. Bonaparte still firmly adhered to the phantom of holding the valley of the Nile; the British government, on the contrary, sought to compel the army which was left there, cut off from reinforcement, to lay down its arms. In this army, since the departure of the commander-in-chief, a deep depression prevailed, and among the officers discord. Kléber, full of bitterness concerning the manner in which he had been placed over this forsaken post, and convinced of the impossibility of retaining the country, had embraced the wisest course open to him, and by a convention entered into with Sidney Smith at El-Arish, January 28, 1800, had secured the return of himself and his army to France on English or Turkish vessels. Not only did several of his generals oppose this agreement, but the English government rejected it and demanded an unconditional surrender. With his 12,000 men Kléber defeated 80,000 Turks at Heliopolis, on March 20. Murad Bey appeared in his tent and swore to be faithful to him. Cairo was again taken. Kléber (Fig. 79) was even beginning to devote himself to the peaceful organization of the country, when on the day of Marengo the dagger of a fanatical Mussulman smote him. Menou, who, as the senior general, succeeded him, was not equal to the difficult task, and by his transition to Islam he had become an object of derision to his men. The utmost which he could accomplish, after the failure of the attempt of Admiral Gantaume to bring him reinforcements, was to make a brave stand at Canopus, March 21, 1801, against the English force under Abercromby; after General Belliard's surrender at Cairo, he concluded a capitulation (September 2), in pursuance of which the French army, with all its baggage and all the treasures of science and art, was conveyed to France in English ships.

Hardly would Pitt have granted such conditions if he had not felt



Fig. 79. Robespierre. From the engraving by P. M. Ait, 1777-1800. Original painting by A. Bolly.

such a great need of peace for the internal reforms by means of which he hoped to close the ever festering wounds of the Irish distress. The deep disorder, not only economic but also moral, of the unhappy island

led him to find the only means, the only possibility of establishing a sounder condition, in calling the Irish lords and representatives into the English Parliament, that is to say, in the parliamentary union of Ireland with Great Britain. The consent of the Lower House at Dublin (September, 1800) was finally secured by the purchase of votes. To the second part of his plan, the emancipation of the Catholics, George III. set himself in opposition, his conscience having been skilfully stimulated by the High Church party. When the king rejected the proposal to abolish the test-oath and to regulate church tithes, Pitt resigned on March 14 to Addington, who came into office with the determination to establish peace with France at any price. On the first day of October the preliminaries were subscribed at London, and on March 25, 1802, this was followed by the definitive Treaty of Amiens. This decreed the giving back of Egypt to the Porte, of Malta to the order of the Knights of St. John, the integrity of Portugal, the evacuation of the States of the Church and of Naples by the French, of the islands and ports of the Mediterranean by the English, and finally the restoration of the colonies of France and her allies, with the exception of the Dutch Ceylon and the Spanish Trinidad.

Relieved from the war with England, the First Consul found nothing in the way of his making the necessary changes in Germany in order to carry into effect the Treaty of Lunéville. The empire itself was brought down to such a feeble and undignified position that it not merely facilitated this but demanded it, and Bonaparte manifested in the negotiations, protracted through two entire years, a mastery of diplomacy in no respect inferior to his military skill. To the peace of France with Russia there was added, three days later, October 11, a secret stipulation, which, under the seductive guise of a participation in the office of arbiter, was designed to bring the young czar into subordination to French policy: in order to establish a just equipoise in the different parts of the world, but especially between Austria and Prussia, they both secretly pledged themselves to act in unison, whether by mediation or force, to maintain all measures that should be proposed for the welfare of humanity, for the general peace, and the independence of the governments. To isolate Austria completely was the surest means of gratifying the desires of Prussia, which were directed first of all to gaining possession of the two Franconian bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg. But Prussia had incurred the ill-will of the First Consul, because, after Hamburg was seized by the Danes and Lübeck by the Swedes, it had anticipated a Franco-Russian occupation of Hanover, and in April, 1801, had taken that country into its keeping by a force of 21,000 men, not

against, but for the King of England. Bonaparte was accustomed to suffer no stroke aimed at him to pass unpunished. To punish Prussia he resolved to play upon the jealousy of Austria. However variable and indecisive the policy of Austria in the feeble hands of a Colloredo and a Cobenzl, the one purpose, to lessen as much as possible the indemnification to be received by Prussia, stood firm. The question with regard to the Franconian bishoprics became immediately involved in the decisive and general question, what extent should be given to secularization; whether it should only compensate the loss of the hereditary princes, or whether it should be fully carried out and be used to strengthen the secular principalities. To the latter view, in concert with France, especially adhered the two most powerful among the secular states of the empire, Prussia and Bavaria, while Austria strove, as far as possible, to maintain the old hierarchical character of the empire. The entire decision became consequently a game in the hands of Bonaparte.

Once more the states of the German empire, with a few honorable exceptions, presented at Paris the degrading spectacle of a race for the spoils of the dissolving realm. Now it was the villa of Joseph Bonaparte, now it was the attic of the Strasburger Matthieu, to which some pressed in person and others by proxy, and where intrigues and oaths, promises of boundless devotion, deceptive calculations, and open corruption were employed, in order to assist the new arithmetic, which reckoned indemnity not according to the actual loss endured, but according to the possibility of attaining the objects coveted. Since the ecclesiastical possessions did not suffice for so many grasping hands, the cities of the empire were also thrown in, and, in order to render the disgrace complete, the only sovereign of the empire who, in these circumstances, stood on the ground of justice and disinterestedness, was the non-German Gustavus IV. of Sweden (Fig. 80). Among all the disgraceful acts exhibited by the German history of that time, these transactions are by far the most disgraceful; and by them was Bonaparte first brought to a true understanding of the Germans. "The future emperor," Häusser declares with justice, "simply took the Germans as he found them, and the years of oppression and disgrace that followed were purely the merited chastisement of our own deeds."

Clearly and consistently Bonaparte pursued his object to thrust Austria and Prussia as far as possible toward the east; the smaller members of the empire, especially those in the southwest, which could no longer find support either in one or the other, were to be converted into his own devoted and grateful clients. In this respect Bavaria gave an example to the others, when the elector, Maximilian Joseph, instead of

turning for protection to the never-resting rapacity of Austria, sought it in a return to the ancient policy of his house. By a treaty signed at Paris on August 24, 1801, he secured the desired indemnities for the cession made on the left bank of the Rhine. For a moment, both at Vienna and Berlin, the need of a mutual approximation made itself felt, and the result was the appointment of a deputation of the empire con-



FIG. 89.—Gustavus IV. of Sweden, as Count of Haga.

sisting of eight members, who should bring to a settlement the work of indemnifying the losing parties. But long before the expiration of the seven months which this deputation required in order to agree upon the form of its proceedings, the contemplated approximation had, on account of Cobenzl's grievous mistakes, given way to a wider separation. As if it were especially his business with his own hand to subject the policy of Prussia to French influence, he was not satisfied with bringing up at

Paris the renewal of the system of 1756, but also, after the death of the Archduke Maximilian, who was elector of Cologne and bishop of Münster (July 27, 1801), he opposed the choice of a successor—which Prussia demanded—and effected in Münster the election of Archduke Anton as bishop. The result was that now Prussia also concluded its treaty with France, May 23, 1802, in order to obtain indemnification, if not by the Franconian bishoprics, then in some other way.

The two treaties concluded by Bonaparte, Russia assenting, with Bavaria and Prussia, and the similar treaties that quickly followed with Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, decided the fate of Germany. On August 24 Russia and France presented their plan of indemnification, whose approval within two months they imperiously demanded; on September 14 the deputies of the empire decided conformably. The emperor protested. But when Prussia, assured of the consent of France, without awaiting the formal approval of the plan, hastened to take possession of the territory promised to her, and thus gave the example to all of helping themselves, the court of Vienna thought it could not remain behind, and sought by a surprise to make sure of Passau, which was in dispute. In the treaty with France, signed December 26, Austria submitted to the principle of complete secularization, and by the decision of the imperial deputation, February 25, 1803, the new arrangement of what still remained of the old empire was finally and formally confirmed; 112 districts of the empire, having 3,000,000 inhabitants and nearly 50,000 square miles, were abolished by this, and divided among the temporal princes. Even the emperor by no means disclaimed to take something from the spoils, and accepted as compensation for the Breisgau and the Ortenau, granted to the Duke of Modena, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent; the other imperial relative, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was compensated by the archbishopric of Salzburg with Berchtesgaden, the bishopric of Eichstädt, and a part of Passau. Prussia received the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, the best part of the bishopric of Münster, Erfurt, and the possessions of the electorate of Mayence in Thuringia, Eichsfeld, the abbeys of Herford, Quedlinburg and others, as well as the imperial cities of Mühlhausen, Nordhausen, and Goslar; the indemnification of the Prince of Orange consisted of the abbeys of Fulda, Corvei, Gandersheim, and Helmstädt. Bavaria, which had been obliged to surrender, beside the territory on the left side of the Rhine, the part of the Palatinate lying on the right side, received the greater part of the bishopric of Würzburg, the bishoprics of Bamberg, Freisingen, and Augsburg, together with the remainder of Passau, the priory of Kempten, twelve abbeys, seventeen imperial cities (Nördlingen, Ulm, and others)

and villages. Würtemberg could easily bear with patience its loss of 170 square miles in consideration of the possessions, more than fourfold greater, which it received. Hanover obtained the bishopric of Osnabrück, and Baden was treated most generously of all, receiving 1400 square miles with 237,000 inhabitants, while its loss was but 200 square miles. Of the cities only six escaped, Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Nuremberg, and Augsburg; of the ecclesiastical powers of the empire, only three remained, the Grand Master of the Teutonic order at Mergentheim, the Grand Prior of the order of the Knights of St. John at Heitersheim, and the electorate of Mayence. The special cause for prolonging the existence of the last-named was the personality of the coadjutor, after 1802 Elector Charles von Dalberg (Fig. 81), in whom Bonaparte had discovered a serviceable instrument for his future schemes. Dalberg received as his portion the archiepiscopal see with the cathedral of Ratisbon, together with Aschaffenburg, Wetzlar, and some other places. Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, and Salzburg were raised to electorates, so that the electoral college, after Cologne and Treves had entirely disappeared, consisted of ten members.

So began the great political revolution of Germany, the conclusion of which did not occur till the year 1871; a transformation as far-reaching as this, neither the Reformation nor the Peace of Westphalia had brought to pass. That intricate complexity of worldly and ecclesiastical forms, which was styled the Holy Roman Empire, was irreconcilable with the newly created order; the hierarchical character of the empire disappeared at the same time with the ecclesiastical states of the empire, and as henceforth in the electoral college the four Catholic electors were opposed by six Protestants, so also in the council of the princes the majority was with the Protestants. Hence the pope was on the point of condemning the change, but the emperor, already burdened with embarrassments enough, gave him a decided intimation to keep silent. In the individual territories also the Catholic church exchanged its ancient spiritual autonomy for subordination to the temporal power. The feudal bond between the emperor and the princes of the empire, already loosened, was now entirely dissolved. The multiplied and variegated divisions shown in the maps of the country gave place to a rolling together of separate atoms into the shape of states or forms resembling states. And this shock, by which the foundation-walls of the empire were burst asunder and a wide chasm created, came not from below, but proceeded from the princely dynasties, by whom, and not by the aspiring masses of the people, the feudal system was overthrown, in order to erect in their dominions the new edifice of state in conformity



FIG. 51—Charles Theodore Anton Maria von Dalberg. From a copper-plate engraving by J. G. Müller (1747-1830); original painting by F. Tischbein (1750-1812).



to those principles, which, since 1789, had gained the ascendancy in France; principles equalizing and leveling, but also establishing order by means of a regulated administration, aiming at the exaltation of the governing power, yet also promoting the general welfare. So utter had been the corruption of the old petty governments, that the people accepted the innovation with evident approval and regarded it as a deliverance. The improvement of the administration of justice, the revival of industry and intercourse, which were utterly languishing, the lightening of the burdens that weighed upon the peasants, were for them palpable benefits. Thus the breaking up of the old system produced also, concurrently, a renovation, and by the same connection of events it was brought to pass that the very man, who formerly from the battlefields of Italy had written to the Directory, "If the German empire did not exist, it ought to be created expressly for the advantage of France," now prepared the way fully for this renovation by breaking down that which was withered, and by setting aside the ecclesiastical states. He did it to enlarge his influence and power, but he thus labored unwittingly to bring about in the future the national development of Germany.

"We have confirmed to France the possession of Italy, and at the same time the supremacy over the continent!" cried Lord Grenville in Parliament, with reference to the Treaty of Amiens. This language by no means expressed the whole truth. Peace was not, for Bonaparte, the limit which commanded him to halt in presence of the rights or interests of others. The definitive peace was not yet signed, when he undertook a series of unjust encroachments, a single one of which might have sufficed to render the renewal of war inevitable. He counted upon the general exhaustion, when, notwithstanding the eleventh article of the Treaty of Lunéville, which guaranteed the independence of the neighboring republics, he forced them into a position of subordination that left them scarcely more than the name of independence. The turn of the Batavian Republic came first. Since the chambers of this republic had the presumption to reject the constitution brought before them by the First Consul, they were driven out by force with the help of Angereau, September, 1801; and the new constitution was submitted to a popular vote, when a majority in favor of accepting it could only be counted up by reckoning the votes of those who did not vote as being in the affirmative. The Cisalpine Republic bowed its neck more meekly beneath its appointed yoke, after the absorption of Piedmont among the French military divisions, and the making out of it six departments, made the republic an immediate neighbor of France. The adjustment of its

phantom constitution to that of the French consulate was a matter of course, but the government also besought the First Consul to undertake the appointment of its officers. The most natural course would have been to accomplish this in Milan, but in order to present to the world a fresh spectacle of his power, he called before him for this purpose, in mid-winter, a consulta of 450 men at Lyons. For president of the republic these delegates had desired the Marquis Melzi, but Talleyrand gave them to understand what they had to do, and on their request the First Consul himself undertook the presidency, January 25, 1802; Melzi became vice-president. The Cisalpine became the "Italian" republic, but its boundaries remained unchanged. The same transformation was experienced by the Ligurian Republic. In the kingdom of Etruria, Murat and Clarke ruled with unlimited power, and Bonaparte summoned the young, feeble-minded king to Paris, since it pleased him "to have a king in his antechamber." The Helvetic Republic he treated with somewhat greater moderation. The popular vote upon the new constitution, in June, 1802, yielded only 72,453 for acceptance against 92,423 for its rejection, but here again those not voting were counted as approving. And then, in order to show the Swiss that they were not able to stand upon their own feet, Bonaparte withdrew the French troops. At once the old democratic, separatist spirit of the original cantons rose up against the new form of the state; the movement seized on other cantons, Zurich rebelled from the Helvetic government and was bombarded by General Aendermatt; presently the whole of eastern Switzerland was in utter confusion, when suddenly the First Consul proclaimed himself mediator, and summoned the Helvetic deputies to meet him at Paris. Thirty thousand men under Ney stood ready for invasion, Aloys Reding and Hirzel, the heads of the anti-French party, were arrested, and there was a general apprehension that Bonaparte was about to make himself president of Helvetia also; yet this did not happen, but instead he issued from Malmaison, April 30, 1803, an act of mediation which formed Switzerland into a league of nineteen cantons. The more than sufficient price for the pains thus taken consisted not only in a new treaty of alliance and a military capitulation, but also in the cutting off of the canton Valais, a valley-region of great importance in keeping up the connection with Italy; this, under the semblance of being formed into an independent state, came into subjection to the direct rule of Bonaparte, and now the construction of the Simplon road was decreed, in order to bind Italy indissolubly to France.

To the mind of Bonaparte all these enlargements of his power, however considerable they might be in themselves, were yet only secondary

things in comparison with one lofty purpose, which from his youth up he never abandoned, of founding his world-wide sway beyond the ocean. After being thwarted in the east he turned his eyes to the west, to the restoration of French colonial power in the West Indies. The island of Santo Domingo was selected as a centre of operations, and, chiefly with the view of protecting it against the United States, he sought for the possession of Louisiana. The island was indebted to Toussaint Louverture, a negro of uncommon gifts, for its ability to rise with comparative rapidity from the ruins with which the emancipation of 500,000 blacks had covered it. Made president for life, Toussaint had brought back the negroes, for whom freedom meant a return to barbarism, to a condition of civil order and industry, had organized justice and administration, had recalled the old planters to their estates, and successfully defended the island against England and Spain. Practically an independent ruler, he regarded the sovereignty of France as simply an unmeaning protectorate, but Bonaparte saw in him "the rebellious black who must be chastised." The sending of 25,000 men (May, 1802) to the island, under the command of General Leclerc, the husband of his sister Pauline, gave him a not unwelcome opportunity to remove to a distance a part of the army of the Rhine, which was distinguished by a want of devotion to his person, and contained many malecontents in its ranks. Leclerc was ordered by his instructions to subjugate the island by terror and by force, to disarm the blacks, to kill or banish their leaders, while he promised, in a solemn proclamation, freedom to all men of color. Without suffering himself to be deceived by these hypocritical words, Toussaint led a brave opposition, but after he was deserted by his comrades Christophe and Dessalines, he fell into the hands of Leclerc, and was brought to France, where, since it seemed impossible to execute him legally, he was left to die in the dungeon of Fort Joux. A law under cover of inoffensive phraseology re-established slavery, and even the slave trade. But on these conquerors the yellow fever took vengeance; Leclerc succumbed to it, and his army also, till only a few thousand were left. On the renewal of war with England, the blacks once more seized their arms and compelled Leclerc's successor, Rochambeau, to surrender the wretched survivors of the French army to English cruisers. Dessalines made himself emperor of Haiti, a tyrant over the blacks and a murderer of the whites; after he was slain in an insurrection, a war of races broke out between negroes and mulattoes, the end of which was the division of the island into a mulatto republic in the south and a negro republic in the north. The great scheme of Bonaparte was again frustrated, but he did everything to cause its victims to be forgotten.

This unbridled impulse to disregard the boundaries of the true, the reasonable, and the possible is the prevailing characteristic of Bonaparte's rule. On the one hand he aspired to found an enduring dominion for himself and his family, on the other he rendered this permanence impossible by his disdain of the limits which the nature of things and of man has established.

That France was once more inclined to monarchy was perceptible even to the dullest vision, and the Count of Provence, in the belief that the First Consul was laboring for the Bourbons, had the simplicity to write him twice, asking to be restored to the throne of his fathers. But Bonaparte refused. This refusal drew on Bonaparte the deadly hatred of the disappointed royalists. On the 3d Nivose of the year VIII. (December 24, 1800), when he was on his way to the opera, a cask filled with balls, powder, and other combustibles exploded directly under his carriage in the Rue St.-Nicaise; four men were killed, sixty were wounded, only the unusually rapid driving of the coachman saved the First Consul. His anxiety was not so much to discover the actual culprits, as to profit by the opportunity of destroying those who chiefly were obstructing his path to the dominion. Before any investigation he accused the Jacobins, the "Septembrists," by whom he knew himself to be hated as a deserter, and caused several of them to be arrested. The only difficulty was how to put them to death without any evidence whatever. A *senatus consultum* was a means for decreeing the adoption of extraordinary measures. An order of the consuls, confirmed by the senate, sentenced to deportation one hundred and thirty persons selected in the most arbitrary manner; Fouché succeeded in discovering the real criminals in three Chouans, who presently expiated their guilt on the scaffold. A further limitation of freedom, for which occasion was now afforded, consisted in the authority usurped by the government, against the strong opposition of the tribunate, of superseding the ordinary courts by special tribunals. These were to have control of exceptional cases, such as street robbery and tumult. This arrangement was to remain in force for two years after the general peace, and indicated nothing else than the right of the government to set aside at its will the forms and guarantees of the regular administration of justice.

After Marengo, the tone of those surrounding the First Consul approached more and more to that of a prince's court. At the Tuileries and at St.-Cloud, the favorite residence of Bonaparte, there were maids of honor and lords of the bedchamber, the etiquette and even the courtly costume of the old régime; salons and antechambers were filled with the *émigré* nobility. Men of the former day pleased him, as alone

knowing how to serve. It was surely a very legitimate purpose on his part, if he sought to reconcile the royalists to his rule. Wherever it was possible, he caused the customs and ideas of the monarchy to live again. The lavish profusion, with which men had played with the old names of freedom and country, disappeared from official proclamations, giving place to truth, fame, and honor. Thoroughly familiar with the excessive ambition of his Frenchmen, he introduced honorary sabres and guns, honorary trumpets and drum-sticks; the names of the recipients were to be engraven on marble tablets; as the source of all advancement, so would he be also the sole distributor of fame to all.

The greatness of his administration as ruler consisted, however, in this, that amid the efforts for the increase of his personal power he never lost sight of the interests of the country. In the combination of these two purposes lay the secret of his unparalleled attainment of power. For the welfare of the individual, he had indeed no heart, he reckoned always only with the masses; to this alone the system of government was adapted which he himself described as "the alliance of philosophy with the sword," that symmetrically constituted centralization in which, before the omnipotence of the state, every local or private activity of the individual disappeared. But in no respect were his personal interests so closely connected with those of the community as in the necessity of re-establishing the church. While, at an earlier day, the state had been master of the church, the law of 1795 (3d Ventose, III.) had entirely separated the two bodies; while formerly Catholicism had claimed exclusive rights, yet now absolute freedom of worship prevailed; the division of priests into those who had taken the oath, and those who refused it, still continued; there were not less than 10,000 married priests, among them fifty bi-shops; the property of the church had disappeared. Personally the attitude of Bonaparte toward all religion was one of complete indifference; it was to him something purely external. Christianity he regarded as acceptable, not because of its divine origin, but because it might serve to hold men in check, to teach them good morals and gratify their longing for the marvelous. "In Egypt," said he, "I was a Mohammedan, in France I am a Catholic." He was drawn to Catholicism by the fact, especially, that it had a pope, and between his maxims of government and the Romish hierarchy, between his hatred of spiritual freedom and the prescribed belief in an infallible church, there existed a natural affinity. He desired to establish the church again, since the people wished for it. In this view the church would become an instrument in his hands for attaining supreme power; and while he gained over the clergy, he intended to sever the last thread

which still bound the country to the old dynasty. Pope Pius VI., shortly before his death in the citadel of Valence (August 29, 1799), had issued an order that the conclave should be held in that place where the greater number of the cardinals might be residing. As soon, therefore, as Cardinal Chiaramonti was elected at Venice and took the name of Pius VII., the First Consul at once gave him to understand that he wished to enter into negotiations with the Holy See. After the battle of Marengo he attended mass in Milan; Sunday was restored as a day of rest; the republican holidays, January 21 and August 10, were abolished; the Madonna, which had been removed, was allowed to return to Loreto. But, notwithstanding the personal mildness of the new pope, he exhibited in the Curia such an invincible tenacity that Bonaparte in anger broke off the negotiations, and threatened, in case a conclusion were not reached in five days, to establish a French national church and annul the Peace of Tolentino. Himself a despot, he was unable to conceive of the relation of the pope to the church as anything else than that of an absolute despot, and did not comprehend the hesitations of the Curia growing out of canon law. On the advice of the French envoy Cacault, Pius VII. dispatched Cardinal Consalvi to renew negotiations at Paris. After his wont the First Consul endeavored to work upon him by intimidation and surprises. But Consalvi understood in what manner to secure his advantage. He completely saw through the design of the First Consul to surrender the French church to the pope on the sole supposition that the pope would assist in rendering it serviceable to him. In the concordat, which was subscribed on July 15, 1801, the pope and the First Consul united in a stroke of policy such as was unexampled in the history of the church. The pope was therein recognized anew as the supreme head of the French clergy, their civil constitution was abrogated, the right of choice in the congregations was abolished. The pope recognized the spoliation of church property and the secularization of the cloisters, and thus admitted that the Catholic religion was only the religion "of the majority of Frenchmen"; marriage became a civil contract. The chief difficulty—the question relative to the nonjuring priests and those who had taken the oath—was not solved, but cut through. In virtue of the plenitude of authority pertaining to him as pope, Pius VII., without even giving a hearing to the French bishops or making any previous communication to them, broke up at one stroke, by a decree of August 13, all archbishoprics and bishoprics, chapters and parishes of France, reduced the number of the former from 156 to 60, with entirely new boundaries, and required all bishops, constitutional and nonjuring, for the welfare of religion, to resign within ten days; those thereupon

nominated by the government to the new dioceses must receive authorization from the Curia; and on October 29 the pope declared all bishops, whose resignation was not then in his hands, to be deposed. The chief object of the First Consul in the Concordat was to make of the clergy a "consecrated police," as was shown by the "organic articles" which he arbitrarily subjoined to it. Inasmuch as these subordinated the influence of the pope and ecclesiastical official action to the civil power, they formed a connection once more with the traditions of the Gallican church, but since they rendered the majority of the priests removable at the nod of the bishop, they made the lower clergy wholly dependent on their ecclesiastical superiors. On Easter-day, 1802, France began its thanksgiving festival for the restoration of its church.

Next to the church, the school system, then in a lamentable condition, had its turn in reorganization; and like the former, this too was pressed into the system of centralization which had shown such an extraordinary adaptation for use in the machinery of the government. All educational institutions, divided into primary and secondary schools, lycées and special schools, were, by the law relating to instruction of May 1, 1802, subjected to the supervision and control of the state, but the aim of this education was not the moral and intellectual development of youth, but the infusion of principles in agreement with the dominant system. What Bonaparte styled ideology, the tendency toward the ideal, the not merely practical, the French were to be guarded against from childhood; history and philosophy, with the exception of logic, were therefore stricken from the course of studies. In the creation of 6400 free scholarships he believed himself to have secured an effective instrument for the political training of the coming generation, and also a means of acting upon the fathers. The public school, since the cultivation of the people seemed neither necessary nor desirable, remained under the control of the several communities, without intervention on the part of the state; and for the same reason, the education of girls fell entirely under the influence of the clergy. As the crown of the whole edifice, the University was constituted at a later day, a grandly planned institution, which, to the exclusion of all other and especially clerical influence, was empowered to organize, direct, and supervise the entire field of education. The reorganization (by the law of January 23, 1803) of the National Institute, erected under the Directory in place of the Academy, pursued also the one sole object of centralizing the arts and sciences and of rendering them conducive to the worship of the supreme power of the state; the abolition of the courses in moral and political science put an end to free inquiry in all other provinces than those of the exact sciences.

The third among the great works which the First Consul called to life was the codification of civil law, the *Code Civil*, the systematic collection of legal statutes previously scattered and in disorder. Without regard to their politics, Cambacérès, Merlin de Douai, Tronchet, and Portalis were chosen by Bonaparte as the most capable men for undertaking this task; he participated personally in the deliberations of the council of state concerning the draft submitted previously for the opinion of the higher courts of justice; the greater, consequently, was his anger on account of the thoroughly substantial and legitimate criticism which the tribunate employed respecting it. There now appeared the utter absurdity of the arrangement according to which neither the tribunate nor the legislative body possessed the right to amend any proposition made by the government, but had only the choice between simple acceptance or rejection. When the tribunate exercised the latter prerogative with respect to three points, escheatage of certain bequests, confiscation, and branding, Bonaparte became extremely indignant over such insolent opposition; but Cambacérès discovered a means to free him from this once for all: in order to secure in the simplest manner the purging of both bodies, and the replacement of opponents by pliant creatures, it was only necessary that the fifth removed annually according to the constitution should be selected, not by lot, but by the senate! With this hypocritical stroke of state policy there disappeared the last traces of influence exercised by popular representation. Now for the first time the First Consul suffered both bodies to take the vote upon the laws which hitherto he had not ventured to lay before them, viz., the amnesty in favor of the *émigrés* (excluding their chief leaders) and the restoration of their estates, so far as they were not yet disposed of or reserved as national forests, and the founding of the Order of the Legion of Honor.

Whither Bonaparte's wishes tended was no longer a mystery. It was certain that at the close of the session an enlargement of his authority would be proposed, but with regard to its limit and title it was in vain that the attempt was made to draw from him even a word. On May 6, the day on which the Treaty of Amiens was brought before the tribunate, this body decreed that a signal proof of national gratitude should be given to the First Consul. He, indeed, acted the part of Timoleon, and protested that the only object for which he strove was the love of his fellow-citizens; but he was seized with rage when the senate, by which he believed himself understood, pretended to take this high-minded disinterestedness in earnest, and decreed only the prolongation of his power for the space of ten years. In this measure he saw an affront. Since the voice of the people, he replied, had clothed him with supreme



authority, a prolongation of that authority required also its confirmation by the people. In view of the alleged general dissatisfaction with the decree of the senate in not having proffered the consulship for life, a decree of the council of state substituted this for the original question, and the highest functionaries of the state solemnly congratulated the First Consul on this compliance with the national will. The result of the vote showed more than 3,500,000 of affirmative against a few thousand negative voices. But whoever believed Bonaparte's ambition to be thus appeased was presently to be made conscious of his error. From his reply to the communication by the senate of the result of the election (August 3, 1802), France learned that the First Consul, "in order to secure freedom and equality against the caprices of fortune and the uncertainties of the future," interpreted the plébiscite in the same arbitrary manner as formerly the senate's decree, and conceived a series of changes in the constitution to be necessary. The inconsiderable remains of the right of election were soon displaced in all cases by appointment to office; the membership of the tribunate was reduced to fifty, and the prerogatives of the council of state were restricted by the creation of a privy council. The senate, through the right assigned to it of suspending or construing the constitution, of annulling decisions of courts of justice, of dissolving the legislative body and the tribunate, obtained a seeming increase of authority, but since it could make use of this only upon the initiative of the government, the advantages accrued not to it but to the First Consul, and his satisfaction was the greater that the gift of pardon and the appointment of his successor now pertained to him alone.

Advancing from one result to another, this Titanic man had reached the critical and decisive period in his life. Two paths lay open before him; one which, regarding the goal as achieved, pointed to the confirmation of his authority and a splendid and powerful position for France among European states; the other, utilizing the power attained only as steps onward to something greater yet to be won, led him on toward the abyss. The final, irrevocable choice depended on the course which he was now taking with regard to England.

The Treaty of Amiens had left several matters of dispute between the contracting powers unsettled, which were not easily adjusted, and were purposely passed over in silence. More dissatisfaction was caused by the disappointment of the English men of commerce, who had promised themselves a great demand for their manufactures in consequence of the peace, and now were compelled to find that not only did the First Consul throw difficulties in the way of the introduction of English merchandise into France, but he had also closed against them the markets of

Holland, Upper Italy, and Spain. On the other hand, nothing enraged Bonaparte so violently as the freedom enjoyed by the English press; he was angry that there should be any corner of the earth where his person and his acts could be boldly criticised. He had already demanded, in the peace negotiations, that "libelers," like murderers and counterfeiters, should be subject to extradition. Two months after the peace, he brought forward his complaints not only concerning the attacks of Englishmen, but also with respect to those of the *émigré* press, and demanded the banishment of leading *émigrés* as editors of the press. The more gentle the weak Addington cabinet appeared, the more vehement became his language. He protracted the negotiations relative to a commercial treaty in order thus to render the British cabinet pliable. But from the day on which he was convinced that intimidation availed nothing, he became firm in the determination to renew the war. That the English refused to give up Malta furnished a pretext; the incorporation of Pied-



FIG. 82.—Nelson. From an engraving by Forsmann, 1806.

mont and Elba was the gauntlet thrown down to England. His agents overran the British Isles, and prepared in advance the materials for a new insurrection in Ireland; he studied the place for a future landing; the greatest activity prevailed in French dockyards; after peace was concluded with the Porte on June 25, General Sébastiani was sent to the East under pretence of a journey with commercial objects. His

report, published in the *Moniteur* of January 30, 1803, contained with injurious attacks upon England a thorough enumeration of all the elements furnished by the East for a second conquest of Egypt. The official statement respecting the condition of the republic contained similar menacing language. Upon this the English cabinet renounced hope of the maintenance of peace, and the country approved. "I, my lords," declared Nelson (Fig. 82) in the Upper House, "have in different countries seen much of the miseries of war. I am, therefore, in my inmost soul a man of peace. Yet I would not, for the sake of any peace, however fortunate, consent to sacrifice one jot of England's honor. Our honor is inseparably combined with our genuine interest. Hitherto there has been nothing greater known on the Continent than the fame, the untainted honor, the generous public sympathies, the high diplomatic influence, the commerce, the grandeur, the resistless power, the unconquerable valor of the British nation." On March 8 the king informed the Parliament that, in view of warlike preparations in the French and Dutch harbors, he had taken the needful precautionary measures for the safety of the state. Bonaparte's answer consisted in issuing an order to create a fleet of 500 ships and gunboats. Louisiana, which could not be held and which was worthless after the failure of his great colonial plans, Bonaparte now sold to the United States for \$15,000,000, not caring that Spain had ceded it only on condition that it should be restored. On April 26, England delivered its ultimatum in Paris: evacuation of Holland and of Switzerland, indemnification of the King of Sardinia; on these conditions England engaged to recognize the kingdom of Etruria and the Italian Republic. Since acceptance of this did not follow within the appointed space of seven days, the English envoy left Paris on May 12. The Addington ministry gave place to the man whom the voice of the nation again summoned to the helm; William Pitt brought to his office the firm purpose of uniting Europe in a new alliance against the supremacy of France. In the proud British nation the threatened invasion of their homes excited an emotion of extraordinary depth and unanimity. Three hundred thousand men were enrolled as volunteers, the Parliament allowed the government to make a loan of £12,000,000, and increased the taxes; by a fresh levy the naval force was brought up to 120,000 men; a premature Irish insurrection under Robert Emmet and Thomas Russell, in July, 1803, met with a speedy end.

Against the opinion of his councillors, against the wishes of a nation longing for the blessings of peace, Bonaparte enkindled anew a war, which for more than a decade filled all Europe with indescribable sufferings, and sacrificed the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, until the

conqueror himself, vanquished and outlawed, was forced to flee for refuge to the hospitality of that same England which he now delivered over to the abhorrence of mankind.

Having once determined upon war, Bonaparte tasked all the formidable resources of his inexhaustible genius to strike to the heart that power, which, more than every other, blocked the way to the realization of his plans of world dominion. In France public opinion, having lost all its natural organs, was unable to make itself heard; the eight newspapers, which were still tolerated in Paris, ventured only to repeat that which the *Moniteur* had previously produced. But Bonaparte, by means of the centralization which was useful in so many ways, discovered the art of creating a public opinion. He needed a national movement, he ordered it, and promptly it was put in operation. The senate and the legislative body eagerly hastened to thank the "consular majesty" for the magnanimity and moderation which had been displayed, and the bishops to appoint prayers for the war against England, which refused to give back Malta to the Knights of St. John. Departments, communes, and private citizens were constrained to vie with one another in the presentation of patriotic gifts. In the *Moniteur* Bonaparte issued a kind of discourse against England. His consideration for the sacredness of the law of nations showed itself in the orders which he gave, before the declaration of war, that all Englishmen found in France, from eighteen to sixty years of age, should be imprisoned. Immense preparations were made to enable him to throw 150,000 men at once upon the English coast; six encampments, distributed along the coast from St.-Malo to Ghent, were established for the training of the troops. Withal he ventured to boast that he needed neither loan nor increase of taxation; for the greater part of the cost was thrown upon dependent states, and in the French budget figured under the modest name of "foreign receipts." The Batavian Republic, beside the support of its own 16,000 men, was obliged to undertake the maintenance of 18,000 Frenchmen, and to supply ten large ships and a great number of smaller vessels; the already sufficiently plundered Helvetic Republic agreed to an alliance offensive and defensive; Naples, although an utter alien to this war, was compelled to receive French garrisons in its harbors and to supply them with sustenance; Etruria also, and the Ligurian Republic, were not spared. According to the Treaty of Hdefonso, Spain was already actually bound to give aid in time of war, but the wretched Godoy made a pretence of remaining neutral. Bonaparte addressed a letter to King Charles IV., demanding of him "to remove a man who was gaining pos-

session of the entire royal power, and thereby had exhibited all the base peculiarities of his character;" and the humbled favorite immediately consented, with tears of repentance, to a new treaty (October 9, 1803), which doubled the burdens of the Treaty of Ildefonso, since, as a subsidy, the annual amount of 72,000,000 francs was imposed on Spain. Portugal had to contribute 16,000,000 francs.

Since a direct attack upon England appeared still to be impracticable, Bonaparte returned to his purpose of occupying Hanover, although this country had not the slightest political connection with the former, except that the two had a common sovereign. In order to obtain the assent of Prussia to this transaction, Duroc was dispatched to Berlin. At that court it was not in the least understood how nearly an occupation of the mouths of the Weser and Elbe by the French concerned the interests of Prussia. To the manly determination of repelling by the sword this invasion of German soil, the timid mind of the king could not be aroused. The Prussian proposal that England should give up Malta, and thus obviate the necessity of the occupation of Hanover, was followed by the dry response from London that Hanover was not England, and that the British government in choosing its political measures would never accept that view.

Hanover, after the departure of her sovereign to England, was under a patriarchal aristocracy, which ruled the country without severity or violence, and imposed only a moderate burden of taxes, but practiced to perfection the art of supporting itself in ease at the expense of the state. A privy council board of nobles ruled in a manner practically unrestricted and irresponsible. Although George III. never set foot upon the soil, a court existed full of lucrative sinecures for the nobility; by its side a bureaucracy of officers, instructed in civil functions, with their knowledge and their industry assisted to support the regiment of distinguished lords: the lower positions in the administration were committed to favorites of the great families. The citizen and the peasant were pleased with this state of things. That Bonaparte cherished some design upon Hanover was not unknown to the government of that country, but it was still far removed from seeking the aid of Prussia, since to this ossified and haughty aristocracy a Prussian occupation appeared greatly more hazardous than the entrance of the French. The brave Field-Marshal von Wallmoden received, in reply to his advice to adopt military measures of precaution, the notable answer: "we must seek to avoid everything which could cause umbrage and make a sensation," and he was instructed not to order the troops to fire, but in cases of most urgent necessity "to use the bayonet with moderation."

On his repeated and pressing representation the government finally issued a summons (May 16) to all subjects "when the necessity arose, to present themselves unhesitatingly for the safety and defence of the fatherland; should individuals seek to withdraw by flight from the country's defence, they should be declared to have forfeited forever all their property." There still survived in the population the hatred of the French, handed down from the Seven Years' War, but this summons made the very worst impression; whole districts refused compliance, and parents sent their sons out of the country. Finally the lords in Hanover came to the conclusion to call on Prussia for assistance, but their envoy, von der Deeken, found nothing but helplessness at Berlin. On May 25, Haugwitz consented that Prussia should make to Bonaparte the proposal to give up his scheme of the occupation of Hanover in consideration of a sum of money. It was confidently affirmed that Bonaparte would undertake nothing without having a previous understanding with Prussia.

But this very weakness and indecision of Prussia relieved the First Consul from all need of further deliberation. On May 27, 1803, Talleyrand gave notice to the Prussian ambassador of the entrance into Hanover. His assurance, that everything should be avoided that could occasion concern to Prussia, was unable to do away with the disagreeable impression in Berlin that deception had been practised. Mortier had only 12,000 men, but, in the daring confidence that no opposition was to be apprehended, he pressed through forest and over moorland as far as the Weser. Begun late and in confusion, all opposing measures were incomplete and imperfect, every act of hostility was carefully avoided, and an unimportant collision of cavalry at Nienburg was the only military event. As soon as Mortier had made arrangements for crossing the Weser, the privy council, intimidated by his threatening tone, concluded with him, on June 3, the thoroughly disgraceful capitulation of Suhlingen. The 15,000 men under Wallmoden were obliged to retreat into Lauenburg and to pledge themselves not to bear arms in this war against France. The Hanoverian fortresses and military supplies were yielded up. In such a dastardly and ignominious manner was all Hanover surrendered to the French. Not till after this occurrence was the entire trickery of Bonaparte disclosed. He made the ratification of the agreement dependent on the consent of King George to regard the Hanoverian army as subject to exchange for Frenchmen made prisoners by the English; if not, he would treat the country according to the rigor of the laws of war; and when the English government sought to escape from this utterly unjustifiable demand, he abruptly declared himself no longer





The Prussian Royal Family in the Garden of the Palace at Sans-Souci.



bound by the convention, and Mortier required that the Hanoverian army, which Wallmoden had led safely across the Elbe at Lauenburg, should be taken to France as prisoners of war. Nevertheless, Wallmoden made preparation for a conflict, but these transactions had so demoralized his troops, and the disposition of the common people had deteriorated to such a degree, that he was obliged to dismiss the thought. On a boat in the middle of the Elbe, near Artlenburg, a new convention was concluded upon July 5, in pursuance of which the disarmament was somewhat modified in execution, and the soldiers were dismissed to their homes.

The spoliation was completed with a thoroughness never seen except in a district occupied by the French. Up to December 23, 1803, in addition to the expense of quartering the men and the extremely costly entertainment of the officers, the amount extorted, simply for pay, supplies and equipment of the troops, was 17,500,000 francs. The indebtedness of the country was augmented, the taxes were increased, and the forests were cut down. The costs of occupation for twenty-six months were estimated at one year's revenue of the electorate, as high as twenty-six millions of thalers. Hamburg also was soon forced by menaces to secure to the French a loan of 3,000,000 francs, and they occupied Cuxhaven as well as Lauenburg and endeavored to prevent the navigation of the Elbe. The threatened attack upon England had already succeeded in summoning the enraged population to the defence of their national possessions, but among Germans there was no feeling of shame, no outburst of patriotic wrath. Emperor and empire remained indifferent spectators, and the court of Vienna preferred seeing the French rather than the Prussians in Hanover. At Ratisbon the diet was so persuaded of its own utter weakness that the semblance of desiring to preserve the integrity of the empire was not once assumed. The absorption of the ecclesiastical possessions had so entirely satisfied the lords of the land in the southwest, that now they subjected the knights of the empire, without further consideration, to their supremacy. This, however, was attempted too soon. When the imperial council interposed energetically in behalf of the injured parties, Bonaparte also, in order not to occasion a conflict, disapproved of the proceeding; Prussia desired at least more circumspection, and thus the princes were obliged for the time to forego the robbery.

In Berlin (PLATE XXI.) it was now perceived that a mistake had been committed in suffering the crying violation of the neutrality of North Germany. The disastrous results of this were experienced not alone in the loss of Prussia's consideration with friend and foe, but still

more immediately in the severe blow inflicted on Prussian business affairs, since England had answered the advance of the French by blockading the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Haugwitz proposed, without hesitation, to demand the evacuation of Hanover, and, if necessary, to enforce it, and the queen and Prince Louis Ferdinand were disposed to break with this lying Bonapartist policy; but the king could not be brought to adopt such an energetic measure. He preferred to send Lombard with a letter to the First Consul, then in Brussels, in order to obtain from him a quieting word for his own subjects as well as for his neighbors. It was a very moderate proof of independence which he thus gave, but even this was rendered of no avail by the folly of his envoy, who suffered himself to be entirely fascinated by Bonaparte, and, instead of the wished-for binding promise in reference to Cuxhaven and the mouths of the rivers, brought back from him, as a counter-proposition, the cession of Hanover to Prussia in return for an offensive and defensive alliance with France. To this proffer, which Lacchesini warmly supported, the king replied evasively, and the negotiations, which had been protracted for a long time between the two powers, ended without result. But already a new and bloody disgrace was awaiting the kingdom of Prussia, which had become contemptible through its feebleness.

Bonaparte's rupture with England had revived anew the hopes of his numerous enemies. Without the least notion of the disposition of the nation, the *émigrés* were again preparing confident plans for the re-establishment of the Bourbon throne. Especially did they count upon Moreau, who, by the seclusion in which he had lived since the battle of Hohenlinden, and the coolness with which he scorned the favor of the new court, had quietly acknowledged himself to be an adversary of Bonaparte. In accordance with their agreement, Georges Cadoudal, together with the most resolute Chouans, repaired secretly to Paris, and as soon as the necessary preparations were effected, Pichegru, who, since his flight from Cayenne, had gone wholly over to the Bourbon camp, was to follow, and to come to an understanding with Moreau and the other malcontents. The princes Artois and Berry and the other chiefs of the *émigrés* were to land on the French coast and put themselves at the head of the movement. The First Consul was to be surprised and captured on the public street. But the French police had knowledge of all the plots hatched within the *émigré* circle. They knew that it was arranged that after February 8, 1804, Pichegru and Cadoudal should be in Paris, and they hunted them from one hiding-place to another, and on the 28th Pichegru fell into their hands through treachery; on March 8,

Cadoudal was also seized. Moreau had been already arrested on February 17. Bonaparte greatly desired to have a sentence of death against Moreau, in order that he might play the part of one who magnanimously forgives, but the court could not declare the accused guilty, and only in order to find a passable expedient, they sentenced him, alleging extenuating circumstances, to imprisonment for two years. It was, however, by his own demeanor before the court that the victor of Hohenlinden lost more in the esteem of the public than a sentence of condemnation could have cost him. At first he denied everything, then he suffered himself to be induced by deceptive representations to appeal to the generosity of his old brother-in-arms, and finally on the supplication of his wife he accepted the modification of his punishment into banishment to America. Cadoudal and eleven of his associates died under the guillotine. Pichegru was found, on April 6, strangled in his prison.

Bonaparte was enraged that the attempt to seize the princes had failed. For weeks at a time had Savary secretly kept watch for them on the coast. But at least one other member of this house should fall a sacrifice, it mattered nothing whether guilty or not, so that the inclination to conspiracy on the part of these Bourbons should be driven out of them forever. The investigation was still pending, when, in the night of March 15, two squadrons of French dragoons crossed the Rhine and surrounded the town of Ettenheim in Baden, where the Duke d'Enghien was living in quiet seclusion; affection for the beautiful princess, Charlotte Rohan, had chained him to this spot. In greatest haste the prisoner was brought to Paris, and at two o'clock in the morning he was placed before a court-martial, presided over by General Hullin. Although not the least guilt could be proved against him, yet, after a summary proceeding without witnesses and without defence, he was condemned to death on the special order of the First Consul, and was immediately shot (March 20), under the eye of Savary, in the moat of the fortress of Vincennes. Either to assume a show of impartiality, or in order to withdraw himself from all requests and supplications, the First Consul had meantime made himself invisible at Malmaison. All the participants subsequently endeavored to exculpate themselves from all share in the crime, and the execution was imputed to an unfortunate concurrence of unforeseen casualties. But it was the deed of a genuine Corsican vendetta, a well-considered assassination, and one of the most dastardly that ever occurred. Murat and Talleyrand were those who confirmed Bonaparte in his purpose, and like him they regarded it only as a salutary terror which ought to be inflicted: but horror and dismay seized upon all his other advisers. Not otherwise was the impression in Europe, and the document in justi-

fication sent to one and all of the cabinets sounded rather like a self-accusation. The court of St. Petersburg put on mourning. In the German empire alone, whose soil had been violated in a manner so unexampled, the sentiment of national and princely honor appeared to be wholly extinguished. There was first needed on the part of Russia—as security for the constitution of the empire—a solemn protest against the outrage by which the peace and safety of Germany were violated, before the affair was brought into discussion before the diet, but even then it came at a time that was highly inopportune. At Vienna, likewise, Cobenzl assured the French ambassador that “his master comprehended the necessity of the policy,” and therefore all imaginable pains were taken at Ratisbon to cause the fatal transaction to pass into oblivion. Talleyrand had insisted upon a simple order of the day, as that which “alone was compatible with peace and dignity,” and then Baden also expressed the desire, in accordance with Bonaparte’s wishes, that “disclosures with regard to the incident which had occurred might be followed up no further.” Since the Russian ambassador did not allow himself to be thereby prevented from insisting upon satisfaction, England also for Hanover, and Sweden for Pomerania, uniting in this demand, the diet finally, in order to avoid all embarrassment, seized upon the expedient of deserting in a body, and thus creating premature holidays. The outrage at Ettenheim was still in the mouths of all, when Bonaparte perpetrated another similar act upon the English consular agent, Rumbold, in the circle of Lower Saxony. Rumbold was seized at night in his country-seat near Hamburg, and dragged away (October 25, 1804). This new and gross violation of the law of nations was not received so patiently at Berlin, and in order not to drive Prussia at an inconvenient time and without need into the camp of the enemy, Bonaparte thought it expedient, on the king’s intervention, to set the prisoner at liberty. But in bitter anger he said: “The King of Prussia has given me a bad quarter of an hour; I will return it to him with interest.”

Bloodshed and violation of law were the steps upon which the First Consul ascended to his throne as emperor.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE FOUNDING OF THE EMPIRE.

**T**HOUGH the execution of the Duke d'Enghien filled the world with horror and unmasked Bonaparte in his real character, various circumstances favored the First Consul in his triumphant progress toward what was virtually absolute power.

The conspiracy of Cadoudal and Pichegru came as if summoned to promote the realization of the long cherished wish of Bonaparte's heart (Fig. 83). The detection was hardly effected when electoral assemblies and municipal councils eagerly vied with one another in conjuring the First Consul to put an end to the disquietude of the nation and to confirm the measures of state that had been adopted by restoring hereditary succession. This storm of addresses came only from above, and it was in no sense the expression of the unbiased will of the people. However, it is true that the tyranny of the democracy was imprinted in such bloody forms on the memory of the French people that, without opposition, they hailed the despotism of a powerful potentate as the only means of maintaining order, and to secure this they willingly renounced the liberty which had been presented before them only in the shape of license. "I found," Napoleon could say with propriety at St. Helena, "the crown of France on the ground, and I raised it on the point of my sword." Suddenly there was awakened the servile zeal of all those who in advance placed their dependence upon the favor of the new monarch. These desires Fouché betrayed in the subtlest manner. At his instance the senate changed their congratulations on the escape of the First Consul into an invitation to him to delay no longer the completion of his great work, but to render it immortal as his fame, and to guarantee the future. The time for deliberation which Bonaparte's hypoeritical modesty demanded served only the purpose of setting in operation the immense bureaucratic machinery for multiplying popular demonstrations. Like Fouché, Talleyrand desired to have no further knowledge of the Revolution, from the body of which France had taken out the bones, and declared himself ready to aid in erecting the new power, it being presupposed that it would be devoted to the welfare of the nation, and that he himself should gain

advantage by it. There remained now only the question of the form to be given to the new monarchy. The title of king, which he proposed, threw Bonaparte into a rage; at no price would he be the successor of the Bourbons. "I am the French Revolution," he exclaimed, "and I shall maintain it." In the tribunate the proposal to establish the empire, in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte and in his family, let loose a flood of the basest flattery. The only man who spoke against it with manly



FIG. 83. Napoleon with the Iron Crown. From an engraving by Longhi, 1812.

boldness, as to Robespierre at an earlier day, was Carnot, who thereby only saved his good name, seriously compromised by previous servility to Bonaparte. On May 18, the senate delivered to the First Consul at St.-Cloud the decree conferring on him the hereditary dignity of Emperor of the French. In case of the failure of direct descendants it should pass over to his brothers Joseph and Louis and their descendants. On this occasion Bonaparte did not await, before assuming the new title, the

popular vote which, for the sake of appearances, had been ordered to be taken. From the constitution of the year VIII. there now disappeared every limitation of his absolute will. The senate, of a servile mind, and treated as slaves, as only the senate of Tiberius had ever been, forgot its own nothingness in view of the rich revenues settled upon it; the legislative body assembled annually for only a few weeks; the prerogatives of the tribunate were still further abridged; the ministers were only mute instruments; woe to him who should have ventured to speak aught contrary to the will of the master. Bonaparte had made no secret of the fact that in his immediate entourage he preferred useful and pliant mediocrity of talent to men of intellectual weight. Thus the supreme rule rested upon the powerful shoulders of one man exclusively and alone, and to his mind the conception appeared utterly foreign that his ability to bear this rule and that of the world besides had any limits whatever. Not as the head of the state in France, but as successor of Charlemagne, as the universal sovereign, he proclaimed himself by the triumphal progress which he made in September, accompanied by his consort, through the Rhine provinces.

As a son of his own deeds had Napoleon reached this pinnacle of human power, but in order to stand as the equal of the old dynasties which he had bowed beneath his feet, he felt that one thing was still lacking: the birthright inherited from remote ancestors, the possession which is sanctioned by prescription. "It is my misfortune," said he, "that I am not my own grandson." This want he considered could be best supplied by a religious consecration, however little this might be in accord with the state of the times. It was a severe humiliation for the pope (Fig. 84) after all the mortifications and injuries




FIG. 84.—Pope Pius VII. Bust by Antonio Canova (1757-1822). From an engraving by P. Fontana (1762-1837).

which he had suffered, and still more after the recent murder of d'Enghien, to anoint his murderer as the chosen of the Lord. However, after long deliberation, Pius VII. decided upon the journey to Paris, and, although he had received nothing but indefinite assurances, he yet flattered himself with the hope of obtaining from the gratitude of Napoleon the removal of the constitutional bishops, the revocation of the organic articles, and even, in addition, the institution of the legations. But his sojourn there, although prolonged for several months, was for him only a series of bitter disappointments. All that he obtained was confined to the reintroduction of the Gregorian calendar and the recantation of the constitutional priests; moreover, the emperor was obliged to consent to the restoration of marriage by the church. The solemnity of the coronation in Notre Dame (PLATE XXII., Fig. 85) took place on December 2, and although set forth with boundless splendor, it was chilling and stiff, and attended with a ceremonial in most respects partly painful and partly ridiculous. The emperor suffered the pope to wait for a full hour, then took the crown from his hand, and himself placed it upon his own head (cf. PLATE XXIII.).

As another means of concealing his plebeian origin, the new Caesar surrounded himself with an exceedingly splendid court. His two oldest brothers and his former associates in the consulship, Cambacérès and Lebrun, were decorated with the grotesque titles of Grand Elector, Grand Constable, Lord High Chancellor, and Lord High Treasurer, but to a large extent he borrowed titles, etiquette, and even persons from the old régime, for Napoleon appointed preferably as officers of his court members of the noble families, who had returned home and were reconciled to the new order, the bearers of names renowned of old. But that which he could not recall to his court was the elegance and the *esprit* of Versailles before the year 1789. Notwithstanding the lavish profusion of external splendor, this court was not free from plebeian features, and remained within itself barren, empty, and tedious. But what was lacking in him was not merely good breeding and good taste; great as was his intellect, equally base was his soul, possessing neither magnanimity nor understanding for that which is noble. Heartlessness, contempt for mankind, and selfishness remained conspicuous in his character, and a want of veracity that was utterly insensible to the disgrace of falsehood. No human yielding up of his heart did Napoleon ever know, and if he seemed to follow it at any time, it was only a calculated attitude. No enkindling breath went forth from him, and never had he a trusted or a real friend. The ablest of his generals, so far as they showed requisite devotion, were promoted to become marshals, but the distinguished







Anointing of Napoleon and the Coronation of the Empress Josephine in Notre-Dame at Paris on December 2, 1804

After an engraving by Filleul of the painting by Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825). (Versailles Historical Gallery.)





- 1 The Emperor
- 2 The Empress
- 3 The Pope
- 4 The High Treasurer
- 5 The Arch-Chancellor
- 6 Prince of Neuchâtel
- 7 Prince of Benevento
- 8 Victor of Italy
- 9 The Chief Master of the Horse
- 10 Prince of Ponte Corvo
- 11 Cardinal Fesch
- 12 Italian priests
- 13 The papal envoy, Cardinal Caprara
- 14 Cardinal Braschi
- 15 A Greek bishop
- 16 The Grand Duke of Berg
- 17 Secretary-Councillor of the Commune
- 18 de Moncey, Councillor of the Commune
- 19 Bessieres, Councillor of the Commune
- 20 The Grand Master of Ceremonies
- 21 General d'Harville, Senator
- 22 The General-Treasurer of H. M.
- 23 Madame de Rochefort-aud
- 24 Madame de la Vierge
- 25 The Archbishop of Paris and his two Vicars-general
- 26 The Empress-mother (Madame de Metz)
- 27 Madame de Fontanges
- 28 Chamberlain de Coze-Brissac
- 29 Chamberlain de la Ville
- 30 Madame de Soult
- 31 The Chief Master of the Horse, de Beaumont
- 32 The King of Naples
- 33 The King of Holland
- 34 The Grand Duchess of Berg
- 35 The Princess Bogues
- 36 The Princess Bacciotti
- 37 The Queen of Naples
- 38 Prince Napoleon (died 1807)
- 39 The Queen of Holland
- 40 Junot, Governor of Paris
- 41 The Prefect of the Palace, de Lema-sat
- 42 Chamberlains
- 43 Duroc, Grand Marshal of the Palace
- 44 Marshals - Lefebvre - Kourmantz, and Pennequin
- 45 Admiral Trépan
- 46 Count Coluzzi
- 47 Saur de Mareschal
- 48 Envoy of the United States
- 49 Envoy of the Pope
- 50 Various famous persons, painters, architects, archaeologists, poets, etc.





Distribution of the Eagles to the Army, on December 3, 1804

After an engraving by Trilley of the painting by Jacques-Louis David, 1774-1825. Versailles, Historical Gallery.

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


Fig. 55.—Head of Napoleon's coronation procession before the Palace of the Tribunal on the way to Notre Dame. Drawn and engraved by L. D. Lelen.

Leconrbe expiated his friendship for Moreau by being entirely neglected.

It was an ardent desire of Napoleon, as it had been of Louis XIV., to render literature and the arts subservient to the glorification of his person and his rule, but this was beyond his power. He was highly annoyed that the great poet, who should have sung his deeds, would not suffer himself to be discovered. In vain did he found high prizes for the best productions in art and science, which were to be distributed by him every ten years on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire, but in both




FIG. 86.—Promenade on the Boulevard des Italiens at Paris. From a copper-plate engraving of 1809.

departments the period of the empire remained fearfully barren. Art was stiffened into conventional dullness, and poetry, subjected to police supervision, was silent or became adulatory. Even an M. J. Chenier profaned his talent to create the fawning drama of *Cyrus*, and, in view of the vast collections, the spoil of conquered princes, that were gathered and displayed in the Louvre for the benefit of all Europe, Schiller was bold to speak the noble words: "He alone possesses the muses who





PLATE XXIV



The Coronation of Napoleon in Milan on May 23, 1805

Fresco in the Imperial Palace at Milan by Andrea Appiani, court-painter of Napoleon (1754-1815), after a copper-plate engraving by Francesco Rosaspina (1762-1841)

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cherishes them in a warm heart; to Vandals they are stone." On the other hand, incomparable in the art of organizing despotism and leading the French into forgetfulness of the sterile theories of the Constituent Assembly, by means of the multiplicity of his creations, he completely brought it to pass that of the intoxication of freedom, only submission, obedience as the sole civic virtue survived. Even among those who were formerly the fiercest republicans he knew how to find useful laborers for the building of the new social edifice. While, indeed, a loud lament arose here and there over the taxes reimposed under the name of *droits réunis*, over the blood tribute of conscription, yet none the less did the nation of Voltaire and Rousseau offer up its idolatrous worship to the wonderful man, to whom it was indebted for its material prosperity, for its highest renown in war, and for the intoxicating consciousness of being the Great Nation.

In continuation of the game begun two years since, the Italian republic must now make request to be transformed into a monarchy. In the beginning Napoleon had destined this crown for his brother Joseph or Louis, but they both rejected it, in order not to endanger in any respect their right of succession to the throne in France. After he had given on the plains of Marengo a representation of that memorable battle, he then at Milan (PLATE XXIV.), May 23, 1805, placed on himself the iron crown of Lombardy, and announced his stepson, Eugene Beauharnais (Fig. 87), as viceroy of Italy. The Batavian republic also received provisionally a half-monarchical form.

Of foreign courts none had such a near concern in the establishment of the empire of Napoleon as that of Vienna. A restoration of the royal throne in France would have been hailed with joy as closing the Revolution, but a second imperial government in the west would, by its mere existence, be prejudicial to the hitherto solitary Roman-German empire. To an immediate, unreserved recognition, such as Frederick William III. had given and as the Archduke Charles warmly recommended, whereby Austria in alliance with France would be able effectually to oppose the designs of Russia upon Turkey and those of Prussia upon North Germany, the court would not assent. It was only after Napoleon had conceded the parity of the Austrian imperial dignity and allowed precedence to the Roman emperor, that the desired recognition followed.

There existed at Vienna the most urgent reasons for compliance. The army was disorganized, among the officers a refractory spirit prevailed, and among the people discontent and ill humor made themselves felt by reason of the scarcity and want existing among the exasperated population. But to strengthen and to exercise these paralyzed energies, sagacity



*J. B. J. Le Prince*  
*Architecte et Peintre*



*Eugene N. Napoleon*  
*Le Roy. M. de la Prince de Serres*

FIG. 87.—Prince Eugene Napoleon. From an engraving by Louis Rados, 1808; original drawing by J. B. Bosio.

and good will were alike wanting. To remedy the extreme financial disorder no other method was known than multiplying government paper money and increasing the taxes, "for a slight burden is prejudicial to a people, since it opens door and gate to idleness and relaxes industry." The payment in paper money of the interest on state debts, ordered on December 14, 1804, was already the beginning of admitted bankruptcy. An economic system, which, as shown by the usury decree of 1805, rather aimed to discourage business than to revive it; the land and water ways wretchedly neglected; agriculture hampered by the remains of the feudal system; the recently acquired Italian provinces extremely dissatisfied because not the least thing was done for their improvement; Hungary embittered by reason of the constantly renewed attempts to restrict her constitutional rights; the Protestants contemptuously treated; all intellectual life after the brief awakening under Joseph II. again fallen into a deep sleep; connection with the great literary movement of Germany severed through petty supervision and a distrustful police censorship; the highest circles split into hostile camps; whence, then, could improvement in affairs have arisen? Men, indeed, imagined that by a change of mechanism of the state such a result could be reached. On August 31, 1801, there was created, instead of the Council of State, a Ministerial and State Conference, under the personal presidency of the emperor, but since this body possessed no really conclusive voice, and the emperor, dull, narrow, and suspicious, stiffly insisted upon personally discharging the most inconsiderable matters of business, delays increased to such an extent that, the next summer, already two thousand reports of the most urgent nature were awaiting action. On the other hand, the clergy recovered its jurisdiction, and, in addition, obtained exclusive control over the schools. A commission of review subjected all writings published since the time of Joseph II. to a careful examination. The Archduke Charles had undertaken to reform the army, as president, since January 9, 1801, of the Audie council of war, and the service for life had been reduced to fourteen years, the purchase of office in the cavalry had been abolished, and the council of war was placed under the war ministry.

Under such circumstances the disinclination at Vienna to take part in the English-French war was justified. No one was more strongly penetrated than the Archduke Charles with the conviction that Austria needed peace first of all, in order to be able to concentrate all her energies upon the work of internal reform. Still, this sagacious and provident caution was shortly afterward put to a test by a change in the general political situation, which it was unable to endure. The shock came from Russia.

The St. Petersburg conspirators of March 23, 1801, had entirely miscalculated if they imagined that after the murder of the Emperor Paul they were to possess the controlling influence. Not to them did the young Czar Alexander I. commit himself, but to a circle of his youthful companions, of whom Count Kotschubey alone filled a ministerial post; the others, like the Polish Prince Czartoryski, Count Paul Stroganoff, Prince Alexander Galitzin, and Nicolas Novosiltzoff, were bound to him by personal friendship. In union with them the susceptible pupil of Laharpe hoped to obliterate the dark commencement of his reign by deeds of beneficence, which he should accomplish for his people and the whole world. The "secret office," the dreaded political and police court under his predecessor, was abolished, and persons imprisoned or banished by it were set at liberty; an imperial council was erected, over which the emperor was personally to preside; the powers of the senate were enlarged; the nobility and clergy were reinstated in the possession of their original rights; educational interests as well as commerce and trade were promoted. Alexander aimed likewise at the greatest results in the foreign policy which he adopted. The more splendidly his fancy depicted the call to be umpire of Europe, the more insufferable to his mind were the arrogant assumptions with which Bonaparte challenged and insulted the other powers. It had been already a sore annoyance that in dividing up the German territories Bonaparte had made use of him only as an instrument, and that he had received nothing; and when the murder of d'Enghien occurred, nowhere was greater agitation caused than in St. Petersburg. Markoff, the Russian ambassador at Paris, acquitted himself in a manner so offensive that his recall was inevitable, but in St. Petersburg his master received him with the highest distinction. Alexander's change of policy, however, had its rise substantially in the interests of the Russian empire itself. The French garrisons in Brindisi and Otranto constituted a violation of the treaty of October 11, 1801, and held in check not only the English at Malta, but also the Russians at Corfu. Bonaparte's evident design to re-establish the influence of France in the east struck the eastern policy of Russia at its most sensitive point. On the First Consul's rejection of the Russian ultimatum—evacuation of Naples and Hanover and indemnification of the King of Sardinia—the diplomatic intercourse between the two empires was broken off.

Alexander would have preferred, at the head of a league with the two German powers, to announce to Napoleon the limits to which the latter could go. To Frederick William of Prussia he was bound, since a personal interview at Memel, in June, 1802, by an enthusiastic friend-

ship. Yet his proposals now found no favorable soil in Berlin; the king desired no war, and continued negotiations with France; he totally failed to recognize the fact that to maintain a peaceable juxtaposition with this military power, provided with over half a million of fighting men and always ready to attack, was in general an impossibility. In February, 1804, Haugwitz, who just then returned to assume direction of affairs, succeeded in having the definite question sent to St. Petersburg: Could Prussia, in case of French hostilities, depend upon Russian aid? The reply of the czar, that if the king stepped forward on behalf of the independence of Europe, he would instantly place himself by his side, was decisive with regard to the conclusion to suspend negotiations with France and to exchange (May 24) secret stipulations with Russia, by which both powers pledged themselves to resist all further encroachments, if necessary with arms, and to effect the removal of the French troops from North Germany. To England, also, Alexander drew nearer, although but slowly; in September he sent his friend, Novosiltzoff, to London, with a comprehensive plan, which aimed at nothing less than the reconstruction of the entire European political world, on the principle of freedom within each state, and just limitation without.

At Vienna the satisfaction over Alexander's estrangement from France could not, however, terminate the wavering between warlike and peaceful councils. As a preliminary measure, the middle course recommended by Cobenzl found favor: to avoid everything that could irritate Napoleon, and, taking advantage of the yellow fever which had broken out in Spain, and under pretext of making an effective quarantine against it, to occupy the Italian and Swiss frontiers. The Austrian court felt itself to be between "the hammer and the anvil," between Napoleon's watchful distrust on the one hand, and on the other Alexander's growing displeasure on account of the indecision at Vienna. To this danger was added the reflection that Napoleon's insatiable avidity would never be self-restrained. These considerations led to the secret defensive treaty of Austria with Russia, of November 6: on the least additional encroachment on the part of Napoleon a force of 350,000 combatants should be put under arms, of which Austria should furnish 235,000 and Russia 115,000 men. The latter promised to secure English subsidies; in the event of a happy issue, Austria should obtain as frontiers the Adda and the Po, the restoration of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and Salzburg and Bavaria as far as the Inn. Both parties pledged themselves not to conclude peace singly.

Although on the side of Austria only measures of defence were meant, yet this treaty became the foundation of the new coalition, by

means of which Pitt's bold scheme of arming the whole continent against revolutionary France approached its realization. Austria being secured, Alexander now signed, on April 11, his league with England, having for its objects the re-establishment of the balance of power in Europe, the removal of the French from Hanover, the independence of Holland and Switzerland, the restoration of the King of Sardinia, and the freeing of Italy from French domination; after the close of the war a general congress was to settle permanently the relations of European states. An army of nearly half a million of combatants was to enforce these demands.

Upon the friends of peace in Vienna the first intelligence of the Anglo-Russian treaty produced a very depressing effect. The Archduke Charles saw in Russia only the endeavor to bring Austria on to the field of battle, in order herself to take just as much part as she might please. Such severe lessons were needed in order finally to open the eyes of the Austrian cabinet to the folly of the old hatred of Thugut's party for Prussia; an honorable understanding with that country was now the only means of protecting Austria against the enmity or against the obtrusive friendship of Russia. With this view labored Friedrich Gentz (Fig. 88), the most remarkable publicist whom Germany had produced up to that time. He preached in the most impressive manner the necessity of overcoming the old spirit of opposition to Prussia, if all was not to come to ruin, if all hope of restoring the German name to its old dignity was not to be lost. There really was in Berlin also a war party; at its head were the Queen Louisa and Prince Louis Ferdinand, who, after a wild youth, had now devoted his rich nature to an earnest discharge of his duties. Haugwitz also, now but a private citizen, zealously favored a good understanding with both neighbors. Hardenberg, who, on August 13, 1804, was appointed his successor, thought otherwise. Quite unconcerned, he did not believe in the existence of any real danger from Napoleon, and cheerfully undertook the art of securing for Prussia, without conflict or great exertion, but entirely by diplomatic skill, the extension of its boundaries and a better rounding out of the frontier. To him, a born Hanoverian, the acquisition of Hanover appeared most desirable, yet he suffered a covetous eye to glance toward Saxony and Bohemia, and, since the accomplishment of wishes of this kind was possible only by the aid of France, his inclination favored that country, and made it his most anxious concern to avert the contingency of war, which the treaty with Russia contemplated. These views found important support as well in the king's avowed love of peace, as also in the deep-rooted distrust of the policy of Vienna.



According to the assurance of Metternich, then Austrian ambassador in Berlin, only one man, the Emperor Alexander, was able to unite Prussia and Austria in alliance; and for this Alexander was very ready. In February, his adjutant, Wintzingerode, appeared at Ber-



FIG. 88.—Friedrich Gentz. From the original painting in the possession of Prince Richard Metternich-Winneburg at Vienna.

lin, in order to compel Prussia to enter the coalition either from regard to profit, or by threats. But in point of honesty this proceeding possessed no advantage whatever; among the advisers of the

czar, at least Czartoryski urged the artful plan that Alexander, in order to gain the good will of the Poles, should assume the title of King of Poland; that Austria should be compensated for the loss of Galicia by Silesia at the expense of Prussia; it was not found at all necessary to grant the Berlin cabinet full insight into the treaties that were concluded. But Wintzingerode's brusque manner had no greater success than the courtliness of Metternich and of General Merveldt, who was sent to his assistance. But meantime an important crisis had occurred at Vienna; the Aulic council of war was again rendered independent of the ministry of war, the Archduke Charles was left at the head of the latter only; Quartermaster-General Duka, his favorite, was supplanted by Mack, in whom was found, as people imagined, the man who, by stamping his foot, could summon armies from the ground; for, when Charles had demanded six months within which to prepare the troops for marching, the other promised to be ready in two months. Hence, without hesitation, the strength of the two armies and the time for commencing hostilities were settled with Wintzingerode.

But Russia was still far in arrears with her preparations. In order to gain time, Alexander turned to the King of Prussia with the request that he would make another attempt for an amicable arrangement, and the latter was immediately ready to aid in extinguishing by diplomacy the threatening firebrand of war; passports to Napoleon were by his order made out for Novosiltzoff. But other difficulties were multiplying from day to day; since King Gustavus IV. had joined the coalition, Swedish Pomerania, also, was threatened with becoming the theatre of war. Napoleon was no longer willing to be appeased. As the wish to maintain peace had at no time whatever influenced his policy, except that he would put off one adversary until he had subdued another, in like manner his provoking procedure at this time in Italy showed that he regarded circumspection as no longer necessary. On June 4, 1805, he effected the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic and Piedmont with the French Empire; Parma was made over to the kingdom of Italy; a principality formed out of Lucca and Piombino, afterwards increased by the addition of Massa and Carrara, was assigned to Bacciochi, the husband of Napoleon's sister Élise. Upon such news Novosiltzoff returned to Berlin. At Vienna the danger to Venice, and the fear of losing the aid of Russia, alike forbade longer delay; on August 9, Austria joined the Russo-English alliance. She went into the war, according to Niebuhr's expression, like a bride, who, forced to marry, comes to the altar with tears in her eyes. While there was needed in order to meet so formidable an enemy the utmost elevation of mind, the

only general of the country depressed by his hopelessness the feeling of the court and of the army.



FIG. 89. Nelson. From an engraving by W. Barnard; original painting by F. L. Abbott (1762-1803).

During those diplomatic preliminaries to a new continental war Napoleon had continually prosecuted, on the greatest scale, his preparations for a landing in England. It was and ever remained the Titan's dream to re-establish that France beyond the ocean which had been destroyed in the conflicts of the eighteenth century, and to overthrow the British power that had risen upon its ruins. Since England by the seizure of the Peruvian silver fleet, in October, 1804, had broken openly with Spain, he found himself master of all the harbors and maritime resources of the latter country. But the further his preparations advanced, the more irresistibly there pressed upon him the conviction of the impracticability of his attempt. However ingenious his arrangements might be, they all led up to one defect, that a very inconceivable concurrence of favorable conditions must exist in order to carry them into effect. Admiral Villeneuve—such was the emperor's plan—taking advantage of stormy weather, was to escape from the harbor of Toulon, blockaded by Nelson (Fig. 89); and draw him off by a diversion to the West Indies; at the same time Admiral Ganteaume should sail from Brest; both, then, should speedily turn back to Europe, form a junction with the Spanish squadron at Ferrol, and hastening to Boulogne cover the passage of the fleet of transports. Villeneuve fortunately slipped out of Toulon on March 30, 1805, at Cadiz joined the Spanish admiral, Gravina, and, on May 13, cast anchor before Martinique; but he waited here in vain for Ganteaume, whom the English held effectually blockaded in Brest. Napoleon's order recalled him to Ferrol; happily he escaped Nelson, who had sought for him with feverish passion, first eastward as far as the Nile, then in the Caribbean Sea; but after an indecisive engagement at the point of Cape Finisterre he retreated to Cadiz in order to escape a sure destruction from the combined forces of the enemy. The grand scheme of a landing was thus frustrated; for this failure the reproaches of Napoleon assailed the admiral most unjustly, and the gathering storm of war upon the continent forced this matter completely into the background, but to deceive the enemy preparations for landing in England still continued to be prosecuted. The concentration of his army at Boulogne gave the emperor a great advantage over his enemies on the continent; this army was, according to his own testimony, the finest in Europe, full of military ambition, from the marshal down to the last drummer, and inflamed by the renown of the Italian campaigns, led by excellent generals in the flower of their age, formed in the school of the most gifted commander of armies, and confident of victory over every foe with the emperor as their chief. On August 23, he wrote to Talleyrand: "Should the united fleet not arrive from Ferrol and

Brest, I shall hasten to that which is most pressing ; I shall break up my encampment, and on September 23, I shall stand with 200,000 men in Germany and with 25,000 in Naples. I shall march upon Vienna, and will not lay down my arms until I have Naples and Venice, and until Bavaria be so enlarged that I shall have nothing more to fear from Austria."

Masterly as was the military preparation for the war, the diplomatic was not less so. It was of the first importance for Bonaparte to detach Prussia from the coalition, and if possible to draw it over to an alliance with himself. He offered Hanover as a price for this : the union of Prussia with France was a promise of the maintenance of peace, since in that event Russia and Austria would not venture to attack him. In a conference held on August 28, at Halberstadt, between Hardenberg, the Duke of Brunswick, and Schulenburg, all three spoke in favor of consenting to these proposals, since without the possession of Hanover, Prussia, on the occurrence of any outbreak between France and England, would be drawn into the strife, and only through the departure thence of the French could the king's possessions in Lower Saxony and Westphalia be secured. On September 1, Duroc delivered the direct proffer of a treaty offensive and defensive with France in return for the cession of Hanover, for which Prussia was to yield up Cleves, together with Wesel. While a proposal that comprehended the surrendering to France of the Lower Rhine and the anticipation of making an enemy of England, and simply ignored the conditions brought forward on the Prussian side, was in itself but little attractive, there came now also the urgent warnings of Haugwitz concerning the devices of Bonaparte, and his counsel to remain neutral. In this respect, he understood so much better than Hardenberg the inmost purpose of the king, that he was recalled to the conduct of affairs in order to maintain neutrality with vigor on every side. Amid all these discussions Napoleon gained this advantage from negotiation, that Prussia withstood the summons to enter the coalition. He met with greater success at Munich. Bavaria, incessantly hard-pressed and threatened by Austria since the reign of Joseph II., was not difficult to win ; on August 24, the Elector Maximilian Joseph (Fig. 90) signed a secret offensive and defensive treaty with France. The dynastic propaganda which Napoleon carried on at the courts of the German princes was more fruitful in results than the revolutionary propagandism with which the republic had afflicted the peoples.

Now followed blow upon blow. On August 16, the emperor brought together the corps of Soult and Ney at Boulogne, for the purpose of inflaming the ardor of his troops by a distribution of crosses of the



FIG. 90 - Maximilian Joseph, King of Bavaria. From an engraving by S. Nikolaus Schenker (about 1769-1822); painted by J. K. Stieler (1781-1858).

Legion of Honor, accompanied with imposing ceremonies ; three days before he had dispatched a note to Vienna, demanding that the Austrian preparations for war should cease ; without awaiting an answer, he followed this on the 16th by a second note in still sharper terms. A more serious error could not have been committed at Vienna than to imagine it possible to surprise Napoleon because occupied with the landing in England ; notwithstanding all doubts on the part of the Archduke Charles, the only explanation admitted for the "blindness" of the French emperor was that he seemed not to believe that the Austrian and Russian preparations were being made in earnest. According to the Austrian plan of campaign the Archduke Charles, with 95,000 men, was to make the principal attack in Upper Italy ; for the scene of hostilities in Germany only 60,000 men were appointed, of whom nominally the Archduke Ferdinand was leader, but in fact the chief command was assigned to General Mack, in Napoleon's judgment one of the most incapable of men. This army was to be brought up to 150,000 by the addition of 90,000 Russians. The connection between the two wings was to be maintained by the Archduke John with 32,000 men in the Tyrol. The operations contemplated at the extremity of each wing—a Swedo-Russian landing in Pomerania, which was to advance against Hanover, and a Russo-English expedition to the Gulf of Taranto for the purpose of bringing aid to Naples and of coming into the rear of Masséna, who was guarding the peninsula with 50,000 men—were both impracticable from the first, the one on account of Prussian neutrality, and the other because Napoleon's menaces had forced Naples into a treaty of neutrality. According to the plan of the Archduke Charles, Mack was to take up a position and wait there until the attack in Italy succeeded ; but notwithstanding that of the two Russian armies one had scarcely reached the Galician frontier, and the second was only assembling at Warsaw, and that much was still wanting on the part of the Austrians in efficiency in the field, Mack was pushed onward by his thirst for action, and not without effort did Charles cause it to be settled that the German army should advance only as far as was necessary to cover Swabia, and that in the event of Napoleon forcing an engagement before the arrival of the Russians, it should retreat.

On September 3, 1805, Austria replied to the note of August 13, to the effect that it pronounced all treaties broken by Napoleon ; a manifesto of the 12th enumerated all his violations of justice since the Peace of Lunéville ; Mack had already opened the war on the 8th by crossing the Inn ; on September 6, Prince Schwarzenberg delivered to the Elector of Bavaria the peremptory demand to unite his troops with those of the

emperor; should the Bavarians appear to be withdrawing, Mack had secret instructions to prevent their march. The elector wavered; already he had determined to change sides and accept the Austrian proposals; when Montgelas, who correctly anticipated the victory of the French arms, threw his whole influence into the other scale, and even asked for his dismissal, and the elector, to Schwarzenberg's amazement, once more changed his decision. When the Emperor Francis, on September 20, made his entry as victor into Munich, the Bavarians had withdrawn to the Danube, and their elector had escaped to Würzburg. As if Mack were making haste to remove as far as possible from the Russians, he made every effort to reach the Iller, and when the Archduke Ferdinand stopped the hurried and broken advance, he was directed by the emperor to submit himself to Mack's counsels. Thus division and indecision came into the supreme command, and Mack's contradictory orders completed the confusion. But in Vienna his abounding activity enkindled the proudest hopes, and Gentz exulted that in Bonaparte's profound silence shame and perplexity certainly had a large part.

But this silence was only the peaceful lull before the hurricane. The emperor remained as long as possible at Boulogne and then at St.-Cloud; his columns moved quietly, but with the precision and rapidity of a machine, from the shores of the ocean toward the Rhine, which they crossed with a united force of 200,000 men at Mayence, Spire, and Mannheim. Napoleon was thus bent upon seeking the decision not in Italy, as in the last war, but in Germany. "Soldiers," he cried to his army from Strasburg, "the War of the Third Coalition has begun; the Austrian army has crossed the Inn, treaties have been violated, our allies assailed and driven from their capital. . . . We will not stop until we have secured the independence of the German empire, aided our confederates, and confounded the pride of our adversaries. Soldiers, your emperor is in the midst of you, you are but the vanguard of the great nation!" His eagle eye at once pierced through the mistakes of the enemy. "The Austrians," he wrote, "have placed themselves on the roads issuing from the Black Forest; God grant that they remain there; my only concern is lest we cause them too great apprehension. If I have the good fortune that the Austrian army sleep on three or four days longer on the Iller and in the Black Forest, I shall then have turned it, and I hope that only fragments of it can then escape me." While Mack, dominated by the conviction that he was threatened with an attack in front, remained immovable upon the Iller, his lines extending from Ulm to Memmingen, Napoleon, who had purposely remained as long as possible at Strasburg to confirm him in his delusion, had formed



the plan of throwing himself with all his force upon the left bank of the Danube, and of surrounding the Austrian right flank. Davout took the direction toward Neuburg, Soult towards Donauwörth, whither Murat also followed with the cavalry; Lannes marched upon Neresheim, and Ney upon Heidenheim. In order to close the net, Bernadotte, who was in Hanover, received orders to march from Göttingen by way of Ansbach to Eichstädt, without regard to the neutrality of Prussia and the electorate of Hesse; he was to give the most friendly assurances, and to proceed with all possible consideration, but to appeal to the necessity of his course in justification. On October 2, Napoleon came up with his army at Öttingen. Forthwith the attitude of the other southwestern German states was decided in conformity to the example set by Bavaria. The Elector of Baden hastened to place his contingent of 3000 men at the disposition of the French commander; the Elector of Würtemberg, who at first seemed disposed to defy the detested upstart, suffered himself, on the personal appearance of the latter at Stuttgart, to yield immediate and submissive obedience, and even promised, having in view a rich recompense, to furnish his 10,000 men. In a like manner, 20,000 Bavarians, under Deroy, joined Bernadotte and Marmont at Bamberg; to their elector Napoleon secured by treaty the acquisitions which constituted his reward. The diet at Ratisbon had no conception how contemptible it made itself, when, only anxious in the great conflict to maintain its neutrality undisturbed, it credulously gave ear to the assurances of the French that they had come simply to protect the German imperial constitution.

On October 7, Murat and Soult began crossing the Danube at Donauwörth, and they immediately tore in pieces the strategic combinations of Mack as if they had been spiders' webs. Now, indeed, the truth began to dawn upon his mind, yet he conceived it possible to frustrate the enemy's plan, if his widely extended lines could be drawn closely together near Ulm; after, however, 5000 men under Auffenberg were scattered or made prisoners by Murat near Wertingen, he embraced the very just plan of retreating through Nördlingen toward Bohemia, but the unfortunate engagement at Günzburg on October 9 frustrated this purpose. After that Mack became blinded in a manner that rendered his fate inevitable. An insignificant advantage gained by the Austrians on October 11 at Haslach, gave him the senseless idea that Napoleon with his main body had turned his course to meet the Russians; he resolved to march upon Heidenheim, and, falling upon the enemy's communications, to "make his retreat as disastrous as it deserved to be"; but then he postponed the execution of the movement till October 13 on

account of the condition of his troops, who were greatly worn by continuous rains, bad roads, and incessantly conflicting commands. The Archduke Ferdinand was furious at Mack's folly. On the same day Soult, by occupying Memmingen, cut the Austrian communication with the Tyrol, and on the 11th Ney crossed the Danube at Elchingen, and at Langenau and Albeck drove back the division under Riesch and thus completed the investment of the Austrians at Ulm. With one voice all the generals demanded a final effort to free themselves from the deadly snare, but, deceived by the clumsy inventions of a spy, Mack thought his adversary compelled, by a landing of the English at Boulogne and by a revolution in Paris, to make a hasty retreat, and dreamed of nothing but pursuit. Since all representations proved vain, Ferdinand, in concert with Generals Schwarzenberg and Kolowrat, determined to break through the circle of foes. This bold stroke succeeded on the following night; they reached Eger with the sacrifice of all their artillery and of the corps of Werneck, which joined them on the way, but they saved for the emperor twelve squadrons, and for themselves honor. The taking by the French troops of the Michaelberg and the Frankenberg by storm, on the 15th, made a capitulation, on condition of retiring unmolested, necessary in the unanimous judgment of the staff-officers, in order to preserve the army for the emperor. Only Mack chafed at the word "surrender," and protested that he would be the first to eat horseflesh; on October 16 he signed the capitulation; should no relief arrive in eight days Ulm would be surrendered. But Napoleon was impatient, and Mack, easily persuaded, put an end to the delay. On October 20, 23,000 Austrians, among them thirteen generals, laid down their arms. Mack, at a later day, was dishonorably cashiered by a sentence of court-martial; but in 1819 he was restored to his rank and dignities. There was no court-martial to pass sentence on the system, which was, properly, the cause of this disgraceful result.

Napoleon lost not a moment in improving his advantage. To Ney he committed the attack upon the Tyrol, while he himself marched toward the Inn, now covered by only 50,000 Austrians. Of the Russians, who ought to have been 60,000 strong upon the Lech at the beginning of October, only one-half had just reached the Inn under Kutusoff; the second Russian army had remained as a menace to Prussia on the farther side of the Vistula. Thus the first decisive action had occurred before these scattered masses had even entered the field. Kutusoff retired, drawing the Austrians after him, behind the Enns, then back to St. Pölten, by way of Krems, and then, on November 9, he crossed over to the left bank of the Danube, without preparing for an engagement—as was generally expected—in order to protect Vienna against

the enemy. For the theatre of war in Italy also, these events were decisive. As soon as it was understood at Vienna that Napoleon was leading his principal force against Germany, Archduke Charles was instructed not only to give up a few regiments to the army on the Danube, but also to hold himself in general on the defensive, so that in this manner the original plan of the campaign was completely changed. The archduke, accordingly, proceeded to occupy a strong position at Caldiero, not far from Verona, in which he awaited the development of affairs on the Danube. Upon receiving intelligence of the emperor's advance toward the Inn, Masséna, who had been joined by St.-Cyr from Naples, marched to attack the Germans, in order to prevent their retreat upon the Danube. But, in hotly contested engagements lasting three days, the archduke repulsed all assaults, and secured an unmolested retreat, which he made through Carniola to Hungary, in order to avoid being taken between two fires. Since Masséna was threatening on the south, while Ney had already gained possession of Innsbruck and Scharnitz, and Augereau, with 30,000 men, was attacking Vorarlberg, the Archduke John abandoned the Tyrol, withdrew through the Pusterthal, and united his forces to those of his brother between Cilli and Marburg. Jellachich, who had delayed too long, and the small corps of Rohan were cut off and compelled to lay down their arms. Everywhere there was confusion and dissolution—as there had been at Ulm.

In this distress the Emperor Francis sent General Giulay to Linz, in order by a truce to arrest the onward march of the formidable victor, but Napoleon offered terms that were inadmissible. Pending other negotiations, the corps of Merveldt, which had foolishly separated itself from the Russians, was scattered by Davout at Xenhaus and Mariazell, on November 8, and driven into Hungary. The only gleam of light in this night of misfortune came from a successful stroke dealt by Kutusoff on Marshal Mortier, who had been imprudently dispatched by Napoleon to the left bank of the Danube in pursuit of the Russians; attacked at Dürrenstein, on November 11, by far superior forces, he escaped across the river with difficulty and with the loss of 2000 men made prisoners, and five cannon. Meanwhile, there prevailed at Vienna a feeling of perfect helplessness, especially after the flight of the emperor and the aristocracy to Presburg. On November 13, the French took possession of the capital, themselves astonished to find in the population neither gloom nor shame, but only curiosity and a craving for show. Napoleon took up his headquarters in Schönbrunn. More important than the possession of Vienna with its abundant supplies, was the command obtained of the great Tabor bridge over the Danube, which he

needed in order to prevent the junction of Kutusoff with the second Russian army, now approaching that place. Murat, with 50,000 men, took the direction of Stockerau, while Bernadotte crossed at Krems in order to take Kutusoff in the rear. At Hollabrunn Murat struck upon Bagration, who was endeavoring to keep the road to Znaim free for Kutusoff. Murat, thinking that he had before him the entire Russian army, delayed in order to gain time for all his troops to come up. Kutusoff, like Murat, could desire nothing better than to delay; he concluded a formal truce, and effected his retreat to Brünn, although with the sacrifice of a part of Bagration's corps, which for a whole day had withstood the shock of 40,000 assailants; at Brünn he joined his forces to those of Buxhöyden, who was leading the rapid march of the second Russian army, with which was the Emperor Alexander.

But before there occurred a new passage at arms, the decisive change in the position of Prussia was completed. Weary of the long, fruitless negotiation, the Emperor Alexander, on the urgent advice of Czartoryski, resolved to make the attempt to see if open threats might not bring the king to the decision which secret menaces had failed to effect. With the request for a personal interview he combined not so much a request to pass through, as a notice that even without this he would march 100,000 men through South Prussia and Silesia. A great council, in which, beside Hardenberg and Haugwitz, the most distinguished generals participated, came to the conclusion that all the forces should be immediately summoned with a view of maintaining by arms the neutrality and independence of Prussia. On September 19 the command went forth to put the whole army upon a war footing; Major Hacke hastened to St. Petersburg with a letter from the king, accepting the proposed interview and deprecating in decisive language the passage of the Russians through his territory. Corresponding declarations were brought by Haugwitz to Vienna, with the result that Cobenzl at once dispatched couriers for the purpose of dissuading Alexander from an indiscretion which would have withdrawn a large part of the Russian troops from the Austrians. Meanwhile, the czar had already of his own accord desisted from this plan; on October 6, his confidential friend, Dolgoruki, delivered at Sans Souci the announcement that instead of the march toward Prussia the czar had ordered a retrograde movement of his army. Thus matters stood when the intelligence arrived of Bernadotte's passage through Aushach. The king was enraged, and his first thought was to give the French ambassador his passports immediately; after the last incident with Russia, to preserve his territory untouched by either party had become the mark of his policy and a point of honor

with him. The manner in which, by letter, Napoleon endeavored to represent the affair as a trifle poured oil upon the fire; the king plainly declared to Duroc that he held himself freed from all former engagements. Moreover, the pride of people of rank rose up with renewed vigor against the insolent upstart. On this occasion the deed promptly followed the word. The Russians received permission to march through, the advance march of the Prussian troops instead of eastward was directed toward the west, and they received orders that to the French in Hanover they were "to show the way out in a friendly manner." On October 19, Haugwitz was summoned to conduct foreign affairs in connection with Hardenberg, the king being dissatisfied with the lukewarmness of the latter. The allies did not delay to reap the advantage afforded them by the incident; Cobenzl now willingly imputed to that march through the Ansbach territory the chief blame for the catastrophe at Ulm, in order thus to lead to the payment of Prussia's debt of honor by getting her to render speedy assistance. On October 25, the Russian emperor arrived at Potsdam. Alexander exhausted his eloquence in the endeavor to persuade the king to enter the coalition immediately, but that was still in no sense the intention of Frederick William; he continued to hold firmly the idea that by mediation between the combatants he would be able to obviate the necessity of taking the sword. In the treaty, subscribed at Potsdam on November 3, he pledged himself to demand of Napoleon the indemnification of the King of Sardinia, the independence of Naples, of the German empire, Holland, and Switzerland, and also the separation of the Italian from the French crown; should these conditions be accepted a congress would meet to re-establish general peace; if within four weeks the acceptance should not follow, Prussia was bound to take the field with 180,000 men. In a secret article Alexander engaged to bring about with England the cession or exchange of Hanover.

The warlike preparations, which were to give needful emphasis to Prussian mediation, took their course. The headquarters of the Duke of Brunswick were established at Hildesheim; a second corps under Prince Hohenlohe moved through Saxony to Thuringia; a third was assembled in Westphalia under the Elector of Hesse. Notwithstanding these movements the old timidity, which had existed before the war, still continued; only in the event of the worst was war to be entered upon, at least not until the country was fully prepared for it, and that could not be, according to the duke's declaration, before December 15. In accordance with this was the conduct of Count Haugwitz, whose duty it was made to deliver the ultimatum of Prussia to Napoleon. He purposely traveled slowly in order not to hasten the decision, and in the

audience granted him by Napoleon at Brünn, on November 28, he was content to proffer the mediation of Prussia only in very general terms. The emperor very well knew the purport of his mission, but, understanding thoroughly how dangerous his situation might become if Prussia joined his enemies, he seemingly agreed to the proposals, and Haugwitz, faithful to his conception of the whole business, willingly allowed himself to be dispatched to Vienna in order there to prosecute the negotiations with Talleyrand (Fig. 91). But the interposition of



FIG. 91.—Talleyrand. From a lithograph by Delpech; original drawing by Hesse.

Prussia rendered Napoleon open to the thought of an understanding with Austria; already, subsequently to the capitulation of Ulm, had Talleyrand counseled him to make this power his friend by compensating, on the Lower Danube, its losses in the west. Stadion and Giulay had interviews with him, but the negotiation was broken off by his demand—either Venice, or the Tyrol and Salzburg. He now sought through Savary to approach the czar, but his proposal of a personal meeting was declined, and, on the other hand, Alexander sent Prince Dolgoruki to the head of the French government in order to offer the articles of the Treaty of Potsdam as conditions of peace. With extraordinary skill Napoleon knew how to turn this Russian arrogance to his

own advantage. The simplest prudence should have enjoined it on the allies to avoid any decision until the Archduke Charles, who was on the march toward the Danube with more than 80,000 men, should reach them, till the arrival of Bennigsen with the Russian reserves, and the entrance of Prussia into the conflict. But Alexander, on account of the haughty spirit dominant in those immediately about him, was badly advised. The relation of the Russians to their allies was exceedingly unfortunate; the miscarriage of the campaign on the Danube had greatly heightened their scornful contempt for the Austrians. Alexander, with his confidential associates, revelled in the thought that it was reserved for him and his Russians to order a halt to the triumphal progress of the French. And thus he suffered himself to be more easily confirmed by Savary's mission in the opinion that Napoleon was afraid. Although the headquarters were completely in the dark with respect to the position and strength of the enemy, yet it was concluded, in spite of Kutusoff's objections and against the view of the Emperor Francis, who lay ill at Austerlitz, to give up the secure position at Olsehan, south of Olmütz, and to advance to the attack. The allies numbered about 80,000 men, and were superior by 10,000 to Napoleon. In pursuance of the plan devised by the Austrian chief of the general staff, Weyrother, the principal assault was to be upon the right wing of the enemy; even if properly planned this operation would have failed through the want of unity, for no one knew whether the chief direction lay with Weyrother, or Kutusoff, or with the Emperor Alexander himself. But a fortunate engagement near Wischau during the forward movement destroyed the last doubt of success.

With unspeakable delight Napoleon saw the allies taking the positions prescribed. More confidently than ever he announced to his troops: "While the enemy is trying to turn my right flank, he will present his to me." Both armies stood facing each other. Through the stillness of the night there came from the French encampment the enthusiastic huzzas with which the troops greeted the emperor wherever he showed himself. On December 2, the anniversary of his coronation, a thick fog concealed Napoleon's position. At half-past seven o'clock Buxhöyden began to move against the villages of Telnitz and Sokolnitz; when his attack with the left wing had succeeded, then Bagration and Liechtenstein were to come into action at once with the right wing. The centre on the height of Pratzen was commanded by Kutusoff in person. Davout, although with an inferior force, defended the two assailed villages with such obstinacy that the Russians gained possession only after a protracted struggle. Toward nine o'clock, when the fog lifted, Napoleon gave





the first great pitched battle in which Napoleon I. had been leader ; the most splendid celebration of the anniversary of his coronation as emperor ; the merited prize of a genius for high command, which never yet had proven itself so much as now ; and also the merited punishment of the barbarous presumption of the Russians as well as of the incapacity of the Austrian strategists. The Austrians gave their loss at 6000 in dead and wounded, the Russians at 21,000 ; both estimates certainly too low. Since the road to Wischau and Leipnik was altogether lost to them, they directed their course upon Goeding in great confusion : on December 4, they crossed over the March, and encamped upon the heights of Holitsch. The greater the previous haughtiness of the Russians, the more disposed were they rendered by the humiliation to cast the entire blame upon the Austrians, and to regard the whole war as a foolish sacrifice to foreign interests. There spread among them a vehement desire to withdraw from the business as quickly as possible, and to leave the Austrians to their fate. Upon Alexander's proposal the Emperor Francis sought a personal interview with Napoleon ; this took place near Nasiedlowitz, under the open sky, by a camp fire ; on the condition that the Russians return immediately to their homes, Napoleon granted the Austrians a cessation of hostilities. But for the moment nothing remained but to bow beneath the hand of the conqueror. The Russians had nothing to do requiring more dispatch than a return home ; the troops landed in the Gulf of Taranto were recalled, and the British-Swedo-Russian corps, which had arrived in Hanover with the design of penetrating into Holland, embarked, leaving their object unaccomplished.

After the battle of Austerlitz, King Frederick William, still persisting in the arrangement inserted in the Treaty of Potsdam, had issued, on December 11, the order for the entrance of the army into Bohemia, but Hardenberg withheld it on receiving intelligence that a truce was made and negotiations had begun. A responsibility of crushing weight rested upon Haugwitz, now that his commission in its original meaning and extent could not possibly be accomplished. On December 13, Napoleon granted him an audience at Vienna ; seemingly in great anger he upbraided him with the Treaty of Potsdam : " It would have been more honorable for your master to declare war against me openly ; he would then at least have rendered his new allies a service. But you wish to be friends with everybody ; that is not possible ; people must choose between me and my enemies. I will have frank dealing, or I part from you ; open enemies I prefer to false friends." " Prussia," declared Napoleon later, in a milder tone, " has thrown down the gauntlet to me : I must take it up ; this conduct has lowered me in the eyes of my nation.

My heart is wounded, but my head is firm in opposition. I ask myself, Whither can a breach with Prussia lead? Prussia and France are made for mutual friendship." Finally, he proposed a treaty which should be for him a pledge of the king's friendship and forever confirm the friendship of them both. To these twofold tactics of intimidation and flattery Haugwitz made no opposition. On the 15th, at Schönbrunn, he affixed his signature to the proposed treaty. By it Prussia concluded an alliance offensive and defensive with France, and surrendered to France Nenchâtel, the remainder of Cleves and Wesel; to Bavaria, Ansbach, in return for which the latter at once made over the duchy of Berg to France. In order to set Prussia at variance with Austria, Napoleon laid upon Prussia the guarantee of Italy for France, and for Würtemberg and Bavaria, of those cessions which Austria would be obliged to make; in order to separate her from Russia, he compelled her to guarantee Turkey; for the purpose of causing a division between her and England, he ceded Hanover to Prussia.

Austria now was compelled "to pass under that yoke." Napoleon did not listen to Talleyrand's astute counsel to make Austria, by mild treatment, the ally of France; he followed only the one purpose of expelling that power forever from Germany and Italy, a purpose that was clearly expressed in the treaty signed at Presburg on December 26, 1805. Vainly did the Archduke Charles at last attempt in person at Stammerdorf a mitigation of the conditions imposed. In them Austria acknowledged all the encroachments made by Napoleon since the Peace of Lunéville as rightful, paid forty millions indemnity, and suffered a loss of territory to the extent of 28,000 square miles and 2,800,000 inhabitants. To the kingdom of Italy, Austria ceded Venice; to Bavaria—which also received Augsburg—Burgau, Vorarlberg, Tyrol, together with Brixen and Trent, and the chapters of Eichstädt and Passau; to Würtemberg were surrendered the remaining territories of Hither Austria. As compensation, Austria obtained Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, in return for which their possessor, the Archduke of Tuscany, received the recently established electorate of Würzburg, in Bavaria. The dignity and possessions of the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order were bestowed upon an archduke. Bavaria and Würtemberg obtained, in pursuance of the compact made with them before the battle of Austerlitz, the rank of kingdoms and became sovereign, as did also Baden, without, however, ceasing to be members of the "German Confederation."

The victorious flight of the imperial eagles from the Rhine to Hungary cast such a dazzling splendor upon the new empire that contem-





The Death of Nelson. October 21, 1805.

*Illustration of the Battle of Trafalgar, 1805, p. 221*

After an engraving by James Heath 1757-1840 of the painting by Benjamin West 1738-1820.

poraries utterly lost sight of the fearful blow which simultaneously, and for a whole generation, absolutely destroyed the maritime power of France. Although a council of war, convened by Admiral Villeneuve, had unanimously pronounced both the French and Spanish ships to be inadequately fitted out, the crews in good part inexperienced and in no condition to render the requisite service, yet, since the emperor still insisted upon his seeking out the enemy, Villeneuve went, with his eyes open, to destruction. Scarcely had he left the protecting harbor of Cadiz, when he saw (October 21), at the point of Cape Trafalgar, Nelson, with his twenty-seven British ships ready to meet the thirty-three ships of the enemy. Bearing down upon the enemy in line of battle, Nelson displayed this signal: "England expects every man to do his duty." A fearful conflict ensued. Nelson, who was leading it from his station on the quarterdeck of the "Victory," was mortally wounded in the breast by a musket-ball, but lived long enough to receive intelligence of the glorious victory (PLATE XXV.). Eighteen of the enemy's ships were taken, and four afterward fell into the hands of the English. Admiral Gravina was mortally wounded; Villeneuve was compelled to strike his flag; released on parole, he put an end to his life at Rennes.

England's command of the sea was more firmly established than ever; Napoleon could no longer think of fighting her on her own element. He imposed upon himself and others by the delusion, that all which he subsequently undertook for the gratification of his insatiable ambition was but the necessary defence against the infamous hatred of the mistress of the seas.

Returning home from Austerlitz, Napoleon promised to his empire the blessings of peace. "The emperor," he assured the legislative body on March 5, 1806, "contemplates no further conquests; he has exhausted military renown; he longs no more for the bloody laurels which others have forced him to gather. To perfect the administration, to make it a source of durable happiness and of ever-growing prosperity for his people; to present the example and the teaching of a pure and lofty morality, and to merit the benediction of the present as of the coming generation,—such is the renown at which he aims."

In other directions, also, the indications of peace gave a favorable promise. On January 23, 1806, Pitt died; the battle of Austerlitz had given the death-stroke to his shattered health, and Fox (Fig. 93), his successor in the Grenville cabinet, was disposed once more to see if peace with France were possible. At St. Petersburg the bitter feeling over the "treachery" of Austria was urgent for an understanding with France,



W. SCOTCHER.

THE RIGHT HON.<sup>BLE</sup>

CHARLES FOX

MEMBER IN THE HOUSE OF COMMON

FIG. 93.—Fox. From an engraving by Cornorotto; original painting by F. Sloane.

and in Berlin everything else prevailed rather than eagerness for war. But the sun of Austerlitz illumined the glories of the new world-empire with such overpowering splendor, that it rendered Napoleon blind as

respects all boundaries of the actual and the possible, of the true and the right; the entire transformation of the European state system, its immediate or immediate subjection to his individual dominant will, seemed to him only the necessary and legitimate result of his previous successes. The weak became the sport of his arbitrary will; whoever incurred his displeasure, or only stood in the way of his calculations, was doomed to destruction. Queen Carolina of Naples was the first to suffer this fate, because by receiving the Anglo-Russian squadron she had violated the neutrality. The decree of December 27, 1805, curtly announced: "The dynasty of the Bourbons has ceased to reign." The 37th bulletin announced: "General Saint-Cyr by a forced march pushed on to Naples in order to punish the treachery of the queen, and to hurl from the throne this guilty woman who so shamelessly has violated all that which is sacred among men." The court was obliged once more to take its flight to Sicily, and on March 30, 1806, Napoleon acknowledged his brother Joseph as King of Naples; after overcoming an inconsiderable resistance on the part of the royal troops and the *lazzaroni*, Joseph effected his entry into the capital in May. From that time Europe began to be covered with Bonaparte vassal kingdoms. Under splendid names they were to become but the servile instruments of the imperial domination, a mere disguise to hide naked conquest. About the same time the High Pensionary Schimmelpenninck received the communication that the emperor perceived in the Batavian Republic a character of instability, which should be remedied by transforming it into a monarchy under his brother Louis, the husband of his stepdaughter Hortense. In vain Schimmelpenninck caused counter-representations to be made to him through Admiral Verhuel and other notables; the new constitution was transmitted, accompanied with the threat that, if it were not accepted within ten days, none of her colonies would be restored to Holland at the peace; thus the Dutch were constrained to entreat submissively that Prince Louis become their king; and his incipient resistance to the emperor's commands was silenced by simply pointing to his duty to obey. For the emperor's brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, the duchy of Berg, composed of Cleves and Berg, ceded by Prussia and Bavaria, was set apart by a decree of March 15, with Düsseldorf as the capital. The youngest sister, Pauline, and her second husband, Prince Borghese, obtained the principality of Guastalla, which, however, the emperor bought from them the same year. Although Napoleon was the heir of the Revolution, which had extirpated the feudal system, yet now even the form of fief that existed in the Middle Ages was restored by the erection of imperial fiefs in conquered territories. Bernadotte became

Prince of Pontecorvo; Talleyrand, of Benevento; Lebrun, Duke of Piacenza. Not satisfied with this, the former comrade of Robespierre burned with the desire to obtain entrance by intermarriages into the ancient princely houses. His earlier proposals at the courts of South Germany were repulsed with abhorrence, but after Austerlitz this was changed. Solicitations were now in request, and princely daughters were now the price paid for the elevation of their fathers. Augusta, the daughter of the new King of Bavaria, gave her hand (January, 1806) to Eugene Beauharnais, Napoleon's stepson; his adopted daughter, Stephanie Beauharnais, was wedded to the hereditary Prince of Baden.

And now came Prussia's turn to be compelled to experience the rancor of Napoleon. When Haugwitz brought the Treaty of Schönbrunn to Berlin, Frederick William was exceedingly angry. On Hardenberg's proposal the king indeed ratified the treaty, but only upon condition of certain alterations which should prevent a disagreement with Russia and England: the aim of the treaty should be limited to defence, and the king was to take Hanover into his possession only till the general peace, "for safe keeping and administration." So confidently, with inexcusable thoughtlessness, did they build upon the acceptance of the proviso which they had framed, that, from economical considerations, on January 21 the army was placed upon a peace footing, long before Haugwitz had returned from Paris with Napoleon's answer. But how entirely different from that upon which they had flattered themselves was the reception which he found there! Napoleon played the part of one enraged; he eagerly seized the pretext to declare the Treaty of Schönbrunn no longer in existence, and laid down the choice between a new treaty and war. The troops returning from the Danube were pushed forward toward the river Main and close to the Prussian frontiers. Then Haugwitz lost heart; on February 15, he concluded a new treaty with far more oppressive stipulations than those contained in the Treaty of Schönbrunn; Prussia was required to take possession of Hanover unconditionally, and to close the mouths of the Weser and Elbe against the English; of any compensation for Ansbach not one word more was said. Resistance was impossible. On March 3, the king signed the treaty. The monarchy of Frederick the Great was thus brought down to the position of a state of the second order, and Napoleon expressly aimed to thrust the thorn of humiliation very deeply into her flesh. He caused Ansbach to be occupied before the ratification of the treaty, and in the *Moniteur* covered Hardenberg with invectives. The French embassy was forbidden to transact business with him in the future. By this means it came to pass that Hardenberg, when he received his dismissal



on April 14, was stamped in public opinion as a martyr to his patriotic sentiments, while Haugwitz, who now once more stepped into his place, appeared as the "subtle instrument of French ambition." The occupation of Hanover signified a rupture with England. Immediately upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris there followed the declaration from London that neither political convenience nor any proffered equivalent would ever induce King George to part with his German possessions. In retaliation, the seizure of all Prussian vessels found in English harbors was ordered. On June 11, England declared war against Prussia, and the same had already been done, on April 27, by King Gustavus IV. of Sweden.

In order to secure reconciliation with Russia nothing more was needed on the part of Napoleon than good will, so strong was the desire for peace at St. Petersburg. The state councillor, Oubril, who went to Paris, ostensibly on the business of exchanging prisoners, had a secret commission to introduce wherever possible the subject of peace, but Napoleon eagerly grasped the opportunity presented, by overreaching this agent, to deprive England of her last ally on the continent. Oubril suffered himself to be cajoled into a treaty of unexampled tenor (July 20, 1806), by the representation that otherwise Austria, menaced by Napoleon, could not be preserved; he found for this reason a very bad reception at St. Petersburg; the treaty was rejected and the unfortunate diplomatist was banished to his estates. Fox also made the discovery that with a statecraft so perfidious as that practiced by Napoleon, even the most honorable love of peace must be put to confusion. Napoleon expressed great readiness to begin negotiations, and even went so far that he offered at once to restore Hanover to England, although it had been made over to Prussia in pursuance of the treaty; he also pledged himself to give up Sicily to the King of Naples. But then he suddenly discovered that Sicily was "indispensable" to his brother Joseph, and offered for the Bourbons of Naples other compensations. Thus there survived from these negotiations nothing but the conviction that peace and friendship with Napoleon could be only purchased at the price of unconditional servile submission. The understanding between England and Russia became only the more firmly established; but Fox was spared by an early death (September 13) the pain of seeing the war break out afresh, and the enemy of his country ascending by new victories to a height of power that grew more and more formidable.

Already had Napoleon, upon the foundation laid by the Peace of Presburg, erected the beginning of a new edifice. After the last breath

of its peculiar life had escaped from the forms of the old empire and the two principal powers had each forfeited the consideration they once enjoyed, there remained to the lesser princes of the empire only the choice of being torn in pieces by the imperial eagle or of flying for shelter beneath its wings. Thus there was accomplished, under the hand of Napoleon, that for which French state policy had been laboring for centuries.

During that splendid court-day which he held at Mayence in the spring of 1804, the first advances to a confederation of German princes under his protectorate were already made; the war of 1805 only made that appear outwardly which before had gradually matured. The dull indifference, rather the satisfaction, with which the population accepted the changes that had been introduced, seemed to the *Mainzer Zeitung* to justify its scornful announcement that there was no longer a Germany. The sentimental and characterless von Dalberg, the last archbishop-elect of Mayence, archchancellor of the empire, invited to Paris, flattered with solicitous complaisance, and appointed by the National Institute to membership in Klopstock's place, subsequently became the enthusiastic worshipper of the emperor. On May 27, he surprised the diet by the announcement that he had designated, as his coadjutor, the emperor's step-uncle, Cardinal Fesch, a Corsican, who did not know a word of German. In anticipation of the general seizure of public property which was again approaching, the disgraceful spectacle of 1789 and 1803 was repeated, and now as then, one vied with another at Paris in begging, bribing, and intriguing.

On July 17, 1806, occurred the signing of the terms of the Confederation. Four electors and twelve princes, with a territory of 57,000 square miles and 7,500,000 inhabitants, by this act declared themselves severed from the empire, and concluded with the emperor of the French a new compact, "in order thereby to secure the internal and external peace of Germany, for which, as experience showed, the constitution of the empire in no respect continued to provide surety." Frederick Augustus III. of Saxony (Fig. 94) at first remained aloof. The name "protectorate" was but a poor cover for the condition of absolute subjection to the rule of Napoleon to which these declared sovereigns, members of the Confederation, placed themselves. Apart from some adjustments by members of the Confederation among themselves, the process of combining the smallest districts of the empire was simultaneously continued; with these fragments Napoleon could make no beginning; he needed bodies large enough to serve him but not large enough to be able to stand without his support. The possessions of nobles of the empire and imperial towns within the circuit of the Confederation of the Rhine were in a body



FIG. 94.—Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony. From an engraving by J. F. Bause (1738-1814); original painting by A. Gaff (1736-1813).

mediatized; that is, subjected to the supremacy of those states to which they belonged geographically. The kernel of the treaty lay in the provision which declared all wars as well of the Protector as of the Cou-

federation to be shared by both sides, and appointed for the latter as a contingent to be furnished 63,000 men, and for the Protector 200,000. What the treaty contained in regard to the constitution of the Confederation, and in regard to the assembly, composed of a royal and a princely college, in which the electoral archchancellor should have precedence—all this appeared as little in actual operation as that promised fundamental law, to which Dalberg devoted himself with such zeal. The Confederation of the Rhine experienced its first enlargement by the accession of the elector, now grand duke, of Würzburg. The French envoy at Vienna had already presented (August 2) the double demand: the laying aside of the dignity of Roman emperor, and the recognition of Joseph Bonaparte as King of Naples. Reluctant but too weak to oppose, Francis II. obeyed. On August 10, he transmitted to the diet the declaration (dated August 6) that he considered the bond which had hitherto united him to the German empire as dissolved.

Thus ended, after a thousand years' continuance, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. The sceptre of Charlemagne and of Otto I. rested now in the hand of the son of a Corsican advocate. But in place of the ideal sway indicated by it in the days of its power, there was now a rough military despotism. Formerly, at the time of the Congress of Rastatt, Napoleon had said that if the constitution of the German empire did not exist, it ought to be invented; and now he had himself with a push of his foot crushed its decaying remains. Indeed, he had created a political structure that excluded every thought of a national union of Germany; but in the book of fate it stood written that his iron hand should only clear the ground of rubbish, so that in the future the edifice of German unity could be reared.

The French empire, at its origin, was baptized with the blood of d'Enghien; to the Confederation of Rhine a similar bloody consecration was not wanting. Exasperation over a pamphlet entitled "Germany in her Deep Degradation" enkindled Napoleon's wrath against six booksellers, whose whole crime consisted in their having sold this publication in the way of business. "I understand," he wrote to Berthier, on August 5, "that you ordered these booksellers to be put in prison; my will is that they be brought before a military commission and be shot within twenty-four hours." It was, therefore, no sentence of a court-martial, but a murder, which was perpetrated, on August 26, at Braunau, on one of these men: Palm, a Nuremberg bookseller; no defender was allowed him. He died with the courage of innocence, and Germany had its first martyr.

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